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Abstract 
The inability of the public sector to satisfy social needs- like poverty alleviation, social inclusion 
of disadvantaged groups, unemployment, health and education - are redefining the relationship 
between the governments and their citizens by making the latter play an active role as the 
provider of the welfare state. Citizens through their entrepreneurial activity have been pulled to 
the third sector leading to the emergence of new organizational forms like social enterprises and 
social franchises. The main focus of this research study is the investigation of the new 
interorganizational format of social franchising which has received ‘scunt’ research attention up 
to now. The behaviour of actors and organizations in the social economy sector are influenced by 
the properties and dynamics of elements coming from the political, social, organizational and 
individual level. We have adopted a systems approach of social network theory. A grounded 
theory named Social Franchise Model (SoFraM) has been induced from an exploratory empirical 
mixed method study conducted at various stages and from different sources during a time frame 
of thirty months. Primary data were raised through six case studies in the UK and Greece, more 
than 143 interviews with social entrepreneurs and various stakeholders and three action research 
projects which were the subject of analytic induction supported by archival analysis of secondary 
data coming from governmental, European Commission, local authority and other sources. Our 
findings indicate that the formation, growth and success of social franchises is heavily shaped 
through: firstly, law, regulations, and incentives introduced by centralized or formal institutions- 
both supranational and national- as well as their driving logics; secondly, the relational and 
structural embeddedness of actors in networks and the social norms that subsequently emerge; 
thirdly, the characteristics of the individual social entrepreneurship profile; and finally elements 
of the social innovation model adopted. The properties of the system of informal or decentralised 
institutions of networks have been further explored through a pilot quantitative study on 
mainstream franchises in the UK and Greece. An online self-administered questionnaire has been 
created based on our conceptual framework of the Franchise Network Model (FNM) drawn from 
existing scales from literature. The findings indicate that relational and structural embeddedness 
of actors and organizations in networks determine choices of formation, partner selection, 
governance mode and the subsequent performance of franchise systems.  
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bohemian free sprited Dr Nellie Bassiakou Anesthesiologist and mother of my God Daughter 
Nefeli her sister Nafsika n her husband Alexandros; to Miranda Vlavianou successful 
Psychologist solid rock friend, a kind faithful ethical spirit, the first in class student; to my blonde 
brother Vasilis Kesisoglou Lawyer and guardian in all my endeavors; to Eliza Spyropoulou 
highly spiritual, amazing mother warmest hostess and her husband and co-founder in “The Nest” 
Andreas Galatis; to ‘my London Bro’ Dr Kostis Michalakis highly intelligent Endocrinologist n 
supporter in life; to my desk-mate in all school years Ioanna Frageskaki a realist a mother a 
senior consultant in Corporate Social Responsibility who is constantly supporting me in my 
work; to my school best friends Tania Riga an ingenious innovative personality and Tonia 
Malaxianaki a warm mother, a fighter in life n a competent entrepreneur; to my friend Nikos NY 
Vasilatos successful Investment Banker World Bank a supporter to my endeavors on all levels; to 
my dearest friend Tina Mavraki ingenious Investment Banker and co-founder of the UK Charity 
“Hellenic Hope” a rare personality; to my deeply loved flat-mate Maria Toubaniari the voice of 
logic and a true fighter; to a very special n beloved best friend Helen NY Dilaras and her amazing 
husband Jurgen both Investment Bankers and solid supporters on many grounds during this 
journey; to my friend Despina Prinia an ingenious innovative resilient personality who gave me 
invaluable advice on my research; to my school mates and very dearest friends: Annie Aivazi a 
very warm n kind soul and a corporate executive, Sofia Michaletou adventurous spirit corporate 
executive n mother, Jason Frydakis a reckless personality, a cyclist a sailor and a new media 
executive, Victoria Papaggeli warm resistant n patient a dynamic venue engineer and her husband 
my university mate Kleitos Georgiou a reckless ambitious entrepreneurial mind, Nomak Zervos 
my warmest friend almost a bro from ever in life, Alexis Kabanaris a noble knight a bohemian in 
nature, a genuine soul, Dr Ioanna Xynogala a noble soul a solid rock a good friend n an excellent 
Gnathologist and her husband n my Gynecologist Dr Alexis Pothos, Iris Vikopoulou a dearest 
friend, Katerina Tsaligopoulou an artistic spirit; to my beloved friends from the ‘enemy-school’ 
Eva Barbopoulou  corporate lawyer n mother ‘we’ve had our exceptional moments!’ and Mariliza 
Anastasopoulou a unique personality, a very good mother and hopefully a future partner in 
business; to my very loved friend Christos Dovletoglou running parallel neighborhood lives from 
ever; to my dearest exceptional friends: psychologist and screen writer George Kasfikis ‘Lord 
Kasfi’; to George ‘Ripley’ Gkouvitsas an adventurer in life a bohemian a free spirit who is and 
will always be there; ; to Apostolos Sarantopoulos restless mind supporter on many grounds; 
economist athletic n bon viveur Pavlos Kavvadouris; mechanical engineer, polo athlete n a true 
Maniatis Konstantinos Tornaros… 
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…. to Vasilis Fwtias ‘Smithakos’ a shinning controversial unpredictable undefined personality, a 
talented athlete, a swimmer taming wild seas, the best mixologist bar-tender, a future 
entrepreneur, a true self-made fighter, an endless source of energy, joy, creativity n power, my 
coach in life, my leader; to Nikolaos ‘Kalamaraki’ Oil venues Mechanical Engineer, beloved 
partner for a period in life, one of the kindest souls in existence, a solid rock, a salient power, my 
voice of consciousness, a life changer; to Giannis Boussias ‘Obrigada’ my first companion; to 
Vaggelis Nikitakis my first love … to many others that left earlier, joint recently and those loved 
ones that are on their way…  
 
As an output of this research I have developed several publications in: academic journals 
(Zafeiropoulou, 2014 working paper in 3* rating); Zafeiropoulou and Koufopoulos, 2012a, 
2013a), in book chapters in research frameworks (Zafeiropoulou and Woods, 2012) and 
conferences (Zafeiropoulou, 2014 ur; Zafeiropoulou and Koufopoulos, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 
2013b; Zafeiropoulou and Woods, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Zafeiropoulou, 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012). I also gave a number of speeches, interviews and wrote articles in: business conferences, 
like the International Sustainability Summit (October, 2012) in Chania, in public media sources 
both radio and newspapers, like the New York Times (interview by Andrew Higgins 29-01-
2014), Guardian (15-6-2012 interview by Henley, J.), Kathimerini Economic Edition (26-02-
2012), Imerisia (18-02-2012), Kerdos (10-02-2012) and municipalities like in Attica and the 
Peloponnese. We developed ‘The Nest’ in The Thrace region in Alexandroupoly with co-founder 
Leonidas Skerletopoulos a restless mind. 
 
Interface 
 
“Research in embeddedness is an exciting area in sociology and economics because it 
advances our understanding of how social structure affects economic life…. Economic theorists 
argue that affects them (economic transactions) minimally or creates inefficiencies… A well 
defined theory of embeddedness and inter-firm networks has yet to emerge…revisionist 
economic frameworks have attempted to explain embeddedness in terms of transaction costs, 
agency and game theory concepts… (they) apply conventional economic constructs to 
organizational behaviour… (they) faintly recognize the influence of social structure on economic 
life” (Uzzi, 1997: 35-38). 
 
The last centuries industrial and technological breakthroughs have helped improve our quality of 
life while at the same time creating a number of threats to our very existence. Governments and 
institutions are proven insufficient in tackling these issues (Jeff Skoll in Nicholls, 2008): 
 
 "Our best hope for the future of humanity lies in the power and effectiveness of socially 
motivated, highly empowered, individuals to fight for changes in the way we live, think and 
behave.... (this is) the case for social entrepreneurship... (It) has rapidly become the most 
influential idea of our time… exceptional individuals, ideas and movements emerge to face and 
find solutions to these challenges. Social entrepreneurs are those people- the practical dreamers 
who have the talent and the skill and the vision to solve the problems, to change the world for the 
better... operating in a free market where success is measured not just in financial profit but also 
in the improvement of the quality of people’s lives… there is a great need for ongoing 
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scholarship and publications that serve as a call to arms to current social entrepreneurs, as an 
inspiration to budding social entrepreneurs and to document the field for institutions, academics 
and legislators… It is up to us to help them (social entrepreneurs) succeed" (Jeff Skoll founder of 
ebay, Skoll Foundation, Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship in Oxford University, in Alex 
Nicholls, 2008, preface) 
 
1. Context and Purpose of the Study  
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter concerns itself with the essence of this study which is the examination of the 
phenomenon of social franchising through a systems approach of social network theory. In details 
it creates the theoretical context, illustrates the general focus, describes the research problem, 
emphasises the academic interest and pragmatic significance of the study, and concludes with a 
description of the thesis structure and order of presentation. 
 
 
1.2. Focus of the Study 
 
The last fifteen years social enterprises have seen a considerable growth in both the developing 
and the developed world; despite of this growth research suggests that their performance and 
development has been poor (Foster and Bradach, 2005), they face issues of formation, 
development, and finance (Foster and Bradach, 2005), they are constrained to their local markets, 
they struggle to achieve financial independence through generating income (Foster and Bradach, 
2005; Meyskens et al, 2010a; Sharir and Lerner, 2006; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007), they rely on 
volunteers and on staff that are willing to work for under the average rate wages (Sharir and 
Lerner, 2006), they struggle to externalize from parenting bodies (Jeffery, 2005; Tracey and 
Jarvis, 2007), and their scale is too small to make the impact that is needed to resolve pressing 
social issues (Dees et al, 2004; Samuelson, 2010). Solutions to the above are the establishment of 
branches, mergers and acquisitions among social enterprises, social venture capital (Bishai et al, 
2008; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Piggot, 2004; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007) and affiliations, like 
social inter-firm alliances, corporate-social partnerships, social venture networks and social 
franchising (Bradach, 2003; Dees et al 2002; 2004; Mair and Sezgi, 2011). 
 
Social franchising emerges as a network of alliances among small scale companies in addressing 
unmet social issues, but at the same time offers the big scales that are needed to attract capital, to 
exploit economies of scale, to enhance rapid growth, to exploit network and other effects; thus to 
achieve considerable economic and social impact (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Social franchising 
could offer compelling solutions to help address issues like unemployment, social exclusion of 
groups, regional development, and poverty by scaling up the impact of social entrepreneurship 
ventures. It could provide the necessary tools to the financial independence and growth of social 
enterprises (Bishai et al, 2008; Piggot, 2004; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Governments and the 
European Commission (hereafter EC) have realized the benefits of social franchises and have 
recently adopted policies to enhance their development (Easton, 2012; Richardson and 
Berelowitz, 2012). 
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We identified the existence of six social franchises in the UK in 2010, only one published paper 
on organizational theory from Cambridge University scholars Tracey and Jarvis (2007), nine 
more published papers in health journals which mentioned the existence of social franchises 
while focusing on health aspects in the developing world (Agha, Gage, and Balal, 2007; Agha, 
Karim, Balal, and Soster, 2007; Bishai et al, 2008; Leite and Carvalho, 1998; Lönnroth, Aung, 
Kluge, and Uplekar, 2007; Montagu, 2002, 2009; Ngo, Alden, Hang, and Dinh, 2009; 
Stephenson, Tsui, Suizbach, Bardsley, Bekele, Giday, et al, 2004), a Scottish governmental 
industry report (Higgins et al, 2008) and various commercial articles. Tracey and Jarvis (2007) 
work on social franchising resulted in that agency and resource scarcity theories-which they 
adopted- were insufficient in conceptualizing this new format. They recommended future 
research to focus on viewing the phenomena through the perspective of embeddedness, through 
network thinking, and through behavioral propositions (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Network theory 
can better explain the formation, governance, and evolution of alliances (Gulati, 1995; 1998; 
Gulati and Sign 1998). Today there are 95 social franchises in Europe of which 50 are in the UK 
(Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
We found ourselves in the position of having to investigate a new organizational format. Social 
franchising is interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary in context and nature, so we had to relate to 
closely linked existing literature based on the similarity of social franchising with other existing 
organizational formats. Social franchises are similar to mainstream business format franchises 
(Higgins et al, 2008; Sivakumar and Schoormans, 2011a), they are forms of inter-firm alliances, 
and are types of networks; therefore drawing from these three areas of research. They are 
alliances among social enterprises, nonprofit organizations and corporations. They are run by 
social entrepreneurs so they also pertain to social entrepreneurship and conventional 
entrepreneurship literature (Dees et al, 2001). In all subsequent chapters we are reviewing and-
were appropriate- drawing from existing theories in these areas.  
 
Current theories like the theory of the firm and transaction cost theory, except from network 
theories, are insufficient in explaining the process of alliance formation (Axinn and Matthyssens, 
2002; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Networks cannot be analysed by the market-hierarchy concept 
they are a distinct structure of governance named ‘network form’ (Powell, 1990). Networked 
social entrepreneurship or social venture networks account for a different model of governance 
and growth that cannot be scaled through mainstream business tools (Leadbeater, 2006; Sloane 
and O’Reilly, 2013; Somersen, 2013). Existing alliance literature has incorporated an atomistic 
notion of the firm analysing it in an asocial context, focusing on dyad relations, rather than 
viewing alliances as whole systems of relationships, that is as channel-wide relations and 
analysing the interactive elements of the market and institutions (Gulati, 1998; Whipple and 
Gentry, 2000); thus failing to capture the whole network as a unit and identify the elements that 
prevail (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013). The paradigm of neoclassical economics although being the 
most advanced in terms of scientific rigour is limited in explaining sufficiently the various inter-
organizational issues that firms face (Leonidou, 2003). This limitation can be overcome by 
approaching the phenomena from the relational research paradigm (Donaldson and O’Toole, 
2007; Hakansson, 1982; Leonidou, 2003). Uzzi (1997) argues that research on embeddedness 
advances our understanding of how social structure affects economic life, while economic 
theorists argue that the latter is either nonexistent or creates imperfections. Granovetter’s 
argument of embeddedness emerged as a potential theory for joining economic theory and 
sociological approaches to organization theory (Uzzi, 1997: 35).  
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In reviewing the franchise and alliance literature the formal aspect of links between franchisors 
and franchisees has been extensively researched, so have the motives for the formation of the 
franchise formats, the choice of partners, and the formulation of their governance structure. If we 
add to that what we already know about the dynamics of relational and structural embeddedness, 
about trust, commitment, and social norms we see that the franchise network expands and 
develops to an entity that its properties are much greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore it 
cannot be treated as a collection of dyadic relationships or be analyzed by studying its parts alone 
(Achrol, 1996, 1997; Achrol and Kotler, 1999; Gulati, 1998; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001). 
Moreover, to understand social entrepreneurship one has to view the various systems that 
influence its process (Leadbeater, 2006; Nicholls, 2008) including: the external environment, like 
the public sector and institutions (Alvord et al, 2004; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b; Mendell, 
2010; Salamon and Anheir, 1997; Powel, 1987); the network models and alliances that it builds 
(Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007); the 
profile of the individual entrepreneurs (Alvord et al, 2004; Bornstein 2004; Drayton, 2002; Guclu 
et al, 2002); the organizational models built around its social innovation element (Murray, 
Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2009; Mulgan et al, 2007; Porter and Kramer, 2011), a sustainable 
resource strategy, its social mission and its social impact (Emerson and Spitzer, 2007; Nicholls, 
2010; Nicholls and Pharoah, 2007; Steffel and Ellis, 2009).  
 
Therefore, we have viewed social franchising as a network format being shaped by the properties, 
dynamics and interactions of various systems from the political, social, organizational and 
individual contexts. Our focus is to understand and explore this new inter-organizational format 
at a network level through a systems approach. To better understand and analyse this 
phenomenon we have identified four strategic constructs that play a preeminent role in the birth 
and survival of inter-firm alliances and networks, these are: formation, partner selection, 
governance modes, and performance (Gulati, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). The theory of Social 
Franchise Model (SoFraM) that has emerged from our research forms part of grounded theories. 
Following a holistic methodological approach we identified four systems and subsystems that 
influence decision making in the aforementioned four strategic choices. From the institutional 
political context we analyze the influence of the systems of centralized or formal institutions, 
whose elements are law, regulations and incentives which are divided in two subsystems a) the 
supranational institutions (like the EU) and b) the national institutions (like the UK and Greece). 
From the institutional social context we analyse the influence of the systems of c) decentralized 
or informal institutions, whose elements are social norms, these elements influence social action 
and shape organizational behaviour through the relational and structural embeddedness of actors 
and organisations in networks. From the organizational context of social entrepreneurship we 
investigate the influence of the system of d) social innovation. Finally from the individual context 
we investigate the influence of the system of e) the individual/psychological social 
entrepreneurship profile.  
 
The contribution and novelty of this research work is both the investigation of a novel 
organizational format as well as the adoption of a holistic systemic conceptual theoretical 
approach in studying organizational phenomena. This research work builds on ontological 
holism, on systems theory and social network theory. Our argumentation on the choice of the 
conceptual theory adopted builds on a debate around: firstly, the fallacy of composition 
(Aristotle, 384-322B.C. translated by David Ross, 1954; Engel, 1980: 25-26; Mautner, 1996; 
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McCain, 1984); secondly, the concept of holism (McCain, 1984; Schombert, 2006; Schombert 
and Bothun, 1987; Seevick, 2004; Tilman, 2000) which was conceptualised by the ancient Greek 
philosopher Parmenides and was reintroduced by Spinoza it has influenced the works of many 
scientists, including Smuts, Durkheim, Hegel, Marx, and scholars of quantum theory; thirdly, the 
relational research paradigm (Donaldson and O’Toole, 2007; Hakansson, 1982; Leonidou, 2003); 
structuralism (Rabaté in Sturrock, 2003), institutionalism (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; Dorado and Ventresca, 
2013; Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meek et al, 
2010; Nicholls, 2010a), systems theory (Greenfield, 2011; Gunaratne, 2008; Mele, Pels, and 
Polese, 2010; Von Bertalanffy, 1968), social capital theory (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 
2009) and social network theory (Granovetter, 1973, 2005; Gulati, 1998; Obstfeld, 2005; Sloane 
and O’Reilly, 2013; Simmel, 1950); fourthly, substantivists and the argument of embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985, 1992, 2005; Marsden, 1981; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997; White, Owen-Smith, 
Moody, and Powell, 2004; Zuken and DiMaggio, 1990); And finally, sustainable arguments to 
support our thinking derive from a critic on unilateral and bilateral approaches and from a 
discourse on alternative levels of analysis (Marsden, 1981;1983, Proven and Milward, 1995; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
1.3. Research Precedent  
 
Social entrepreneurship has received much criticism; it has been criticised as being: poorly 
defined, widely misunderstood, representing a controversial business strategy just encompassing 
a social agenda, a mechanism for governments to try to privatise the social welfare state, the 
same thing that civil society organizations did just dressed up in new terms, and finally 
representing a threat to established civil society innovative organizations (Nicholls and Young, 
2008). Thus more research is needed to clarify those issues (Nicholls, 2008). Social 
entrepreneurship research has moved out of its early introduction stage but there are some 
significant issues to be addressed: firstly, there is a need for more primary data raised; secondly, 
there is a need for stronger and multi-disciplinary theory development; and finally, there is a need 
to raise the research credibility of the field (Nicholls, 2008). 
 
Sullivan (2007) argues that more research in needed in identifying the elements that stimulate 
social entrepreneurship.  Existing research on social entrepreneurship has investigated issues of 
definition (Alvord et al, 2004; Chell, 2007; Dees 1994; Dorado, 2006; Mair and Roboa, 2006; 
Nicholls and Cho, 2006; Nicholls, 2006; Shaw and Carter, 2007; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007), 
definition and ethics (Zahra et al, 2009); the process of social entrepreneurship (Griffiths et al, 
2013) drawing on the strength of the individual hero or groups and networks (Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2006); on economic development (Seelos and Mair, 
2005); on community sustainability (Young and Young 2008); on sustainability and poverty 
alleviation (Halkias and Thurman, 2012); on resource-based theory and operational processes 
(Meyskens et al, 2010b); on social investment (Nicholls 2010b); on entrepreneurship models 
(Mair, Battilana and Cardens, 2012); on social innovation (Dees, 1998; Donaldson and O’Toole, 
2007; Elliot, 2006; Obstfeld, 2005); on systems approaches and institutional theory (like the role 
of socio-political factors) (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Korosec and Berman, 2006; Griffiths, 
Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Mair and Roboa, 2006; Meek et al, 
2010; Nicholls 2010a; Salamon and Anheir, 1997; Sullivan, 2007; Powel, 1987); on institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009); institutional theory and 
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intraorganizational political processes (Pache and Santos, 2010); on scaling (Bishai et al, 2008; 
Bradach, 2003; Dees et al, 2002; 2004; Leadbeater, 2006; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Mair and 
Sezgi, 2011; Nicholls, 2008; Piggot, 2004; Sakaraya et al, 2012; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007; 
Waddock, 1991); on performance and success (Sharir and Lerner, 2006); on managing social 
enterprises and organization theory (Bornstein and Davis, 2010; Gunn and Durkin, 2010; Doherty 
et al, 2009; Mykoskie, 2011). Another area of significant emerging research on social 
entrepreneurship is resource strategy: the social investment market and the formation of specific 
financial models (Emerson and Spitzer, 2007; Nicholls, 2010; Nicholls and Pharoah, 2007; 
Steffel and Ellis, 2009). 
 
The political context of social entrepreneurs has been drawing intrinsic research attention shifting 
the focus of research from the application of neoliberal economic theories and strategic theories 
to the study of the politics of social entrepreneurship. This shift indicates that social 
entrepreneurship is not a format to address the failures of the economic systems but is even more 
an institutional transformation of these systems to achieve survival (Nicholls, 2008). Little 
research has dealt with the significant role of macro-level and contextual factors in social 
entrepreneurship formation, like socio-political, economic and cultural variables (Griffiths, 
Gundry and Kickul, 2013). Dorado and Ventresca (2013) identify the need for institutional 
research on social entrepreneurship formation. Korosec and Berman (2006) argue that the means 
that are deployed by governments to support social entrepreneurship is an under-researched area; 
the latter research exploited perception and not hard data of the actual methods employed which 
they acknowledged as being a limitation of their study. 
 
Previous research on social venture inter-firm alliances has dealt with issues like necessity 
(Brooks, Liebman, and Schelling, 1984; Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011); institutional theory and 
organisational legitimacy (Huybrechts and Nicholls, 2013); formation (Gricar and Brown, 1981; 
McCann, 1983; Sakaraya et al, 2012); structure (Austin, 2000; Berger et al, 2004; Waddock, 
1991); consumerism and demand (Vock et al, 2013); social network theory and partner selection 
(Sorensen et al, 2013); governance (Leadbeater, 2006), contract law (Arrighetti et al, 1997); 
social venture networks and resource-based theory (Meyskens et al, 2010a). Nevertheless, there is 
a lack of empirical research on the motives, resources and performance of social alliances 
(Sakaraya et al, 2010). Alliances, especially those that involve multiple partners, need further 
research attention (Dunning, 2000). Johanson and Vahlne (1990) argue that research needs to be 
renovated by introducing a network view. There is a lack of research on the performance 
objectives for entering into alliances as well as on the resulting performance of alliances (Gulati, 
1998; Huszagh et al, 1992; Sakaraya, 2012; Whipple and Gentry, 2000). Social network analysis 
(SNA) has grown in recent years providing further benefits to the investigation of alliances 
(Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Somersen, 2013). 
 
The variables of social norms need for more research on the emergence of theory, concept and 
methods of analysis (Achrol, 1997; Meek et al, 2010). Meek et al (2010) recommend the need for 
future research to address the explanatory power of social norms and their correlation with 
central institutions interventions in enhancing social/responsible entrepreneurship. Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) focused on trust and commitment in analysing networks and suggested that future 
research should focus on norms. Uzzi (1997) supports that more research is needed on 
embeddedness in order to create rigorous theoretical propositions that could explain the 
relationship between social structure and economic transactions. 
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Existing research on social franchising is ‘scant’ (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a) it has 
considered it in a healthcare or educational context in the developing world and it mostly focuses 
on effectiveness of health social franchising and health aspects (Agha, Gage, and Balal, 2007; 
Agha, Karim, Balal, and Soster, 2007; Bishai et al, 2008; Koehlmoos, Gazi, Hossain and Zaman, 
2009; Leite and Carvalho, 1998; Lönnroth, Aung, Kluge, and Uplekar, 2007; Montagu, 2002, 
2009; Ngo, Alden, Hang, and Dinh, 2009; Ngo, Alden, Pham, and Pham, 2010; Peters, 
Mirchandani and Hansen, 2004; Qureshi, 2010; Shah, Wangm and Bishai, 2011; Stephenson, 
Tsui, Suizbach, Bardsley, Bekele, Giday, et al, 2004; Prata, Montagu and Jefferys, 2005). Two 
papers investigate organizational issues specifically social franchisee partner selection 
(Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b), and formation (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007); only the 
latter research is from the developed world while all other research view cases from the 
developing world. There are also several industry reports- published by social enterprises and by 
the International Centre for Social Franchising two of them commissioned by the Big Society 
Capital and the Scottish Government- which include important information on the social 
franchising sector (Berelowitz, 2012; ESFN, 2011; Higgins et al, 2008; McNeill Richie et al, 
2011; Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
 
1.4. Purpose of the Study 
 
In the beginning of the interrogation we asked ourselves: what is social franchising? How does it 
work? How does it differ from mainstream franchising? How and why do social franchises 
emerge? What are the determinants to their formation? What are the specific mechanisms that 
have been adopted? Who are its constituents? How do networks select members? How is it 
organised? What are its results? What do they do and where? How can it be more successful? 
What is its impact? Once we got replies we kept asking: who, how, what? Like: who is a social 
entrepreneur? What are the determinants of social entrepreneurship? What do they do? 
 
Our research is mainly exploratory building on an analytic induction theory of data raised 
through mixed-method approaches (Bailey, 2008; Bryman, 2006; Grasser and Strauss, 1967; 
Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Yin, 2008) during a period of thirty months. Our sampling is 
produced from an activity we performed and is called ‘Mapping of the Social Economy Sector’. 
Both quantitative and qualitative research techniques were adopted, including: 1) case studies of 
six social franchises in the UK and Greece; 2) in depth interviews with 113 social entrepreneurs 
in Greece and the UK; 3) In depth interviews with 20 stakeholders in Greece and the UK; 4) an 
action research with the local authority of the city of Athens, the project named ‘Athens Social 
Economy Initiative’; 5) an action research 30 hours workshop with 30 prospective social 
entrepreneurs and social franchisors in Greece; 6) an action research three days workshop with 7 
CEOs of best practices social entrepreneurship centers and hubs in Europe, 2 experts policy 
advisors from the EC, 2 members of the Social Business Initiative of the EC, and 14 
representatives from Greek formal institutions; 7) archive analysis of secondary data from 
sources including Europa, governmental, organizational, and local authorities; 8) and an online 
pilot survey through a quantitative approach in franchise systems in the UK and Greece to 
provide a quantifiable tool for future research needs in evaluating and explaining the influence of 
the system of informal institutions of relational and structural embeddedness on the choices of 
franchise formation, partner selection, governance and performance.  
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A conceptual framework is induced from the data analysis, named ‘SoFraM’ (Social Franchise 
Model) which identifies the elements that influence social franchising formation, partner 
selection, governance and performance. These elements pertain to the following systems: 
 
a) Institutional Political Context: 
a. centralized or formal institutions 
i. the supranational institutions, (data drawn from the EU case) 
ii. the national institutions, (data drawn from the UK and Greek case) 
b) Institutional Social Context: 
a. decentralized or informal institutions of networks, social norms and the argument 
of embeddedness  
c) Organizational context: 
a. social innovation.  
d) Individual Context: 
a. the individual/psychological social entrepreneurship profile   
 
The properties and interactions of the system of decentralised or informal institutions of social 
networks have been further investigated through the explanatory quantitative study. The ‘FNM’ 
(Franchise Network Model) has been proposed, and subsequently empirically tested, which 
describes a number of factors hypothesized to be related to the formation, partner selection, 
governance, and performance of franchise systems. To analyse and assess the benefits of network 
organizations we have to see it as a mini society of interdependent relationships characterized by 
trust, commitment, restraint of power, solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, role integrity and 
harmonization of conflict, known as the social norms of governance (Achrol, 1996; Heide and 
John, 1992; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1981). These are the constructs that constitute 
the relational and structural characteristics of the embedded network organization and are the 
core variables of our theoretical model, the Franchise Network Model. The goal of this secondary 
quantitative approach was to create a model that could be used in future research in assessing 
these causal relationships and measuring these variables in social enterprise networks and social 
franchises. Our objective was not to run a significant large scale quantitative research with strong 
generalisable results based on a sufficient sample. So it is considered a pilot study. 
 
Consequently, the objectives of our study are to explore the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: What is the role of the system of the individual/psychological social entrepreneurship 
profile in the formation, governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ2: What is the role of the system of social innovation in the formation, governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
RQ3: What is the role of the system of formal institutions in the formation, governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
RQ31: What is the role of the system of national formal institutions in the formation, governance 
and performance of social franchising? 
RQ32: What is the role of the system of supranational formal institutions in the formation, 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ4: What is the role of informal social and cultural institutions of the system of relational 
network embeddedness in the formation, governance and performance of social franchising? 
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RQ41: Does the system of relational network embeddedness influence the formation and partner 
selection decision of franchises? 
RQ42: Does the system of relational network embeddedness influence the governance mode of 
franchises? 
RQ43: Does the system of relational network embeddedness influence the performance of 
franchises? 
 
Another important goal of this research project is dissemination; we are mostly interested in 
benefiting practitioners in the field and in identifying applicable solutions to identified needs. We 
are interested in seeing the specific incentives that exist in the EC, UK and Greece which could 
benefit the social entrepreneurs and social investors; we are also interested in identifying the 
specific mechanisms that trigger social entrepreneurship formation growth and success in order 
for policy makers and support organisations to design appropriate schemes. For these reason our 
primary data builds on firstly, hard data of policies and regulations; secondly, we identify best 
practices, thirdly, we approach the phenomena holistically investigating a broad spectrum of 
contextual factors; fourthly we identify challenges faced by social entrepreneurs and social 
franchisors as well as emerging needs of entrepreneurs and solutions adopted; finally, 
dissemination is adopted early on as we engage in action research projects with practitioners and 
stakeholders. 
 
1.5. Research Interest and Significance of the Study 
 
The choice of Greece as a country for collecting our data can be supported by the recent 
European and international elevated interest in raising understanding of the Greek situation 
(Fahrholz and Wojcik, 2010:5; Eichengreen, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010). The possible 
limitations to the implications of this research from focusing on the Greek case can be offset by 
the counter-analysis of the social entrepreneurship sector in the UK which represents the richest 
policy and organizational context globally because of the fact that: a) the UK government has 
adopted the most substantive portfolio of public measures to support the formation and growth of 
the social entrepreneurship sector (Nicholls, 2010a); b) The UK is the world centre for social 
investment and the global leader in the socially responsible investment market (Eurosif, 2012); c) 
it has more than double the number of social franchise networks than all other European countries 
aggregated (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
Studying social entrepreneurship contributes to a holistic understanding of entrepreneurship 
(Mair and Roboa, 2006). Meyskens et al (2010a) argue that to their knowledge no study has dealt 
up to now with social venture networks in terms of creating a framework and conducting an 
explorative study based on hypothesis. The only prior research we identified on social venture 
networks was Sorensen et al (2013) who dealt with social network theory and partner selection in 
social venture networks and Leadbeater (2006) who addressed the issue of governance of social 
venture networks. Incorporating factors of network theory perspective and embeddedness into 
alliances can have both descriptive and normative outcomes that can provide significant insights 
to the theories of economics, strategic management, organizational theory, marketing theory, and 
sociology and has important implications for managerial practices (Gulati, 1998).  
 
Moreover, to our knowledge no prior research has dealt with the analysis of the specific methods 
deployed by governments and the EU in enhancing formation and growth of social 
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entrepreneurship. There is no prior research on the analysis of social franchising from a network 
or systems perspective or an analysis of the influence of relational embeddedness or of formal 
and informal institutions. To our knowledge there is no prior quantitative research on the 
influence of the systems of informal institutions of social norms on the formation, partner 
selection, governance and performance of mainstream franchising through systems approach and 
network thinking; though individual elements of social norms have been investigated and 
network research has been conducted. Network theory has been used to investigate aspects of the 
phenomenon of franchising (Achrol, 1996, 1997; Achrol and Kotler, 1999; Paswan, Loustau and 
Young, 2001) but not of the aforementioned constructs of franchising. Therefore this research is 
investigating a novel aspect that is expected to give new insights to franchise theory, network 
theory and generally to the area of inter-organizational relationships and alliances.  
 
As already said the contribution and novelty of this research work is both the investigation of a 
novel organizational format as well as the adoption of a holistic systemic conceptual theoretical 
approach in studying organizational phenomena. In detail significant contributions can be gained 
by this investigation, which can be considered in four forms. First, the topic could be of 
significance to the decision maker of social enterprises in adopting a scalable strategy, to social 
franchising actors in designing their network, to policy makers in adopting public policies for the 
growth of the social economy sector and social franchising sector, to social investors and 
financial institutions that want to invest in the social economy sector, and finally to support 
organizations in designing appropriate services for social entrepreneurs. Second, to the 
knowledge of this author, this is the first significant attempt by a researcher to investigate the 
process of social franchising as well as the dynamics of network embeddedness for mainstream 
franchise formation, partner selection, governance, and performance and thus offers a 
reconceptualisation of franchising. It is also the first holistic attempt in explaining the process of 
social entrepreneurship through a systems approach. Third, to the knowledge of this author, it is 
the first significant attempt by a researcher to bring together at one model the aforementioned 
constructs, institutions and systems on social entrepreneurship and social franchising and to 
investigate them through a comparative study in the UK and Greece. Fourth, by examining 
factors associated with the formation, evolution and performance of social venture networks we 
are aiming to create a novel theoretical approach with direct implications both to practitioners 
and scholars. 
 
1.6. Genesis of The Subject Theme 
 
The interaction of the researcher with franchise networks, enterprise Europe networks for rural 
and regional development since 1999 in the UK and Greece led to the observation of a number of 
problems that inter-firm alliances-specifically business format franchises- face and to the 
identification of the existence of many structural and behavioural problems (Achrol, 1996; 
Higgins et al, 2008; Stanworth, 1995; Stanworth et al, 1998), to mention some: a) high failure 
rates equal to small medium enterprises failure (Bates, 1995; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996; 2005; 
Ozanne and Hunt, 1971; Shane, 1996; Stanworth, 1995; Stanworth et al, 1998; Storey, 1994); b) 
increased number of inner-network disputes (Achrol, 1996). c) The need for research on the 
network paradigm, through behavioural propositions and through the argument of embeddedness 
(Achrol, 1996; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001).  
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So initially we started investigating the relationship between network embeddedness and business 
format franchises through the lenses of social network theory and developed a model named 
‘FNM’ – the ‘Franchise Network Model’ (Zafeiropoulou and Woods, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; 
Zafeiropoulou, 2006). In 2010 Professor Adrian Woods who was actively involved with social 
enterprises in the UK made a research proposition: “Social Enterprises and Franchising. How 
about Social Franchising? What would the contribution be?” (October, 2010, individual research 
meetings at Brunel Business School). This was the beginning of an interrogation into the area of 
social entrepreneurship, social economy and social inter-firm alliances through a holistic 
methodological approach. 
 
Our research into social franchising coincided with the strategic political interest of the European 
Commission to actively support the growth of social enterprises in Europe and especially in 
Greece. In January 2011 the writer of this thesis was informally invited by the ministry of Labour 
and Social Security to consult on the creation of the Greek legislation on social enterprises. In 
November 2012 they were appointed by the City of Athens as PM of “Athens Social Economy 
Initiative” to design and lead the policies for the growth of social enterprises in the region of 
Athens. In February 2013 we established the first regional centre on social entrepreneurship with 
the municipality of Alexandroupoli in the Thrace Region at the northeastern part of Greece. In 
March 2014 we incorporated our social cooperative enterprise “The Nest” based on the Greek 
law (No 4019/2011). The Nest is a centre for social innovation and entrepreneurship providing 
capacity building, incubation, acceleration and access to funding for prospective and established 
social entrepreneurs. We have partnered with a Greek university, City Unity College, and have 
jointly created a research centre on social entrepreneurship, innovation and franchising. Finally 
we are setting up a Social Entrepreneurship Fund with the support of seeding capital from the 
Greek cooperative bank Pagkritia, from a newly established crowd funding platform, 
foundations, big corporations and international affiliations.  
 
We organised and chaired the first International Experts Committee of European Best Practices 
on Centers for Social Entrepreneurship on 11-13 February, 2013 at the Athens City Hall Centre 
with the participation of the CEOs from these European centers and experts from the TROIKA 
task force committee in Greece. We also gave a number of speeches, interviews and wrote 
articles in: business conferences, like the International Sustainability Summit (October, 2012) in 
Chania, in public media sources both radio and newspapers, like the Guardian (15-6-2012 
interview by Henley, J.), Kathimerini Economic Edition (26-02-2012), Imerisia (18-02-2012), 
Kerdos (10-02-2012) and municipalities like in Attica and the Peloponnese.  
 
We organised and run the first capacity building programmes in Greece on how to start-up a 
social enterprise and a social franchise as part of the ongoing learning curriculum of universities 
(like the American College of Greece-Deree, the Kapodistrian University of Athens and the 
Vocational Training Centre of the City of Athens) which resulted in the actual creation of social 
enterprises and social franchises from the participants.  
 
All these aforementioned activities have transformed our thesis and opened new methodological 
opportunities in investigating the format of Social Franchising which have been incorporated in 
our research. 
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1.7. Structure of the Thesis and Order of the Presentation 
 
This study has been structured in a way to reflect the main aim of this thesis and has been 
structured in seven chapters.  
 
Chapter one has introduced the context and general focus of the study, research precedent, 
purpose of the study and finally has stretched the academic interest and significance of this 
research. 
 
Chapter two presents the theoretical framework of the study it focuses on the main concepts of 
this thesis by reviewing existing literature in an analytical and comparative way. It begins with an 
analysis of theories pertaining to social entrepreneurship and of the spheres of political and social 
institutions; the latter is seen through a study of network embeddedness and social norms, as well 
as organizational and individual contexts. It also reviews the inter-organizational forms that are 
relevant to this research which are social inter-firm alliances, social networks and social 
franchising. Then we offer a critical analysis of existing theoretical approaches in analysing the 
formation, partner selection, governance and performance of interfirm-alliances, networks and 
franchising. Finally, we present an analysis of the main theoretical theories that have been 
adopted in studying the phenomena of inter-organizational relations, networks and franchising. It 
provides the foundation and argumentation on the choice of adopting a systems theory 
perspective and a social network theory approach.  
 
Chapter three presents the conceptualisation of the factors associated with the phenomenon of 
social franchising which are the spheres of our research. We also present our theoretical models, 
the model induced from our qualitative study (‘SoFRaM’) and the conceptual model of our 
quantitative study (‘FNM’) along with the deduced hypothesis of the latter.  
 
Chapter four presents the empirical approach of this study explaining the epistemological 
approach, the research design and research techniques adopted, the interviewing process as well 
as the questionnaire development process for the quantitative study, the survey methodology and 
the methodology for data analysis. It also presents the process of conducting our empirical 
research; describing the steps followed and challenges encountered in collecting our primary data 
from the various sources at the various stages.  
 
Chapter five presents our qualitative data analysis along with the induced research propositions 
and discussion of findings.  
 
Chapter six presents the descriptive findings of our pilot quantitative study with brief discussion 
of the tendency of the participants’ responses. The principal components analyses; from this 
process scale indices are designed and the reliability and validity of the scales is presented. It also 
presents the correlation analysis and offers a discussion of the hypothesis of the study, and a least 
squares multiple linear regression analysis is presented. 
 
Chapter seven presents the conclusions of this study, summing up the main findings of the 
research and their implications for decision makers and policy makers. It also presents the 
limitations of the research and offers recommendations for future research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework of the Study: Conceptual foundations of 
Management and Organizations  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This section provides the basis for the following ones in that it creates the theoretical ground for 
the research that will be constructed step by step at this thesis. In the absence of literature on the 
process of social franchising we critically review existing theories on the formation of social 
entrepreneurship, networks and mainstream franchising by focusing on the constructs of our 
research. The main scope of this chapter is to review existing research on formation, partner 
selection, governance, and performance of the aforementioned phenomena. And how these four 
constructs have been associated with the four systems of: social entrepreneurship psychological 
profile, social innovation, formal institutions, and informal institutions of social norms of 
relational network embeddedness which are: trust, commitment, solidarity, flexibility, role 
integrity, mutuality, restraint of power, and harmonization of conflict. We finally provide a 
critical review of alternative conceptual theories in support of our choice of approaching the 
phenomena under investigation through the lenses of systems theory and social network theory.  
 
2.2. Social Entrepreneurship 
 
Our qualitative research indicates that in understanding social franchising we have to understand 
the process of social entrepreneurship and the social innovation model. The latter reflecting the 
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combination of resources in an innovative way to achieve social objectives and impact. The 
determinant factors that differentiate social franchises from mainstream franchises and alliances 
are these two elements which are strongly embedded and influenced by their contextual political 
and social environments building on the dynamics of social networks. Social franchises cannot be 
analysed in isolation from the spheres of social entrepreneurship, social innovation, the political 
context within which they emerge and operate and the social settings of relationships they form 
with other organizations and actors which shape their behaviour through the dynamics of 
relational and structural embeddedness. All these issues will be critically analysed in the 
following sections. 
 
The global financial crisis of the last years has increased the need of finding solutions for poverty 
alleviation (Seelos and Mair, 2005). The financial recession has mostly affected the most 
disadvantaged in society (Cohen, 2010). The social welfare state has been traditionally offered by 
the public sector, which has been now forced to make serious cost cuts because of escalating 
fiscal deficits, and by not for profit organizations and NGOs, which also have serious funding 
issues (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; Jeffery, 2005; Zahra et al, 2009). The replication of existing 
‘best practices’ by development organizations has not been proven successful at the same time 
social issues and needs are not only left unsatisfied but have also worsened because of the 
financial crises (Seelos and Mair, 2005). So societies are in need of sustainable solutions; with 
long-term horizons, that are self-sufficient, self-funded and innovative, and that can address 
various social issues simultaneously and bring societal transformation (Alvord et al, 2004).  
 
The fatal weaknesses of the public sector to satisfy social needs have redefined the relationship 
between the state and the individual, entrepreneurial activity has been pulled to the third sector 
leading to the emergence of new organizational forms like social enterprises (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010a, 2010b) and social franchises (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a; Tracey and 
Jarvis, 2007). Social entrepreneurs through discovery and experimentation provide innovative 
solutions to address pressuring social issues (Seelos and Mair, 2005). Communities and groups of 
people form networks. These networks innovate through social entrepreneurial ventures to 
resolve the issues that their communities are facing (Bishai et al, 2008; Defourny and Nyssens, 
2010b; Leite and Carvalho, 1998; Zahra et al, 2009). Issues of poverty can be challenged through 
sustainable inclusive business ventures (Gradl and Knobloch, 2010; Porter, 2010), innovation and 
sustainable entrepreneurship (Sonne, 2010) that can also account for the sustainability of the 
environment and social development; as Jeffrey Sachs (in Nee, 2010) notes ‘sustainable 
development is humanity’s most pressing challenge’ (Seelos and Mair, 2005).  
 
Businesses founded by low-income sections of the population face many challenges from lack of 
expertise for their development, to lack of resources for their implementation, through to lack of 
performance measurements, goal alignment, and standardization to accomplish growth (Gradl 
and Knobloch, 2010:4). According to the World Bank (2008) most of the poor people live in 
rural areas and organizational innovation in rural areas is more likely to arise through small 
ventures and entrepreneurship, but on the other hand the answer to pro-poor entrepreneurship 
financing are big businesses who can provide disadvantaged groups access in the market and who 
can enhance the development of inner city economies (Porter, 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011; 
Samuelson, 2010). The most successful performance in battling poverty can come from the big 
global businesses (Porter, 2010; Samuelson, 2010). It is time to bring legitimacy back to 
businesses by repurposing them towards environmental consciousness, healthy communities, 
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prosperous inner cities economies, and profit (Porter, 2010; Samuelson, 2010); in this shift 
business schools and academics should be on board to enhance the creation of social 
intrapreneurs (Jeff Skoll in Nicholls, 2008).  
 
Samuelson (2010:1) argues that ‘the shareholder-centric business model that the purpose of 
business is to maximize profit has served as the organizing principle of US-style capitalism for 
decades’ and as Porter (2010) argues this model has made businesses lose their legitimacy along 
with ‘economic inequality in urban cities that raise fundamental challenges to capitalism’ (Porter 
and Kramer, 2011). The debate over the current financial crisis has lead to discussions about 
issues of business morality and business ethics: ‘was the crisis a moral issue?’ (Thoma, 2008). 
Cultural shifts of the last decade have moved towards ethical consumerism, ethical finance and 
community enterprising which have not been slowed by the recession (Big Society Capital, 
2012a). Critics to existing organizational approaches argue that ‘amoral (economic and 
organizational) theories lead to immoral behaviour (of businesses and actors)’ (Johan Roos, 
2006). Debates over the role of capitalism and the role of social entrepreneurship are a major 
topic of discussion today: ‘How can capitalism better serve society?’ (Al Gore and Sir Robert 
Cohen in Bridges Ventures, 2012). Karl Marx, a collective philosopher adopting a social holistic 
approach (Schombert, 2006) referred to the inherent contradictions and fatal weaknesses of 
capitalism (Sarris, 2009). Karl Polanyi saw capitalism as an immoral and inefficient system that 
causes dehumanization and increased lack of social rights (Sherratt and Sherratt, 1993). 
Organizations need to reconnect themselves with communities and to exercise their social role as 
corporate citizens.  
 
Jeffrey Sachs (in Nee, 2010) highlights that poverty alleviation and sustainable development need 
a change in political thinking; require a holistic approach for the creation of a ‘political sensibility 
of a global society’. The nation-states play a preeminent role in the creation and growth of these 
activities by helping the formulation of a social economy institutional framework that provides 
incentives, regulates, coordinates, facilitates and acts as incubator for the formation of social 
enterprises and social franchises. If free market societies are to maintain cohesion this will be 
achieved by a powerful social sector driven by social entrepreneurship and social investment, 
acting together with governments in tackling social issues (Cohen, Chairman of the UK Social 
Investment Task Force and Big Society Capital, 2010).  
 
Taking into account the current political debate on the role of the federal state, the role of the 
local communities, and that of the individual; on the argument that states should be peoples’ 
states organized by the people for the people, then maybe Social Franchising could be part of a 
wider concept of local capitalism stepping in within a social capitalistic framework where social 
enterprises and social franchises are empowered to grow from within and offer the social welfare 
state to their citizens.  
 
2.2.1. The New Organization 
 
The critic and failure of the bureaucratic organization lead to the emergence of new 
organizational forms from the late 90s and onwards.  
Table 1 The new organizational forms  
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(enriched and adapted from Clegg et al, 2005: 98) 
 
Concept Characteristics Author and Year 
Adhocracy Lack of structure and formal rules Mintzberg 1983 
Technocracy Structure is enabled by technological innovations Burris 1993 
Internal Market Flexible markets and internal contracts within an organization 
structure 
Malone et al 1987 
Clans Organization that is based on shared culture rather than formal 
rules 
Ouchi 1980 
Heterarchy A form resembling a network or fishnet Hedlund 1986 
Virtual 
organization 
A form linked through virtual networks involving several separate 
organizations project-based 
Davidow and Malone 1992 
Social 
Organization 
A hybrid form between private, state and network governance 
mode 
Keast et al 2006 
Rotter 1967 
Social Enterprise (Social enterprises) seek to serve the community’s interest (social, 
societal, environmental objectives) rather than profit 
maximisation. They often have an innovative nature, through the 
goods or services they offer, and through the organisation or pro-
duction methods they resort to. They often employ society’s most 
fragile members (socially excluded persons). They thus contribute 
to social cohesion, employment and the reduction of inequalities 
Dees 1994 
Borzaga and Defourny 
2001 
Nicholls 2006 
Defourney and Nyssens 
2006 
Mair, Battilana and 
Cardens, 2012 
Network 
organization 
An organization formed by intersecting and crosscutting linkages 
between several separate organizations 
Biggart and Hamilton 1992 
Ghoshal and Bartlett 1997 
Powell 1990 
Rockart and Short 1991 
Relational 
enterprise 
Relationship Management, relational paradigm Cooper 2001 Hakansson 
1982 
Leonidou 2003 
Federated 
Enterprise 
A federation of competing companies replacing the integrated 
worldwide firm with the strong single culture and hierarchies 
Child and Faulkner 1998 
Handy 1992 
Post bureaucratic 
organization 
An absence of formal rules and hierarchy and more network 
structure 
Heckscher 1994 
Post-modern 
organization 
De-differentiation of structure Clegg 1990 
 
The future organization based on Cooper (2001) is going to be a ‘relational enterprise’ which is 
formed by its core business adding to that all the relational parts that participate in its operation. 
The new organization has such an access to information which brings new challenges, the need 
for new organizational culture and new processes (Tabrizi, 2007) moving to the era of ‘social 
innovation’ and ‘open innovation’ (Elliot, 2006). As Obstfeld (2005) argues the formation of new 
social connections among people, their ideas and their resources generate new combinations 
which is frequently seen as the process of organizational innovation. Innovation occurs within 
and outside organizations according to Schumpeter (1934) and social networks are important 
predictors of its creation (Obstfeld, 2005).   
 
A significant feature of the new organization influenced by the various institutional logics that 
exist in the external and internal environment is forcing them to respond to societies pressuring 
need in addressing serious social and environmental issues. The new organization is redefining its 
social and ethical role by adopting what is called a corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) 
approach. CSR is the responsibility of the organization to achieve long-term goals profitable for 
the society; it is the attempt of a business to balance its commitments to groups and individuals in 
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its environment, including customers, other businesses, employees, investors, and local 
communities (Clegg, Kornberger, and Pitsis, 2005:5; Griffin and Ebert, 2005:5; Jones and 
George, 2003:3).  
 
The current financial crises increased the competition among organizations over the strength of 
their CSR strategy, over their capacity to be a good citizen and to offer social value to the general 
public (Hosford, 2011). Though some research suggests that financial crisis have a negative 
effect in numbers and extent of CSR projects (Karaibrahimoglu, 2010). Most of the big 
organizations are adopting socially responsible strategies which can be reflected at this statement 
of the Bank of America: 
 
 "Our communications strategy will be to respond to the genuine concerns of consumers 
and society with real actions. They want to know that large financial institutions are committed to 
the prosperity of the communities" (Bank of America in Hosford, 2011:12).  
 
This argument can be strengthened by the practice of ethical consumerism (Nicholls and Opal, 
2005). Public attitudes are shifting and consumers expect from the organizations that they 
transact with to show high social and environmental responsibility. Data from the UK shows that 
between the years 1999 to 2007 the consumers that chose a product based on the social 
responsibility reputation of the organisation increased from 51% to 55%. Between 2007 and 2009 
ethical consumption grew by 18%, the ethical market’s value in 2009 was £43.2bn, and average 
household spend on ethical products/services was £754 (Big Society Capital, 2012a) 
 
The socially responsible organization is seen nowadays collaborating with social enterprises. It 
offers funding through grants or various types of investments, like equity social investments. 
Through social procurement it chooses the supply of products and services from social 
enterprises. It forms alliances with social enterprises through corporate-social partnerships or else 
called business-nonprofit alliances, like social marketing alliances (Sakaraya et al, 2012; 
Sorensen et al, 2013; Vock et al, 2013).  
 
2.2.2. Definition of social enterprises 
 
There is no universal definition of social enterprises (Dacin et al, 2011; Mair, Battilana and 
Cardens, 2012; Papaoikonomou, et al 2009). Nicholls (2008) argues that trying to conclude on a 
single definition for social entrepreneurship proved to be a sterile activity. Instead the scope is to 
provide boundaries 
 
 "what makes social entrepreneurship so successful is that it resists isomorphic pressure to 
conform to set types of action preferring instead to remain fluid and adaptable to fill institutional 
voids in environmental or social provision" (Nicholls, 2008, preface:xii).  
 
The characteristics forming these boundaries are: it is the product of any individual, 
organisational or network activity that demonstrates some element of socialite, innovation and 
market orientation irrespective of its legal type that is charity or business; of its resource strategy 
that is for or not for profit; or of its sectoral home that is public, private or civil society (Mair, 
Battilana and Cardens, 2012; Nicholls and Cho, 2006). They represent a hybrid of public, private 
and civil society activity; they combine business activity with social purpose (Mendell, 2010; 
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Papaoikonomou et al, 2009). There is broad agreement in the literature, that the social mission is 
the central construct in social entrepreneurship. It reflects the aim of creating social value in form 
of products and services that benefit society at large (Dees, 1998; Mair & Noboa, 2006; Austin et 
al., 2006). In defining social enterprises elements of how they came to the market, their business 
model, and their sector play a preeminent role (Cabinet Office, 2011); to understand social 
entrepreneurship we need to investigate what they do, how they do it and why (Mair, Battilana 
and Cardens, 2012). 
 
There are two theoretical approaches that have prevailed internationally: the European tradition 
of the ‘non-profit school’ which bans the distribution of profits and were co-operatives prevail 
(Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). According to this approach social enterprises are seen as non-
profit organizations that generate income to address the issues of budget constraints due to 
governmental and donors constraints, increased social needs and increased competition (Mair and 
Roboa, 2006). The North America view of the ‘earned-income’ school through business 
approaches to solve social problems irrespective of profit distribution; it brings together co-
operatives, mutual societies, foundations and associations and stresses the centrality of the social 
mission of these enterprises (Defourny and Nyssens, 2006). According to this approach social 
enterprises are formulated by individuals or groups to resolve certain social issues (Mair and 
Roboa, 2006) through entrepreneurism. The latter approach has been criticised as having a 
tendency to bring with it elements of individualistic and neoliberal agendas (Nicholls, 2010), 
despite its social focus. There is also a third group of research that defines as social 
entrepreneurship socially responsible strategies of for profits through establishing social 
partnerships (Mair and Roboa, 2006). The economic activity characteristic differentiates social 
enterprises from social movements or philanthropic activities and the social transformation 
element differentiates them from socially responsible corporate activities.  
 
 “SE (social entrepreneurship) refers to opportunities and activities that leverage economic 
activity to pursue a social objective and implement social change” (Mair, Battilana and Cardens, 
2012: 353) 
 
“social entrepreneurship encompasses the activities and processes undertaken to discover, 
define, and exploit opportunities in order to enhance social wealth by creating new ventures or 
managing existing organizations in an innovative manner" (Zahra et al, 2009:519) 
 
Social entrepreneurship is associated with many different concepts, a plurality of social missions, 
purposes and motivations. The field includes a quite wide variety of phenomena for this reason 
there have been attempts to specify different forms of social entrepreneurship. Social entrepre-
neurship encompasses a wider area of entrepreneurship concepts such as: societal entrepreneur-
ship, sustainable entrepreneurship, ecopreneurship. Ecopreneurship is also referred to as ecologi-
cal, environmental or green entrepreneurship. It is the ecologically oriented counterpart to social 
entrepreneurship. Yet, a major point of differentiation to social entrepreneurship is the equally 
important creation of economic value, which is why ecopreneurship is found in for-profit con-
texts only (Linnanen, 2002). Sustainable entrepreneurship pursues the triple bottom line of eco-
nomic, social and ecological goals. 
 
The driving forces to the creation of social enterprises from the demand side have been found to 
be: (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b; Greek Ministry of Labour, 2010):  
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a. persistent structural unemployment,  
b. the need to reduce state deficits,  
 the need to reduce the size of the public sector 
 and the need to empower communities 
c. the need for active integration policies of exclusion groups, 
d. the need to tackle poverty,  
e. the failure of the welfare state to satisfy various social needs;  
f. the need to enhance social cohesion  
g. the need to empower regional development and create new markets (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010b; Greek Ministry of Labour, 2010)  
 
2.2.2.1. Cases of social enterprises 
 
One of the first UK social entrepreneurs who has received world recognition of being ‘the 
world’s more prolific social entrepreneur’, as argued by Nicholls (2008), is Michael Young; he is 
the founder of the Open University addressing the issue of making education open to people that 
couldn't have the ability to appear physically on campus, of the Consumers’ Association, and of 
the School for Social Entrepreneurs which is one of the first social franchises in the UK (this case 
is included in our empirical study) (Nicholls, 2008).  
 
In the developing countries we find some outstanding examples of sustainable social 
entrepreneurship models as early as the 70s, like BRAC in Bangladesh founded in 1972 by 
Fazele Hasan Abed that enhances through systematic prototyping, evaluation and learning, 
through micro-credit and ongoing support the establishment of innovative schemes by local 
individuals and villages to achieve self-sustainable economic development; the model has been 
expanded to Afghanistan (Seelos and Mair, 2005). SEKEM in Egypt founded in 1980 by Dr 
Ibrahim Abouleish who was the first social entrepreneur to receive the ‘Right Livelihood Award’ 
in 2003 known as the equivalent to the Nobel Prize. SEKEM started from a desert land and 
turned it to organic farming, now has a medical centre, a school, a university, an orchestra and 
supports a wide network of local farmers and achieves economic, cultural and social 
transformation impact (Seelos and Mair, 2005). 
 
Social enterprises in recent years are rapidly increasing both in terms of their numbers and their 
impact (Bornstein, 2004; Drayton, 2006; Harding and Cowling, 2006). They are increasing in the 
countries in need like India, in Africa, in Latin America; western models adapting to these 
countries, like ‘UnLtd India’; local models growing internationally and entering the global north 
like ‘Childline’; new startups and alliances between governments and civil society. Exemplary 
cases are: the ‘ChildLine’ from India entering the US; in Mumbai India in the sector of education 
‘Toybank’; in Andhra Pradesh India the ‘SERP’ and in the sector of renewable energy generation 
the ‘SELCO’ an Ashden Award winner in 2005 and 2007; in Kerala India a waste recovery 
model the ‘BIOTECH’ which is an Ashden Winner 2007; in India in the sector of economic 
development the ‘Fair Trade Forum’; in Africa Vodafone's ‘M-PESA’ initiative using mobile 
telephony to provide access in banking for people without a bank account; from Paraguay ‘Teach 
a Man to Fish’ has a network of 400 initiatives in 65 countries; and in the UK  ‘Patient Opinion’ 
which is a service user evaluation for the Department of Health (Nicholls, 2008).  
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“Highercroft Action Group is a Lancashire-based community organisation that was set up 
in 2008 to improve the lives of young people and promote community cohesion on the local 
Roman Road estate. It started with the transfer from the local council to the community group of 
two local assets that had fallen into disrepair and disuse – a multi-use games area and a 
recreational games park. Highercroft Action Group raised funds to regenerate and rebuild these 
assets, hosting community cohesion events at the new sites (such as a local carnival, youth club, 
football tournament and junior masterchef competition) and providing volunteering opportunities 
to young people in the community to help to manage the new assets. The community organisation 
established a foundation to help to raise funds (£100,000 to date, mainly from local support 
services and BIG Lottery funding)” (Cabinet Office, 2013c, p.11) 
 
“Shelter is a charity that works to alleviate the distress caused by homelessness and bad 
housing. It develops practical solutions by giving advice, information and advocacy to people in 
housing need. It also engages in campaigning and works with the housing sector to promote good 
practice. Shelter generates most of its revenue from voluntary income (51% of income), national 
and local government grants (31%) and through its commercial activities (15%) in approximately 
100 Shelter shops, training services and housing publications” (Cabinet Office, 2013c, p.12) 
 
“Bikeworks was set up in 2007 with the aim of using bikes to tackle environmental, social 
and economic challenges in Tower Hamlets, east London. Bikeworks provides employment and 
training opportunities for marginalised individuals in recycling and refurbishing second-hand 
bikes. Bikeworks’ approach is to develop and build on the best of small-scale community cycling 
initiatives but to do so on a greater scale, achieve significant outcomes and build a viable 
replicable model. They recently opened a second community cycling hub in Kensington and 
Chelsea, west London, in September 2010, and have aspirations to replicate the service further. 
Bikeworks’ income is earned through contracts to provide a range of organisational cycling 
services to local authorities, civil society organisations and corporate clients. It also generates 
income from the retail sale of recycled bikes and the provision of repairs and maintenance 
services to the public” (Cabinet Office, 2013c, p.12) 
 
“CLARITY employs over 60 people who work in the manufacture and sale of soap, hand 
washes, toiletries, cleaning products and perfumes for both UK and export contract customers. It 
also produces its own CLARITY brand products. Currently, 61% of CLARITY’s employees are 
blind or have a disability, and they work in a range of factory and office positions throughout the 
UK. CLARITY also runs specialist ‘Skills for Life’ training programmes, National Vocational 
Qualifications and basic literacy, numeracy and IT courses to support employees to progress in 
the organisation and ultimately into mainstream industry. CLARITY has a turnover of almost £4 
million. The majority of its income is earned through trading, with a proportion earned through 
government contracts for supported employment provision. All of its profits are re-invested in the 
organisation to provide training and employment opportunities for blind people” (Cabinet Office, 
2013c, p.13) 
 
2.2.3. The profile of social enterprises 
 
According to the Social Enterprise Business Barometer in 2010 in the UK social enterprises have 
had a better performance than mainstream businesses throughout the recession and prospective 
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growth expectations are generally alike (Cabinet Office, 2011). Social enterprises are part of the 
third sector, also called social sector, or voluntary sector, or civil society sector (Papaoikonomou 
et al, 2010). In Europe in 2010 they represented 10% of European companies employing 11 
million people, 5.9% of total employment and 6.7% of paid employment (Europa, 2011; Greek 
Ministry of Labour, 2010). In the UK in 2012 their proportion was about 6% (5% in 2006) of all 
businesses, thus 70,000 (55,000 in 2006) of them were classified as very good fit social 
enterprises employing 1mil people (half a million in 2006) and generating £55bn income (£27bn 
in 2006). There were also 283,500 social enterprises not employing people. These numbers were 
slightly lower than in 2010 (Cabinet Office, 2013a; 2006a). While Social enterprises median 
turnover in the UK in 2010 was £240,000; 33% had turnover less than £100,000, 39% turnover 
between £100,000- £1m, and 20% had a turnover over £1m (Big Society Capital, 2012a). There 
are also 600,000 informal community organisations and 171,000 charities (Big Society Capital, 
2012a). In 2009 the majority of charities 53% were micro in size with less than £10,000 income, 
32% were small with income £10,000-100,00, 12.5% were medium with income up to £1m and 
only 2.4% were large with turnover over £1m (Big Society Capital, 2012a) 
 
Based on the UK Cabinet Office (2013a) in the UK in 2012 social enterprises were 80% micro-
businesses (1-9 employees), they are mostly found in food/accommodation, health, arts/leisure 
and the subsectors of membership organizations, sports and leisure, social work, food service, 
food manufacturing, creative arts, residential health and human health. Only 31% of social 
enterprises in the UK had work done for the public sector in 2012 and 36% in 2010. Among them 
Local Authorities was their main customers in 40% of businesses and the Departments of State in 
16% of businesses- the latter indicate that they have better access to the Departments of State 
than SMEs. As opposed to SMEs they are less than average (49%) family businesses and they are 
more than average women-led (25%) and disabled-led (13%) businesses. Business-owners seem 
to be older than in SMEs, 23% under 45 and 41% over 55. They are mostly than average located 
in the most deprived areas of England and in rural areas (18% of social enterprises). 65% of 
social enterprises are aged over 10years like the SMEs, while 10% are 0-3 years as opposed to 
7% in 2010 showing that there is a growth in new social enterprises start-ups (Cabinet Office, 
2013a).  
 
Social enterprises can be found to offer work integration for vulnerable groups, like the case of 
social firms that employ disabled people, or to encourage local development, environmental 
activities, provision of social and personal services, health care, care for elderly and children, 
ethical finance, fair trade, consumer rights, cultural creation, education, training and research, and 
international development (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b; Papaoioanou et al, 2009). They range 
from small charitable and community start-ups right through to the largest and longest-
established social enterprises (Cabinet Office, 2013c).  
 
2.2.4. Legal Types of social enterprises  
 
Table 2 Characteristics of Social Economy Organizations  
(adapted from EMES European Research Network
1
 Defourny, 2001: 16-18; Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2006:5; Papaoikonomou et al 2009: 1755; Cabinet Office, 2013a; 2013c) 
                                            
1
 The letters EMES stand for ‘‘Emergence des Enterprises Sociales en Europe’’ a formal international association that conducts 
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Organizations Characteristics 
Community 
Organizations 
Mission driven organizations that offer service to a specific community or area 
and aim to build community cohesion and social capital (Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
Charities Organizations with regulated charitable status that defines social purpose and 
block profit distribution; rely on grants and donations (Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
Social firms Sub-set of mainstream enterprises that use market-led businesses to employ 
people with disabilities or other disadvantages in the labour market (Cabinet 
Office, 2013c) 
Social Enterprises 
I 
a) they should think themselves as: “A business with primarily 
social/environmental objectives, whose surpluses are principally reinvested for 
that purpose in the business or community rather than mainly being paid to 
shareholders and owners” 
b) they should not pay more than 50% of profit or surplus to owners or 
shareholders,  
c) they should not generate more than 75% of income from grants and donations,  
d) thus, they should not generate less than 25% of income from trading,  
e) they should consider themselves to be social enterprise They span a variety of 
legal types, market sectors and business models (Cabinet Office, 2013a; 2013c) 
Social Enterprises 
II 
1) a continuous activity producing goods or services; 
2) a high degree of autonomy, although they may depend on public subsidies they 
should not be managed by public authorities;  
3) a significant level of economic risk which is assumed by those that establish 
the social enterprise;  
4) a minimum amount of paid work.  
The social purpose of these enterprises should meet the following five criteria:  
a) an explicit aim to benefit the community;  
b) an initiative launched by a group of citizens;  
c) a decision-making power not based on capital ownership, although the owners 
of capital are important when social enterprises have equity capital, the decision-
making rights are generally shared with the other stakeholders;  
d) a participatory nature, which involves various parties affected by the activity;  
e) a limited profit distribution, so social enterprises not only include organizations 
that are characterized by a total nondistribution constraint, but also organizations 
which, like co-operatives, may distribute profits, but only to a limited extent, thus 
allowing to avoid a profit-maximizing behaviour; They are registered as private 
companies, as co-operatives, associations, voluntary organizations, charities, or 
mutuals; some are unincorporated. (Defourny, 2001p. 16-18) 
Mutual Societies Voluntary and open membership; equal voting rights; resolutions carried by 
majority; members’ fees based on insurance calculations (where relevant); no 
capital contributions; autonomy and independence; the sectors of medical, life and 
non-life insurance, guarantee schemes, home mortgages 
Associations 
Voluntary 
organizations 
Voluntary and open membership; equal voting rights; resolutions carried by 
majority; members’ fees; no capital contribution; autonomy and independence; 
service providers, voluntary work, sports and advocacy/representative; the sectors 
of healthcare, care for elderly and children, welfare services, sports and 
recreation, culture, environmental regeneration, humanitarian rights, development 
aid, consumer rights, education, training and research 
Foundations Run by appointed trustees; capital supplied through donations and gifts; the 
sectors of financing and undertaking of research, supporting international, 
national and local projects, providing grants to relieve the needs of individuals, 
                                                                                                                                             
research projects on social enterprises and, more broadly, on the third sector as a whole. EMES European Research Network brings 
together  ten university research centers and individual researchers specialized in these fields throughout Europe. These research 
works, mainly supported by the European Commission’s Research Directorate-General. (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a,2010b; 
Defourny ,2001) 
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funding voluntary work, health and elderly care 
 
Where the legal frame allows a freedom for selling goods and services social enterprises are 
established as associations (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b). In the UK in 2012 their legal format 
is 8% Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG) and 5% Community Interest Companies (CICs) 
though in the majority, 60%, are private limited companies or sole proprietorships (Cabinet 
Office, 2013a). Social enterprises include among other community enterprises, development 
trusts, credit unions, and housing co-operatives (Jeffery, 2005). In other countries, like France, 
Portugal, Spain and Greece they are more often established as cooperatives (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010b) and are seen as a mechanism to execute public policies. 
  
2.3. Social Networks and Social Franchising 
2.3.1. Introduction Cooperative Strategies 
 
At this section we will present the concepts of social networks and social franchises; we will 
view the latter through the network thinking. Cooperative strategies have attracted increasing 
attention in the academic world because organizations are realising that they can meet their 
objectives through cooperation with other organizations instead of competing with them; 
cooperation with competitors can preserve both the structure of an industry and a firm’s position 
within it (Child and Faulkner, 1998). Companies competing in an environment characterized by 
converging consumer tastes and escalating fixed costs, shortening product life cycles and 
accelerating pace of technological change, declining trade and investment barriers (Glaister, 
2004; Parkhe, 2003) and at the same time having competition raising the bar for quality, 
innovation, productivity, and customer value, find the scope of what they can do alone shrinking 
(Parkhe, 2003). In this context alliances emerge as an increasingly used organisational structure. 
Alliances facilitate the transfer of technology and knowledge between countries, they provide 
access to new markets, and they allow firms to leverage their capabilities and to outsource risk 
(Clegg et al, 2005).  
 
A major issue in recent research is the development and management of inter-firm relationships 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), most specifically the types of: inter-firm alliances (Gulati, 1995a; 
Heide and John, 1990; Ohmae, 1989; Whipple and Gentry, 2000), partnerships (Ellram, 1991), 
strategic alliances, coalitions, franchises, research consortia, and networks (Thorelli, 1986).  
 
“(Inter-firm alliance are) relations of mutual dependence between organizations that retain 
their separate identity as legal and/or economic entities, these relations are said to exemplify a 
distinct form of economic coordination which is ‘neither market nor hierarchy’. Examples of 
such ‘hybrids’ or ‘networks’ of firms include franchising, patent licensing, joint ventures” 
(Arrighetti et al, 1997:172). 
 
“(Alliances are) Voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or 
co development of products, technologies or services. They can occur as a result of a wide range 
of motives and goals, take a variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal 
boundaries” Gulati (1998: 293).  
 
Organizational transactions can take place in the market by firms forming arm’s length 
relationships with other firms- or else called market relationships- or when these are considered 
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too costly then internalisation occurs, like internal development, mergers, and acquisitions. In the 
middle between these two choices we have hybrid governance structures which are mostly known 
as partnerships, alliances, and networks (Williamson, 1975). Firms in order to manage the 
dynamics of their various interdependencies they apply inter-firm relationship strategies (Ulf and 
Ulf, 1996). The portfolio of relationships that they create can offer them various strategic 
advantages; also these relationships can be either viewed as vertical- which includes 
organizations on interrelated levels of the distribution chain- or horizontal- which includes 
organizations in the same industry relationships (Ulf and Ulf, 1996). 
 
The same applies to international transactions, in this case the entry modes are typically classified 
into three categories: export entry mode (like direct exports, indirect exports through 
agents/distributors, direct branch/subsidiary, wholly own foreign subsidiary), contractual entry 
modes (like international franchising, international licensing, technical agreement, service 
contracts, management contracts, co-production agreements, turnkey projects), and investment 
entry modes (like international joint ventures, acquisitions, Greenfield sole ventures).  
 
Alliances can vary from written contracts between two or more companies to exchange resources 
or can result in the creation of new organizations. A typology of alliances based on equity can 
take many forms at one end there are the joint ventures and at the other end are alliances that 
share no equity and have few hierarchical control mechanisms. There are the non equity 
cooperative arrangements; when firms agree to share efforts, assets and profits without engaging 
in equity ties, these are managed directly through contacts, like licensing agreements, use of 
brand name, distribution channels, etc. There are equity contracts which are supplemented by 
equity investments of one partner to the other, like minority equity investments; when one firm 
takes a minority-equity position in another ongoing firm. At the other end there are the joint 
ventures when two parent companies agree to jointly establish and share the ownership of the 
third child company (Jones and George, 2003). 
 
According to Griffin and Pustay (2005) the most common types of inter-firm alliances are: 
licensing, franchising, management contracts, production contracts, service contracts, technology 
agreements, turnkey projects,  a variation of which are the B-O-T projects (built-operate-
transfer), public private partnerships (PPPs), various types of joint ventures. Another typology of 
alliances based on the scope of cooperation is: comprehensive alliances when the participating 
firms agree to perform together multiple stages of the process by which goods or services are 
brought to the market, like research and development, design, production, marketing and 
distribution. Or functional alliances which involve the cooperation on a single functional area, 
like: production alliances; marketing alliances, financial alliances, Research and Development 
alliances or R&D consortia (Griffin and Pustay, 2005). 
 
2.3.2. Social Cooperative Strategies  
 
“We have learned to create the small exceptions that can change the lives of hundred. But 
we have not learned how to make the exceptions the rule to change the lives of millions” (Lisbeth 
Schorr in Dees et al, 2004: 26) 
 
One of the most important issues that social enterprises are facing is scaling up to increase their 
social impact in order to achieve transformational change and sustainable resolution of pressuring 
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social needs (Bishai et al, 2008; Bradach, 2003; Dees et al 2002; 2004; Leadbeater, 2006; Mair 
and Sezgi, 2011; Nicholls, 2008; 2009; Piggot, 2004; Sakaraya et al, 2012; Samuelson, 2010; 
Tracey and Jarvis, 2007; Waddock, 1991). Scaling can happen in two ways through 
internalization and through hybrid governance structures. Internalization happens though 
organizational resources to organically grow in order to increase impact, like differentiation of 
services, diversification, new market development, new product/service development, and 
penetration (Doherty et al, 2009; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Nicholls, 2006); through branching 
in creating new locations or through the formation of mergers and acquisitions among social 
enterprises. 
 
Growth can also happen through hybrid structures through the use of formal relationships like 
affiliations, where affiliated members are independent from each other and tied together through 
contracts, there is some type of control according to the mode used; they can span from loose 
coalitions to social franchises. Or through dissemination, where the company- often by the use of 
contracts- shares knowledge with other partners to adopt the specific model, usually through 
‘open source’ approaches; it includes training, consultancy and information sharing; it implies 
low levels of control but non-profit organizations use dissemination to increase their social 
impact (Dees et al, 2004; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Mair and Sezgi, 2011). An alternative 
model for growth is networked social entrepreneurship were scaling up is based on the increase 
of the members of the network. There may be a central organization but the social impact is 
delivered from the reach of the network partners (Leadbeater, 2006). 
 
Other affiliation hybrid structures are: social inter-firm alliances, social partnerships, social 
franchising (Bishai et al, 2008; Piggot, 2004; Sharir and Lerner, 2005; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007), 
private-public partnerships, corporate-social partnerships, business-nonprofit alliances and social 
alliances like the case of social marketing alliances (Sakaraya et al, 2012; Sorensen et al, 2013; 
Vock et al, 2013; Waddock, 1991). Many new hybrids among the public sector, the private sector 
and the social sector are emerging with new innovative business models to address societal 
change and to ease the impact of social problems. Types of these new models that have emerged 
from our empirical study are: social impact bonds, spin outs of public services by public servants 
becoming social entrepreneurs, various types of social joint ventures, community development 
venture funds, community loan funds, community banks, community development financial 
institutions and social enterprise networks (Cabinet Office, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Cohen, 2010; 
Sakaraya et al, 2012).  
 
The role of social partnerships and social alliances in bringing social change has become 
increasingly important (Waddock, 1991) new models of collaboration among the social, the 
public and the private sector emerge in a pursuit of creating sustainable communities (Sakaraya et 
al, 2012). Social partnerships are part of what in literature is called collective strategies (Astley, 
1984), social action systems (Van de Ven 1976), problem-solving networks (Austrom and Lad, 
1986) and action sets (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981); they are: 
 
“(partnerships are) cooperative relationships in which resources are shared and exchanged 
in the pursuit of mutual goals” (Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011:62). “(Social partnerships are) the 
voluntary collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more economic sectors in a 
forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a problem or issue of mutual concern that is 
in some way identified with a public policy agenda item” (Waddock, 1991: 481-482).  
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2.3.3. The Network Structure and Network Relationships 
 
The new strategic imperative for organizations is on managing multiple and overlapping 
relationships of the networks they belong to at a global scale (Parkhe, 2003); a significant 
strategy is considered the successful application of a network strategy (Stevenson and Greenberg, 
2000; Ulf and Ulf, 1996). 
 
“The network approach offers a particularly powerful descriptive tool for analysing 
contemporary inter-organizational business exchange” (Tikkanen, 1998:109). 
  
“The words relationships and networks have recently received a great deal of attention 
from both academics and practitioners…strategists have been concerned with joint ventures, 
inter-firm alliances and strategic networks” (Hakansson and Ford, 2002: 133).  
 
According to the writings of Ford (2002) the areas of distribution channels, internationalisation 
and networks have great similarities although they seem to be investigated in isolation from one 
another. Distribution channels appeared as a topic of analysis regularly in the 60s and 70s, 
internationalisation peaked late 70s early 80s, and “nowadays everyone is trying to make sense of 
things called networks” (Ford, 2002: 226). According to past literature the channel group has 
been argued to be in the nature of a network. Internationalisation literature concerned itself with 
how channels through which a company reaches foreign markets evolve over time. Finally, the 
network literature Ford (2002) claims makes a return to some of the approaches that were 
common in channel literature, but without acknowledging it.  
 
The growing sophistication of information technology allows managers to share information and 
cooperate and thus has made managing inter-firm alliances easier; the result in the growth of the 
network structure. A network structure is a series of inter-firm alliances that an organization 
creates with suppliers, manufacturers and distributors to produce and market a product. Network 
structures allow organizations to manage their global value chain, without having to bear the 
excess cost of employing managers (Jones and George, 2003). Evidence indicates that the 
classical organization will be replaced by new forms of network organizations consisting of large 
number of functionally specialised firms tied together in cooperative exchange relationships 
(Achrol, 1997). Networking is regarded as an especially important strategy for managing the 
development of the internationalisation of markets and industries, because it combines autonomy 
and flexibility with increased control and efficiency (Ulf and Ulf, 1996). The challenge of any 
hybrid form of governance, like inter-firm alliances, joint ventures, partnerships, franchises, 
research and development cooperation are on managing these networks and the wide variety of 
relationships in them (Donaldson and O’Toole, 2007). 
 
Network organizations have been defined as:  
 
“A network is a set of relations that connect a multiplicity of independent agents, usually 
organizations or individuals, in a structure characterised by relations among the parts that make 
up the network. The relations may be more or less linear-one-to-another- or they may be more 
complex, interconnecting many agents with many others” (Clegg et al, 2005: 501).  
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“In its most abstract form a network is a structure where a number of nodes (business 
units) are related to each other by specific threads (business relationships). Both the threads and 
the nodes in the business context have their own particular content. Both are "heavy" with 
resources, knowledge and understanding in many different forms. This heaviness is the result of 
complex interactions, adaptations and investments within and between the companies over time” 
(Hakansson and Ford, 2002: 133).  
 
“A network organization is an independent coalition of task-or skill- specialised economic 
entities (independent firms or autonomous organizational units) that operates without hierarchical 
control but is embedded, by dense lateral connections, mutuality, and reciprocity, in a shared 
value system that defines ‘membership’ roles and responsibilities” (Achrol and Kotler, 1999: 
148).  
 
Social venture networks or social engagement networks are formed by corporations, governments 
and social enterprises; these actors through their symbiosis, interactions, mutual interdependence, 
and collaboration facilitate the acquisition of resources, the achievement of strategic objectives 
and the creation of both social and economic value (Meyskens et al, 2010a).  Strategic networks 
and inter-firm alliances are used in literature as interchangeable terms. In some cases they do 
overlap, like the Japanese keiretsu, although there is a distinct separation between them; inter-
firm alliances often answer to the transaction cost approach though networks mostly exist for 
reasons coming from resource dependence theory (Child and Faulkner, 1998).  
 
“The relationships among firms in networks are stable and can play the same function as 
intra-organizational relations… they are not handled within the transaction cost approach” 
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1991: 264). 
 
Networks benefit through two significant elements symbiosis and commensalism; commensalism 
suggests that actors sharing similar requirements will decide whether to cooperate or compete, 
while symbiosis suggests the mutual dependence of actors with different elements (Meyskens et 
al, 2010a); the symbiotic element has been identified as a determinant of power and control in 
networks (Dana et al, 2008). 
 
The network governance form refers to a network where the existence of the relational ties and 
the communication mechanisms among its members create the dynamics that shape endlessly the 
nature and form of the network. These dynamics may also offer control benefits to members but 
this is one of the outcomes of the network and not the ‘raison d’être’ of the network. As Ulf and 
Ulf (1996) argue network relationships do not only aim at maintaining stability and keeping 
control, but what is important is that networks generate change and innovation (Obstfeld, 2005). 
Therefore what is important to consider when defining network organisations is to see what 
differentiates them from networks of organizations or relationships. According to Barker (1992) 
the presence of ties is not a distinguishing feature of the network organization. As Barker (1992) 
argues it is the quality of relationships and shared values that govern it that distinguishes it from 
networks form of organizations. These relationships, as Gerlach (1992) claims, are characterised 
by non hierarchical, long-term commitments, multiple roles and responsibilities, mutuality and 
affiliation sentiments. Therefore a network organization is distinguished from a network of 
exchanges by the level, frequency and reciprocity of ties, also by the density, reachability, 
centrality and multiplicity of these ties, by direct (also called strong ties) and indirect ties (also 
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called weak ties) and a shared value system defining membership roles and responsibilities 
(Achrol, 1997; Meyskens et al, 2010a). This is the reason why in our conceptual modelling we do 
not deal with the nodes or the mere existence of threads but the emphasis of our research is on the 
essence of these threads of the network; on the content and nature of the relationships between 
exchange partners whose properties are the informal institutions of social norms and how these 
affect the behaviour of firms and networks.  
 
Inter-organizational relationships can be differentiated between market relationships- or arm’s 
length ties- and embedded ties- or close or special relationships. The first case follows the 
patterns of the neoclassical microeconomic theory, while the latter case cannot be explained by 
neoclassical theories and follows the paradigm of the theory of embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). 
Granovetter (1985) argues that embeddedness is the fundamental concept differentiating 
networks from economic theories of organizations. ‘Embeddedness increases with the density of 
embedded ties’ (Uzzi, 1997: 48).  
 
According to Easton’s (1992) typology of networks we can distinguish three types: the first refers 
to the exchange dimension in two or more connected relationships, the other refers to the bond or 
social relationships that link loosely connected organizations and the third describes the network 
as a total pattern of relationships within a group of organizations. As we find in the writings of 
Hakansson and Ford (2002) an important feature of network is the interconnectedness of business 
relationships. Firms are not only affected by the behaviour of firms with whom they are directly 
tied, but also by the behaviour of the firms with whom their direct ties are directly tied thus by 
the behaviour of the firms with whom they are indirectly tied. This is also known as the structural 
element of networks. 
 
“What happens in one relationship will always affect all connected relationships, 
sometimes marginally, but often substantially… Thus, the development of any one relationship 
between two companies will depend on a number of factors: on what has happened in the past in 
the relationship; on what each of the two parties has previously learned in its other relationships; 
on what currently happens between the companies in the relationship and in others in which they 
are involved; on the expectations of both companies of their future interactions; on what happens 
in the wider network of relationships in which they are not directly involved… No one 
relationship can be understood without reference to the wider network” (Hakansson and Ford, 
2002: 133-135). 
 
As we find in the writings of Granovetter (1973) the strength of a tie is a linear combination of 
time, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services; each item is independent of the other 
but the set of items is intracorrelated. Granovetter (1973) offers two categorisations of ties: 
firstly, based on the strength of the aforementioned set of items we have: strong, weak, and 
absent ties; secondly, based on the structural positioning of actors we have direct and indirect 
ties.  
 
Let us assume that A and B are two actors with direct ties and S is a set of C,D,E, etc actors who 
have direct ties with either or both A and B. Then Granovetter’s (1973) findings suggest that the 
stronger the ties between A and B the larger the proportion of individuals in S with whom they 
will both be directly tied. Granovetter argues that when A has ties with B and A has ties with C, 
then B and C will be tied with each other, so actors will be connected forming triads of bridges. 
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What Obstfeld (2005) calls the ‘tertius iungens’. Granovetter also argued on the concept of the 
‘strength of weak ties’ suggesting that weak ties are bridges that connect actors and provide the 
route along which information and influence flows from any contact of A to any contact of B, 
and from any indirect contact of A to any indirect contact of B. Therefore weak ties are important 
channels of ideas, influences and information (Granovetter, 1973). Obstfeld (2005) argues that 
the strategic intention of joining people from opposite sides of the bridges that connect them 
brings about organizational innovation.  
 
The emergence of the network structure has developed the concept of the boundaryless 
organizations, whose members are linked by telecommunication devices and who rarely meet 
with each other in person. People are used when their services are needed without being formal 
members of the organization; the structure is close to a matrix one (Jones and George, 2003). 
Inter-organizational networks have been found to be a motive for the creation of new 
organizations through three central processes: resource exchange, legitimation, and domain 
definition (Wiewel and Hunter, 1985).  
 
As we find in the writings of Boje and Whetten (1981) there are two important dimensions of 
inter-organizational networks: the horizontal differentiation of transactions into stable subsystems 
and the vertical differentiation of organizations into a dominant centre and a less influential 
periphery. Achrol (1997) differentiates four types of network organizations: the internal market 
network, the vertical market network or marketing channel networks, the intermarket networks, 
and the opportunity networks. Snow et al (1992) identify three types of networks: the internal 
network, the stable network, and the dynamic networks. 
 
There are four interconnected relational issues that actors in international networks face: the need 
to co-ordinate the management of horizontal and vertical directed network relationships in order 
to obtain a favourable and stable network position and the need to co-ordinate offensive moves 
made in order to pursue new opportunities within the extended network and defensive moves 
aiming at safeguarding original relationships (Ulf and Ulf, 1996). These issues result in: 
extending the number of potential suppliers and customers, exploiting the complementary 
competencies and potential synergies of actors on the same horizontal level, co-ordinating 
competing actors that are a threat to the home market, and controlling the existing resource flow 
by maintaining established vertical relationships. As we find in the writings of Ghauri, Lutz, and 
Tesfom (2003) the factors for successful export network organizations are: a clearly defined 
market problem or opportunity, a willingness to respond together, development of solidarity, 
coherence and commitment, and initiating foreign market activities.  
  
The disaggregation of the hierarchical organization into a network of independent organizations 
has already happened as Donaldson and O’Toole (2007) argue. Winning future strategies are 
those of organizations that can combine resources, capabilities and learning across organizational 
boundaries. The advantages of technological advancement, like the new interactive World Wide 
Web, also known as ‘Web 2.0’ and the ‘Social Web’ facilitate the exchange of resources among 
any network members providing to organizations the benefits of what is called ‘social 
innovation’ and ‘open innovation’. The benefit of social web is that consumers own and 
participate in the creation of organizations (Lafley CEO of PandG in Elliot, 2006). As Obstfeld’s 
(2005: 100) research confirms innovation is generated from the dynamics of social networks 
which connect people, knowledge and resources and from the strategic orientation of introducing 
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disconnected individuals what he calls ‘tertius iungens’.  
 
“Networks, involving organized systems of relationships between entrepreneurs and the 
outside world, are particularly valuable to the small business sector since the vulnerability 
associated to small size can be offset by supported environment provided by resilient networks” 
(Donckels and Lambrecht, 1997). 
 
2.3.4. The Paradoxes of Networks 
 
Barriers to networks are firstly time, since cultures of networks take time to develop, secondly 
finding partners with the network mind-set, thirdly the unwillingness of central members to lose 
control and power, and fourthly firms may have to incur short-term losses of implementing a 
network strategy (Achrol, 1996).  According to Labianca, Brass, and Gray (1998) the open 
communication could be used for creation of factions leading to intergroup conflict. 
 
Hakansson and Ford (2002) identified three paradoxes to business networks and their 
implications to practitioners. The first is related to having simultaneously opportunities and 
limitation in networks. That is because the development of relationships in networks gives 
opportunities to both parties, but the same relationships impose restrictions on them. This 
network paradox implies that firms within a network cannot act according to their own interests 
or to react to opportunities as they present themselves. 
  
The second paradox is related to influencing and being influenced at the same time. A network is 
both a way to influence and to be influenced. Both situations are present concurrently and both 
premises are equally valid. The third paradox is related to controlling and being out of control. 
Companies in a network attempt to control it and to manage their relationships to accomplish 
their own goals. The paradox is that the more that a company achieves its aim to be able to assert 
control, the less effective and innovative will be the network. The more successful a single 
company is in forcing its thinking onto the network, the more it and those around it are likely to 
face long-term problems. If the development process becomes directed from one centre it will 
become more integrated and may have fewer overt conflicts, but the network may cease to exist 
and become more of a hierarchy (Hakansson and Ford, 2002: 135-137). 
 
Uzzi (1997) identifies the paradoxes of embeddedness. He argues that when firms become too 
embedded in a network it can firstly lose its ability to adapt, secondly isomorphism within a 
network can decrease diversity, and thirdly a firm loses its ability to access new opportunities. He 
identifies three conditions that can lead embeddedness to become a liability; an unforeseen exit of 
a core network player, institutional forces that rationalize networks and when overembeddedness 
exists. 
 
2.3.5. Social Franchising 
 
A type of social inter-firm alliances which incorporates the mechanisms of networks is social 
franchising. Social franchising is proposed as a compelling format to scale up social enterprises 
and to increase social impact and social value creation (Leadbeater, 2006; Nicholls, 2008; Tracey 
and Jarvis, 2007). It allows to social or environmental entrepreneurial ventures to scale up with 
few resources by engaging the resources of local partners/ franchisees and of local communities 
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while targeting social change at a wider level (Berelowitz, 2012). The results of the Berelowitz 
(2012) report highlight that social franchising as a sector is under-developed, under-researched, 
and under-resourced. They argue that a lot of resources are dedicated into starting-up new 
ventures ‘too much time and money are currently wasted in reinventing the wheel’.  
 
“We are at a very exciting time in the history of the world. We need solutions, we need 
them to scale and we need them rapidly. This is where social franchising comes in” (Michael 
Norton in Berelowitz, 2012:2) 
 
Social franchising is a novel format that has recently appeared in the social sector; it is attracting 
considerable attention as it can provide the scales that are needed to increase the impact of social 
ventures. The biggest growth is seen in the US market, following the UK and the European 
markets. Social enterprises have grown considerably in the UK- almost entering early maturity-, 
the need now is to direct resources to the scaling of the successful ones so as to achieve 
sustainable social change and to start generating serious financial returns; especially now that the 
social investment market is starting to grow (Ritchie et al, 2011). Some evidence for the growing 
importance of social franchising can be stretched by the fact that since 2003 in the UK a number 
of public funded programmes supported the development of franchise systems; most of these 
have grown considerably, like CASA, Big Issue, and Pack-IT. In Europe successful social 
franchises include Le Mat, Emmaus, and Cap Supermarkets (Higgins et al, 2008; Richardson and 
Berelowitz, 2012). In 2012 The ‘Big Society Capital’ (also known as the Big Society Bank) 
whose role is to fund social ventures and boost the social investment market chose to fund- 
among its five first social ventures- the scheme ‘Franchising Works’ that helps unemployed 
people in running franchise businesses (Easton, 2012).  
 
Examples of social franchises in the UK and Europe are: School for Social Entrepreneurs 
founded in 2002 in the UK has 12 franchised units; Citizens Advice Bureau founded in 1939 has 
394 franchised units; Free, independent, confidential and impartial advice to everyone on their 
rights and responsibilities; Emmaus founded in 1949 in France that has grown in the UK has 22 
franchised units, communities running recycled units and providing home and occupation for 
homeless people; FoodBank founded in 2004 has 200 franchised units it tackles food poverty 
through distribution of food to charities and those in need. It grew from 55 to 200 over 18months; 
Care and Share Associates CASA found in 2004 delivers health and social care services; Pack-IT 
founded in 1988 has three franchised units, offers direct mail and third party logistics services 
employing people with disabilities. ‘Fruit to Suit’ founded in 2007 offering healthy snacks to 
primary school ‘tuck shops’ and management training to pupils so that they can run the tuck 
shops themselves; it charges £2.500 entry fees and 4% royalties and now also charges school 
enterprise training thus being able to have a grant-free growth. Le Mat in Italy founded in 1995 
has ten franchised units, hotels employing people with learning disabilities and mental health 
issues; Barka in Poland founded in 1989 has entered the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland 
provides educational, training to excluded and disadvantaged groups especially housing for 
homeless people and Eastern European migrants, vocational schools for unemployed and 
development of social enterprises (Berelowitz, 2012; ESFN, 2011; Richardson and Berelowitz, 
2012). 
 
The phenomena of mainstream franchising and social franchising are formations of enterprises 
through formal linkages (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a), it is considered to be part of 
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inter-firm alliance theory (McIntyre, Young and Gilbert, 1994, 1997; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 
1996), it is mainly an alliance between SMEs (Stanworth, 1995b), and is considered to be the 
pioneering network organization (Achrol, 1996). Franchising is a unique phenomenon, 
sometimes unrelated to any directly experienced reality (Stanworth, 1995) it cannot be fully 
understood by the development or adaptation of models and theories to this specific practice 
(Hoy and Stanworth, 2003; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996) and could benefit from a fresh look 
and a new level of analysis (Achrol, 1996; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001) 
 
We can identify three schools of thought in theory development on mainstream franchising: the 
first accepts that it is a variation of existing business formations and so can be studied by 
applying existing models and theories, the second accepts that it a unique phenomenon but can be 
understood through the application of existing theories, and finally the third that it is a unique 
phenomenon that cannot be fully understood by the development or adaptation of existing 
theories (Hoy and Stanworth, 2003). Evidence from Sivakumarand Schoormans (2011a) research 
identify that partner selection criteria of mainstream franchising are equally applicable to social 
franchising, also that major organizational issues encountered by mainstream franchisors are 
similar to those faced by social franchisors, like control, quality assurance and availability of 
appropriate franchisees. Lonnroth et al (2007:158) research suggests that ‘social franchising 
applies the fundamental elements of franchising’. 
 
According to the first school franchising can be explained as a variation of what are called 
partnerships, inter-firm alliance, strategic alliances, or contractual relationship (Baucus and 
Baucus, 1997; McIntyre, Young and Gilbert, 1994; 1997; Spriggs and Nevin, 1994). 
Nevertheless, there remains a distinct separation between the parties (Stanworth, 1995b). So 
according to the second school various theories have been used to explain franchising (Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard, 1999), like resource-based theory and strategic theory (Huszagh et al, 1992), 
agency theory (Lafontaine, 1992; Monye, 1997), like the theory of the firm (Barney, 1991; Grant, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Wernerfelt, 1984); life-cycle theory (Stanworth 
et al, 1996), entrepreneurial theories (Kaufmann and Dant, 1999) transaction cost theory 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999); and lately institutional theory (Barthelemy, 2011; Combs, 
Michael and Castrogiovanni, 2009; Gauzente and Dumoulin, 2012; Gorovaia and Windsperger, 
2013; Young and Merritt, 2013). The third school believes that the world of franchising has its 
own myths, slogans, and ideologies, which form up into a perception of franchising, sometimes 
unrelated to any directly experienced reality (Stanworth, 1995b). As argued by Stanworth and 
Kaufmann (1996) the novel ingredient distinguishing franchising from most other forms of 
business activity is the symbiotic relationship of inter-dependence existing between two legally 
distinct economic entities. It is a field both interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, which is not 
sufficiently understood through the models of overlapping disciplines (Hoy and Stanworth, 
2003). Franchises are hybrid governance structures, they are characterized by bilateral 
dependency of the partners, which mutually invest equity and assets and which agree on how to 
divide profits and costs (Bercovitz, 1999; Glaister, 2004; McIntyre, Young and Gilbert, 1994). 
Business format franchising is a popular example of a hybrid organizational form that 
incorporates elements of both markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1991). According to current 
research the constructs of franchising and networks are closely linked since franchising is a form 
of networks (Achrol, 1996; 1997; Achrol and Kotler, 1999; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001; 
Stanworth and Curran, 1999).  
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 “Franchising is the pioneering network organization based on long-term relationships 
between independent organizations bound together by well-defined roles, responsibilities, and 
objectives, it is a centrally organized system of carefully selected and enduring membership of 
firms organized around well defined business strategy, mutual goals and interests” (Achrol, 1996: 
24).  
 
Franchise systems are collections of independent economic entities each specializing in specific 
tasks and skills, but it is a very franchisor centred system (Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001). 
Franchisors offer expertise in setting up and running the system while franchisees offer financial 
and managerial resources to the system. The notion of control, commitment, longevity, and 
governance is often referred to the wordings in a contract, as well as the duties, roles, tasks and 
access to information. There is a flow of communication and directions from the franchisor to 
other system entities such as other suppliers and franchisees, while franchisees tend to take on the 
role of a passive recipient of information, instructions, and dictates. Social norms such as 
mutuality, solidarity, trust, which are essential for the survival of a franchise are not encouraged 
(Achrol, 1996). Franchisees own capital that alone has little value and little dynamic to produce 
(Felstead, 1993). It is the mental means of production that the franchisor own and that the 
franchisees rent which empowers their physical means of production to actually produce. 
Franchisees do not have an employment contract but a commercial one, they are legally 
independent, and they trade as sole proprietors, partnership, or limited liability companies, so 
they work for profit not for wage. Franchisees appear to be owners of capital, of means of 
production since they own machinery, raw materials, buildings, and employ their own 
employees, but these are the physical means of production and with only these means the 
franchisees would not be able to set up a business and become entrepreneurs. In addition statistics 
show that most of them have no prior experience of entrepreneurship and no prior experience of 
the specific business sector, but they have the desire to become self-employed. In addition most 
of them invest a significant part of their personal savings (Felstead, 1993). 
 
Franchisors own the mental means of production: the business idea, the organizing ability, the 
recognized trademark, accumulated experience, the ‘know how’ of the business, the contracts 
with the suppliers, the formula of the products’ production, the marketing, the R&D. It is because 
of the ownership of these means, which are also the competitive advantage of the business, that 
they contract with franchisees and they can take part of the value produced by the franchisees. 
There is an imbalance of power between the two parties. So franchisees according to Felstead 
(1993) find themselves at a contradictory position being the ‘employees’ of the franchisor and at 
the same time being the employer of others. Taking into account that the proportion of ownership 
of each franchisee in comparison to the franchisor is very minor and also the fact that the 
competitive advantage is in the ownership of the franchisor, a franchisee could not survive at the 
market alone.  
 
What is missing from most traditional franchise systems is horizontal interaction and 
communication, which on the other hand is a key characteristic of network organizations 
(Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001). To integrate characteristics of network organizations to 
franchise systems there is the need for: transparent communication systems where is feasible to 
have open and routine access to all information including performance about all members in the 
network, solidarity by integrating a communication program which points out the successful 
performance of its members with reference to mutual responsibilities and underlines competitor 
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oriented research, targets and strategies, and flexibility by sharing research and analysis and by 
allowing to everyone to participate in the process of change and adaptation (Achrol, 1996). Free 
flow of information and transparent communication are the core characteristics of a franchise 
network organization  
 
Paswan, Loustau, and Young (2001) believe that a network organization concept delivers to 
franchise systems tangible benefits, resources and capabilities that could decrease processing and 
transaction costs, and that could lead to optimization of distribution networks and band 
implementation of just in time systems. Supplier’s involvement in the value chain of the 
franchise network organization could create economies of scale and help perfect production 
planning, reduce lost sales, wasted resources and over stocking. This system could also provide a 
tool for effective and high quality franchisee recruiting and include current franchisees in this 
procedure.  
 
The network concept could also deliver intangible benefits: higher levels of relational norms, like 
commitment, trust, solidarity and mutuality, improved communication, feeling of openness, 
feeling of being part of a system, of a strategy, of having common goals. It could boost 
entrepreneurial innovation of franchisees and help them be proactive, which could benefit the 
entire system. Higher usage of information technology leads to higher levels of customer trust 
and commitment (Ryssel, Ritter and Gemunden, 2000). The system is likely to reduce various 
hazards, like shirking, free riding, and moral hazards. Parties are likely to engage to self-
monitoring and self-governing activities (Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs, 1998), thus opportunism 
will be constrained (Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001).  
 
In addition to the above the integration of customers to the franchise network organization will 
provide greater market advantage, quality improvements, new product development facilitation, 
global market research at minimal cost and finally, customers integration could be a competence 
to create competitive advantage to the franchisors (Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001). The use 
of technology-driven information transparency allows for the creation of a sophisticated 
communication system that can implement real time decision-making that can enhance the 
development of networks (Achrol, 1996, 1997; Achrol and Kotler, 1999; Paswan, Loustau and 
Young, 2001). 
 
2.4. The Process of Formation of Social Entrepreneurship, Social Alliances and Social 
Enterprise Networks 
 
In this section we review existing literature on the independent constructs of our study which are: 
individual social entrepreneur profile, social innovation, formal institutions, and informal 
institutions of social norms of relational network embeddedness which are: trust, commitment, 
solidarity, flexibility, role integrity, mutuality, restraint of power and harmonization of conflict. 
 
The drivers that have lead to the formation of social entrepreneurship include: individual ethical 
or religious motives; personal altruism; community or political contexts; professional interests; 
cultural mutuality; and the development of solidarity (Nicholls, 2008). The aforementioned 
motives that are essential in explaining the process of social entrepreneurship formation are part 
of three systems: firstly, the dynamics of the external environment, especially the political 
context and institutions (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Salamon and Anheir, 1997; Powel, 
 47 
1987). Social entrepreneurship is strongly shaped by the public sector dimension and institutional 
innovation. Social entrepreneurs bring about changes at the societal context within which the 
issues that they address are embedded (Alvord et al, 2004). Secondly, social entrepreneurship is 
largely shaped by informal institutions of social norms (like mutuality and solidarity) and the 
dynamics of networks. Research suggests social enterprises instead of being the product of a 
charismatic hero entrepreneur are actually the products of groups and networks who collectively 
innovate to solve social problems (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2006). 
They are in constant quest of forming alliances and so social entrepreneurship has to be examined 
in relation to network models (Nicholls, 2008). And thirdly, the organizational and individual 
context dynamics, including: the individual social entrepreneur profile (like traits, character, 
skills, motivation and ethics) (Bornstein 2004; Drayton, 2002), and the dynamics of social 
innovation (expressed in missions, strategies, business models).  
Evidence from Van Putten and Green (2010) research indicates that formal institutions (tax 
incentives), innovation (technology) and networks (social networks) are positively related to 
social entrepreneurship formation which is increased in a recession- like the one started in 2007. 
Evidence from cross-country research (in the UK, Germany and Italy) supports that the formal 
institutional context of laws and governmental interventions (providing incentives for 
maintenance of stable, long-term relationships), the informal institutions of social norms 
(especially leading to trust building) and the organizational context of technology are strongly 
related to formation and governance modes of mainstream inter-firm alliances (Arrighetti et al, 
1997). The latter argue that to investigate social inter-firm alliances we have to see the influence 
of the social, institutional and organizational context within which they are embedded. Alvord et 
al (2004) research on social entrepreneurship formation indicates that external environment 
institutions, organizational variables and collective action are related to the nature of their 
innovation, to organizational issues of leadership and to paths to social transformation. Their 
theoretical approach was built on development studies (which focus on economic, political and 
social contexts and innovation within these systems), on organization theory (which focuses on 
organizational context characteristics) and on social movements theories (which focus on 
collective action and political strategies).  Zahra et al (2009) support that the emergence of social 
partnerships and alliances is due to the same issues that have led to the emergence of social 
entrepreneurship. Stanworth and Curran (1999) findings suggest that the formation, growth and 
survival of franchises is influenced by elements at the societal, organizational and individual 
context; the societal level includes elements from the cultural, economical, and political contexts 
(the latter identifies governmental interventions towards small medium enterprises growth), the 
organizational sphere includes organizational characteristics like innovation of franchisees and 
finally the individual context includes motivation intentions and prior self-employment.  
 
The aforementioned research conclusions are in line with the spheres that emerged from our 
empirical study as significant determinants to the process of social franchising. In the following 
sections we analyse in depth existing literature on these spheres.  
 
2.4.1. Individual context: The Social Entrepreneurship Individual/Psychological Profile 
 
Sociological school of thoughts believe that entrepreneurial activity is driven by religious beliefs 
and ethical values, and these determine entrepreneurial growth (Weber, 1947); like people’s 
sociological background that can predict how much they strive for success (Reynolds, 1991) and 
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like the influence of the Protestant culture in shaping the rational of economic attitude and growth 
of entrepreneurship (Becker and Woessman, 2009; Reynolds, 1991). Economic theory 
approaches entrepreneurship as being driven by the opportunities detected in the market which 
trigger entrepreneurial activity that is then seen to create changes in the market (Drucker, 1985; 
Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). The dynamic entrepreneurship innovation theory argues that 
entrepreneurship dismantles the stable circular flow of the economy; a new level of development 
is created by the entrepreneur (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; De Jong and Marsili, 2010; 
Schumpeter, 1949). This latter has been strongly debated (Shane, 2003; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).  
 
Resource based approaches underline the role of resources in the appearance and growth of 
entrepreneurial activity (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Clausen, 2006); the latter is more likely to 
grow and develop when entrepreneurs have access to resources (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; 
Meyskens et al, 2010a; Sharir and Lerner, 2006). With access to financial, human and social 
resources, entrepreneurs can discover new opportunities and detect gaps in the market (Davidson 
and Honing, 2003). Evidence shows that when financial capital is accessible, there is a higher 
chance of establishing a new firm (Blanchflower, Oswald, and Stutzer, 1991; Clausen, 2006; 
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994). Recent literature on the 
resource strategy of social enterprises is focusing on the formation and growth of the social 
investment market and of various financial models which is seen nowadays as the most important 
vehicle addressing the sustainability of social ventures (Cabinet Office, 2013a; 2013b;2013c; 
Cohen, 2010; Emerson and Spitzer, 2007; Nicholls, 2010; Nicholls and Pharoah, 2007; Steffel 
and Ellis, 2009).  
 
Criticism to resource dependency theories argue that financial capital is not necessarily 
associated with being an entrepreneur (Davidson and Honing, 2003; Fairlie and Krashinsky, 
2012) highlighting the innovation component of entrepreneurship (Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012). 
Innovation theorists argue on the capabilities of creating new products and processes to respond 
to market opportunities (Davidson and Honing, 2003; Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012) 
 
According to the entrepreneurial supply theory cultural values, social sanctions and role 
expectations shape entrepreneurship activity (Cochran, 1964). Thus entrepreneurship urges are 
associated with the environment where the person was brought up. Entrepreneurship is formed by 
role expectations established by society, especially in the case where entrepreneurs are seen like 
role models. Entrepreneurial behavior derives from child learning practices but is mostly 
dependent on the circumstances and institutional resources available (Young, 1971). According 
to the human capital theory education and experience are positively related to the emergence of 
entrepreneurial activity (Becker, 1975; David and Honing, 2003; Korunka, Frank, Lueger, and 
Mugler, 2003). These factors are differently distributed across people and thus influencing the 
capacity to identify the difference between opportunities and exploitation (Anderson and Miller, 
2003; Chandler and Hawks, 1998; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
.  
Institutional approaches highlight the power of the environment in the process of 
entrepreneurship (Young, 1971), while social network theory approaches identify the significance 
of the channeling of information and control through the social interactions of actors (Aldrich and 
Cliff, 2003; Reynolds, 1991; Shane and Eckhardt, 2003). Institutional entrepreneurial theory 
(Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio, 1988) argues that it’s not only institutions 
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that influence entrepreneurship but also agents can bring about institutional change in spite of 
institutions inertia and stasis. The counterargument to this thinking is that actors are an 
endogenous elements of institutions and deeply embedded in them therefore cannot change them, 
what is known as the ‘paradox of embedded agency’. A theory of action is proposed by Battilana, 
Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) viewing entrepreneurs as actors that employ resources to bring 
about institutional transformation or create new ones through a process of social change; 
institutional entrepreneurs (being individuals, groups or organizations) are differentiated in that 
they set up divergent changes to challenge existing institutions- whether or not they do that 
intentionally or not- and in that they engage in action and mobilize resources to actually make 
these changes regardless if this change is actually successful or not. An important element of 
institutional entrepreneurs is that they create new innovative business models to bring about those 
institutional changes.  
 
The ability of institutional entrepreneurs to actually emerge and break the boundaries of their 
embeddedness within institutions (the paradox of embedded agency), thus to be able to bring 
institutional transformation is influenced by the so called ‘enabling conditions’. Enabling 
conditions have two parameters according to Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) research: 
the field characteristics (like regulatory changes, scarcity of resources, economic and political 
crises, coexistence of contradicting institutions, low degrees of institutionalisation, the behaviour 
of other actors) and the social position of actors. Actor’s social position is also influenced by 
their perceptions of field level characteristics but also by their ability to leverage resources to 
challenge them. They argue that there exists a correlation among social position -that is structural 
embeddedness in networks- and institutional entrepreneurship. They also argue on the influence 
of personal characteristics such as demographic and psychological factors and their correlation 
with institutional entrepreneurship.  
 
Personality and behaviour are closely interrelated thus leading to the investigation of personality 
traits in entrepreneurial activity. Personality traits are the fixed qualities that an individual 
exhibits in most circumstances, like extraversion, these personal characteristics define the 
entrepreneurs (Coon, 2003). Trait theorists believe that entrepreneurs have innate qualities that 
naturally make them an entrepreneur (Hornaday and Aboud, 1971; Low and MacMillan, 1988; 
McClelland, 1987; Shaver and Scott, 1991; Solomon and Winslow, 1988). Personality trait 
theory has been strongly criticized; evidence suggests that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
are not different in terms of universal characteristics (Shaver and Scott, 1991). Intelligence and 
skills are also important parameters when applying trait theory (Baum, Frese, Baron, and Katz, 
2007). Based on the concept of locus of control entrepreneurial success derives from a person’s 
abilities (internal locus of control) and support from others or other sources (external locus of 
control). Empirical data suggests that internal locus of control can characteristically describe an 
entrepreneur (Cromie, 2000; Koh, 1996; Robinson et al, 1991; Rotter, 1966). The main traits that 
have been identified by most theorists as influencing entrepreneurial behaviour are achievement 
motivation, locus of control and preference for innovation (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009) 
 
According to motivational theories research indicates that there is a relationship between 
entrepreneurship and achievement (Johnson, 1990; Shaver and Scott, 1991); entrepreneurs feel 
the need to succeed, accomplish and achieve (McClelland, 1961). According to the results of 
Sharir and Lerner (2006) the motives of social entrepreneurs that are common with main stream 
entrepreneurs were: self-fulfillment, occupational independence, and opportunities for creativity; 
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the motives that were unique to social entrepreneurs were: personal rehabilitation, search for 
solutions to individual distress, obligation or affiliation to one’s community.  
 
Mair and Roboa (2006) research on behavioural intentions that lead to social entrepreneurship 
formation developed a model of social entrepreneurial intentions with which they identified two 
elements: the perception of whether a social entrepreneurial activity is desirable which is 
influenced by the traits/behaviours of empathy and moral judgment and the perception of whether 
a social entrepreneurial activity is feasible which is influenced by social support and the trait of 
self-efficacy. As Mair and Roboa (2006) argue the various traits and behaviours may be similar 
to all mainstream entrepreneurs and do not distinguish among failed and successful social 
ventures, the only element that is actually significant is empathy; they also consider the 
background and context of social entrepreneurs as important in shaping self-efficacy and moral 
judgment. Mair, Battilana and Cardens (2012) research adopts a categorization based on the 
principles of justification that govern the actions and beliefs of social entrepreneurs; these 
principles include 6 different categories among which the most prevalent to social entrepreneurs 
in driving their actions are: the world of fame, the domestic principle of trust and tradition, the 
market principle and the civic principle of collaborative action. 
 
Research on social entrepreneurs highlights that the traits identified are: creativity, collaborative 
leadership skills, team-work capability, socio-moral motivation, long-term community oriented 
motivation, unique ethics (Bornstein, 2004; Drayton, 2002; Mair and Roboa, 2006); their 
capacity to innovatively exploit opportunities suddenly identified; their skills in building 
networks (Nicholls and Opal, 2005). The issue of commitment to their communities, of team 
working and collaborative leadership, entrepreneurial personality and the ability to see 
opportunities was also raised by Korosec and Berman (2006). Social entrepreneurs are motivated 
by a strong desire to change society, by discomfort of the status quo, by altruistic feelings, and by 
a need to be socially responsible (Mair and Roboa, 2006). In terms of behaviour attributes 
include: accept social criticism, ability to appear trustworthy and receptivity to other’s feelings 
(Mair and Roboa, 2006). Guclu et al (2002) created a model that inter-relates personal variables 
named ‘individual social assets’ with operational variables which are the creation of a realizable 
operating model, a social impact theory and a sustainable resource strategy.  
 
The influence of personality traits of franchise partners has received minimum research attention 
although evidence suggests that it correlates with formation, governance and performance 
making it an attractive topic to raise understanding (Weaven Grace and Manning, 2009). In social 
franchising formation the criteria of social franchisees that are evaluated by social franchisors 
before entering in the relationship are: personality and psychological profile, like commitment 
level, risk-taking ability, innovativeness, good team players, personal integrity, ability to 
persuade, enthusiasm, entrepreneurial skills, commitment to social objectives, confidence, 
willingness to be trained and to maintain quality; skills and capabilities like fund raising skills, 
linkages with the local networks and knowledge of the local sector and in some cases financial 
robustness (Doherty, 2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003; Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 
20011b). In investigating the relationship between partners’ personality and franchise formation 
the elements that synthesize the system of personality traits are: extraversion, agreeableness, 
consciousness, emotional stability and intellect (The Big-Five), empathy, and emotional 
intelligence (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). The letter research findings indicate that 
among the aforementioned empathy, emotional intelligence, consciousness and emotional 
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stability were significant.  
 
Evidence from Weaven, Grace and Manning (2009) research suggests the correlation among: 
firstly, personality traits of franchisees and governance structure modes (multi-unit vs single unit 
ownership types) and the accumulation effect of alliances formation (multi-unit); secondly, 
personality traits and performance of the systems (franchisee performance, partners relationship 
quality, stability and compatibility); thirdly, personality traits and standardised vs 
customised/personalised franchisee services, the latter leading to better performing systems as 
trust and long-term relationships with customers are created when customised services are 
offered.  
 
The initial approaches identified the ‘hero entrepreneur’ as the central constituent of northern 
paradigms, a trend triggered by philanthropic donators to build on individual hero stories 
(Nicholls, 2008). Research though identified that social enterprises were mostly the output of 
groups, networks and formal or informal organizations (Alvord et al, 2004). Alvord et al (2004) 
research investigated the element of networking leadership skills either in terms of individual 
leadership skills or in terms of leadership groups and found it to be a significant parameter in the 
success of social enterprises. Leadership skills that are in line with social entrepreneurship 
alliances and networks include: a particular open and inclusive leadership style that 
accommodates for other dynamic and ambitious leaders to act for; leading through persuasion 
and consensus; good listener skills and ability to promote others contributions; and showing 
direction (Leadbeater, 2006). 
 
Zahra et al (2009) research identifies three types of social entrepreneurs: a) the social bricoleur, 
who addresses needs at a small-scale local level, their motives are noble, the level of their ego 
and ambition are limited; b) the social constructionist who attempts to resolve market failures by 
launching innovation that can bring social changes, their motives and aspirations are complex and 
have many facets, their behaviour might become opportunistic and coercive as they try to 
influence others in meeting their goals; and c) the social engineer who identifies failures at the 
social structure and launches actions to target revolutionary transformational change, they are the 
most ambitious, their egos and needs may be ahead of their ventures, they may be individualistic, 
socially deviant and manipulative. These three types are differentiated based on the process they 
follow to identify problems, based on the conceptualisation of the impact they want to bring and 
based on the way they mobilise resources to do that. Their research investigates issues of ethics 
of social entrepreneurs.  
 
2.4.2. Organizational context: Social innovation  
 
There are many definitions to the phenomenon of social innovation all of them agree that a social 
innovation has to meet both social ends and means. Social Innovation is the effort to create 
purposeful focused change in an enterprise‘s economic and social potential (Drucker, 1985), is all 
about innovation that aims to achieve social goals.  It is in recent years that social innovation has 
attracted research interest and concerns new practices to resolve societal challenges and 
transformation, adopted and utilised by social groups (Alvord et al, 2004). Social 
entrepreneurship is often defined as innovation that leads to positive social change regardless of 
the mechanisms through which it is achieved (Dees, 1998; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). According 
to this approach the focus is on innovative ventures initiated by social entrepreneurs to tackle 
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social or societal issues; so meeting the social goals is more important that the resource mix of 
the enterprise which involves a particular combination of human and financial resources (Dees, 
1998; Donaldson and O’Toole, 2007; Elliot, 2006; Obstfeld, 2005). 
 
Social Innovation emerges as a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, 
sustainable for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private 
individuals (Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2009). Today governments and institutions all 
over the world adopt the idea of social innovation and create places, frames and actions to 
enhance social innovation and its practices. The social entrepreneur should be measured by their 
ability to create shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011), not just social benefit. The small 
organizations, individuals and groups are the ones that generate new ideas and the big 
organizations as government, companies or big NGOs although they are poor in creativity they 
can support the small ones to deliver the innovation. The existence of both can drive in new ideas 
generation and implementation (Mulgan et al, 2007). Social innovation to be successful needs to 
be based on a pragmatic philosophy and not a perfectionist one; it should accept experimentation 
and trials (Leadbeater, 2006).  
 
The idea of patterns of innovation of social entrepreneurs is investigated by Alvord et al (2004) 
showing that specific systems of innovation emerge around: local resources, the offering and 
alliances; they identify three systems of social innovation: capacity building, package 
dissemination and social movements. Alternative social enterprises business models include (Big 
Society Capital, 2012a): trading for social purposes; delivering pubic services; providing support 
and services to vulnerable and excluded groups; providing financial services. Alvord et al (2004) 
research results in that a successful social innovation is dependent upon the networking and 
relationship leadership skills of the social entrepreneurs. The latter argument is consistent with 
further research that highlights that an important variable of social innovation is the relational 
capital of societies and their networks, as the ability to attract new information (Mulgan et al, 
2007; Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2009). The relations with other locations, the 
intersections and the use of social networks can accelerate growth, enhance new ideas generation 
or adopt already used success models of other societies. The dynamics of social innovation are 
closely related with social networks (Obstfeld, 2005). This is due to the fact that innovation first 
appears in local social groups, and then its ability to be spread to the rest of the society depends 
on their social network (Mulgan et al, 2007; Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2009).  
 
Mair, Battilana and Cardens (2012) offer another classification of social entrepreneurism models 
based on the issue identified, the constituents and the activity selected (the offering as mentioned 
above). They identify four models: the political capital model, the human capital model, the 
economic capital model and the social capital model. Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) 
identify the same elements/phases of social innovation in bringing transformational change: 
create a vision from an identified issue, mobilize constituents, and motivate them to achieve 
vision. In detail: a) to create a vision for divergent change, this means defining an issue, 
conceptualizing it and justifying it [this thinking is in line with Mair, Battilana and Cardens 
(2012) approach on principles justification]; b) the mobilization of people of allies which is 
influenced by the existence of field characteristics (like crises or institutional voids) through use 
of discourse and the mobilization of resources through authority and social capital through the 
social position of actors (structural embeddedness in social networks); and c) the act of 
motivating those people to actually engage in actions to achieve the vision.  
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Alvord et al (2004) research identifies a pattern among innovation and scale up strategies. In 
detail: a) the innovation system of capacity building programmes, it refers to capacity building of 
disadvantaged groups to achieve self-help usually targeting cultural transformation and 
challenging existing norms that affect marginalized groups, like women’s role and disabled 
people; these models scale up by offering their capacity building programmes to other groups. b) 
The social innovation system of package dissemination programmes, it refers to an offering to 
disadvantaged groups to help them resolve a social issue they face usually targeting economic 
transformation through offering tools and resources to enhance productivity, like microcredit 
services; these models scale up by offering more services to these groups or to individuals. In the 
beginning the innovation is around a core service/product and then other services are built up and 
extend the offering. And c) the social innovation system of movement-building initiatives, it 
refers to the entrepreneurs activities in building networks to address a social issue by influencing 
other powerful actors usually targeting political transformation, like strengthening political voice 
of disadvantaged groups to change their political context or education interventions; these models 
scale up by forming alliances and extending influence to decision makers and other 
organizations.  
 
Social entrepreneurship ability to choose a successful strategy for scaling up is considered part of 
its social innovation model. The models used for scaling up social enterprises are: branching, 
affiliations (which can span from loose coalitions to social franchises) and dissemination (usually 
through ‘open source’ approaches) (Bradach, 2003; Dees et al, 2002; 2004; Lyon and Fernandez, 
2012; Mair and Sezgi, 2011). According to Dees et al (2004) the nature of a scalable social 
innovation can take the following forms: an organizational model (based on a set structure that 
mobilizes resources to satisfy a social need), a programme (based on a set of actions that achieve 
a social purpose), or principles (based on values and rules on how to achieve a social purpose). 
 
Evidence from Mair and Sengi (2011) research suggest that the goal of scaling is to increase 
social impact while keeping value consistency throughout the network through an appropriate 
control system. The elements of the control system to maintain coordination are: training, 
communication, mobility and creation of templates (that is codifying processes through 
standardised packages). Their results indicate that informal mechanisms of control through 
training, communication and mobility are vital to create trust and commitment that can achieve 
culture and value consistency across the network of affiliates and thus higher levels of control. 
 
Social enterprises are evaluated through their social impact and social value creation. Impact is 
not only seen as the output of social venture activity but is also built in its operation process thus 
throughout their entire value chain (Nicholls, 2008). Measurements include the Triple Bottom 
line accounting; ‘social enterprises are committed to measure their success according to the triple 
bottom line’ (Elighton, 1994), which measures the company's success capturing an expanded 
spectrum of variables including the impact to the people, the planet and the profit. Other 
measurements are the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan, 2002), social reporting, and quantitative 
benchmarks such as Social Return on Investment (SRI) (Nicholls, 2008) (more on this issue is 
analysed in the Performance section). 
 
Social enterprises and social entrepreneurs bear a significant economic risk associated with their 
initiative, so economic sustainability is vital to the venture’s survival (Defourny and Nyssens, 
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2010a). The resources of social enterprises can have a hybrid character coming from trading 
activities, from public subsidies or from voluntary resources. European social enterprises 
combine resources from sales through public subsidies and private donations, while the US 
tendency views them as market oriented non-profit organizations generating earned income 
strategies (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b). So based on the ‘earned-income’ school a social 
enterprise should undertake activities to generate income from the market in support of its 
charitable mission (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Social enterprises 
reinvest their surpluses so that they achieve a social or community-related goal, serving either the 
interest of their members or the interest of a wider social group (Laville and Nyssens, 2001). In a 
study conducted at WISIs (work integration social enterprises) in Europe their mix of revenues 
included 53% from the sales of goods and services of which one third was socially motivated 
sales, 38.5% from redistribution resources from direct and indirect subsidies and 8.5% came from 
voluntary resources (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b).  
 
2.4.3. Institutional Context 
 
Institutions through their presence or absence play a central role in the growth of market 
economies and in determining the behaviour of actors; research should be directed to the 
understanding of the role of institutional and macro-level socio-political and cultural contextual 
factors in the process of social entrepreneurship (Dorado and Ventresca, 2013; Griffiths, Gundry 
and Kickul, 2013; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). Institutions and institutional logics 
influence social action through rules and regulations, normative order, social expectations and 
culture thus formulating or restraining organizational behaviour (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
 
Acknowledging the position of institutions means that the study of formation can be executed 
without firstly analyzing why actors engage and also acknowledges the power that constraining 
institutional environments have over actors’ intentions (Dorado and Ventresca, 2013). This latter 
research explores the issue of institutional conditions for social entrepreneurship engagement 
which lies in the middle among the two poles of the Foucaultian position that in institutionally-
constrained environments actors will not engage and the functionalist position that the 
fundamental element is the motivation of actors. They conclude in that formation of social 
entrepreneurial activity does not require the recruiting of highly moral or over skilled 
entrepreneurs but rather the creation of the suitable conditions for this to happen through 
governmental and social interventions (Dorado and Ventresca, 2013).  
 
According to Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) entrepreneurs should be seen as actors that 
are not only influenced by institutions but can also shape and change them as endogenous agents, 
thus being agents of institutional transformation in a process of social change.  
 
Evidence from Meek et al (2010) research also suggest that decentralized institutions –which are 
socially formulated such as social norms- as well as centralized institutions- designed by the 
governments such as laws, regulations and incentives- have a positive effect on the formation of 
entrepreneurial activity. Their research findings also suggest that social norms influence the 
formation of entrepreneurial activity and that the effectiveness of governmental incentives is 
dependent on the social norms that exist in the entrepreneur’s environment. Evidence form 
Sullivan (2007) research also supports that government interventions enhance the development of 
social entrepreneurship. 
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Mair, Marti, and Ventresca (2012) research on institutional factors focused on institutional voids 
which directly impact social entrepreneurship activity. These happen when interventions of 
central institutions disregard the role of local decentralized institutions, such as customs, social 
norms and religious norms.  They actually found that ‘voids’ represent an institutional pluralism 
and are the result of conflict and contradiction among formal and informal institutions. 
Institutional plurality is also indicated as a source of conflict creation that influences social 
entrepreneurship (Nicholls, 2010a; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
 
As Pache and Santos (2010) findings indicate the institutional environment of social enterprises 
can impose pressures to them when their actions are seen as ambiguous and illegitimate, 
especially with reference to the balance between economic and social objectives. These 
conflicting institutional demands have to be handled by social enterprises to sustain legitimacy 
and support (Pache and Santos, 2010). The more fragmented an environment is the more likely 
institutional pressures will be conflicting (Pache and Santos, 2010). The strength of an 
institutional logic to prevail in organisational decision making is determined by: firstly, the 
centrality of actors; for example governments have a central role and through coercive power can 
impose their institutional logic. Secondly, by the resources of actors; like foundations that have 
the resources needed by social enterprises and so their logics influence significantly decision-
making of social entrepreneurs. And thirdly, by normative processes that shape the behaviour of 
social entrepreneurs; like through training, mentoring and socialization activities carried by 
educational and business support centers or by the norms and values coming from the internal 
environment of social enterprises through their volunteers, trustees and staff and through their 
social networks and alliances (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair and Serzgi, 2011). As Pache and 
Santos 92010) argue a typology of strategic responses of enterprises coming from neo-
institutional theory suggests that strategic choices are: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance or manipulation. They argue that this approach ignores the dynamics of 
intraorganizational processes and behaviour that are triggered in a systematic way to handle this 
conflict which may lead to organizational break up or paralysis (Pache and Santos, 2010).  
 
2.4.3.1. Political Context: Centralized/Formal Institutions 
 
The role of central institutions in the formation and growth of social entrepreneurship has been 
documented and evidence suggests that there is a clear positive relationship (Korosec and 
Berman, 2006; Dees 1994, 1998; Nicholls, 2004, 2008, 2010a; Sullivan, 2007). Emerson and 
Bonini (2003:106) argue that they may have the primary effect on the formation of social 
ventures since the government ‘sets the term of play and is a key actor’. Sakaraya (2012) and 
Leadbeater (2006) research provides evidence that the same applies for social alliances. The 
context of social enterprises is highly influenced by the institutional context of independent 
countries (Mendell, 2010), by altering forms of government support to third sector organisations 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b); tax incentives lead to entry in social entrepreneurship (Van 
Putten and Green, 2010). Evidence from Korosec and Berman (2006) and Sullivan (2007) 
indicate that government support to social enterprises in US cities was positively related to both 
the frequency and the quality of social entrepreneurial ventures without indicating that it is a 
necessary condition to their existence. If a government wants to direct entrepreneurial activity in 
one sector then this can be done with the design of a basic legal system, through regulation 
interventions and through incentives, such as tax reliefs (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Meek et 
al, 2010; Sullivan, 2007). These arguments support for the existence of a relationship among the 
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central/formal institutions and the formation of social enterprises and thus social franchising.  
 
Formation and increase of quality of social ventures can be also accomplished through the 
following activities of formal institutions: firstly, through raising public awareness on the 
existence of social entrepreneurship and educating prospective social entrepreneurs. Secondly, 
through supporting social enterprises to obtain resources; the government can act as an 
intermediary to help social enterprises access private capital, it can directly provide financial 
resources to social ventures, or it can provide services to social enterprises to help them apply for 
grants. And thirdly, through enhancing the formation of networks, partnerships, alliances and 
collaborative actions among social enterprises (Korosec and Berman, 2006). Evidence from 
industry research conducted for the Scottish government highlights that the elements that 
influence the business model of social enterprises are: the access to public procurement market, 
the taxation and fiscal instruments for the third sector, the existence and expertise of social 
enterprise support mechanisms, the characteristics of the local formal and informal economies, 
and the characteristics of a social enterprise sector in a country (Higgins et al, 2008:7).  
 
Korosec and Berman (2006) research on formal institutions influence investigated: types of 
support, perception of policy makers of adequacy of support, the roles adopted by public 
officials, and strategies employed. The limitation of this study acknowledged by the researchers 
was that it was based on perceptions and not on hard data of the actual methods employed.  
 
In studying the dynamics of the central regulatory systems three element were identified as 
important in Nicholls (2010a): the regulatory boundaries, the key actors that negotiate within this 
system, and conflicting ideas and debates that emerge though discourse. His research draws on 
two institutional theory perspectives: the new-institutionalist theory and the sociology of 
accounting institutional approach. Nicholls (2010a) in studying the new regulation in the UK that 
introduced the new organizational format for social enterprises named ‘Community Interest 
Company’ (hereafter CIC) in 2005 investigated the negotiation of conflicting approaches of 
actors with reference to the reporting and disclosure elements of this new regulation so that it 
could have high legitimacy; based on these negotiations the regulation emerged. Within this 
system of regulatory space actors and discourse elements interact to formulate the reporting and 
disclosure practices. Another important element of this system is the boundary factors within 
which disclosure logics are negotiated. Within this system there is a tension resulting from the 
negotiation between the ‘light touch’ logic of the regulator and the need for performance 
indicators and reporting systems to provide legitimacy to the new organizational forms that 
emerge. The findings of this empirical study identify the limitations and challenges of CIC 
regulation with regards to the light touch logics of its disclosure practices and the resulting 
barriers to the legitimacy and usefulness to stakeholders of the reporting data disclosed by many 
CICs (Nicholls, 2010a). 
 
The rationale behind formal institutions interventions to support social entrepreneurship is, 
among others: firstly, the leadership resources that social entrepreneurs convey to their 
communities, which are essential to the latter to address their pressuring social needs; secondly, 
the high experimentation and innovation levels in tackling social issues; and thirdly, the 
deployment of public resources which can be redirected to other social issues (Korosec and 
Berman, 2006). Barriers to formal institutions interventions are: unwillingness of public officials 
to share power; low levels of trust of social entrepreneurs objectives; bias of policy official 
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towards voluntary/non profits/social organizations of their personal affiliate networks; low levels 
of trust in the managerial abilities and tactics of social entrepreneurs; legal and contractual 
barriers; lack of performance measurement tools; lack of public officials that have the skills to 
enhance public-community collaboration; incompatibility or conflict among social issues 
addressed by social entrepreneurs and public issues agenda; corruption of social organisations’ 
missions caused by high value public programmes; and finally, concerns of enhancing formation 
of grant dependent and public dependent organizational logics jeopardising the emergence of 
financially sustainable social ventures (Korosec and Berman, 2006).  
 
Social entrepreneurship is not a mechanism to address the fallacies of economic systems but 
rather an institutional format for these systems to achieve survival and existence (Nicholls, 2008). 
Social entrepreneurship targets social change through a highly embedded political institutional 
context (Alvord et al, 2004), this can be stretched by the following two elements: firstly, they 
have a very close relationship with the public sector either working with public bodies or 
receiving public funding. Even in the case of the UK where the social/impact investment market 
is the most advanced; the funding of the Social Investment Financial Intermediaries (who provide 
financial input to social enterprises) comes 63% from the government (Big Society Capital, 
2012a). A significant other proportion of the input financial sources to social enterprises is 
delivered through transnational and supranational institutions (like United Nations in the first 
case and European Union in the second case) and through international aid. Also, the output of 
social entrepreneurship ventures very often brings reforms in the public sector and in the delivery 
of the social welfare state.  
 
Secondly, social entrepreneurs shape various types of micro-level political structures to overcome 
institutional barriers in bringing societal change (Alvord et al, 2004), like the case of social 
enterprise networks. Through the formation of networks they build on the strength of their social 
norms, e.g. they exploit solidarity and power benefits to address the inequalities that exist in the 
markets and the public sector that impede them from meeting their social and environmental 
goals (Nichols, 2010b). 
 
The European welfare states have a long practice of partnerships with third sector organizations 
which is influenced by the type of welfare mix (Evers and Laville, 2004; Grifitths, Gundry and 
Kickul, 2013). So social enterprises are also influenced by the type of the economic system based 
on which each economy is organized which has shaped its welfare state. Based on the Esping-
Andersen typology (1999) we have four types: the Anglo-Saxon welfare state of the liberal 
countries where the low level of government spending has resulted in a large voluntary sector 
financed by private resources. The UK is a mixed model where the government through contracts 
and third-party payments has supported third sector organizations. This trend has triggered the 
creation of social entrepreneurship and social enterprises. (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b) 
 
In the corporatist countries, like Belgium, France, Germany and Ireland we often see social 
services offered from associations that are financed and regulated by public bodies, which has 
resulted in the creation of the so called social economy or solidarity economy. In the socio-
democratic countries like Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark which are characterized by 
large government expenditure for the welfare state, new forms of cooperatives appear in the third 
sector with the aim of producing welfare. Finally in the Southern-European countries, like Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and Greece there is low government spending for the welfare state which was 
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traditionally offered through families and Church-related charitable organizations (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010b). In the United States and Britain social enterprises are seen mostly as business 
ventures having a social purpose, while in Europe and Canada are seen as having primarily social 
objectives whose profits are reinvested, they are mostly cooperatives, networks of similar 
organizations, community-based organizations (Nasioulas, 2012). 
 
2.4.3.2. Social Context: Decentralized/Informal Institutions of Social Norms and Network 
Embeddedness  
 
Social norms are socially shaped (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meek et al, 2010) and 
emerge through the relational embeddedness of actors in networks (Granovetter, 1985). Evidence 
of Meek et al (2010) study suggests that social norms influence the effect of governmental 
interventions and therefore before the design of policies authorities should research the social 
norms that exist in this region and culture. The study of institutional voids of Mair Marti, and 
Ventresca, 2012) and Mair and Marti (2009) provides further evidence of the strength of social 
norms when formal institutions are absent or weak and when there exist market failures. These 
arguments suggest the emergence of contradiction and conflict among the two set of systems that 
of central/formal institutions and that of decentralised/informal institutions. Another important 
parameter that has been investigated is the level of corruption in formal and informal institutions 
which influences social enterprises formation (Tonoyan et al, 2010); evidence from the latter 
research indicates that the lower the GDP the higher the level of corruption.  
 
The relationship between social norms and social entrepreneurship has been under-researched 
(Meek et al, 2010). According to Mair et al (2012:820) when market institutions are weak then 
social injustices are reinforced as informal institutions ‘determine the rule of the game and, 
importantly, who is allowed to play’ excluding certain groups, like women from entry in the 
market. In the absence of formal institutions entrepreneurs rely on the social norms of trust in 
their networks and systems like the blat in Russia and the guanxi in China (Mair, Marti, and 
Ventresca, 2012). These arguments support for the existence of a relationship among the informal 
system of social norms and social enterprise formation (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013). 
Research on network embeddedness and social network theory supports the existence of causal 
relationships among social norms and interfirm alliances’ formation, partner selection, 
governance and performance (Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1992; Gullati, 1995b, 1998; Kogut, 1988; 
Somersen et al, 2013; Uzzi, 1997). Most theories on social innovation identify the correlation 
among social innovation models and network embeddedness of actors (Alvord et al, 2004; 
Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009; Mair, Battilana and Cardens, 2012; Seelos and Mair, 
2005). There is also a relationship that can take the form of conflict among formal institutions 
and informal institutions (Meek et al, 2010). As argued in the previous section governmental 
interventions can be offset if they are contradictory to prevailed institutional logics of social 
norms. 
 
Religious institutions have also been investigated indicating that they support the formation of 
social entrepreneurship and small business creation (Choi, 2010); though evidence from Griffiths, 
Gundry and Kickul (2013) research found the opposite that in countries where there are dominant 
religions in a state there are low levels of social entrepreneurial activity.  
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Entrepreneurs have a higher chance of succeeding when they have large social connections. 
Having other entrepreneurs in one’s social network is fundamental for detecting opportunities in 
the market (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003).  Lack of social connections, can make business startups 
unsuccessful despite having identified an opportunity gap in the market (Shane and Eckhardt, 
2003). Obtaining resources can also be facilitated when the entrepreneur has strong bonds with 
resource providers (Reynolds, 1991). Research suggests that social partnerships and inter-firm 
alliances have a positive effect on the formation and performance of social entrepreneurial 
ventures (Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011). Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) support that the 
structural embeddedness of actors in networks and organizations enables the emergence of 
institutional entrepreneurship that can bring about social change; it is their social position that 
influences how they perceive institutional field characteristics that could trigger the need to 
change those institutions and also their ability to mobilize resources and allies.  
 
A vital characteristic of social entrepreneurs is their ability to build networks (Nicholls and Opal, 
2005) those networks provide them access to resources, help them support their venture, but also 
increase their capacity in making social impact and social value creation (Nicholls, 2008). The 
study of network models is paramount in raising understanding of the development of social 
entrepreneurship (Nicholls, 2008). Nicholls (2008) claims that social franchises maybe important 
in addressing the issues of locality and scale that social enterprises face.  
 
“If we want social entrepreneurs to have more impact we must help them to build larger 
organizations with finance and management expertise and models of growth- such as franchising 
and mergers and acquisitions- drawn from the private sector” (Leadbeater, 2006:240) 
 
2.4.3.2.1. The Argument of Embeddedness 
 
Polanyi (1957) analysed the social structure of modern economies through the concept of 
embeddedness. Schumpeter (1950) and Granovetter (1973; 1985; 1992) researched the dynamics 
of social structure to economic life and inter-organizational relationships. Granovetter (1985) saw 
organizational culture as being socially embedded and formed by the social relations of networks 
of organizations.  
 
 “Embeddedness is the realization that economic relations can never be grasped purely in 
terms of their economic rationality but need to be seen as organically situated within specific 
features of social settings” (Clegg et al, 2005: 496). 
 
Embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985, 1992; White, Owen-Smith, Moody, and Powell, 2004) is a 
central concept in economic sociology and one of the most commonly cited ideas in the networks 
literature. Within the context of richly differentiated networks- social, political, economic, and 
familial- relations can provide interlocking configurations of multiplex and cohesive support for 
one another. Embeddedness, as formulated by Granovetter (1985), is a property of structures in 
which actors that are integrated in cohesive clusters or multiplex relations of social networks face 
different sets of opportunities and constraints than those who lack such connections or 
encumbrances. 
 
 “Embeddedness refers to the fact that economic action and outcomes, like all social 
action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic (pairwise) relations and by the structure of 
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the overall network of relations” (Granovetter, 1992: 33).  
 
“(Embeddedness refers to) the fact that exchanges and discussions within a group 
typically have a history, and that this history results in the routinization and stabilization of 
linkages among members. As elements of ongoing social structures actors do not respond solely 
to individualistically determined interests” (Marsden, 1981: 1210). 
 
Zuken and DiMaggio (1990) classified embeddedness in four forms: structural, cognitive, 
political and cultural. The last three forms reflect social constructionist perspective on 
embeddedness, where as structural embeddedness is principally concerned with how the quality 
and network architecture of material exchange relationships influence economic activity (Uzzi, 
1997: 36). 
 
In analysing the influence of embedded social networks there are two approaches; the one 
focuses on the differential informational advantages and the other one on the control benefits of 
actors. According to the first approach embeddedness can provide informational advantages 
through its relational element that focuses on the norms that are cultivated by the strong direct 
ties of actors in a social network. In relational embeddedness or cohesion perspectives actors with 
cohesive ties can possess more common information and knowledge that can diminish 
uncertainty and promote trust. Embeddedness can also provide informational benefits through its 
structural element, which focuses on an actor’s position in a network that builds his so called 
status and through the norms that emerge from the indirect ties or tertius role that actors have. In 
structural embeddedness or positional perspectives the advantageous positioning of an 
organization in the structure of the network provides it with higher informational advantages. 
These aforementioned benefits overlap since the latter provides the former and can be referred to 
as the relational and the structural aspects of embeddedness (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1992; 
Gulati, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Walker, 1988; White et al, 2004). 
Relational exchange is the extent to which relational norms exist in a relationship between 
contracting actors. 
 
According to Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) the network perspective is based on the notion 
that economic actions are influenced by the social context in which they are embedded and that 
actions can be influenced by the position of actors in social networks. Embeddedness of actors in 
social networks creates norms such as commitment and loyalty, the precondition of the rationale 
of the creation of the network is mutual trust. The features of the social relationship between a 
pair of actors in a network, serve as imperfect substitute for the assurances provided by money in 
an economic system (Marsden, 1983: 692). 
 
“(norms are) patterns of accepted and expected sentiments and behaviour shared by members 
of an exchange system and having the force of social obligations or pressure” (Jackson, 1966).  
 
Values are beliefs and ideas about the kind of goals members should pursue and about the kind of 
behaviour they should use, while norms are unwritten informal rules or guidelines that prescribe 
appropriate behaviour in particular situations (Lebas and Weigenstein, 1986). Norms emerge 
from values. Therefore as argued by Jones and George (2003) norms perform the same function 
as formal rules and direct supervision. Values and norms are transmitted through the values of the 
founder (Schein, 1983), through socialisation, ceremonies, and rites, as well as through stories 
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and language (Jones and George, 2003). For a review on the elements of social norms see Table 3 
 
Table 3 Existing research on relational norms and inter-organizational relationships  
 
Relational Norms Author and Year 
commitment, trust, restraint of power, solidarity, mutuality, 
flexibility, role integrity and harmonization of conflict 
Achrol (1997) 
Trust, restraint of power (reputational, referent, expertise) Boje and Whetten (1981) 
harmonization of conflict, solidarity, role integrity, Boyle et al (1991) 
Referent power Brockner et al (1995, 1997) 
trust and commitment Child and Faulkner (1998) 
harmonization of conflict, solidarity, role integrity Dong-Jin (1997) 
morality and solidarity Durkheim and Pareto in Dingley (1997) and 
Tilman (2002) and Mayo (1949) 
solidarity and commitment Ghauri, Lutz, and Tesfom (2003) 
Trust Granovetter (1985) 
Trust from prior direct or indirect ties Gulati (1998) 
Solidarity, harmonization of conflict, role integrity Gundlach and Achrol (1993) 
Commitment Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) 
Trust, commitment Havila et al (2004) 
Trust, solidarity, role integrity, harmonization of conflict Heide and John (1992) 
Trust Jensen (2003) 
harmonization of conflict, mutuality, solidarity, role integrity Kaufmann and Dant (1992) 
Flexibility, solidarity, harmonization of conflict, role integrity Kaufmann and Stern (1988) 
Conflict, trust Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
trust, commitment, cooperation, conflict, uncertainty, 
dependence, control, satisfaction, and adaptation 
Leonidou (2003) 
Commitment, role integrity, solidarity and harmonization of 
conflict 
Macneil (1980, 1981) 
Power Marsden (1983) 
Trust, commitment Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001) 
Trust from prior social ties McGinn and Keros (2002) 
Trust, flexibility Mollering (2003) 
Trust Moorman et al (1993) 
Trust and commitment Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
Trust, commitment Mowday et al (1979) 
Solidarity, role integrity, harmonization of conflict Noordewier, John and Nevin, (1990) 
reciprocity, trust, forbearance Parkhe (1993) 
Trust Ring and Van de Ven (1992, 1994) 
Power Thorelli (1990) 
Trust Uzzi (1997) 
 
Relational embeddedness and social network theory explain the role of networks of social 
relations in producing social norms that define social action and shape organizational behaviour 
and economic activity. There have been several studies on the relational norms to measure the 
degree of relational exchange in a network (Dong-Jin, 1997; Heide and John, 1992; Kaufmann 
and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1980). Macneil (1980) argues that the norms that most characterise 
relational exchange are role integrity, solidarity and harmonization of conflict. Relational norms 
enhance trust and the feeling that the other will not act opportunistically (Dong-Jin, 1997). The 
focus of the network organization is on the relational ties and how to develop mutually 
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reinforcing, long-term relationships. Relational cultures are based on the assumption that 
exchange is an inherently constructive relationship that needs to be cultivated and network 
cultures underline the importance of loyalty processes in vertical relations and dialogue processes 
in horizontal relations. The key elements are trust and the social norms of governance (Achrol, 
1996). According to Child and Faulkner (1998) the strategic attitudes that bring success to an 
alliance are commitment and trust. They also argue that one of the main issues that need to be 
addressed is the issue of control in a subtle way different from that of hierarchies. 
 
The important parameters of the atmosphere governing business relationships that have been the 
subject of relationship management are: trust, commitment, cooperation, conflict, uncertainty, 
dependence, control, satisfaction, and adaptation (Leonidou, 2003). According to the writings of 
Uzzi (1997) the features of embeddedness are trust, personal direct ties, third party or indirect 
ties, increased information exchange, sacrifice of immediate gains for long-term cooperative ties, 
joint-problem solving procedures, mutual adjustments and flexibility.  According to Child and 
Faulkner (1998) the key attitudes of alliances which are mostly associated with successful 
performance are commitment and trust. The importance of trust in social networks is also stressed 
by Whetten (2001: 176) who argued that the social networks of academics are fruitful when their 
social fabric is characterised by open, honest, and trusting relationships. He highlighted the 
importance of mutual trust, including appropriate expressions of support and intimacy. 
 
"Networks are about skill and capability substitution so their strength lies in their 
specialisation, adaptability and flexibility" (Child and Faulkner, 1998: 7).  
 
From the writings of Durkheim, Pareto and Mayo we see that the cores of the social dynamics are 
the norms of morality and solidarity. The more relational an exchange becomes the more it 
creates a distinct social order within the relationship itself and promotes characteristics such as 
trust, commitment, solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, harmonization of conflict and restraint of 
power, which are referred to as ‘social norms of governance’ (Achrol, 1996, 1997; Heide and 
John, 1992; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1981). 
 
In the relational literature we often see international business relationships as being investigated 
without taking into account the differences of cross-cultural contextual factors, but rather through 
direct replication of Western constructs (Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). The latter researchers 
argue that this approach should be rejected because the constructs that are being analysed should 
capture the differences in business behaviours and practices that derive from the differences 
between more collectivistic or more individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 1983). 
 
At this stage we should consider how in Asian cultures the elements of relational and structural 
embeddedness prevail in economic exchanges (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). In Asian 
cultures which are structured around the Confucian values business relationships are based on 
high levels of trust (Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). The ‘guanxi’ in China indicates that 
interpersonal and social relationships pertain to business; guanxi is a key part of inter-
organizational relationships and extremely important to the conduct of business in China (Mair, 
Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Yau, 1988). In Japan for instance the ‘keiretsu’ meetings are a forum 
where heads of the individual businesses of a network meet to discuss issues of mutual concern, 
where feelings of camaderie reign, rather than a formal command centre consisting of members 
with set agendas where policies and practices are determined (Achrol, 1997). The keiretsu 
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provides a strong social culture and spirit of mutual accommodation, not only business but social 
as well; the keiretsu network takes care of all needs, e.g. in alimentation, accommodation, health, 
even facilitates marriages (Achrol, 1996). An interesting example that resembles to that is the 
culture of the Italian Mafia families as it has been described to us by many films especially 
“Godfather” trilogy whose director, writer and producer (except for Part I) is Francis Ford 
Coppola. The Mafia network seems to operate and conduct business based on strong relational 
and structural norms and on a collectivistic culture.  
 
 “The keiretsu (in Japan) reflects the importance of socialisation and informal processes in 
the structure and operation of the network organization…the Japanese keiretsu provides a classic 
example of how systems of extensive reciprocal ‘side-bets’ can be created to yield highly 
interdependent and committed networks…keiretsu networks have strong affiliation cultures 
which moderate channel conflict via a system of norms…via cultural and sociological solution” 
(Achrol, 1996: 9-13).  
 
This come in contrast with the US business practices of networks that are based on the norms of 
competition and fast-tracking (Achrol, 1997). 
 
Under the same notion we expect countries that conduct business according to the Anglo-Saxon 
paradigm which is based on a more individualistic culture to be differently influenced by the 
presence of relational and structural embeddedness than more collectivistic cultures (Hofstede, 
1983). Therefore in individualistic cultures we would expect that despite the presence of trust, 
commitment and social norms the structure of the inter-organizational relationships of networks 
would be still based on higher levels of hierarchies and contractual costs. Thorelli’s (1990) 
findings suggest that the presence of trust in Asian cultures cancels out the need of formalised 
contracts. According to game-theory findings the presence of trust in inter-organizational 
relationships is a source of competitive attitude rather than cooperative, the latter is the case of 
the US business environment (Scodel, 1962).  
 
“If there is one key difference between the West and the East business philosophy is that 
the West is individualistic and competitive right down to an interpersonal level, whilst the East is 
collective and cooperative within dense networks of relationships. This is the basis of its strength. 
If so, it is important that Western companies understand the philosophy and practice of 
cooperation, and perhaps adopt those aspects of it that are culturally congruent with our own way 
of doing things” (Child and Faulkner, 1998: 4). 
 
At the following subchapters we will present and review the core variables of embeddedness as 
have been identified by our research, these are: trust, commitment, restraint of power, 
harmonization of conflict, solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, and role integrity. 
 
2.4.3.2.2. Trust 
 
“The primary control mechanisms that govern economic transactions between firms are price, 
authority, and trust, therefore if there were trust firms would not find hierarchical controls 
necessary” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).  
 
“Trust is perhaps the most efficient mechanism for governing economic transactions” 
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(Arrow, 1974:1). 
 
One of the most salient factors in the effectiveness of social organizations is the presence of trust 
(Rotter, 1967). Trust is an important issue in international relationships and a common notion in 
industrial network research (Ford et al, 1986; Huemer, 2004). Trust is the explicit and primary 
feature of embedded ties, it is a governance structure that resides in the social relationships 
between and among individuals; it is fundamentally a social process (Uzzi, 1997). The 
fundamental necessity of trust in alliances has been supported by many scholars none the less 
trust remains one of the least understood concepts (Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
 
We can find several definitions of trust in existing literature we quote a sample of these for the 
purposes of this research: 
 
“…The confidence that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the other” (Barney 
and Hansen, 1994: 176). “A firm’s trust in its network partners is the belief that the partners will 
without the exercise of influence or controls strive for outcomes that are beneficial for all 
member firms” (Driscoll, 1978:45). “(Trust is) an expectancy held by an individual or a group 
that the word promise, verbal or written statement, of another individual or group can be relied 
upon” (Rotter, 1967:651).  
 
Trust emerges in two ways: firstly, based on norms of equity which define the degree to which 
one party judges that the other will fulfil its commitments and that the relationship will be 
equitable and secondly, trust has direct utilitarian roots and it emerges from the existence of 
social sanctions and reputation loss if act opportunistically (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). The 
first type is called knowledge-based trust and the second enforceable trust (Gulati, 1998). Equity 
is based on the concept that actors desire reciprocity, fair rates of exchange and distributive 
justice (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
 
In the writings of Barney and Hansen (1994) we see that there is a significant difference in 
approaching the construct of trust between behaviourally oriented and economically oriented 
researchers. The latter argue that actors in an exchange are inherently untrustworthy and tempted 
to behave opportunistically, thus trust will only emerge with governance mechanisms based on 
legal and contractual safe-guards. Behaviourally oriented literature suggests that this rational 
economic approach is empirically incorrect, socially inefficient and morally bankrupt. 
 
Mutual trust in a relationship reduces the development of opportunistic intentions and thus may 
eliminate the need for structural mechanisms of control (Granovetter, 1985). The level of trust in 
a network is indicated by the confidence in its partners’ sincerity, reliability, loyalty, and 
willingness to refrain from opportunistic behaviour (Achrol, 1996). Barney and Hansen (1994) 
identify three types of trust: the weak form of trust, the semi-strong form of trust and the strong 
or hard-core form of trust. Weak trust is possible because the exchange vulnerabilities are very 
few, semi-strong trust is possible despite the existence of vulnerabilities because of significant 
economic and social costs imposed by governance mechanisms in case of an opportunistic 
behaviour. Finally, strong trust emerges from significant exchange vulnerabilities independent or 
not of the existence of governance mechanisms, because opportunistic behaviour would violate 
values, principles and standards of behaviour that have been embedded on actors in an exchange. 
When we are referring to exchange vulnerabilities we refer to adverse selection, moral hazard, 
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hold up vulnerabilities (when partners make investments on the partnership), and other.   
 
Trust according to Achrol (1996) implies some level of uncertainty of outcome and of 
surrendering some influence and control, therefore its two elements are risking and faith, which 
interact in a dynamic mutually reinforcing spiral and create a trusting relationship (Achrol, 1996). 
According to Achrol’s writings the most stable trusting relationship will be cultivated when faith 
is built first, but the easiest and fastest way to create trust is to start with a risk taking approach. 
In ongoing relationships the nature of a members’ past experiences and continuing relationship 
reinforce each firm’s confidence that mutually satisfying outcomes will continue to be obtained 
through the network (Thorelli, 1986). The third element for creating trust is self-regulation/ 
verification processes, to do that a transparent system is needed in which there is open and 
routine access to all information about all members in the network. The system must be self-
regulating rather than run by authority (Achrol, 1996). Social norms, like trust should be self-
regulated and operate with the force of social obligation rather than hierarchical control, this 
means that there should be social sanctions in case of transgression in the form of denial of 
privileges, roles and status and that institutionalized mechanisms that deal with transgressions 
must have the character of a process (Achrol, 1996, 1997).  
 
Trust building is facilitated if interactions are among persons of equal status; communication and 
interaction between the president of the franchise unit and middle managers of the franchisor are 
not facilitating the development of trusting relationships, also middle managers of the franchisor 
should be trained to treat the president of the franchisee firm like theirs. Apart from that trust 
building is encouraged when interactions are perceived as not evaluative, spontaneous rather than 
planned, empathic rather than neutral and suggestive rather than directive (Achrol, 1996).  
According to the writings of Uzzi (1997) trust is developed when extreme effort (also called 
favours) is voluntary given and reciprocated, without the existence of a formal device to ensure 
reciprocation, like contract, sanctions, fines, etc. 
 
According to Whetten (2001) trust involves the choice of forbearance. By trusting others it means 
that we anticipate that they will not exploit our vulnerabilities. Therefore he mentions that: 
 
“the reciprocal of the gift of trust is the gift of disclosure. By exposing more of ourselves 
to others, we give them the opportunity to become trustworthy… in order for norms to change, 
they must be broken by those who have the most to lose from the resulting social instability. 
Paradoxically, these individuals are often those in positions of power and high status.” (Whetten, 
2001:177) 
 
According to Granovetter (1985) the argument of embeddedness emphasizes the role of inter-
organizational relations of social networks and structures of relations as mechanisms to facilitate 
the emergence of trust and to discourage the presence of malfeasance. Trust emerges from prior 
direct or indirect ties (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
Direct ties in networks of relations become channels of information that facilitate the emergence 
of trust for the following reasons: because this information is cheap to acquire, because it is more 
reliable as one trusts one’s own information best, because repeated ties give an economic 
motivation to be trustworthy so as not to discourage future transactions, and finally, because 
continuing ties become overlaid with social content that brings strong expectations of trust and 
refraining from opportunism (Granovetter, 1985). 
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Direct ties between A and B lead to the formation of knowledge based and enforceable trust 
between A and B. Indirect ties between B and C when actors can assure of their trustworthiness 
(direct ties: A-B) and (direct ties: A-C) leads to the emergence of trust between B and C 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1985).  
 
The issue of trust can be viewed in comparison to domestic and international franchises. 
According to current research there are systematic differences in the behaviour of partners of 
different nationalities (Parkhe, 1993b) and in the choices of modes of entry into foreign markets 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988). It is suggested that there are more obstacles in building trust in cross-
border alliances and therefore there will be higher hierarchical controls and that trust will be 
greater in domestic alliances than in international ones (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
2.4.3.2.3. Commitment 
 
Lamsa and Savolainen (2000) argue that commitment is the binding of an individual to 
behavioural act. There are two main approaches in studying commitment, the first is the 
attitudinal and the second is the behavioural. The attitudinal focuses on the process by which 
individuals think about their relationship with an object, while the behavioural focuses on the 
process by which individuals are committed to a specific course of action. 
  
“Inter-organizational commitment in relational exchanges constitutes of continuity, 
mutuality, loyalty, and forsaking of alternatives, it is associated with motivation, proactiveness, 
involvement, and performance and obedience to organizational policies” (Achrol, 1996:8).  
 
Achrol (1997) also identifies two elements of commitment: the attitudinal and the instrumental; 
the former is in terms of affective commitment, psychological attachment, identification, 
affiliation and value congruence it is defined as: 
 
“A partisan affective attachment to the goals and values of an organization, to one’s role 
in relation to the goals and values, and to the organization for its own sake” (Buchanan, 1974: 
533).  
 
According to Nielson (1998) commitment refers to the belief that a relationship will continue in 
the future. Apart from its purely instrumental worth, commitment can be cultivated in two ways, 
the first by targeting reputational power, thus stability and security of relationships, solidarity, 
and belongingness and the second by using interlocking management, which promotes the flow 
of employees and managers in a network, i.e. a franchisor could offer new franchises to its own 
employees or relatives. In order for commitment not to fade out it has to be supported by ‘side-
bets’ that refer to the allocation of resources, which become specific to a relationship 
(Williamson, 1985). Side-bets goal is to yield highly interdependent and committed networks. 
 
According to the writings of Achrol (1996) interdependence is a vital element that holds the 
network into a stable, cohesive and mutually oriented economic system and leads to attitudinal 
commitment which provides the foundation for the development of social norms of governance 
(Macneil, 1981). One source of interdependence in the franchise networks is through the products 
and services that are exchanged between franchisor and franchisees. These interdependencies 
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may not be a strong base for commitment because they can also be the source of conflict. 
Another way to create interdependencies is through cross investment and shared-equity between 
the franchisor, the franchisees and the distribution and supply companies set up to service the 
network; the latter are useful to the extent that they promote efficiency, coordination and quality 
without the bureaucracy of corporate ownership. Mair and Sezgi (2011) argue that social 
enterprises should use informal mechanisms such as communication, mobility and training to 
maintain higher levels of commitment. 
 
According to the writings of Mendelsohn (1992) the relationship between franchisor and 
franchisee changes as the franchisee moves from a state of ignorance about the way to conduct 
the specific business and a state of a very high dependence to a state of gained confidence from 
being a successful businessman that feels that can operate independently.The legal contract, 
Mendelsohn (1992) claims, that coordinates the relationship between the two parties cannot cover 
the aspect of the interpersonal business relationship that exists between them. There is a long-
term relationship that needs to remain healthy and productive through time for both parties. This 
relationship is a determinant of success of the franchising. This relationship goes through three 
main psychological phases: dependence, independence, and interdependence (Hall and Dixon, 
1991; Mendelsohn, 1993). 
 
In the first stage the franchisee is completely dependent like a ‘baby’ on the franchisor, which 
plays a role that, can be paralleled to that of a ‘parent’. In this early stage the franchisee focuses 
all their strengths in absorbing all the knowledge and techniques that are needed for the 
successful operation of their own store. The enthusiasm from both sides is at very high levels. 
This is the dependence phase. In the process as the franchisee gains more and more experience 
they get to the ‘adolescent’ stage. The franchisee starts to consider that the success of the store is 
owed solely to them (Knight, 1986). The franchisee starts to feel very limited from the system, 
starts considering the royalties to be an unbearable burden and seeks for more freedom and 
autonomy. This is the independence phase. As the relationship comes to a stage of maturity, the 
franchisee realizes the actual benefits from their participation in an organized chain. Thus the 
relationship becomes more stable aiming at the mutual benefit. Finally, this can be called the 
interdependence phase (Hall and Dixon, 1991; Mendelsohn, 1993).  
 
2.4.3.2.4. Restraint of power 
 
“Power is the concept that encompasses the mechanisms, processes, and dispositions that 
try to ensure that people act according to the rules of the game…it is impossible to escape power 
in organizations” (Clegg et al, 2005: 153). “Power is having something that somebody else 
wants” (Ferney in Felstead, 1993: 78). “Power is the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the 
behaviour of other persons” (Max Weber in Lukes, 1986: 212). 
 
Power and control are significant issues that social entrepreneurship faces when scaling up (Mair 
and Sezgi, 2011). The factors that dominate network relationships are power and trust, which are 
the factors that dominate in any political economy institution (Thorelli, 1986). The members of a 
network although perceived as equals do not have the same degree of power; there are five 
sources of network power for a member: its economic base, technologies, range of expertise, 
level of trust and legitimacy given to him by other members (Thorelli, 1986).  
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“The inter-organizational network may be conceived as a political economy concerned 
with the distribution of two scare resources, money and authority” (Benson, 1975: 229) 
 
As we find in the writings of Jones and George (2003) there are different types of power: 
legitimate, reward, coercive, expert and referent power. In studying inter-organizational power in 
networks there are two important issues: the kind of power that is compatible with network 
relationships and the way it is exercised (Achrol, 1997). Organizations have used coercive kind 
of power and legitimate authority which is not compatible with the evolution of networks 
(Achrol, 1997). According to the works of Barker (1993) there are four types of control: firstly, 
simple control which is the direct, authoritarian and personal control that is exercised by the 
owner’s on employees; secondly, technological control which emerges from the physical 
technology of an organization; thirdly, bureaucratic control that derives from hierarchically based 
social relations of the organizations; and finally, concertive control. The latter type of control 
represents a shift in the locus of control from the managers to the employees; the employees 
achieve concertive control by reaching a negotiated consensus on how to shape their behaviour 
according to a set of core values of group norms. Concertive control, Barker (1993) argues, 
reflects the adoption of a new substantive rationality, a new set of consensual values by the 
organization and its members. Evidence from his research indicates that concertive control is 
stronger than coercive forms of control, this is because the created system of shared value 
consensus results in that employees enforce it on each other creating a powerful system of control 
and because the way it becomes manifested is subtle and less apparent than bureaucratic control.   
 
Power is not only viewed in relations to authority but it exists outside the formal structure of 
authority. Power is more effective when it is less evident (Clegg et al, 2005). The sources of 
power are information, expertise, credibility, stature and prestige, controlling uncertainty, access 
to top-level managers, control of money, sanctions, rewards, control over resources, being in a 
central position, and building alliances (Benfari et al, 1986; Boje and Whetten, 1981; Clegg et al, 
2005; Hinings et al, 1974; Jones and George, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). According to the 
strategic contingency theory of intraorganizational power an important determinant is the 
perspective of uncertainty (Hickson et al, 1971). The latter argues that when in an organizational 
form there is uncertainty and one actor manages to reduce it then they will gain power from that 
in spite of the existence of formal hierarchies, communication patterns and specified relations. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) approach power from a resource perspective. In the writings of 
Pettigrew (1977) and Mintzberg (1975) we view power in relation to organizational politics and 
strategy formulation, we also view power as deriving from the organizational culture. 
 
 “(decisions are) likely to threaten the existing distribution of organizational resources as 
represented in salaries, in promoting opportunities, and in control of tasks, people, information 
and new areas of business” (Pettigrew, 1977: 45). 
 
When one is trying to do something against the will of others from a superior position it is called 
authority and is considered legitimate. On the other hand when one wants to do something 
against the will of his superiors it is considered resistance and is illegitimate. Resistance as 
argued by Clegg et al (2005) is not always something bad, because organizations should not be 
seen as engineering systems which become more efficient as resistance decreases. Lukes’s (1975) 
theory on power identifies three dimensions of power: Dimension one is power that is exercised 
in order to secure the application of a decision when there is observable conflict and 
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disagreement. In this case the powerful impose their decision on the less powerful by observable 
behaviours. Dimension two is power that is exercised to keep issues on or off the agenda so that 
conflict or disagreement remains unobservable. This is the case when the decision-making is 
excluding groups even though the issue concerns them. So the powerful are excluding the less 
powerful from the decision making. Dimension three is institutionalized power, which is used to 
define reality for its members. In this case the powerful define reality for the powerless in the 
organization. The true grievances of the powerless are obscured or distorted by attracting their 
attention to other events. Lukes (1986) conceptualizes three different notions of power: condign 
power, compensatory power, and the conditioned power.  
 
“The conditioned power is exercised by changing belief. Persuasion, education, or the 
social commitment to what seems natural, proper, or right causes the individual to submit to the 
will of others. The shift in the source of power from personality and property to the organization 
resulted to an increase of the exercise of conditioned power. The organization is the most 
important source of power and management teams of specialists exercise conditioned power” 
(Lukes, 1986: 220).  
 
With reference to power in interfirm alliances we view that: 
 
“The problems in managing joint ventures stem from one cause: there is more than one 
parent” (Killing, 1982: 121). “A real alliance compromises the fundamental independence of 
economic actors… alliance means sharing control” (Ohmae, 1989: 143).  
 
Other things being equal, a partner desires more control the greater an alliance’s strategic 
significance to the partner. More control can be gained through ownership, by increasing equity 
share or through bargaining power, by making the alliance more dependent on the partner’s 
proprietary resources that are costly or impossible to replace (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 
2003). Control can be gained primarily by three means: price, authority, and trust (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992). As we find in the work of Pettigrew (1977) organizational politics, thus 
organizational power, derive from the following five areas: structural cleavages in the company 
among various component elements and identities and the different values associated with these, 
the complexity and degree of uncertainty, the salience of the issues for different actors and 
identities in the firm, the external pressure coming from stakeholders, or other organizations in 
the environment, and the history of past politics. 
 
Franchisors can still exercise various degrees of control over those working in the periphery. This 
extends to those with whom the flexible firm appears to have a commercial rather than 
employment relationship – the franchisees in our case. Franchisees have ownership over their 
stores, which would suggest that they have control, but they are still minority so this only ensures 
effective managerial control in practice (Belussi, 1987). Franchisees may be self-employed and a 
significant level of investment, risk, and independence may characterize their work, but working 
conditions differ little from those classified as employees (Felstead, 1993). Franchisees are 
legally independent from both their franchisor and others within the chain, yet they trade in more 
or less the same way, under the same brand name as those from whom they are autonomous 
(Felstead, 1993). In Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands where the labour market is more 
regulated there have been cases where franchisees had been considered employees (Der Spiegel, 
2 April, 1990). German courts have been ready to sustain claims that works councils for 
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franchisees should represent them to the level of franchisor and for franchisee’s employees 
(Felstead, 1993:201). This shows that franchisees are not independent and not fully dependent at 
the same time. According to Stanworth et al (2002) findings one should not have illusions of the 
fact that words like franchisee-independency are used only to attract prospective franchisees and 
do not represent the reality.  
 
“Just because the `independent contractor' has a stake in the business dressed up in the 
language of entrepreneurship is no reason to confuse this kind of business with a genuinely 
independent small business. The language of independence and entrepreneurship, it might be 
argued, is being used simply to tempt people into committing their efforts and resources since it 
exploits the cultural approval given to economic independence in capitalist society” (Stanworth, 
2002). 
 
Franchisors prefer as franchisees people without prior experience in the operational line of the 
franchise. The reason usually offered by way of explanation of this is that they are more 
amenable to training and operational compliance with the franchisors instructions and thus more 
amenable to be under the franchisor’s control (Stanworth, 1994). The implementation of 
conditioned power (Lukes, 1986) is also facilitated in the aforementioned case, which is the case 
of an uneducated and non specialized franchisee that has the illusion that affects the decision 
making of an organization only because they are part of a franchise network, when the franchisor 
is being administrated by a team of specialized, experienced managers. In the process as the 
brand becomes more famous and the franchisor gains more experience on how to manage and 
control franchisees the supply quantity of franchisees raises and so does the price that they have 
to pay to enter in the net. So franchisees bargaining power diminishes (Felstead, 1993). The 
increasing power of franchisor’s as the brand becomes more valuable and popular is also argued 
by Stanworth (1994), who claims that as franchise companies become well established, 
recruitment of franchisees becomes easier and selection procedures more rigorous. So franchisors 
exercise power and control over franchisees and can exploit the surplus of value of franchisees 
work.  
 
“The power to control or influence the other resides in control over the things he values, 
which may range all the way from oil resources to ego support. In short, power resides implicitly 
in the other’s dependence” (Felstead, 1993: 78). 
 
Evidence from Lafontaine (2001b) research on company ownership and managerial control 
indicate that franchisors manage their portfolio of company and franchised units to maintain a 
particular target level of corporate control and ownership of outlets. Franchisors with high brand 
name value (measured by advertising fees) target high rates of company ownership and exert 
more direct managerial control over the franchisees. High rates of company ownership provide 
for the franchisor higher incentives to maintain high brand value. According to this research the 
sectors that show the highest company ownership is the health and fitness, the eating places-fast 
food, and full service restaurants. The company ownership percentage in some well known chains 
was: Mc Donald’s 26.5%, Burger King 14.1%, Pizza Hut 49.2%, KFC 26.1%, Church’s Chicken 
67.3% and Hertz 66.1%. According to the same survey the ration of company-owned to 
franchised outlets does not rise or fall with experience or learning, or with success or failure 
(Lafontaine, 2001b). 
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In managing organizational power, one of the main strategies of normalization is empowerment, 
which is targeted by teamwork and by eliminating hierarchies (Clegg et al, 2005). In the writings 
of Sewell (1998) we see that teamwork is associated with the rhetoric of empowerment, trust and 
enhanced discretion and with the notion of giving away power. As Barker (1993) claims this is 
the type of concertive control, which is:  
 
 “a substantial consensus about values, high-level coordination, and a degree of self-
management by members or workers in an organization” (Barker, 1993: 180). 
 
Under this notion authority comes from an organization’s consensual, normative ideology instead 
of its structure of formal rules. Recent works on organizational culture identify the creation of 
culture as a mechanism of soft domination and they view it as rhetoric of control linked with the 
notions of teamwork, quality, flexibility, commitment and learning organizations (Clegg et al, 
2005). So the use of power becomes more subtle and it shifts from hierarchies to the team and 
socially created and generated rules. According to Barker’s (1993) writings this could result in an 
even tighter form of control based on peer surveillance. 
 
2.4.3.2.4.1. Network approach to restraint of power 
 
One of the key elements of embedded networks is the restraint of power, so it is an essential 
concept to analyse the nature and use of inter-organizational power in a network organization. In 
the pairwise paradigm power-dependence is viewed as an inter-firm organizing mechanism, as 
the mean by which control and coordination is extended to maximise efficiency and effectiveness 
of the inter-organizational relationship (Achrol, 1996). Franchisors have used various reward and 
coercive powers, such as offering or withholding favourable locations, delivery, payment, 
marketing discounts and legitimate authority, mainly contractual and market power based, which 
on the other hand are not prosperous for the evolution of the franchise network (Achrol, 1996). 
The more relational an exchange becomes the less likely the parties will exercise legitimate or 
coercive power (Macneil, 1981).   
 
Achrol (1996) claims that although power in network organizations is not defined in a 
hierarchical sense this does not mean that it does not play an important role in the governance of 
the system. It is rarely exercised by fiat and it is usually behind the scenes manoeuvring and 
consensus. It is based on the culture of belongingness and solidarity and on a solid web of inter-
organizational commitment, where committees are expected to act in the interest of the common 
good of the network. 
 
In analysing networks with vertical differentiation, status hierarchies and power derive from 
control over strategic interdependencies and have been approached from a power-dependency 
perspective and a resource-dependency perspective. In franchisor-centred systems (Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard, 1999; Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001), network centrality boosts power 
because the ability to control valued resources increases by the proximity of some members at the 
core of the system (Boje and Whetten, 1981). Network centrality is to be viewed through the 
structural embeddedness influence of social networks (Gulati, 1998). Apart from the issue of 
centrality, increased power of franchisors can be also explained through the concept of the 
‘tertius gaudens’ as conceptualised by Simmel (1950). The ‘tertius gaudens’ strategy provides the 
opportunity to exploit structural holes in social networks. That is by keeping unique connections 
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with members/franchisees in the network which the franchisor keeps disconnected from each 
other he can manipulate them to his benefit, the franchisor gets access to higher information and 
has more opportunities to exercise control (Burt, 1992; Simmel, 1950). These networks are 
named by Burt (1992) as low-density egocentric social networks and the tertius gaudens strategy 
can be also called a disunion strategy or an active separation strategy (Obstfeld, 2005). The 
problem of this tertius gaudens strategy and of deliberately keeping structural holes in franchising 
networks is that although it may lead to the creation of new ideas it does not lead to innovation 
and to the necessary adoption of action for innovation (Burt 1992, 2004; Obstfeld, 2005).  
 
The typology of power according to Burt (1977) consists of three aspects: control of resources as 
the bases of power, processes converting the bases of power into the manifestations of power, and 
the network of influence relations as manifestations of power. The same typology has been used 
by Boje and Whetten (1981) in analyzing power and hierarchies in inter-organizational networks. 
They argued that companies formulate strategies to improve their resource transaction position, 
which are limited by contextual constraints. Strategies and constraints determine the 
organizations position in the network, which translates into influence in the network. Bonacich 
(1987) researched power in relations to centrality in networks and found a negative relation 
contradicting previous findings. He argues that different types of centrality exist which depend on 
whether a network is local or globalised, on whether it is organised on hierarchy and on the 
existence of powerful partners, the only variable that had similar significance in all cases was 
one’s status as a function of the status of those one is connected to (Bonacich, 1987: 1181).    
 
Marsden (1983) has also used the typology of Burt (1977). In analysing power-dependency and 
control in networks Marsden (1983) argues that when access to resources is limited then the 
ability to exercise control is restricted. That is because an actor doesn’t have the possibility to 
conclude all rational transactions, because the set of actors that they can contact may not always 
include those with complementary patterns of interest and control. Therefore these mechanisms 
that limit the contacts of an actor create a network of access relationships and the position of the 
actor in this network defines the set of potential exchange partners. This set of partners is the 
suppliers and the consumers that he can contact to make an exchange. One way that such a 
network of restricted access relationships is created is through embeddedness. The social ties 
between actors in an embedded network create a sense of commitment and loyalty, the 
precondition of this network is mutual trust. Marsden’s (1983) research on networks with 
restricted access due to social structural restrictions, such as embeddedness, revealed that there is 
a reduction in the resource exchange among the members of the network, that actors well 
positioned in the network have higher power, and that these influence the efficacy of the overall 
system. The central position of the members is directly influenced by the assumption of 
leadership roles, having high reputation, participation in collective actions, having control of 
communication channels. He also concluded that the control of the resources has a partial 
influence in the centrality of the actors in a network. 
 
According to the writings of Achrol (1996) and Boje and Whetten (1981) the kind of power that 
is consistent with network organizations is the one that builds social bonds and close 
relationships, like expert, reputational, and referent types of power. Restraint in the use of power 
is one of the social norms of governance of network organizations (Achrol, 1997; Kaufmann and 
Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1981). The expert type of power is exercised through an ongoing 
programme of innovation, training and communication of competitive gains, market positioning, 
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customer satisfaction and effects of innovation to all the members of the network. Expert power 
is based in the special knowledge, skills and expertise that a leader possesses, it can be technical 
expertise or it can derive from decision making, planning and strategy formulation (Jones and 
George, 2003). The expertise once passed to the franchisee it is lost and therefore should be 
constantly promoted and communicated (Knight, 1986). The effective management of expertise 
according to Achrol (1996) demands that competitive gain, market positioning, effects of 
innovation and customer satisfaction are constantly monitored and communicated to the 
franchisees.  
 
Reputational and referent power are also hard to pin down. The stability of relationships, security 
of employment, and solidarity among member firms are critical elements of their reputational 
power. Another important element of reputation power is the feeling of belongingness, which can 
be promoted through interaction among members for joint decision-making; through security and 
stability of relationships, mutuality and solidarity. This type of power is exercised through 
processes of socialisation, peer review and consensus and not through executive fiat.  
 
Referent power is more informal than the other kinds of power, it comes from subordinates’ and 
co-workers’ respect, admiration, and loyalty (Jones and George, 2003). Marsden (1983) 
concluded that the central position of the members and thus their ability to exert higher influence 
is directly linked to the assumption of leadership roles, having high reputation, participation in 
collective actions, having control of communication channels. At the heart of the system with 
expert, reputation, and referee types of power is a system of cross-investments and 
interdependencies which create inter-organizational commitment (Achrol, 1997).  
 
2.4.3.2.5. Harmonization of conflict 
 
“Conflict is defined in terms of disagreement over goals, domains, and functions” (Achrol, 
1996:23). 
 
Conflict should not be viewed as a problematic situation between the relationships of 
stakeholders in a franchise net. It is the extreme situations that create problematic conditions and 
poison the relationship of franchisees and franchisor; it is the absence or the over-presence of 
conflict that could be the source of negative circumstances. (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2001; 
Thomas, 1976). Conflict is a state of mind and it has to be perceived by both parties involved in 
order to exist, otherwise there is no conflict.  
 
Based on the writings of Fox (1966) there are four different theoretical approaches to 
organizational conflict: the unitarist, pluralist, interactionist and radical. Unitarist sees 
organizations as essentially harmonious and any conflict as bad. It assumes that there is a 
commonality of interests between the stakeholders and de-politicizes the relationships in the 
working environment considering conflict to be peripheral. Conflict is considered to be a failure 
of co-ordination and communication or the result of deviant behaviour. In order to manage 
conflict theorists of this approach suggest individually focused and liberal-humanistic methods 
and consider that managers are able to control conflict if they apply the appropriate techniques. 
Pluralist sees organizations as a collection of groups, each with its own interests, therefore 
conflict is inevitable. It takes a political consideration and considers that conflict is a positive 
stage to prevent the ultimate breakdown. It is a warning mechanism that makes both parties 
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realize the course of the events and makes them adopt correcting behaviours. Therefore 
management is keeping the balance between conflicting goals, is managing differences and 
accomplishing compromises. Conflict maintains the vitality, effectiveness, and efficiency of a 
corporation (Fox, 1966). Interactionist sees conflict as a positive, necessary force for effective 
performance. It agrees with the pluralist approach and it argues that conflict has to be 
institutionalized within an organization through systems of collective bargaining. Conflict has to 
be encouraged in order for the evolution of a corporation, absence of conflict brings apathia, but 
too much conflict becomes dysfunctional. Finally, radicals see conflict as an inevitable outcome 
of capitalism. It is based on the Marxist approach. It sees conflict as inevitable since capitalists 
generate profits from the surplus value of labour and management will have to deal with tensions 
by limiting the effects of worker resistance (Fox, 1966). 
 
Conflict may arise primarily through two sources: inter-firm diversity, and actual or potential 
opportunism of alliance partners. Together these sources may help explain a significant portion of 
the high failure rates observed in alliances (Harrigan, 1988). Alliances bring together partners 
who may defer in two ways, each being able to arise conflict: Type I diversity includes the 
familiar inter-firm differences that alliances are specifically created to exploit, like reciprocal 
strengths and complementary resources. Type II diversity includes differences in partner 
characteristics that could affect negatively the longevity and effective functioning of alliances, 
like societal culture, national context, corporate culture, strategic direction, and management 
practices and organization. During the life of the partnership the dynamics of Types I and II are 
very differently impacted by the processes of organizational learning and adaptation, and thus 
destabilizing or fortifying the alliance (Parkhe, 1991).  
 
As we have already mentioned another factor that could cause conflict is opportunistic behaviour 
by an alliance partner.  
 
“Opportunism is behaviour by economic agents that involves self-interest-seeking with 
guile” (Williamson, 1975: 26). “Some agents behave in this fashion and it is costly to short out 
those who are opportunistic from those who are not” (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981: 351). 
 
Voluntary inter-firm cooperation is characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability to 
opportunism, because: alliances involve mutual interdependence, such that one is vulnerable to 
another whose behaviour is not under one’s control (Zand, 1972), there is only partial overlap of 
goals of the cooperating parties (Ouchi, 1980) and each firm exercises only partial influence over 
the outcome of the alliance.  
 
Excessive use of coercive power and force brings resistance and thus can be a source of conflict. 
Therefore organizations prefer more subtle mechanism of power (Clegg et al, 2005). Power can 
be used to prevent conflict by shaping: 
 
“perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that (people) accept their role in 
the existing order of things either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because 
they view it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial” (Lukes, 1974: 24). 
 
The franchise relationship is characterised by tension caused by the trade off between franchisees 
 75 
need to be autonomous and franchisor's need to be in control (Stanworth and Stanworth, 1999). 
Franchisors exercise power by enlisting the support of franchisees for the intensification of work 
rather than increasing work themselves by employing more labour within their firm and then they 
take a part of the increased revenue that the franchisees generate. There is a conflict of interest 
since franchisors generate profit from the surplus value of labour and this is the traditional 
conflict between owners of means of production and those who sell their labour power (Brickley 
and Dark, 1987; Felstead, 1993; Rubin, 1987). In the short run of the relationship when the 
franchisee is still in the dependant phase and when the broad recognition of the brand is a strong 
common goal the conflict of interest will remain hidden, in the long run though the conflict of 
interest will become evident and intense (Thomas, 1976). Then different advantages will need to 
be offered to keep franchisee motivation high (Peterson and Dant, 1990: 59). Such advantages 
maybe offer to successful franchisees opinion leader positions or franchisee of the year 
(Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996).  
 
The factors that motivate a person to become franchisee and thus affect their level of satisfaction 
from the system are: security-since the risk is lower that starting your own business 
independently-, team spirit – since they joined the franchise network to be part of a big team-, 
and self-esteem – since people that chose to become self-employed have more the need to feel 
self-esteemed, autonomous, prestigious, and in power; most franchisors use as an advertising 
slogan for prospective franchisees the ‘ability to become your own boss’ (Hall and Dixon, 1991). 
When the franchisee joins a network he usually is satisfied, but with the process of time problems 
may arise which can cause their dissatisfaction and lead to conflict. This can be described by the 
franchise relationship life cycle. It is the franchisor’s duty to be aware of this situation and to be 
able to prevent these problems from arising.  Dissatisfaction can arise from problems related to 
control issues. In the process the franchisee will realize that the level of control and power 
exercised by the franchisor is bigger than they thought, taking into consideration the fact that they 
will have gained experience of the market by then. So the franchisees need for self-esteem will 
not be met, creating high levels of dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction will grow by the danger and 
the fear of not getting a renewal to his/hers contract. Some franchisors actually use this case as a 
threat to control the franchisees. When areas of divergent interest also arise then there will be an 
inevitable conflict between franchisor and franchisee, if this conflict is let unmanaged it can 
develop severe problems. Therefore the franchisor has to develop a system to control the level of 
conflict. (Hall and Dixon, 1991) 
 
Usually there can be two kinds of groups of franchisees that can be formed according to 
Mendelsohn (1992). The group of the resentful and deluded ones that is hostile to the franchisor. 
The creation of such a group should be impeded by all means, but on the other side it indicates 
that the franchisor is doing something wrong. The other group that can be created is formed to 
resolve creatively the problems that may arise in the chain and does not represent a serious 
danger to the net. Therefore having a healthy communication is a way to overcome serious 
problems, which is in line with the theory of network organizations. 
 
Relationships between franchisors and franchisees possess for many reasons (i.e. profit, fees, 
territory, monitoring) the potential for conflict and the franchisor’s management system should 
keep it at manageable and non-destructive proportion (Stanworth and Curran, 1999). Sources of 
conflict in a franchise relationship (Felstead, 1993) can be: firstly, royalty fees that the franchisee 
pays to the franchisor periodically, which are usually a percentage on gross sales; secondly, the 
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prices of the supplies that the franchisor sells to the franchisees; thirdly, another issue that 
demonstrates the two parts conflicting interests is the fact that the franchisor targets the 
maximization of sales of the whole net while the franchisees target the maximization of profits 
within their own point of sales. Therefore the franchisor has the incentive to open more stores in 
close geographical areas even if this would mean to get some customers from the existing ones 
what is also known as the «cannibalization» of the chain, which would result in lowering the 
franchisee’s profits. 
 
Moreover, the franchisor sets price ceilings on the products/services based on their goal to 
maximize sales of the whole net and given the condition that prices have to be the same for the 
entire system. On the other hand franchisees may realize that in their spot of sales the demand is 
inelastic so there are opportunities for price and profit margins increases. So there is an 
inconsistency of goals since the franchisor sets prices under a maximization model of sales, while 
the franchisee would set prices under a maximization model of profits of their own point of sales. 
Furthermore, conflict could arise from ownership changes of the whole franchise system 
(Felstead, 1993). Finally, organizational change can lead to conflict. The inability of an 
organization to cope with change or to be able to manage effectively the chosen change strategies 
can create an even more turbulent environment (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2001). 
 
The focus of the traditional organization according to Achrol (1996) was in maximizing 
cooperation, which was often viewed as the contractual obligations and minimizing conflict and 
opportunism, while the focus of the network organization is on the relational ties and how to 
develop mutually reinforcing, long-term relationships. Therefore harmonization of conflict is the 
degree to which the exchange partners rely on trust and other internal processes rather than 
arm’s-length bargaining and legal enforcement in order to manage conflict (Dong-Jin, 1997; 
Macneil, 1980). Uzzi (1997) identifies as one of the most important features of embedded ties the 
existence of joint-problem solving arrangements that enable actors to coordinate functions and 
work-out problems, which take the form of routines of negotiation and mutual adjustments so as 
to harmonize the presence of conflict.  
 
2.4.3.2.6. Solidarity 
 
Solidarity is the extent to which the safeguarding of the distinctive relationship is internalised by 
the exchange partners as being important in and on itself (Jensen, 1997). There are two types of 
solidarity, the first is the individual preservation, it refers to the safeguarding of memberships in 
the relationship, and the second is the collective preservation, which refers to the safeguarding of 
the larger relationship. The contracting parties expect that this relationship will continue for an 
indefinite period (Macneil, 1980).  
 
Solidarity refers to the notion of unity among members of the network; it is the common 
conscience, a norm of stability, preservation and sometimes sacrifices (Achrol, 1996). Unity and 
fellowship appear when there are common responsibilities and interests; therefore the same 
mechanisms that cultivate commitment and interdependence facilitate solidarity, like cross 
investment, joint projects, and participation in joint committees, i.e. franchises could promote 
innovation programmes at the regional levels. Solidarity can be cultivated by offering assistance 
in the form of finances, management, technology, sales orders, and deferred payments when it is 
needed to support the franchisee in crisis (Achrol, 1996). It can also be fortified when a group is 
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directed against external groups like competitors, so franchisors could adopt communication 
programmes that emphasize achievements in common responsibilities, and competitor oriented 
research, goals, and strategies. 
 
2.4.3.2.7. Mutuality 
 
Mutuality has two elements: acting in the interest of the mutual good and equitable sharing of 
future benefits and burdens (Achrol, 1996) and is: 
 
“The extent to which contractual monitoring of individual transactions is tempered by 
trust” (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992).  
 
In franchise systems standardization of operations is a very crucial part and contracts are formed 
in a way to ensure the performance of individual transactions. The monitoring of the performance 
and the presence of norms of mutuality in networks can make sure that members act in the best 
interest of the network without direct supervision and control. Another facet of mutuality is that 
when members can see the long term potential, stability, and regularity of benefits they can 
sacrifice short term gains in favour of the network goals. This can be accomplished by offering to 
franchisees long-term membership such as stock or options in the franchisor company, multi unit 
franchises, career opportunities in franchise management and appointment to prestigious councils 
(Achrol, 1996). 
 
2.4.3.2.8. Flexibility 
 
Flexibility is defined as: 
 
“The bilateral expectations that the substance and terms of exchange are subject to good 
faith modification and adaptation if environmental changes so require” (Heide and John, 1992).  
 
Franchisors can facilitate the creation of the norm of flexibility by sharing research and analysis 
of the environment with its members, and by guaranteeing that franchisees have the chance to 
take part and share in the benefits of changes or adaptations proposed (Achrol, 1996). 
 
2.4.3.2.9. Role Integrity 
 
“Role integrity is seen as complex and extending beyond transactions” (Kaufmann and Dant, 
1992). 
 
Role integrity is a sign of the degree to which parties in an exchange maintain highly complex 
and multidimensional roles, forming a network of relationships that is more than purchasing and 
selling (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). In the network the roles are multiplex, and have inter 
linkages between internal rules, social customs, future expectations, and span a range of 
obligations. According to Achrol (1996) another important aspect of role integrity is to preserve 
the domain of members: the identity, markets, customers, technology, functions and other normal 
responsibilities that define a member’s role as an independent entity and as a part of the network. 
Franchises often create internal competition and challenge the norm of role integrity; by 
operating multiple channels were customer segments are not well defined, over saturating a 
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market and replacing franchisee units with company owned.   
 
2.4.3.2.10. Flow of Information and Communication 
 
Above all organizations are communicating units (Clegg et al, 2005).  Early organizational 
communication research investigated the flow of information in hierarchies and how it influenced 
efficiency. It is assumed that the more hierarchical an organization, the more specialization, 
formalisation and centralisation exists then the more restricted communication is.  
 
According to the organizational behaviour theory communication ensures that employees act 
according to management’s decisions as instructions flow from the top to the bottom. From a 
cultural perspective the process of communication produces and shares common meanings and 
interpretations in order to achieve openness, trust, commitment and collaboration (Clegg et al, 
2005). From a power perspective the process of communication is a mean to manage conflict and 
to achieve control. According to a recent approach of the discourse theory, communication is 
seen as discursive, both verbal and non verbal, both writing and speaking, both formal and 
informal, and it informs about organizational actions and decision-making processes (Clegg et al, 
2005).  
 
“Communication conveys all organizational attempts to create an organization’s most 
powerful point of differentiation – its identity” (Clegg et al, 2005: 315) 
 
As we find in the writings of Littlejohn (1989) there are four levels of communication: dyadic 
communication, it’s an interpersonal communication based on interdependence; small group 
communication, when group dynamics influence the whole decision making; organizational 
communication, which is seen as patterns of shared meanings and understandings; and finally, 
mass communication, which is between the organization and its audience. We can also identify 
three types of communication based on its audience: intraorganizational, inter-organizational and 
with the wider society. The case of inter-organizational communication is becoming essential for 
organizations which rely for many reasons on inter-organizational collaboration and networks 
(Clegg et al, 2005). As we find in the writings of Irwin and More (1994) networks in order to 
grow need mutual trust and consensus which can only be achieved through communication. 
Networks require a great deal of coordination, cooperation and bargaining, which in cases create 
conflict and coercion, the latter can only be managed through communication and non-
communication.  
 
According to Obstfeld (2005) the exchange of information and communication among members 
in a dense network where social norms are present lead to the creation of knowledge and 
especially to the sharing of complex knowledge. It also creates the dynamics for the appearance 
of action that leads to innovation (Obstfeld, 2005); ‘a firm’s capacity to integrate knowledge 
represents a critical competitive advantage’ (Obstfeld, 2005: 107). Communication should be an 
essential part of an organizations strategy (Hatch and Schultz, 2001).  
 
Evidence from Battilana and Dorado (2010) and Mair and Sezgi (2011) research on social 
enterprises scaling stretch the importance of communication mechanisms to ensure value 
congruence among the systems members, the emergence of commitment and the creation of a 
strong identity of the social venture. Leonidou (2003) has also stretched the importance of the 
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element of communication in inter-organizational relationships and has approached it from the 
relational paradigm. The formal and informal use of information and meaning between the 
exchange parties is essential for the relationship. Information exchange in embedded ties in 
comparison to arm’s length ties is more proprietary, it includes information on strategy and profit 
margins, it brings tacit knowledge through learning and is holistic in nature (Uzzi, 1997). 
Alliances sometimes arise on the basis of already existing personal friendships, the growing body 
of shared information and mutual knowledge help the development of trust in alliances and the 
sense of shared identity which solve issues of control, integration and learning (Child and 
Faulkner, 1998). 
 
“Networks have influence primarily through their channelling of information, if one is to 
observe dynamics at the network level it is valuable to assess how the content of information 
flowing through those networks may change over time” (Gulati, 1998:307). 
 
Informational advantages to organizations from their prior ties constitute a specific type of 
strategic resources called network resources. According to the structural approach to networks, 
the firms’ centrality in networks is an indicator of the measurement of accessible information 
(Gulati, 1999; Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001). To manage communication successfully in 
networks there is the need for two distinctive roles that of the boundary spanner, this person 
represents the organization’s views to its partners and also collects information from them, and 
that of the interlocker, this person works for both organizations and so has access to information 
that the boundary spanner as an outsider has not (Wenger, 1996).  
 
2.4.4. Formation, Partner Selection, Governance and Performance  
 
At this section we present a theoretical debate on the dependent constructs of our study which are 
formation, partner selection, governance, and performance of social networks and social 
franchising. In reviewing literature we identified that to raise understanding of social franchising 
we have to see the determinant elements that shape and constrain decision making with reference 
to these strategic issues (Parkhe, 1993). This thinking is supported also by the writings of Gulati 
(1998) who argues that the phenomenon of alliances can be better investigated and understood 
when viewed in the sequence that it occurs, that means decision to enter an alliance, the choice of 
appropriate partners, the choice of structure for the alliance, the dynamic evolution of the alliance 
and the performance of the alliance relationship. He argues that an organization’s social 
connections are closely related to the process that underlies an organization’s entry into new 
alliances. At the following sections we critically evaluate existing literature, we elaborate on its 
weaknesses which we try to address through the network theory approach. We bring together 
theories on social entrepreneurship, alliances, networks and franchising. 
 
 
2.4.5. Motives for social inter-firm alliance and social venture network formation 
  
Existing research on inter-firm alliances has attempted to answer the research question of why 
and when alliances are formed (see Table 2). Institutional theorists have been based on the works 
of  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who argue that the engine of rationalization that makes firms 
more similar, without necessarily making them more efficient, is the result of three institutional 
isomorphic processes: coercive, mimetic and normative. It is argued that firms yield in 
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isomorphic pressures and mimic other firms that have entered alliances (Grifitths, Gundry and 
Kickul, 2013; Korosec and Berman, 2006; Meyscens and Carsrud, 2011; Venkatraman, Koh, and 
Loh, 1994). Institutional approaches have been used in analysing formation of franchising 
(Barthelemy, 2011; Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni, 2009; Gauzente and Dumoulin, 2012; 
Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013; Young and Merritt, 2013). Stanworth and Curran (1999) 
identified the influence of societal (from the cultural, economic and political context), 
organizational and individual factors in the formation of franchising activity. Transaction cost 
theory suggests that alliances are intermediate hybrid forms between markets and hierarchies that 
happen when the transaction costs of an exchange are too high for a market exchange but not so 
high for a vertical integration (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Glaister, 2004; Hennart, 1988, 
1991; Stanworth and Curran, 1999; Williamson, 1975, 1985). From an agency theory perspective 
alliances have been seen as a mean to lower moral hazards by residual claimancy instead of 
monitoring (Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1996).  
 
From a population ecology and resource scarcity theory perspective social enterprises address 
natural and environmental constraints and resource scarcity constraints by forming 
interorganizational relationships and entering into social venture networks thus responding to 
selection pressures and achieving survival (Meyskens et al, 2010a). From a resource-based 
perspective social venture networks and social alliances are formed so that firms can acquire 
resources. These resources are combined by enterprises to help them achieve competitive 
advantage. Resource-based theory views the formation of social venture networks as a mean to 
allow for the exchange of resources and the achievement of the social objectives of social 
enterprises (Barney, 1991, 1999; Glaister, 2004; Kogut, 1988; Meyskens et al, 2010a; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Tallman, 2000). From a corporate strategy perspective firms enter alliances to 
improve their strategic position (Kogut, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988).  
 
Table 4 Literature Review on Theories of Motives for Alliance and Franchise Formation 
 
Authors Date  Theory on Motives for Alliance/Franchise Formation 
Alon 1999 Expectation of rapid cash and risk of competitor international expansion 
Alon and Welsh 2002 Regional economic integration 
Balakrishnan 
and Koza,  
1993 Trust from prior ties, social networks 
Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 
2000 New product creation, industry transitions, competition 
Baucus et al 1993 Self-employment and executive redundancies  
Beamish and 
Banks 
1987 Transaction cost motive formation for international horizontal diversification 
Contractor and 
Lorange 
1988 Seven overlapping objectives: risk reduction, economies of scale and/or 
rationalisation, technology exchanges, co-opting or blocking competition, 
overcoming government mandated trade or investment barriers, facilitating initial 
international expansion, and vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the 
complementary contributions of the partners in a value chain 
Dees et al 2004 Increase impact of social objectives 
Dong-Jin 1997 Relational exchange and transaction costs; economic ethnocentrism, cultural 
distance, uncertainty, exporting performance and duration of relationship 
Ellram  1991 Financial, managerial and technological motives 
Eroglu 1992 A conceptual model based on a cost/benefit framework of analysis of the 
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determinants of the internationalization of franchising 
Gulati 1995 Resource considerations, a quest for complementary skills and mainly direct or 
indirect ties between firms influenced the formation of alliances 
Gulati 1998 Social networks and the channel of information, embeddedness  
Gulati et al 2000 industry structure, positioning within an industry, inimitable resources and 
capabilities, contracting and coordination costs and dynamic network constraints 
and benefits. 
Hall and Dixon 1991 Growing role of services and self-employment  
Heide 1994 Social networks and channel of information through access, timing and referrals 
Huybrechts and 
Nicholls 
2013 Institutional organizational legitimacy; pragmatic and moral legitimacy 
Huszagh et al 1992 Motives of financial and managerial resources lead to franchising.  
Kogut 1988 By the organisational learning motive, by the transaction cost motive and by 
strategic behaviour  
Lafontaine  1992 The need for fast growth.  
Leonidou 2003 Social networks and channel of information through access, timing and referrals 
Lyon and 
Fernandez 
2012 Increase impact of social objectives 
Mair and Sezgi 2011 Increase impact of social objectives  
Martin 1988 Motives of financial and managerial resources lead to franchising  
Meyskens and 
Carsrud 
2011 Institutional theory and resource acquisition 
Millington and 
Bayliss 
1995 Organizational learning  
Nicholls 2008, 
2009 
Increase impact of social objectives 
Parkhe 2003 Organizational learning and network membership 
Paswan, 
Loustau, and 
Young 
2001 Industry dynamics and home-market saturation 
Peterson and 
Dant 
1990 Franchisor and Franchisee motivation patterns  
Powell et al 1996 Network membership 
Sakaraya et al 2012 Coercive, cognitive and normative; alliance-driven objectives and partner-driven 
objectives. Social enterprises ‘altruistic’ objectives 
Sanghavi 2002 Business growth, brand name global, the image, positioning value, ego 
satisfaction 
Shane 1996 The need for fast growth 
Sorensen et al  2013 Social networks and channel of information 
Stanworth and 
Curran 
1999 A sociological approach by evaluating the influences of formation, growth and 
survival of franchise networks at three levels: societal, organizational, and 
individual.  
Stanworth and 
Kaufmann 
1996 Franchisee motivation patterns, a social theory of motivation in the area of 
franchising 
Stugley 1983 Transaction cost motive formation for international vertical integration 
Tracey and 
Jarvis 
2007 Agency theory and transaction theory in social franchise 
Waddock 1991 Market failures and interdependencies 
Walker 1989 Unsolicited enquiries from potential franchisees 
Wille 1988 Three categories: resource-driven alliances, market-driven alliances, risk-driven 
alliances 
Whipple and 
Gentry  
2000 Financial, managerial, technological and strategic motives 
Uzzi 1997 Social networks, embedded ties, relational and structural embeddedness 
 82 
Zahra et al 2009 Market failures and unmet social issues 
 
The nationalities of partners, the motives and goals for entering alliances, and the formal 
structures used to organize partnerships have all become increasingly varied (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). According to Contractor and Lorange (1988) there are seven overlapping objectives for 
which companies tend to form cooperative ventures: risk reduction, economies of scale and/or 
rationalisation, technology exchanges, co-opting or blocking competition, overcoming 
government mandated trade or investment barriers, facilitating initial international expansion, and 
vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary contributions of the partners 
in a value chain. Based on the motivations that form the alliances we have three categories: 
resource-driven alliances, market-driven alliances, risk-driven alliances (Wille, 1988). Modern 
alliances are driven by multiple motivations, i.e. the focus now is on the creation of new products 
and technologies, and partnerships are often forged during industry transitions when competitive 
positions are shifting (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000).  
 
Kogurt (1988) analysed alliances being driven by the organisational learning motive, when firms 
learn or seek to retain their capabilities, by the transaction cost motive, when firms want to 
minimize the sum of production and transaction costs and by strategic behaviour when firms 
want to enhance their competitive position or market power. Using the transaction cost motive, 
Stugley (1983) studied the case of alliance formation for international vertical integration, while 
Beamish and Banks (1987) examined the choice of alliance formation for international horizontal 
diversification. According to the writings of Vyas, Shelburn, and Rogers (1995) on inter-firm 
alliances there are six dimensions along which alliances are being formed: intra/inter-industry 
alliances, arena of alliances, alliances built on relationships, influence of technology and market 
related factors-like distribution channels, synergy, diversification, sourcing raw materials-, 
alliances driven by state of technology, and alliances to produce technology fusion. They also 
define the octopus strategy, which is the case when multidivisional companies from Japan, EU 
and the USA join forces to create multiple inter-firm alliances.  
 
Sakaraya et al (2012) argue that resource dependence theories are not sufficient in explaining 
social alliances which can be resolved by the perspective of institutional theory. Coercive forces 
can be related to regulatory pressures from a local government, legal status and reporting 
requirements which a local partner may be familiar with. Normative forces can be related to 
various norms of a specific industry, like knowing the right people in a government or even 
bribing authorities, which a local partner can bring in the alliance. Mimetic powers maybe 
associated with the need of an organization to mimic other organizations in the way they 
overcome institutional constraints thus avoid being an outsider in close communities or having to 
bribe; thus choosing a local partner to achieve these (Meyskens and Casrud, 2011). Social 
alliances can be a respond to the need of social enterprises to scale up and increase the impact of 
their social venture (Bishai et al, 2008; Bradach, 2003; Dees et al 2002; 2004; Leadbeater, 2006; 
Mair and Sezgi, 2011; Nicholls, 2008; 2009; Piggot, 2004; Sakaraya et al, 2012; Samuelson, 
2010; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007; Waddock, 1991). Huybrechts and Nicholls (2013) analysed the 
formation, partner selection, framing and evolution of social partnerships through an institutional 
perspective of organisational legitimacy and found that moral and pragmatic legitimacy 
influences the aforementioned constructs. 
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The emergence of social partnerships and alliances is due to the same issues, such as market 
failures and social problems that have led to the emergence of social entrepreneurship (Zahra et 
al, 2009); ‘the dominant precondition for the emergence of social partnerships is the existence of 
a problem that is indivisible’ (Waddock, 1991:486). ‘Environmental turbulences’ lead to higher 
levels of uncertainty and resource interdependences of organizations, so organizations have to 
enter into joint actions and resource exchanges to solve these problems (Waddock, 1991).  
 
Social alliances aim in raising the effectiveness and efficiency of social enterprises through 
leveraging resources (Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011). Types of these resources are: a) human, like 
volunteers as board members, trustees, staff and pro-bono consultants and from paid full-time 
and mostly part-time staff; b) social capital, which refers to resources gained from relational and 
structural embeddedness that emerges through the relationships of actors and their positioning in 
networks; c) financial capital, like grants and investment capital coming from formal institutions- 
i.e. the EC, governments and local authorities-, the social investment market, philanthropy, 
religious entities, communities and individuals, the latter group provides resources through crowd 
funding platforms and from fees paid by customers; d) physical resources, like space coming 
from incubators and other organizations and location; e) organizational resources, like systems, 
distribution channels, structure and planning; and finally, f) intangible resources, like tacit 
knowledge, learning new skills, leadership, organizational styles, values, culture, reputation and 
innovation (Meyskens et al, 2010a). Especially in developed countries social alliances allow 
social entrepreneurs to overcome formal and informal institutional barriers and to overcome 
higher resource restraints that social ventures face (Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011). The findings 
of Meyskens et al (2010b) study suggest that social entrepreneurs follow similar operational 
processes in managing resources as do mainstream entrepreneurs. Resource-based theory views 
the formation of social venture networks as a mean to allow for the exchange of resources and the 
achievement of the social objectives of social enterprises.  
 
Evidence from Sakaraya et al (2012) research in corporate-social partnerships formation 
identified that motives can be grouped in two categories: alliance-level objectives and partner-
level objectives. Alliance-level objectives apply for both social enterprises and corporations, they 
are joint value creation, which refers to the joint products or services produced, and building 
community capacity, which refers to interaction with disadvantaged groups. The partner-level 
objectives for corporate partners are stakeholder appreciation and enhanced reputation and image 
and for social enterprises are fund raising and enhanced visibility and image. In terms of inputs 
the corporate partner provides mostly financial resources and organizational infrastructure, while 
the social enterprise partner provides knowledge, networks and expertise. Evidence from Mair 
and Sezgi (2011), Lyon and Fernandez (2012), and Dees et al (2004) research on scaling social 
enterprises identified that the motives for the formation of interfirm alliances and affiliations 
were the increase of the social impact, rather than organizational motives. In live with the above 
results both Sakaraya et al (2012) and Waddock (1991) research identified that the motives of 
social enterprises for scaling were ‘altruistic’ in nature.  
 
According to the findings of Child and Faulkner (1998) motives for network formation are: to 
reduce uncertainty, to provide flexibility, to provide capacity, to provide speed, to provide access 
to resources and skills and to provide information. Dong-Jin (1997) approached formation 
through relational exchange theory and transaction cost theory; his findings indicate that 
economic ethnocentrism, cultural distance and decision making uncertainty influence 
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opportunism, which in turn affects relational exchange in alliances. Relational exchange, 
exporting performance and the duration of the business relationship also affect the decision to 
form an alliance.) Recent research identifies two, sometimes related, motives for alliance 
formation: organizational learning and network membership (Millington and Bayliss, 1995; 
Parkhe, 2003; Powell et al, 1996). 
 
“Recent research has shown the importance of embeddedness for alliance formation, its 
results indicated that motives were not only financial and technological, but also how firms are 
embedded in social networks between firms” (Gulati, 1998: 301).  
 
Gulati (1998) research indicates that organizations that decide to form alliances face moral hazard 
concerns, which are due to opportunistic and unpredictable behaviour of partners, and thus 
alliances are considered risky. Also changes to the environment may change a firm’s needs and 
orientation thus making the relationship even more unpredictable. Therefore organizations in 
order to enter into alliances that would help them satisfy their needs and at the same time 
minimize the risks should have information about potential partners, their needs and 
requirements, and their reliability.  
 
According to Sorensen et al (2013) the positioning of social enterprises in networks with close 
connections with other members increases the opportunity for social alliance formation. 
Meyskens and Carsrud (2011) research argues that social partnerships have positive effects in the 
formation and performance of social entrepreneurial ventures.  Social networks and the channel 
of information explain the formation of alliances (Gulati, 1998; Sorensen et al, 2013). Network 
theory suggests that organizations rely to existing networks to find information that lowers search 
costs and the risk of opportunism. It also argues that social networks can both restrict and enable 
the alliances a firm enters. Network theory suggests that the motives for alliances are based on 
economic motivations and strategic complementarities. According to existing research the social 
structure of resource interdependence is an important determinant of the formation of ties 
between firms which suggest that resource considerations and a quest for complementary skill is 
a valuable incentive for the formation of alliances (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
Sorensen et al, 2013), but that these alone are not sufficient conditions for alliance formation. 
 
“…The channelling of information helps organizations to discover new alliance 
opportunities and can affect how often and with whom they form alliances…it is a firm’s 
network that helps it identify new alliance opportunities and chose appropriate partners that 
possess the complementary assets…In the case of inter-firm alliances their accumulation can also 
become a social network, therefore they can be investigated through network theory perspective 
as both endogenous and exogenous factors. In the first case we see the influence of social 
networks for the formation of an alliance and in the second case we see how the effects of social 
networks explain the accumulation of alliances” (Gulati, 1998: 293-317).  
 
“Embedded ties primarily develop out of third–party referral networks and previous 
personal relations... The structural consequence of the formation of dyadic embedded ties is that 
they generate a network of organizations that becomes a repository for the accumulated benefits 
of embedded exchanges” (Uzzi, 1997: 47-48). 
 
Trust from prior ties can be an indicator of alliance formation and partner selection. Prior ties can 
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also be a negative experience and resulting in firms not forming further alliances between them or 
when it is a positive experience it can help control adverse selection problems since firms can 
have firsthand reliable information about each other and promote repeated ties (Balakrishnan and 
Koza, 1993).  
 
The informational advantages to firms from a network can enable the creation of new alliances by 
three means: firstly access, which refers to information about current or potential partners on their 
capabilities and trustworthiness, secondly timing, which refers to having informational benefits 
about potential partners at the right moment, and thirdly referrals, which is the fact that existing 
partners of a firm may refer it to other firms for alliances (Gulati, 1998; Heide, 1994; Leonidou, 
2003; Sorensen et al, 2013). Gulati’s (1999) findings indicate that accumulated network resources 
arising from firms’ participation in a network of accumulated prior alliances are influential in 
alliance formation. Network resources are influential advantages of firms from their prior ties. 
They are considered competitive advantages because they are specific types of resources that 
provide the strength to a company in order to conceive and implement its strategies (Barney, 
1991), The larger the information the greater the opportunities from network resources, critical 
factors influencing network resources are the frequency of past ties and the identity of partners 
(Gulati, 1999). 
 
In line with that, experience shows that the first franchisees that enter a system are members of 
the family of the franchisor or personal friends, because also at the first stage the level of 
confidence to franchisees is low (Felstead, 1993). 
 
In the writings of Whipple and Gentry (2000) on networks and motives for alliance formation we 
find four categorisations of motives, the first three are based on the work of Ellram (1991) and 
are: firstly, financial like economic performance and stability, sharing business risk, economies of 
scale, joint product development (Clegg et al, 2005); secondly, technological like gain of 
technological capabilities from new technologies, sophisticated information capabilities, R&D, 
process improvements, new products, higher quality of goods and services (Achrol, 1996; Clegg 
et al, 2005); thirdly, managerial like easier management from having reduced number of 
suppliers, quality improvements, effective marketing, support, supply chain efficiency (Barney, 
1991, 1999; Glaister, 2004; Kogut, 1988; Tallman, 2000); and fourthly, strategic like competitive 
advantage (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Day, 1994; Kogut, 1988; Larson, 1992; Ohmae, 
1989), new products/market, and differentiation (Ansoff, 1957). 
 
While Gulati and Singh (1998) used the following motives for alliance formation which are 
similar to the aforementioned ones: sharing costs/risks, access to financial resources, sharing 
complementary technology, reducing time span of innovation, joint development of new 
technology, access to new markets, access to new products, sharing production facilities. The 
latter typology of motives has been also used by Contractor and Lorange (1988). 
 
Gulati et al (2000) studied the factors that lead to the incorporation of strategic inter-firm 
networks and found them to be: industry structure, positioning within an industry, inimitable 
resources and capabilities, contracting and coordination costs and dynamic network constraints 
and benefits. 
 
 86 
2.4.5.1. Motives for franchise formation 
 
“To understand how and why the franchise partnership is created a clear explication of the 
incentives of each party is needed” (Peterson and Dant, 1990).  
 
Coming from the third school that views franchising as a unique phenomenon that cannot be 
sufficiently explained by existing theories we have the works of Stanworth and Curran (1999) 
who attempted to bridge this gap by creating a theoretical overview of franchising through a 
sociological approach building on existing literature and suited to quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches. They created a general theory of franchising by evaluating the influences of 
formation, growth and survival of franchise networks at three levels: societal, organizational, and 
individual. The model takes the form of 15 general propositions. The three levels interconnect 
and overlap. In more detail the elements that were identified as catalytic in formation growth and 
survival are the following: 
 
Franchising at the societal level: Cultural, the extent to which economic individualism is a valued 
means of initiating or operating economic activity. Where value is strong we can expect franchise 
to prosper. Economic, to the extent that the economy contains a high proportion of tertiary 
activities, there is greater likelihood of the franchised business form. Political, the emergence and 
survival of franchised business forms depends on state attitudes to small enterprises (Stanworth 
and Curran, 1999). 
 
At the organizational level: Rapid market penetration, franchise organizations will be common 
where an initiating organization, relatively small, seeks rapid market penetration through multiple 
outlets dispersed over a wide geographical area. This will be reinforced when the initiating 
organization find franchisees the most attractive or the only source of capital to fund the 
expansion. Divergent economies of scale, when the linked production and marketing processes of 
a product or service involve strongly divergent or split economies of scale franchising may 
emerge. Format permanence, the franchise business form is a relatively permanent and genuine 
form and unlikely to lapse into vertically integrated hierarchical organization, this may happen 
but there is no evidence of a pattern or cycle of development Relationship management. 
Franchise failure rates (Stanworth and Curran, 1999).  
 
At the individual level: Route into self-employment, the franchised business form will exist most 
successfully in societies where there is a supply of individuals positively committed to economic 
individualism in the form of small business ownership. Unemployment push, franchising may be 
attractive to individuals constrained by the dynamics of labour market. Prior self-employment, a 
substantial minority (one third to one half) will be drawn from those with previous experience of 
self-employment. Complexity of franchisee motivation, it will be more varied and complex than 
being simply an expression of profit maximization desires or a solution to hierarchical control, as 
agency theory tends to suggest. Intrinsic/extrinsic goals, for franchisees with no prior self-
employment experience, independence, and autonomy act as strong early motivations. For those 
with prior self-employment experience, such intrinsic goals may yield to extrinsic such as 
security and profitability, but intrinsic goals will remain significant. Franchisor advertising will 
acknowledge the importance of both kinds of goals. System Innovation, franchisees will make 
substantial contributions to innovation such as new product development or pioneering ways to 
adapting to local conditions like cultural differences and as the system grows and matures this 
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contribution will be formalized. Contemporary views of autonomy, the franchise business may 
realize the cultural values of independence, autonomy, material rewards, and even creativity more 
effectively than other forms (Stanworth and Curran, 1999). 
 
Stanworth and Curran (1999) argue that at the macro level of analysis cultural, economical, and 
political contexts may be favourable or unfavourable to franchising. In the mid of the 20
th
 century 
economic individualism was being destroyed by large-scale bureaucratic firms. Towards the end 
of the century the need for customer-organization interface through small-dispersed outlets was 
pushing towards decentralization and multi-establishment operations, which produced problems 
of personnel motivation, supervision and quality control. Therefore corporations needed to seek 
for another way to retain control, one such strategy was franchising. Moreover, large corporations 
had to deal with globalization and problems of synchronizing national, regional and community 
levels. Thus a network organization, of which franchising is an important form, emerged 
(Stanworth and Curran, 1999). Driven by turbulent, dynamic and knowledge rich environment 
large vertically integrated value-addition-chain systems evolve into more efficient, flexible and 
adaptable network governance systems, which allow open access to information and are not very 
rigid in terms of meshing of systems entities (Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001). Network 
systems are also more efficient in obtaining, retaining, and using knowledge (Achrol, 1997; 
Achrol and Kotler, 1999). 
 
According to Stanworth and Kaufmanns’ writings (1996) franchisee motivation patterns will 
probably occur with certain regularity required to back up a social theory of motivation in the 
area of franchising. The study adopted an ‘Action frame of Reference’ based on Weber, Parson, 
Mead and Silverman. Results showed that slightly over 50% of prospective franchisees were now 
or prior self-employed both in the US and the UK, slightly over 50% wanted a sector where they 
had no prior experience, except for business services, food, retail, building, automotives and 
printing. The majority did employ staff. US respondents were running larger businesses and had 
more money to invest. The reasons why they chose franchise according to this study were 
independence, proven business system, known trade name, and reduced risk. 
 
“Franchising has grown rapidly the recent years and this can be due to several reasons. 
The most important is the growing role of service activities; many sectors are personnel-intensive 
and rely on the existence of a distribution network with a large number of outlets dispersed 
geographically” (Hall and Dixon, 1991).  
 
Another factor is the growing interest for self-employed activities and the importance that has 
been attributed to entrepreneurship in modern western economies (Hall and Dixon, 1991). There 
is a big trend towards small firms and there is also an extended literature that encourages the 
small entrepreneurship. In recent years, entrepreneurs and "corporate dropouts" or former 
Executives (Fortune 1991) have turned to franchising as an attractive alternative to traditional 
forms of organization (Baucus et al, 1993). As Stanworth (2002) argues in the final two decades 
of the 20th century, in sharp contrast to earlier trends and predictions, self-employment has 
grown faster than civilian employment in most OECD economies. 
 
The growth of franchising can be also due to the fact that:  
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  “The new systems are situated on the burgeoning ‘new economy’ of the high technology 
–like virtual businesses- and often are linked to the trend of big organizations to go outsourcing 
or sub-contracting to small businesses many of their activities, while they are focusing on their 
core activities” (Stanworth, 2002).  
 
The benefits and thus motives for both parties entering a franchise venture can be summarised as 
following. The franchisor experiences firstly, rapid business growth. 
 
“Firms use franchising when they want to grow faster, implying that franchising allows 
franchisors to relax some form of constraint on their growth” Lafontaine (1992: 281)  
 
“Hybrid organizational forms like franchising may be valuable when firms want to grow 
faster than the rate of expansion of their managerial capacity” (Shane, 1996).  
 
At the same time it provides rapid geographical growth, it strengthens the brand name and it 
increases the convenience and accessibility of a broad clientele. It also provides economies of 
scale to the markets of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, by accomplishing better 
deals with companies offering services: like marketing, construction, insurance, equipment, 
computerization, etc. Financing the business growth with investment capital accomplishes 
diversification of business risk. At the same time the organizational structure remains simple, 
thus accomplishing lower administrative leverage. Moreover, franchisees have high incentive to 
function for the maximization of the chains performance, so there is a high commitment strategy. 
Also, small and large firms alike use franchising to overcome the problems of stretched financial 
and managerial resources (Huszagh et al, 1992; Martin, 1988).  
 
Other motives for franchisors are the steady and frequent flow of profits from the franchisees to 
the franchisor in the form of royalties and the steady flow of information about the trends of the 
market which allows them to easily adapt. Furthermore, the franchise system offers increased 
control to the franchisor over the distribution because the franchisee is obliged to buy only from 
the franchisor, it offers the franchisee’s experience of the sector and it increases the intangible 
value of the company. Apart from that it offers higher credibility and access to the financial 
systems because of the existence of the chain (Mendelsohn, 1993; Stanworth, 1995a, 1999). 
Franchising creates also defence mechanisms to multinational organizations.  
 
“…It offers a solution to promoting or defending market share for companies at both ends 
of the polarization trend between small and large scale organizations” (Sanghavi, 2002).  
 
“The argument that franchisors chose franchising only because of capital constraints is 
not strong, because firstly there would be a trend to reduce their reliance on franchising as they 
grow stronger, which has not been established empirically, secondly it is not unusual for 
franchisors to provide financing to franchisees and finally a risk averse franchisor could obtain 
cheaper capital by offering shares of all his outlets to his store managers” (Lafontaine, 1992). 
 
Franchisees are supposed to gain- and thus their motives for entering into a franchise agreement 
are-: minimization of business risk, guarantees for a successful and profitable performance from 
early stages, continuous support to all business aspects and problems, benefits from the 
economies of scale that are created, and ability to offer products at very competitive prices. 
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Moreover, franchising offers to franchisees benefits from the national or international marketing 
that the franchisor conducts and of which the franchisees incurs only a small percentage. The 
franchisees remain legally independent businessmen and yet benefit from the brand name and 
trademarks of the franchisor. Furthermore they benefit from the continuous development and 
evolution of the system, from the continuous access to information for the rest franchisees and 
competitors. Also the franchising businesses are supposed to be less vulnerable to external shocks 
during recession. Recent data from the US, the UK and Greece indicate that the latter argument 
has been confirmed and that franchise systems resisted stronger to the recent recession (see 
Chapter 1.3). Franchisees enjoy the benefits of the umbrella effect since they are part of a 
credible system. Finally, the control that the franchisor exercises can be to the benefit of the 
franchisee since it secures the smooth functioning of the system and it is a disincentive to ‘bad’ 
entrepreneurs as it protects the system from the phenomenon of adverse selection and moral 
hazard that can appear in an umbrella system (Mendelsohn, 1993). 
 
2.4.6. Partner selection criteria 
 
2.4.6.1. Introduction 
 
“Identifying and selecting a partner is possibly the most important consideration in 
establishing a cooperative venture” (Lane and Beamish, 1990 cited in Parkhe, 2003). 
 
 “Success of an alliance is heavily dependent upon the partners’ behaviour” (Gulati, 
1998:301). 
 
 “Alliances involve close interaction and interdependence between two parties making 
common cause when their interests run parallel to each other” (Ohmae, 1989).  
 
The second strategic phase when analyzing alliances and franchises is the issue of partner 
selection, which is also closely linked to the motives for alliance formation.  
 
2.4.6.2. Social inter-firm alliances partner selection process 
 
Most theories on partner selection according to Gulati (1995b; 1998) have been based on 
resource dependence theories that suggest that firms create ties with partners that can help them 
manage strategic interdependencies, when one firm has resources or capabilities beneficial to but 
not possessed by the other. Harrigan (1985) and Lynch (1989) have suggested that partners 
should be complementary in the products, geographic presence, or functional skills that they 
bring to the venture. Apart from these, as Beamish (1988) has emphasized it is important to select 
a partner with whom trust already exists or can be established. Geringer (1991) separated task- 
and partner-related dimensions of partner selection criteria and concluded that observed 
variations in the choice of criteria used to select alliance partners might be attributable to 
differences to the specific competitive circumstances confronting the proposed venture. Partner 
selection has been also explained through the perspective of knowledge transfer between partners 
(Simonin, 1999), cultural factors (Fedor and Werther, 1995), and a firm’s home market 
relationships (Elg, 2000).  
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Theorists have also attempted to explain franchisee selection through agency theory (Doherty, 
2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003; Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b); according to this 
approach three problems may arise from partners’ selection: adverse selection, moral hazard and 
holdup. In the case of social franchising where monetary objectives are not that important the 
most important threat is through adverse selection which could lead to serious losses for the 
social franchisor (Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b). The selection criteria provide to 
franchisors a control strategy in minimizing ex-posts costs that could arise from adverse selection 
and moral hazard threats from franchisees (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). The 
characteristics that have been identified as elements that franchisors assess during the filtering 
stage are: personality, age, professional and industry experience, entrepreneurial background, 
financial robustness, psychological profile, educational background, linkages with local networks 
and knowledge of local sector (Doherty, 2009; Sivakumar and Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b). 
Sivakimar and Schoormans (2011a) conclude in that mainstream franchising criteria are equally 
applied to social franchisee partner selection criteria. Theorists argue that approaches on selection 
criteria are ‘outdated, narrowly focused and unreliable’. Other theorists argue that personality 
characteristics have not been researched, although evidence suggests that they are significant 
determinants of the quality of exchange relationships (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009:91). 
 
Porter and Fuller (1986) identify six criteria for partner selection: possession by the partner of the 
desired source of competitive advantage, the need for a complementary or balanced contribution 
from the partner, a compatible view of international strategy, low risk of the partner becoming a 
competitor, a pre-emptive value in relation to rivals and high organizational compatibilities. 
Kanter (1994) links the process of selection to the personal-relationships and identifies three 
factors: self-analysis, chemistry, and compatibility. Child and Faulkner (1998) identify two 
factors: strategic fit and cultural fit based on which many theories have been developed. 
 
  “Franchisors have often gone on record as preferring potential franchisees from outside 
the operational line of the franchise in question. In order not to introduce pre conceived ideas or 
‘bad habits’ and ‘contaminate’ the rest franchisees” (Felstead 1994: 85). 
 
 The reason usually offered to explain this is that they are more amenable to training and 
operational compliance with the franchisors instructions and thus more amenable to be under the 
franchisor’s control (Stanworth, 1994). 
 
According to Huszagh et al (1992) research small franchise systems succeed internationally when 
significant financial, managerial, and marketing expertise is contributed by local franchisees. 
Hadjimarcou and Barnes (1998) researched the case of internationalization by relatively new and 
small franchisors. They concluded that the importance of alliance from the host country and the 
issue of partner selection are critical to the franchise operations. They suggested that sensitivity to 
host country culture and the advantages gained from a partner that represents this culture are very 
big.  
 
The issue of partner selection is a vital first step to the success of social franchises; unlike 
commercial franchises where the strong brand plays a vital role the social franchises depend 
highly on the performance of social franchisees (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a). The 
partner selection process is harder for social franchisors than mainstream franchisors as the 
partners have to be able to meet both financial and social objectives (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007; 
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Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a). According to Battilana and Dorado (2010) research the 
criteria could be either to selects partners with strong socializability skills or with specific 
sectoral capabilities. In the former case partners can help create a strong network identity but 
could have implications in growth. In the latter case partners with specific sectoral capabilities or 
specific capabilities in meeting social objectives could provide growth benefits but could impose 
a threat in emerging conflict; this is because  different institutional logics would have to co-exist 
in the network and intra-network conflicting groups maybe formulated 
 
Network theorists claim that interdependence can explain the formation of ties between some 
firms, but is not adequate to explain the alliance formation and thus partner selection (Gulati, 
1998). According to network theory familiarity with potential partners is likely to lead to joint 
venture formation (Gulati, 1995; Glaister, 2004). The decision of an organization to form an 
alliance is closely linked to its decision for an appropriate partner and may even be determined by 
that partner’s availability, it is the network that allows to firms to learn about new alliance 
opportunities and to overcome the fears associated with such partnerships through the 
mechanisms of access, timing and referrals (Gulati, 1995b, 1998; Stuart 1998).    
 
As evidence by network theorists suggests, we will analyse the motives for franchise formation 
and the criteria for partner selection as two facets of the same decision, thus as one construct. 
 
 
 
2.4.7. Governance structure 
 
2.4.7.1. Introduction 
 
“An important aspect of the significant growth of inter-firm alliances the last twenty years 
is the increasing diversity of the alliances, which suggests that there are significant variations in 
the formal structure of alliances” (Powell, 1990). 
 
The governance structure of the alliance is the formal contractual structure participants use to 
formalize it (Gulati and Singh, 1998). It has been defined as a “mode of organizing transactions” 
(Williamson and Ouchi, 1981) or: 
 
“(Governance is) a short end expression for the institutional framework in which contracts 
are initiated, negotiated, monitored, adapted and terminated” (Palay, 1984: 265). 
 
When we talk about contracts we do not refer necessarily to the formalised legal binding 
documents (Heide, 1994). The different types of alliances’ governance structures are based on the 
degree of hierarchical elements and on the extent to which they reproduce control. So at one end 
there are the joint ventures and at the other end are alliances that share no equity and have few 
hierarchical control mechanisms of organizations (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1987; 
Hennart, 1988). Hierarchical controls are viewed as a mechanism to manage uncertainty in the 
inter-firm relations (Gulati, 1998) and existing literature has approached these issues from 
different perspectives. Various typologies of alliances based on equity and other parameters have 
been discussed in Chapter 2.5.3 
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2.4.7.2. Theories on inter-firm alliances and social venture networks governance modes 
 
Research on governance structures of inter-organizational exchanges has been approached by 
various perspectives: game theory (Axelrod, 1984), transaction costs economics (Williamson, 
1975; 1985), microeconomic approach of marketing channels literature (Stern and Reve, 1980),  
behavioural paradigms of marketing channels literature (Hunt, Ray and Wood, 1985), 
relationship management (Heide, 1994), relational contract law (Macneil, 1978, 1981), argument 
of embeddedness and social network theory (Hakansson, 1987; Gulati and Singh 1998; Sharma, 
1998),  agency theory (Lafontaine, 1992; 2001b), resource dependence and resource-based 
theories coming from organization theory (Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Meyskens et al, 2010a; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), entrepreneurial theory (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009; Zahra et 
al, 2009), institutional theory (Arrighetti et al, 1997; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Grifitths, 
Gundry and Kickul, 2013 Korosec and Berman, 2006) and other.  
 
Research on transaction-cost economics has been based on the writings of Williamson (1975; 
1985). Some transactions because of transaction-specific investments and external and internal 
uncertainty have higher transaction costs and therefore cannot take place at the market level. 
Transaction-specific investments give rise to safeguarding problems, external uncertainty cannot 
be predicted ex-ante and gives rise to adaptation problems and internal uncertainty gives rise to 
evaluation problems. These three sources of problems rise transaction costs. So the solution 
would be internalisation of the transaction. If internalisation is not feasible or desirable then 
hybrid governance structures will be selected (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Heide, 1994; 
Parkhe, 2003; Williamson, 1975). 
 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) used transaction cost theory to explain the structure of the 
franchise organizations. After a franchise agreement is established the parties face ex post 
transaction costs: bargaining costs (are expenditures associated with negotiation between 
transacting parties; long-term franchise agreements do not eliminate them, i.e. franchise partners 
keep negotiating about order quantities and delivery schedules), monitoring costs (are 
expenditures made to guarantee the fulfilment of contractual obligations, i.e. franchisees dedicate 
effort to ensure that shipments are accurate and timely), and maladaptation costs (are embodied 
for communication and coordination failures between parties to a contract, i.e. they franchisor 
may benefit from making a product/service available for selling to franchised outlets without 
providing instructions regarding the use and sale of the product) (Williamson, 1985: 21). 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard’ study (1999) concluded that franchisor opportunism is associated 
positively with franchisee bargaining, monitoring, and maladaptation costs, thus transaction 
costs. 
 
Franchise relationships are subject to moral hazard on the part of the franchisor as well as the 
franchisee (Lal, 1990). As Parkhe (2003) claims ex-ante and ex-post safeguards exist to defend 
against opportunism, like alter alliance’s payoff structure to reduce gains from cheating, or 
increase gains from cooperation or increase costs of agreement violation. 
 
“Franchisors/ees are opportunistic in their behaviour, for example franchisors are 
opportunistic when they develop national promotional campaigns for products but fail to ship 
appropriate quantities of the product to franchisees, which also results in higher transaction costs” 
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(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999: 161).  
 
According to the model created by Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999), opportunism is a determinant 
of multiple facets of ex post transaction costs and is associated positively to them. They 
concluded that inter-firm cooperation (which refers to the interaction between principals and 
agents to coordinate marketing strategies) and formalization (which refers to the level that rules 
and procedures govern the relationship between inter-organizational partners) are control 
structures negatively related to franchisor opportunism, under the condition that rules and 
procedures recognize complementary responsibilities and convergent goals.  
 
“Franchised systems should audit the level of cooperation and formalization operating in 
the channel continually in order to minimize opportunism and lower transaction costs” 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999: 167). 
 
According to the new institutional model franchise minimizes transaction costs of shirking, as 
well as excessive consumption of leisure and weak corrective incentive structures. Managers of 
company owned stores, even if they have performance related payments they do not have the 
same incentive as franchisees. On the other hand the more concentrated geographically company 
owned stores get the lowest get the monitoring costs, and it is more profitable for a manager to 
monitor several units. Moreover, because of the franchisees’ incentive to free ride there is the 
pattern of both company owned and franchise ownership outlets within a chain (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987; Felstead, 1993; Rubin, 1987).  
 
“Contracts must incorporate sanctions and safeguards that limit the liabilities incurred as a 
consequence of dealing with opportunistic trading partners” (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999: 
162).  
 
It is critical to ensure that franchise partners do not shrink contractual responsibilities (Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard, 1999). Participative decision-making is critical to the maintenance and 
development of the inter-organizational franchise relationship (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). 
Especially knowing when theory suggests that the system is designed, developed, perfected and 
initiated by the franchisor, who controls all aspects of the system including communication and 
flow of information, therefore it is a very franchisor-centred system (Paswan, Loustau, and 
Young, 2001). 
 
Much research coming from the marketing channels literature has approached the issue of 
governance of inter-organizational relationships through a microeconomic approach which is 
based on the neoclassical economic theory suggesting that the decision is based on economic 
efficiency and on a cost analysis (Stern and Reeve, 1980). Another approach is through the 
behavioural paradigm which has viewed governance as the issue of establishing and employing 
power and control opportunities (Hunt, Ray and Wood, 1985). This latter approach has failed to 
specify the relationship between power and performance or to address the effect of contextual 
variables like when specific power strategies are suitable (Heide, 1994). Felstead’s (1993) 
research on franchising through the economic perspective is viewing the issue of governance 
through a power and control analysis. Both approaches offer limited explanations into the 
specific mechanisms that can be used to govern inter-organizational relationships (Heide, 1994).  
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According to resource dependence and resource scarcity approaches social enterprises need 
resources that are owned by other organizations and so enter into inter-organizational 
relationships with them to acquire access to these resources; the acquisition of scarce resources 
by organizations explains their positioning in social venture networks and thus their ability to 
have a dominant role (Meyskens et al, 2010a). The resource-dependence theory is based on social 
exchange theory (Emerson, 1962) of power-dependence relations and views governance as a 
strategic response to conditions of uncertainty and dependence (Meyskens et al, 2010; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1974; 1978). So firms in order to reduce uncertainty and manage dependency they will 
use various governance structures to formalise their relationships and increase coordination. 
Another important determinant of governance structure is the social structure of resource 
dependence between partners and so particular governance structures maybe selected to control 
specific resource asymmetries (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Baker, 1990). 
 
According to the resource-based theory of the firm the management control will be structured in a 
way to help the acquisition of competencies and is driven by strategic motives (Glaister, 2004).  
The governance of social venture networks in which actors (like organizations, governments, 
social enterprises, beneficiaries and community groups) are embedded will be formed in a way to 
allow for the acquisitions of resources (social, financial, human, physical and intangible) to gain 
competitive advantage and create social and economic value and to help to the growth and 
development of individuals, communities and regions (Meyskens et al, 2010a). The acquisition of 
resources is strongly influenced by social capital (or relational and structural embeddedness), by 
the existence and content of the relationships between inner network actors and among networks 
as well as by the positioning and diversity of location of actors ties (Meyskens et al, 2010a). 
Rubin (1987) applied the theory of the firm to investigate issues of franchise governance.  
 
Lafontaine (1992) argued that franchisors adjust to differences in risk, supervision problems and 
capital constraints more often through their contract mix decisions than through their contract 
terms, since they typically offer a single franchise contract at a point in time, which tends to be 
relatively stable over time. So she argues that it is more valid to focus on studying the proportion 
of franchise stores rather than the terms of the franchise contract when studying governance 
structure. Lafontaine (2001b) applied agency theory persective to analyse the governance of 
international franchises. She conducted a research on large geographical dispersed chains with 
international operations and experience in master franchising and concluded that they have the 
same extent of company owned versus franchised stores worldwide as in their domestic market. 
Moreover, the financial contract terms set by the franchisors, in the vast majority of cases, are 
exactly equal to those set in their home market.  
 
“Consistent with agency-theory arguments, the few firms that do use a differentiated 
contractual structure tend to be those with more international experience and a more delegated 
approach” (Lafontaine, 2001b). 
 
It can be argued that the organizational structure is the skeleton of the company where as control 
and culture provide the muscles, nerves and sensations that allow regulating and governing 
(Jones and George, 2003). We can identify three types of control; the output control, through 
financial measures, organizational goals and operating budgets, the behavioural control, by direct 
supervision, management by objectives, bureaucracies, formalisation and hierarchies, and finally, 
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the clan control. The latter being the way to govern through the values and norms of an 
organization’s culture (Ouchi, 1980).  
 
In the case of behavioural control through hierarchies we see that as companies grow, managers 
need to develop a clear hierarchy of authority in order to be able to coordinate the organizational 
activities (Blau, 1970). The hierarchy of authority is an organization’s chain of command, 
specifying the relative authority of each manager. By authority we mean the power to hold people 
accountable for their actions and to make decisions concerning the use of organizational 
resources. As hierarchy rises, the organization becomes less flexible, managers’ response to 
changes slows and costs rise from the existence of many managers. Also communication 
problems arise, resulting in more time-consuming decision making, and in the accidental or 
intentional distortion of commands and orders (Jones and George, 2003). Hierarchy creates 
unacceptable levels of organizational inertia that impedes the organization to respond to turbulent 
environments and to manage efficiently information (Achrol, 1997).  
 
Based on Sharir and Lerner (2006) findings the governance of social enterprises based on 
behaviour, decision making, skills and mix of the board of directors and board of trustees- who 
are often pro-bono members- are important contributors to the success of a social enterprise but 
there was no indication of a significant correlation among boards and success.  
 
In the case of the clan control we see that employees internalise organizational values and norms, 
and then let these values and norms guide their decision and actions. Norms are unwritten 
informal rules or guidelines that prescribe appropriate behaviour in particular situations, they 
emerge from values and have the same function as formal rules and direct supervision, thus as the 
hierarchical controls (Lebas and Weigenstein, 1986). An organization may intentionally choose 
to encourage and develop the organizational values and norms that are suitable to their task, 
environment, strategy or technology (Feldman, 1984) as there should be coherence between 
structure and task (Mintzberg, 1981). According to Ouchi (1980) when a strong and cohesive set 
of organizational values and norms exist, then employees act for the best of the organization in 
the long-run. What keeps partners together in alliances is not only the expectation of gains but 
rather values and common interests (Ouchi, 1980).  
 
According to Gulati and Singh (1998) previous research on governance structure has been 
inadequate because of two reasons. Firstly it has been based on transaction cost theory suggesting 
that hierarchical controls are a response to appropriation concerns in alliances and even research 
on the theory of the firm has suggested, they argue, similar moral hazard concerns as a reason 
why firms integrate power relations. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) argue that traditional 
transaction cost economics and agency theory leave a void in the study of governance modes 
because they ignore the issue of trust and of equitable outcomes, they focus on a single 
transaction as a unit of analysis and they are static in their approach. As we find in the writings of 
Heide (1994) both microeconomic approaches of marketing channels literature and transaction 
cost theory are limited in that they fail to analyse the relationships between contracting firms.  
 
Appropriation concerns come from contracting hazards and behavioural uncertainty at the time 
the alliance is being formed, difficulties of specifying intellectual property rights, challenges of 
contractual monitoring and enforcement, cost uncertainties, problems in observing partner’s 
contributions, and all these aggravate the potential for moral hazards. Hierarchical controls 
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enable monitoring and provide incentives and the greater the appropriation concerns from an 
alliance the higher the hierarchical controls will be (Glaister, 2004; Williamson, 1985). 
Appropriation concerns are influenced by two conditions: firstly, the presence of a technology 
component in the alliance, that is because it is difficult to monitor and codify the knowledge and 
fears of free-riding and possible appropriation of key technology by the partner arise so 
hierarchical controls will be higher, and secondly, the appropriability regime in the industry 
which is the degree to which firms can capture the rents generated by their innovations; the 
strength of this condition is related to the patent strength, the value of first mover advantage, and 
the ability to maintain the secrecy of an innovation, the weaker it is the more the hierarchical 
controls will be (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
In addition to that Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest that there are also concerns on anticipated 
coordination costs that influence the governance structure of an alliance. Gulati and Singh (1998) 
researched the level of coordination costs in alliances and found them to be very indicative of the 
governance structure that would be chosen. Coordination costs arise from the interdependence of 
tasks across organizational boundaries and the complexity of coordinating activities to be 
completed jointly or individually, they also derive from the division of labour and the uncertainty 
originating from the need to coordinate interdependent subtasks. When interdependence or 
coordination costs rise they can lead to an increase to information-processing costs, to pressure 
for fast responses and to conflict all these can ultimately lead to a drop in performance (Gulati 
and Singh, 1998).  
 
Interdependence between partners can vary at one extreme an alliance may have a simple 
division of labour with minimal ongoing adjustments or at the other extreme there may be 
anticipation of a complex and overlapping division of labour that demands mutual adjustments 
between partners and require each partner to link specific activities with other partners regularly 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
“Interdependence is a vital element that holds the network into a stable, cohesive and 
mutually oriented economic system and leads to attitudinal commitment which provides the 
foundation for the development of social norms of governance” (Achrol, 1996:12).  
 
The higher the anticipated level of interdependence between alliance partners the greater the 
expected coordination costs will be, so partners will have to create mechanisms through their 
governance structure to be able to process information (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Hierarchical 
controls institutionalize or formalize interactions between partners and reduce uncertainty for 
future tasks they can also decrease coordination costs by informal means, by creating a moral 
sense of shared purpose and minimize conflict. Coordination costs are managed by hierarchies 
through planning, rules, programs and formalised procedures (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; 
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
 
“Franchisees will make substantial contributions to innovation such as new product 
development or pioneering ways to adapting to local conditions like cultural differences. As 
system grows and matures this contribution will be formalized” (Stanworth and Curran, 1999). 
 
Waddock (1991) produced a typology of social partnerships based on multiplexity and on joint-
problem solving perspective. He argues that the type of social partnership that will be formed and 
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the number of partners is dependent on interdependence and on the structure and salience of the 
problem. Three types emerge: the systemic social partnerships, when interdependence is high 
organizations commit at a strategic or institutional level and the need of interaction among top 
managers is needed; the federation partnerships when interdependence is medium; and the 
programmatic partnerships when the problems are structured, so interdependence is low and the 
partnerships includes interaction of low level managers. If there is a fit among these elements 
then social partnerships tend to be more successful (Waddock, 1991).  
 
Secondly according to the writings of Gulati and Singh (1998), prior research has been restricted 
because theorists have classified alliances as equity and non-equity and have considered shared 
equity synonymous to hierarchy. They argue that shared equity offers only a partial measure for 
categorising types of governance structure. 
 
“Equity stakes provide a mechanism for distributing residuals when ex-ante contractual 
agreements cannot be written to specify or enforce a division of returns” (Teece, 1992: 20).  
 
As we find in the writings of Gulati (1998) a major drawback in the traditional literature on 
governance structure is that the thinking is static and ignores the influence of time and experience 
to alliances governance structure. They argue that appropriation concerns and coordination costs 
can be controlled through the emergence of trust and social norms in alliances. 
 
Network theorists believe that: 
 
“The governance structure may be the result of previous alliances and of the prior 
interaction between partners that may change the thinking of firms when forming contracts” 
(Gulati, 1998:303).  
 
Multi-unit ownership as opposed to single-unit ownership emerges as a compelling typology in 
studying governance structures. Multi-unit ownership being an accumulation of alliances between 
the same partner actors provides many advantages to franchisors, minimising threats of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, of free riding and shirking, rapid system growth, system-wide 
adaptation and uniformity, and the strategic delegation of quantity or price choices; the multi-unit 
franchisee gains subsystem scale economies as well as higher control advantages in the wider 
system (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). The profile of franchisees of multi-units is more 
entrepreneurial than single-units which could be seen as a ‘controlled self-employment’. 
Evidence from research suggests the correlation among personality traits of franchising partners 
and governance structure mode (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). 
 
The appropriation concerns of firms when forming alliances can be minimized either by a 
detailed contract or by trust (Gulati, 1998). According to contractual theory the relationship 
between contracts and trust has been widely researched implying that contracts can offset 
cooperation; that law is inversely related to cooperation (Arrighetti et al, 1997). There are three 
types of contractual approaches the classical contract law based on strong legal agreement that 
provision for all cases; the neoclassical contracts where assets are specified but flexibility is 
allowed; and relational contracts were the focus is on ongoing cooperation, flexibility, building 
trust, and self-regulating mechanisms based on social norms of governance (Arrighetti et al, 
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1997; Williamson, 1995). Evidence from Arrighetti et al (1997) cross-country research supports 
the significant role of trust in the formation and governance of inter-firm alliances as opposed to 
contracts. Social venture networks governance is based on relationships and trust (Meyskens et 
al, 2010a). The embeddedness of alliances in trusting relationships has as a result that the partners 
are likely to have greater confidence in the predictability of each other’s actions and thus 
appropriation concerns will be lower when forming the alliance. 
 
“The primary control mechanisms that govern economic transactions between firms are 
price, authority, and trust, therefore if there were trust firms would not find hierarchical controls 
necessary” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).  
 
Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that inter-firm trust can also control coordination costs since 
partners are more likely to be aware, or to have the willingness to become aware, of rules, 
routines, and procedures without the need of formal hierarchical control. Coordination costs 
would be also reduced in the case of inter-organizational trust promoted by prior networks. In 
Gulati and Singh’s (1998) writings it is stated that the presence of trust in alliances can reduce 
adverse selection problems. Therefore Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that network embeddedness 
can promote trust, which can control both coordination costs and appropriation concerns and thus 
partners are likely to promote fewer hierarchical controls.  
 
According to the findings of Gulati and Singh (1998) alliances in which there is less trust 
between partners are more likely to be organized with more hierarchical governance structures 
that those in which there is greater. Repeated ties diminish the use of hierarchical controls, 
regardless the type of their prior alliances.  
 
According to the relational contracting theory of Macneil (1978; 1980; 1981) relational exchange 
is formed by the historical and social context in which transactions take place. Enforcement of 
obligations is viewed as being based on the bilateral relational aspects that govern the 
relationship between the contracting parties. He differentiates relational exchange from discrete 
exchange, the latter is the case of transactions as defined by the classical and neoclassical 
economic theory where actors remain autonomous, pursue their self-interests and rely on 
economic and legal sanctions. It is a unilateral governance mode based on hierarchical command. 
As we find in the writings of Rubin (1978) and Heide (1994) franchising is considered often a 
unilateral governance mode as the franchisor specifies standard operating procedures, incentive 
systems, monitoring mechanisms and termination clauses. Sharma’s (1998) research identifies 
three factors that govern exchange in international inter-firm alliances which manage to control 
opportunism and prevent exit from the alliance, these are: relational, ethical and institutional. 
 
“Governance is a normative process in which the members of a system come to adopt the 
norms of the larger system through socialization efforts… deviance or opportunism is dealt with 
in a proactive fashion; members use self-control based on their internalised values” (Heide, 1994: 
74). 
 
Although this approach encompasses the social structure within which exchange is embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985), Macneil’s theory has been criticised as failing to make explicit predictions 
with regards to the conditions under which bilateral structures are appropriate in dealing with 
performance ambiguity and offers only general assumptions that bilateral elements are required 
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for a set of parties to project their exchange into the future (Heide, 1994: 74). 
 
An important notion of norms is the fact that they are a system of voluntary shared values. In 
addition to that there has to exist a notion of sanctions for non conforming behaviour, the latter is 
seen through the force of social obligations and not through hierarchy. For a system of sanctions 
to exist there has to be some sort of denial of privileges, roles and status for the non conforming 
behaviours. The mechanisms that institutionalise these social sanctions have to be though peer 
processes of a self-regulated system where transparent communication and free flow of 
information exists about all members of the network (Achrol, 1997). Even when actors do not 
value certain norms and reject them, evidence suggests that they will conform to the majority of 
the norms (Packer, 2008). Granovetter (1985) argues that embedded partners in social networks 
put the networks in risk if they act opportunistically and they emphasize the presence of 
mechanisms to impose social costs and, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim, to lose social 
legitimacy by having a reputation of a cheater. Social norms emerge partially from direct, 
utilitarian roots related to social sanctions and reputational loss by acting opportunistically (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1992). 
 
Social inter-firm alliances are associated with a long-term horizon of cooperation which is mutual 
to all partners, there is a level of risk-sharing and exchange of information; this can take a formal 
contractual form or be based on informal agreements (Arrighetti et al, 1997). Social partnerships 
have shared responsibilities and power, they interact to mutually implement and manage 
activities, they must be committed to a common goal, they lie on a common shared set of values, 
and their purpose has a social positive impact; their structure is that of a network (Sakaraya et al, 
2012; Sorensen et al, 2013; Vock et al, 2013; Waddock, 1991).  
 
Network organizations are organised on decentralized authority which is based on the social 
norms of mutuality, solidarity and commitment, where committees act in the interest of the 
common good of the network (Achrol, 1996). Coercive types of power are replaced by expert, 
reputational and referent types of power (Achrol, 1996). Evidence from Mair and Sezgi (2011) 
research indicates that the issue of the type of control systems of the governance of social 
enterprises affiliations when scaling up should be based on informal mechanisms like 
communication, mobility and training (that account for higher commitment) when a social 
enterprise wants to maintain higher control levels and both operational and value consistency. 
The elements of control and resource dependencies were also identified by Lyon and Fernandez 
(2012) as determinants in the choice of the governance mode of scale up strategies of social 
enterprises.  
 
Social entrepreneurs function in environments with inadequate governance and control 
mechanisms (Zahra et al, 2009). The existence of institutional plurality which is more possible to 
arise in social partnerships that have to combine different logics (logics guide actors’ beliefs and 
behaviour) through their hybrid nature of having at the same time social nonprofits logic and rely 
on the logics of a specific sectoral business logic, can lead to the emergence of conflict. The 
network to overcome conflict and institutional plurality needs to create a strong identity based on 
a specific set of values and behaviours. The mechanisms that are employed to achieve this are 
through hiring or partner selection and through socialization policies (Battilana and Dorado, 
2010). These mechanisms used are in line with Mair and Serzgi (2011) research and are: 
communication, training, and incentive systems of collective performance and group activities.  
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Evidence from Leadbeater’s (2006) research suggest that the governance of networks of social 
entrepreneurship are based on five key factors: firstly, an open and inclusive leadership style; 
secondly, shared platforms where there is free access and open flow and sharing of information; 
thirdly, on a pragmatic philosophy of social innovation which allows for experiments, trials and 
errors; fourthly, on a high distribution of resources to all agents of the networks; and finally, on a 
collaborative and conversational engagement which allows for shared responsibility, there are 
clear rules but also ability to mutate, adapt and evolve for a fast growing network to survive. In 
investigating cross-national best practices of social enterprise the conclusions of Alvord et al 
(2004) indicate that the significant element is the ability of leadership- either of the individual 
social entrepreneurs or of groups- on managing relationships and establishing networks among 
diverse constituents. Their scale up is either organic by investing in organizational and 
management systems or through the establishment of social inter-firm alliances; a drawback in 
the latter is that the size of the venture remains small because the impact depends on allies rather 
than on organizational resources (Alvord et al, 2004). In the case of social franchising this 
weakness is offset as the social alliances are all part of the same network and investment in 
organizational capacities (like management systems, staff development, and performance 
evaluation and reporting systems) is a pre-requisite for its formation.  
 
 
 
2.4.8. Performance  
 
2.4.8.1. Introduction 
 
“The issue of measuring the performance of an alliance has received less attention 
because of various difficulties, such as measuring indicators and collecting data, as a result it 
remains one of the most exciting and under explored areas of alliance research” (Gulati, 
1998:308).  
 
This process becomes an even bigger challenge for social enterprises and social franchises as 
social outcomes and social impact have to be measured and evaluated and a balance has to be 
kept among social and financial objectives (Meyskens et al, 2010a; Nicholls, 2010b; Zarha et al, 
2009).  
 
2.4.8.2. Measuring performance social inter-firm alliances&social venture networks 
 
In measuring performance one approach is in the use of objective measures, like financial 
indicators, market share, survival and alliance duration, but these measures have been criticized 
as being too narrow. Research indicates that multiple performance measurements should be used 
(Sharir and Lerner, 2006). 
 
“So researchers have began to use indirect criteria for assessing alliance outcomes like 
fulfilment of major strategic needs and indirect performance indicators (net spill over effects for 
parent firms, the alliance’s profitability relative to its industry, and overall performance 
assessment by responsible parties)” (Parkhe, 1993b).  
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In social partnerships the performance is measured with regards to the actual delivery of the 
desired outcomes that benefit all partnering organizations, so all members must receive benefits 
(Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011; Meyskens et al, 2010a); the benefit that partners receive must 
offset their costs for entering into social alliances (Waddock, 1991).  Social enterprises are 
evaluated through their social impact and social value creation. Impact is not only seen as the 
output of social venture activity but is also built in its operation process thus throughout their 
entire value chain (Nicholls, 2008). 
 
Evidence from Sakaraya et al (2012) research on social alliances indicates that performance 
measurement can be done by using perception criteria of impact achieved and criteria for 
measuring the social transformation impact of alliances. Social enterprises measure the social 
impact of the output of their social alliances and no measurement exists to assess their corporate 
partners meeting of objectives. The means to collect data are through on site data collections 
techniques, recording devices, tools created by psychologists, and enterprise information system. 
According to Zahra et al (2009) performance can be measured through social wealth creation 
which adds on total wealth maximisation, encompassing both economic and social wealth 
creation and costs incurred and accounting as well for opportunity costs (that is of opportunities 
that have not been pursued). Balancing among their motive to meet social objectives but at the 
same time achieve financial sustainability is a difficult process for social entrepreneurs (Zahra et 
al, 2009). An important obstacle in performance measurement of social ventures stems from the 
difficulty of measuring many of the products and services that social entrepreneurial ventures 
offer, like how to measure clean water or change in norms and behaviour and also from the 
subjective nature of social value itself among societies (Zahra et al, 2009). As Alex Nicholls (the 
first world Lecturer in Social Entrepreneurship at Skoll Research Centre in Oxford University) 
says (in Sky News, 2012) when an organization is deciding in which way to chose to assess its 
social impact the important thing is primarily to turn to its beneficiaries and ask them ‘how would 
you evaluate us?’ and then incorporate those parameters in the social reporting of the 
organization.  
 
The most popular measuring instruments of social ventures are the triple bottom line approach 
(Elighton, 1994) and the social return on investment (SROI); the former evaluates performance 
based on value creation with reference to people, planet, profit or else economic, social, 
environmental impact measurements. The latter is an adaptation of (ROI) ratio through a blend of 
both social and economic value creation elements (Emerson and Bonini, 2003; Meyskens et al 
2010b). Other instruments are: the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, 2002), social reporting and 
vartious quantitative benchmarks (Nicholls, 2008).  
 
Evidence of Sharir and Lerner (2006) research identified eight elements of success in social 
enterprises, these are in order of importance: the entrepreneur’s social network, commitment to 
success, capital base in starting up phase, receptiveness of venture in public discourse, start-up 
team composition and also ratio of paid staff to volunteers, establishment of alliances with public 
bodies and nonprofits in the long-run, market testability of offering, the entrepreneurs 
background in terms of management experience. In evaluating performance they measure three 
conditions: the level at which social enterprises can meet their objectives, the capability of the 
social enterprise to raise resources so as to maintain stability and sustainability of the offering 
(service/product/programme), and the resources available to achieve growth and development. 
The variables are drawn from individual, environmental and organizational contexts and process. 
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Their findings indicate that the only two conditions that are necessary to the success of the social 
venture are the social network and levels of commitment. Meyskens and Carsrud (2011) research 
results support that alliances and networks are more important for social ventures than for 
mainstream businesses (Galaskiewicz et al, 2006) and also that they are more important for social 
ventures in developing countries than in developed countries to overcome formal and informal 
institutional barriers and to overcome higher resource restraints that social ventures face 
(Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011). The results of Sakaraya et al (2012) findings indicate that: 
performance measurements of social alliances revealed the altruistic motives of social 
enterprises; the perception of impact achieved was evaluated as successful for all partners 
although perceptions were higher for corporate partners than social enterprises due to the fact that 
social enterprises engage in many social projects and have higher knowledge of the needed 
impact. In measuring the social transformation element findings indicate that most corporate-
social partnerships are micro in focus as they target individual and organizational change and 
their nature is cultural. Their research confirmed the issues of effectiveness and sustainability of 
such social ventures in making social change.  
 
Various research studies support that the survival and success of social enterprises is heavily 
associated with their ability to secure financial capital coming from formal institutions like the 
EC, governments and local authorities, from the social investment market, from philanthropic 
donations, from crowd funding platforms and customers (Nicholls, 2010); their access to 
financial capital can allow them to focus on delivering their social objectives and creating social 
impact (Meyskens et al, 2010a). To be able to access capital social enterprises need to use 
performance measurement tools which is a skill that most of them lack (Nicholls, 2010).  
 
In social franchising in lack of a strong brand the performance of social franchisees plays a 
significant role to the survival and development of the system (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 
2011a); their capabilities to raise funds from donors, to engage and raise community resources, to 
act as referees through word of mouth, to meet social objectives and make social impact at their 
local communities, to maintain quality of social offering. Evidence from current research 
suggests that personality traits of franchisees influence their performance as well as the quality of 
the relationship with the franchisor, compatibility and stability of franchise systems (Weaven, 
Grace and Manning, 2009). The latter view performance in terms of the franchisees financial 
performance, the quality of the relationship with franchisors seen as stability and compatibility 
and through the franchisee services offered to customers seen as standardised vs. customised 
arguing that customised services lead to long-term and trusting relationships with customers thus 
better performing systems.  
 
Related to performance is the issue of alliance stability. According to Gomes-Casseres (1987) 
there are three types of alliance instability: an alliance may liquidate completely, an alliance may 
be sold to the local partner or others, or one partner can buyout the other’s interest in an alliance 
and create a wholly owned subsidiary. Yan and Zang (1999) defined instability as: 
 
“The extent to which the (alliance) alters its strategic directions, renegotiates its 
contract/agreements, reconfigures its ownership and/or management structures, or changes the 
relationship with/between the parents that may have a significant effect on the venture’s 
performance” (Yan and Zang, 1999: 405). 
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Another issue is the performance consequences for firms entering into alliances. Research 
suggests that there are positive performance outputs for firms entering into vertical alliances 
when there is high information exchange and long-term commitment, which lead to greater 
cooperation and joint activities among partners, and higher asset-specific investments (Gulati, 
1998). Hybrid organizational forms provide a way to overcome the agency problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in selecting, assimilating, and monitoring new managers (Shane, 
1996). Shane concluded that franchising is an expansion strategy that provides positive outcomes 
to growth and survival since it overcomes managerial limits to firm growth. Strong evidence 
from many research studies supports the positive causal relationship among cooperation and 
performance, especially in the case of networks which have proven to be sources of higher 
efficiency and competitiveness (Arrighetti et al, 1997); taken into account the losses associated 
with overembeddedness in networks.  
 
Based on the competitive strategy theory there are factors that provide strategic advantages to 
established firms against their competitors and create entry barriers to new firms, such factors 
are: cumulative experience, scale economies, product differentiation, high capital requirements 
and the benefits associated with the location of a firm’s headquarters (Huszagh et al, 1992). 
Huszagh et al joined the two theoretical perspectives of the competitive advantage and the theory 
of the firm and concluded that franchisors with an international network have greater competitive 
strengths in comparison to domestic franchise nets in terms of experience, scale economies and 
location and that such strategic advantage provides greater prospects for success against 
internationally established firms.  
 
According to Gulati (1998) it is important to research the issue of whether alliances that are 
embedded to a greater or lesser degree in various networks perform better or worse than others 
and why; he also argues that the extent to which an alliance is embedded is likely to influence its 
performance. Evidence from various research studies supports that social enterprises growth and 
success is greatly associated to their embeddedness in social networks (Alvord et al, 2004; 
Leadbeater, 2006; Meyskens and Carsrud, 2011; Meyskens et al, 2010a; Sharir and Lerner, 
2006). According to Burt (1977, 1992) to approach the issue of performance in social networks 
of alliances we have to view actors as being provided with social capital which can become an 
essential foundation for competitive advantage.  
 
This is because by being in an alliance the partnering firms are most likely to share high levels of 
confidence and trust, both because they have greater information and because the network creates 
a safeguard for bad behaviour that would damage reputation. As Powell (1990) argues embedded 
relationships have fundamentally different characteristics and course than those that are not. 
Therefore there are higher prospects for success of the alliance. Research has also indicated that 
alliances with embedded ties may perform better and for longer (Gulati, 1998; Kogurt, 1989). 
The extended network of embedded ties has profound effects on firms’ performance (Uzzi, 
1997). The values and norms of an organization affect organizational actions and behaviour and 
thus are closely linked to its performance (Jones and George, 2003). 
 
“Trust has been shown to be a determinant of critical factors related to performance, like 
more open exchanges of relevant ideas and feelings, greater clarification of goals and problems, 
more extensive search for alternative courses of action, greater satisfaction with efforts and 
greater motivation to implement decisions” (Zand, 1972) 
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“The different evolutionary paths that alliances follow can have very important 
implications on their performance” (Harrigan, 1987).  
 
“It is important to investigate the dynamic processes that underlie the development of 
alliances, which can offer valuable insights on how they could be better managed” (Gulati, 
1998:305).  
 
Proven and Milward (1995) did a comparative study of inter-organizational networks to 
investigate the issue of network effectiveness; their findings indicate that critical structural and 
contextual factors were significant, these are: network integration, external control, system 
stability and environmental resource munificence. For their research design to assess 
effectiveness they considered the views of organizational constituencies or key stakeholders and 
chose a measure of effectiveness that reflected outcomes of network-level activities and 
structures. 
 
2.4.8.3. Failure rates of franchise ventures and networks 
 
According to a research conducted by Stanworth et al (1998) business failure rates of franchised 
small businesses are at least as high as non-franchised small businesses (Higgins et al, 2008). 
New methods indicate that franchising could be more risky than conventional business in the first 
five years of operation, but thereafter, has a relatively low risk of failure once break-even has 
been reached. According to another study of Stanworth (1995b) it was proven that developmental 
franchises would experience high rates of business failure. The result was that half the sample 
had failed in 10 years time scale and that franchise operations are quite vulnerable to failure in 
the early years of their development. The analogy that applies for commercial to social businesses 
failure rates apply also to mainstream and social franchise failure rates (Richardson and 
Berelowitz, 2012) 
 
Based on the principle of ‘cloning’ success, a principal tenet of the franchise fraternity is that 
franchise failure rates are low (Stanworth et al 1998); therefore it is valuable to compare 
franchise failure rates with SMEs failure rates. According to Hoy (1994) the issue of franchisee 
failure rates is an ambiguous area because of the following problems: unreliability of 
uncorroborated franchisor reported data. Many franchisee failures are disguised by franchise 
outlets changing hands, ‘under-reporting’ by franchisors, low questionnaire response rates, the 
exclusion of unethical franchises, etc.  
 
Storey (1994) after comparing US and UK data on SMEs resulted in:  
 
“The broad pattern which emerges is that the young are more likely to fail than the old, 
the very small are more likely to fail than their larger counterparts, and that, for young firms, 
probably the most powerful influence on their survival is whether or not they grow within a short 
period after start-up” (Storey, 1994: 109).  
 
This also supported by Martin (1988) who argues that the larger a franchise system is, the lower 
the per-unit cost of operating it because of economies of scale. Therefore the survival of new 
franchise systems depends on whether they will be able to grow at the number of outlets that will 
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provide them with competitive cost structure before they run out of cash (Carney and Gedajlovic, 
1991).  
 
Moreover based on data analysis from VAT registrations and deregistrations he showed that 
failure rates of UK small business start-ups is 1/3 (33.3%) within 3 years and 70% within 10 
years, with higher rates of failure on the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 year. Also according to Phillips and 
Kirchhoffs’ study (1989: 74) they used the US Small Business Administration’s 1976-1986 
Establishment Longitudinal Microdata files and showed that small business start-ups failure rate 
over 6 year period is 60% it ranging from 75%in construction and 53% in manufacturing. 
 
On the other hand on Franchise failure rates we have the following studies: 
 
Lafontaine and Shaw (1996; 2005) using data in the US from 1980-1992 showed that in a period 
of 11 years the failure rate of franchise business was 70.8% and in a period of 12 years was 
71.4%. In 1989-1992 they identified 2,524 firms entering the franchise industry of which 1,941 
exited during the same period. They commented,  
 
“While many firms keep entering into franchising, giving the impression of tremendous 
growth, many are also exiting, leading to an overall growth rate at best commensurate with that 
of the economy” (Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996, 2005). 
 
“The use of franchising enhances firm survival and growth. This finding is particularly 
significant given that the failure rates of new franchise systems approximate that of new 
organisations” (Shane, 1996: 230).  
 
Shane identified 138 US franchise systems in 1983 and in a period of 10 years the 75.4% had 
failed.  
 
“Potential franchisees should be very wary of buying into systems that have not yet 
reached their fourth anniversary” (Shane, 1996).  
 
According to Price (1996) in the UK in the period 1984-1995 a total of 1,658 companies were 
identified as being operational and at the end of the period a 64% had failed, with younger 
systems displaying higher withdrawal rates than their older counterparts.  
 
“There is evidence from the US of franchisor failure …may not only fail but do so quite 
frequently” (Ozanne and Hunt, 1971).  
 
They also argued that these tend to be younger franchises with only fairly small numbers of 
franchisees experiencing the problems of rapid growth.  
 
Bates (1995) created a sample of 7,270 small businesses started between 1984-1987 from the US 
Census Bureau’s Business Owners Database. He used 1987 as a baseline and analysed those 
companies through to 1991. He found out that 34.9% of franchised businesses failed compared to 
28% of non-franchise businesses. And that pre-tax income was higher for non-franchise 
businesses.  
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According to Stanworth and Curran (1999) factors that influence the survival of a franchise net 
are at the societal level, political factors, such as the emergence and survival of franchised 
business forms depends on state attitudes to small enterprises. They also argued that franchise 
failure rates are the result of interplay between age of system, quality of franchisees’ prior 
experience, sector, and niche and vary within even the same franchise. 
 
Cross (1994) concluded that the SME failure ‘generic’ factors are: undercapitalisation, absence of 
economies of scale, lack of business acumen, inability to survive intense competition where entry 
barriers are low. While franchising related factors are: business fraud, intrasystem competition 
between franchisee-franchisee and franchisee-company owned, insufficient support, poor 
franchisee screening, and persistent franchisor franchisee conflict. According to Bates (1995) 
other reasons are high royalties and franchisor base fees. According to Mendelsohn (1992) lack 
of adequate infrastructure of the franchisor, poor management and control of the chain, 
inexperienced executives and badly staffed franchisor, inefficient channels of communication 
with the net that impede the flow of information. Coming from the franchisee: badly choosing 
franchising as a way to be self employed, badly choosing to invest in a concept that does not fit 
with his/hers nature, wrong selection of geographical spot to open the franchisee store, low 
initiated and low motivated, a franchisee that resists change and improvement of the chain. 
 
Issues related to the international expansion of a franchise network that can lead to failure are: 
evaluation of target markets, selection of franchise candidates, location of sites, legal barriers in 
matters of taxation, protection patents, and trademarks, maintenance of product quality, and 
supervision and training of personnel. It is difficult to maintain control on product quality and 
employees’ attitude towards customers. There are many problems related to personnel 
management, financing and marketing adaptation. (Adams, 1987) 
 
The risk to integrating the framework of network organizations in franchise systems could lead to 
failure. Barriers to that are: time, network cultures take time to develop and franchisors may not 
want to wait, to find prospective franchisees with the network mind-set, the unwillingness of 
franchisors to lose control and power, the unwillingness of franchisors to face the short-term 
losses of implementing a network theory (Achrol, 1996). Also other riskes associated to network 
strategy is overembeddedness and the paradoxes of networks (see Chapter 2.5.3.4) 
 
Solutions that could promote the success of an alliance are: flexibility in the management of the 
alliance, building trust with partners, constructive management of conflict, continuity of 
boundary personnel responsible for the interface between the firm and the alliance, managing 
partner expectations, etc (Gulati, 1998). 
 
2.5. Conceptual Theoretical Approaches in Studying Social Inter-firm Alliances and Social 
Networks 
 
At this chapter we attempt a critical review of the main conceptual theories that have been 
adopted in the study of inter-organizational alliance literature, franchising and networks 
 
In researching theories of cooperation there is no universal accepted theory to economists, 
sociologists and anthropologists (Child and Faulkner, 1998). There are different approaches from 
economics, game theory (Axelrod’s, 1984; Zagare, 1984), strategic-management theory 
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(Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Geringer, 1991), organization theory (Barney, 
1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) and other. There are four main different 
approaches in economics which have been used in analysing cooperative strategies: the market-
power theory, transaction-cost economics, agency theory and increasing returns theory. As 
presented in Glaister (2004) inter-firm alliances have been examined from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, two approaches have been influential the transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975, 
1985, 19991; Hennart 1988, 1991; Beamish and Banks 1987; Buckley and Casson 1988) and the 
resource-based view of the firm (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Mahony and Pandian 1992; 
Grant 1991; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). These two theories provide different insights to the 
issue of alliance activities and according to the findings of Glaister’s study both theories 
influence the decision to form a joint venture. Moreover his findings support that together these 
perspectives provide a more balanced and comprehensive understanding of the potential 
advantages of collaborative ventures. 
 
 “Therefore they should be regarded as complementary views rather than substitute views. 
Both perspectives assume a rational choice process in deciding to adopt a particular 
organisational form. Transaction cost basing choice on cost minimization and resource-based 
view on value maximization” (Glaister, 2004:497).  
 
Most research trying to explain the creation of franchise systems has been based on franchisor 
motivation and used agency theory (Monye, 1997; Lafontaine 2001b, 2002) and transaction cost 
analysis (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996). Other theoretical 
approaches include resource scarcity theories (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006; Tracey and Jarvis, 
2007), life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966; Stanworth et al, 1996), entrepreneurial theories 
(Kaufmann and Dant, 1999); the theory of the firm (Huszagh et al, 1992); institutional theory 
(Barthelemy, 2011; Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni, 2009; Gauzente and Dumoulin, 2012; 
Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013; Young and Merritt, 2013). Previous literature has investigated 
issues referring to franchising, such as ownership redirection (Dant et al, 1992), franchisee 
selection (Doherty, 2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003), efficiency (Lafontaine, 1992), control 
(Brickley and Dark, 1987), coordination (Lal, 1990) and the failure of new franchise systems 
(Bates, 1995; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996; 2005; Ozanne and Hunt, 1971; Shane, 1996; 
Stanworth, 1995b; Stanworth et al, 1998; Storey, 1994) from a domestic perspective. There have 
been researches which attempt to create new conceptual models of franchising (Sashi and 
Karuppur, 2002; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996). Franchising in global markets (Eroglu, 1992; 
Quinn and Doherty, 2000; Sashi and Karuppur, 2002). In recent years there have been more 
attempts to cover the international aspect of franchising. So there are studies about the diffusion 
of franchise systems (Welch, 1989; Aydin and Kacker, 1990), differences between domestic and 
international systems (Huszagh et al, 1992), factors prompting internationalization (Eroglu, 1992; 
McIntyre and Huszagh, 1995; Shane, 1996), and control issues in international franchising 
(Quinn and Doherty, 2000).  
 
Traditional approaches have viewed the phenomena from a dyadic perspective as opposed to 
systems and network perspectives (Gulati, 1995, 1998; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001); 
therefore the network concept is presented hereunder and is evaluated against the other 
conceptual theories. Social network theorists have mainly approached there analyses through two 
perspectives the relational network perspective and the structural network perspective (Burt, 
1992, 2004; Granovetter, 2005; Ibarra, 1993; Obstfeld, 2005;). Few research studies have dealt 
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with the relational ties of franchising through the network theory perspective (Achrol, 1996, 
1997; Achrol and Kotler, 1999; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Li et al, 2013; Paswan, Loustau and 
Young, 2001). Structural network perspectives have dealt with issues of power, control, and flow 
of information by focusing on the positioning of members in franchise networks (Boje and 
Whetten, 1981; Bonacich, 1987; Hinings et al, 1974; Marsden, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). 
The problems of mainstream franchising have been related to moral hazards, high monitor costs 
from forbearance and sub-optimal behaviour, free riding hazards and opportunistic behaviour. 
The solutions to these problems through the perspective of the dyadic relationship have been 
provided by legal or economical acts. In contrast to that network organization framework 
proposes that franchisors, franchisees, suppliers and customers are intricately involved with one 
another (Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001). There is a growing interest in understanding the 
influence of the social context in which firms are embedded on their behaviour and performance 
(Gulati, 1998). The network is the key-integrating concept because it offers the essential context 
in which a mini society governed by its own norms of conduct can emerge and regulate itself 
(Achrol, 1996). 
 
2.5.1. Transaction Cost Theory 
 
Transaction cost theory is the most popular one used to explain alliance formation (Tsang, 
1998:218) and offers compelling logic for evaluating the efficacy of exchange in alternative 
governance structures, like franchise (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). The most common 
explanations of the emergence of franchising are linked to transaction cost theory (Stanworth and 
Curran, 1999). Transaction cost theory was pioneered by Coase (1937) and developed by 
Williamson (1975).  
 
In transaction cost economics the decision centre of a firm targets on minimizing the transaction 
costs and production costs (Williamson, 1975) in order to maximise efficiency (Stanworth and 
Curran, 1999). Transaction costs are those caused by the realization of an economic exchange, 
such as costs of research, negotiation, monitoring and control of economic exchanges, finding 
contacts, managing logistics (Glaister, 2004) and vary independently of competitive prices and 
the product exchanged (Robins, 1987). While production costs are related to in-house learning, 
organizing and managing production. When the transaction cost of an exchange is high according 
to Glaister (2004) then internalization (mergers, acquisitions and internal development) is 
preferred. On the other hand market exchanges that incur transaction costs but avoid production 
costs will be chosen when production costs are high and transaction costs are low.  
 
Williamson (1975, 1985) identifies a set of factors that influence the decision of a firm to conduct 
transactions in the market or within the organization (the latter is called ‘hierarchies’, where one 
set of owners/managers have unilateral authority which usually defines large-scale vertically-
integrated organisations), such as: opportunism, bounded rationality, number of exchanges, 
degree of uncertainty and complexity, information impactedness, and asset specificity.  
 
Between the two choices of market and hierarchies there are intermediates stages, which are 
hybrid governance structures (Glaister, 2004), like franchising. The franchise business form is an 
important strategy to reduce transaction costs in many sectors (Stanworth and Curran, 1999).   
 
After an agreement is established the partners face bargaining, monitoring and maladaptation 
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costs (Williamson, 1985, p.21). Partners can control and monitor activities which result in 
decreasing the level of control that the other can exercise. To overcome this as stated at Glaister 
(2004) they rely on long-term contracts, on both offering mutual hostages, such as assets and on 
building trust.  
 
“In the transaction cost theory inter-firm alliances are viewed as a hybrid form between 
the polar cases of market and hierarchy, inter-firm alliances are chosen as the optimal 
organisation mode” (Glaister, 2004) 
 
Partner selection involves issues of trust and opportunism (Williamson, 1975), so the type of the 
management control structure of the alliance will be determined by the transaction costs of the 
venture, in order to minimize opportunism and promote co-operative activity to bridge diversity 
(Parkhe, 2003). So the performance of the alliance will be seen in relation to partner selection, 
motives for alliance formation and the issue of control.  
 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) argued that in long-term contractual alliances –like franchising- 
geographic distance, legal constraint, and local market characteristics often make integration 
infeasible or undesirable. Integration could damage motivation structures and complicate cost 
allocations. Management must therefore find other ways to boost performance. They proved with 
their study on franchise networks that management actions that try to minimize opportunism have 
as a result to lower transaction costs. To prove the above point they implicated inter-firm 
cooperation and formalization as control structures to ease opportunism.  
 
The main theme of the transaction cost approach to the rational of alliance formation as Glaister’s 
(2004) study points out is to ask why a partner firm chooses a particular transactional mode, that 
is on which ground the choice between market transactions (such as exporting), internalization 
(internal development or mergers/acquisitions) and hybrid co-operative arrangements (such as 
joint ventures) would be made, that is what are the advantages of each alternative.  
 
“In transaction costs, internationalisation is imperative when market agents are likely to 
take advantage of a firm’s limited knowledge and when future transaction contingencies could 
not be specified because of uncertainty or complexity” (Shenkar, 2003) 
 
In predicting entry modes, transaction cost theorists associate higher cultural distance with a 
higher cost of transaction, due to information costs and the difficulty of transferring competencies 
and skills (Vachani, 1991 cited in Shenkar, 2003). The loosening of control in culturally distant 
locations was seen as a way of reducing uncertainty and information costs (Alpander, 1976; 
Richman and Copen, 1972 cited in Shenkar, 2003).  
 
2.5.2. Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory is another approach of economists that deals mostly with governance mechanisms 
from a principal-agent perspective and addresses issues like control, incentives, conflict, and 
asymmetry of information. It deals with identifying the most efficient contract to govern the 
relationship between agents and principals (Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
 
According to the writings of Shane (1996) in most cases of modern corporations there is a 
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separation of ownership and control since managers are not the owners of the organizations that 
they manage. Entrepreneurs (principals) are compensated through residual claimancy and 
managers (agents) through wages, which means that they are motivated by different goals and 
may act in different ways. So there are three problems that owners face: adverse selection, when 
an employee misrepresents his/hers true abilities; moral hazard, when an entrepreneur cannot 
know whether an employee is working hard or shrinking (Hendry, 2002; Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling, and Dino, 2005); and holdup, when a principal may act opportunistically once the 
investment has been made to renegotiate the terms (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 20011a). 
 
According to agency theory, there are two solutions to these problems residual claimancy and 
monitoring, the first solution is to replace wage by hybrid organizational arrangements like 
franchising that provide residual claimancy to employees and the second solution is to increase 
the amount of information about the agents’ behaviour by monitoring agents (Shane, 1996). 
When applying agency theory to franchising according to research the owners encounter a 
significant dilemma. The dilemma is choosing between agents to manage the unit is either to 
employ a manager that will run the business and be remunerated by salary or to employ an 
external franchisee who is allowed to retain the unit’s profits in return for a fee; in both cases, the 
delegation of responsibility incurs agency costs for the system (Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Shane’s 
research results in that when firms grow rapidly, franchising is a superior solution to monitoring 
employees and to reduce the agency problems of firm growth, thus of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in selecting, assimilating, and monitoring new managers and employees. As the 
firm grows franchise reduces the rate of the increase of monitoring costs, thus allowing the firm 
to grow faster (Shane, 1996: 221). Lafontaine (1992) concluded that in terms of the theoretical 
models explaining franchising, the empirical results are consistent with a two-sided hidden action 
or moral hazard explanation of franchising. That franchising is more possible to happen when 
there is an incentive or monitoring problem downstream since, she argues, franchisees are more 
motivated than hired managers. 
 
According to the writing of Castrogiovanni et al. (2006) the cost-benefit trade-offs that the 
franchisor incurs based on agency theory mean that the proportion of franchised against 
company-owned outlets will get to an optimum level, rather than a maximum or minimum level. 
Also they note that evidence shows that agency problems are likely to decrease if the proportion 
of franchised outlets increases as the system grows. 
 
A counter argument to agency theory comes from Stanworth and Curran (1999) who argued that 
franchisee motivation is more varied and complex than being simply an expression of profit 
maximization desires or a solution to hierarchical control as agency theory tends to suggest. 
 
2.5.3. Market-power Theory 
 
The Market-power theory is an economic theory that refers to the way organizations can improve 
their competitive success by securing stronger position in their markets. Higher market power 
which increases returns can be the result of cooperative ventures (Child and Faulkner, 1998).  
 
A first approach of market-power theory to alliances was by Hymer (1972) who differed among 
offensive and defensive coalitions. One of the more influential writers on market-power theory is 
Michael Porter (1980); at his writings he refers to the notion that the relative position of 
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organizations in an industry formulates their generic strategies: cost leadership, differentiation or 
focus. Inter-organizational cooperation offers opportunities to firms to modify their position and 
thus their generic strategy. 
 
Another theory that uses the market-power perspective is Porter’s (1985) value chain which 
categorises between primary and support activities. According to the value chain theory alliances 
can be seen as bringing together similar resources to secure economies of scope or 
complementary resources to create new joint value chains (Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
 
As we find in the writings of Child and Faulkner (1998) the market power perspective focuses on 
how contextual features, like national, industrial, and organizational factors determine the 
cooperative ventures that firms can form. It is a deterministic approach that fails to capture the 
way that the emerged relationships between firms can influence the rationalities and strategic 
options of firms. 
 
2.5.4. Increasing-returns Theory 
 
Coming from the area of economics is the increasing-returns theory which contradicts the 
traditional economic assumption that after a certain point there are decreasing returns to factor 
inputs (Child and Faulkner, 1998). As we find in the writings of Arthur (1989) increasing returns 
are mostly evident in knowledge-based industries and help firms form dense technological 
networks and built loose alliances around those key technologies. In these cases returns have the 
potential to increase until they lead to market domination. 
 
2.5.5. Resource Scarcity Theory 
 
According to the writing of Meyskens et al (2010a) population ecology and resource dependent 
theories explain the formation and processes of social venture networks and inter-firm alliances; 
the former approach explains formation and stability seen as the need of organizations to adapt to 
natural and environmental constraints in order to survive and respond to selection pressures thus 
forming networks. While the latter explains control of actors in networks through their structural 
positioning, the logic is that organizations need to acquire scarce resources that other actors have 
which drives them to form inter-organizational relationships with them.  
 
As we find in the writings of Oxenfeld and Kelly (1969) according to resource scarcity theory 
firms turn to franchising because of a lack of resources to finance their growth and this is due to 
the fact new firms often are established below minimum efficient scale (Lafontaine and 
Kaufmann, 1994). Research suggests that there is a positive correlation between acquisition of 
resources through franchising and growth and survival for new firms (Azoulay and Shane, 2001).  
 
So franchising provides rapid market penetration and access to resources that are vital for the 
growth of the firm thus overcoming the barriers to financing that usually new start-ups face 
(Oxenfeld and Kelly, 1969; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). 
 
Apart from insufficient access to financial resources new businesses encounter lack of managerial 
expertise as well as low information on the local markets they want to expand to (Shane, 1996) so 
they turn to franchising to get access to new talent and to share the risk associated with entering 
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new markets (Kaufmann and Dant, 1998; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007).  
 
According to the writing of Tracey and Jarvis (2007) as the social franchise system grows the 
social franchisor has greater access to financial and managerial resources so franchisors opt for 
maximization of returns (social and economic) from each unit. According to the resource scarcity 
theory the franchisor will try to turn the profitable franchisee units into company-owned ones. 
Nevertheless, research shows that franchisors do not search for buying out all of their franchised 
outlets as predicted by resource scarcity; this would be too costly, and as some franchised units 
underperform there would be no motivation to buy this back (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006). There 
is strong evidence to support that franchisors tend to keep a stable level of franchised outlets over 
time (Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005). As Stanworth and Curran (1999) argue business format 
franchising is characterised by format permanence, which means that the franchise business form 
is a relatively permanent and genuine form and unlikely to lapse into vertically integrated 
hierarchical organization, this may happen but there is no evidence of a pattern or cycle of 
development. 
 
2.5.6. Game Theory 
 
Game theory deals with the strategies adopted by the players of a game and with the prediction of 
outcomes from these games among economic actors (Child and Faulkner, 1998). It focuses 
mostly on the issue of cooperation and competition among partners of an alliance.   
 
“Games are social situations involving two or more actors whose interests are 
interconnected or interdependent” (Zagare, 1984: 7).  
 
Game theory assumes that actors’ behaviour is based on self-interest and though cooperation 
maximises joint interest it doesn’t maximise self-interest. This leads to the popular ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ which describes how one acts selfishly against the collective rationality of the common 
good as trust is inexistent. Axelrod’s (1984) research on game theory suggests that the best 
strategy is to be cooperative at the first time and to reciprocate your partner’s behaviour at the 
second round, the so called ‘tit-for tat’ strategy. 
 
The more the players of the game the highest the cost for a partner who defects, as not only he 
will lose the benefits from the specific alliance but he will create a bad reputation against future 
alliances (Child and Faulkner, 1998). As we find in the writings of Gulati et al (1994) game 
theory fails to address the issue of cooperation being developed by partners mutually offering 
commitments. Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that the assumptions made by game theorists are 
simplistic and rarely found in real life; they also fail to include issues of social ties, 
embeddedness, norms created from the cooperation between actors, and the relational aspects of 
the interaction among actors. 
 
2.5.7. Strategic Management Theory 
 
From the area of strategic management theory we find many approaches that try to explain the 
motives for alliance formation, the choice of partners and the way integration among exchange 
partners is achieved and many of its contributions often join those of organization theory. Its 
main focus is how organizations manage to fit their respective strategies so that the alliance can 
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value-add to their strategic objectives (Child and Faulkner, 1998). Different approaches lead to 
different conclusions within the area of strategic management and according to the contingencies 
that each one assumes. We have presented in more detail some of these approaches in the 
previous chapters that dealt with formation, selection and governance. Namely some of the 
scholars are Contractor and Lorange (1988), Harrigan (1988), Geringer (1991), etc. 
 
Scholars on strategic management theory focus on various contingencies like technology, size, 
environment, etc in investigating how fit of strategies can be achieved. Mintzberg (1981) argues 
that the major concept is consistency and coherence between structure and task. Child (1972) 
argued that strategic choice is the prevailed construct that forms an organization’s structure. Two 
issues that are of significant importance in inter-firm cooperation are national culture and 
organizational culture (Child and Faulkner, 1998). The contingent view of strategic management 
theory is more sophisticated and realistic than the universalistic rationales contained in the 
economic theories that we have presented and emphasizes the matching of partners rather than 
looking at cooperation simply from a single partner’s point of view (Child and Faulker, 1998: 
33).  
 
Based on the competitive strategy theory there are factors that provide strategic advantages to 
established firms against their competitors and create entry barriers to new firms, such factors 
are: cumulative experience, scale economies, product differentiation, high capital requirements 
and the benefits associated with the location of a firm’s headquarters (Huszagh et al, 1992). 
 
2.5.8. Resource-based Theory of the Firm 
 
From the area of the organization theory we find an ample of perspectives that investigate the 
issue of inter-firm cooperation. A very influential approach is that of the resource-based theory of 
the firm. According to the resource-based view a firm can achieve and sustain a competitive 
strategic advantage from its assets in a way that cannot be imitated perfectly, or by its resources 
and capabilities that are durable and not perfectly transferable and replicable (Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). The terms used in theory as ‘organisational 
resources’, ‘dynamic capabilities’, ‘core competencies’ and ‘invisible resources’ are all according 
to Tallman (2000: 97) considered as interchangeable. The resource-based approaches are rooted 
at the classical theory of the firm as conceptualised by Penrose (1959). 
 
The Uppsala Model of the Nordic School (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) approaches the issue of 
internationalisation through the resource-based theory; it explains entry modes as a time-
dependent process and a consequence of a firm’s prior knowledge.  
 
According to the writings of Glaister (2004) based on the resource-based view there are three 
mechanisms for acquiring resources and capabilities: markets (buying resources or hiring 
people), hierarchies (internally creating them) and inter-organizational relationships (through 
combination of complementary resources and/or capabilities). The decision to form an alliance 
implies three considerations: firstly, the firm does not possess the required resources or 
capabilities to form the desired competencies, and cannot acquire them at acceptable time frames 
and cost. Secondly, the market transactions do not make available the organisational integration 
to facilitate the organisational learning of embedded knowledge. According to Barney’s (1999) 
theory there are various reasons why it may be costly for a firm to create a desired capability on 
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its own: historical context, path dependence, social complexity, and causal ambiguity. Thirdly, 
acquiring another firm that possesses these skills is not feasible (Glaister, 2004). Based on the 
theory of Hennart (1988) Barney (1999) identifies a number of reasons that explain why 
acquisition may not be feasible or desired: legal constraints, reduced company value, costly to 
reverse, acquiring “unwanted capabilities” and integration difficulties. 
 
Therefore the costs and difficulties linked to internal development or acquisition means that a 
firm may turn to hybrid organisational forms in order to gain access to capabilities and desired 
knowledge. Thus inter-organizational relationships have advantages over market transactions. 
 
Knowledge is distinguished between explicit and tacit, the first being codifiable and exchanged 
easily the second being uncodifiable, more individual or organisation-specific and cannot be 
easily exchanged in the market. An alliance can provide access to certain types of explicit 
knowledge, but it is more difficult to acquire the tacit types of competencies that a partner has. 
Because the accumulation of tacit knowledge is based on shared experiences and deeply 
embedded in the day-to-day organizational practices of learning, co-ordination and 
communication it is very difficult to transfer it across organisational boundaries (Choi and Lee, 
1997:39).  
 
“Alliances permit firms to create new joint competencies by rapidly and inexpensively 
combining sets of resource and capabilities that are not available to them individually, but which 
are in a way complementary” (Tallman, 2000: 96). 
 
The resource-based theory views strategy in relation to the resources and skills of the firm 
(Glaister, 2004). The acknowledgment according to the study of Glaister (2004) from the part of 
the firm to fill a resource or a competence gap provides the motive for alliance formation. In this 
context partner selection is seen as accessing relevant competencies in order to provide strategic 
capabilities. The management control will be structured in a way to help the acquisition of 
competencies and is driven by strategic motives. The performance of the alliance is seen as the 
outcome of the strategic motives of the parents’ strategy. Therefore the success of the alliance is 
seen as the result of partner selection and management control structure in the context of motives 
for the alliance.  
 
Based on the concept of resource-dependencies various scholars have analysed the issue of power 
and control which have been further analysed in previous chapter (see Chapter 3.5) on restraint of 
power (Burt, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancic, 1974). These analyses offer also a political perspective 
on inter-organizational relationships.  
 
From a resource-based perspective the very ability to bridge cultural distance can offer a unique 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Huszagh et al (1992) joined the two theoretical perspectives of the 
competitive advantage and the theory of the firm and concluded that franchisors with an 
international network have greater competitive strengths in comparison to domestic franchise nets 
in terms of experience, scale economies and location and such strategic advantages provide 
greater prospects for success against internationally established firms.  
 
2.5.9. Theories of entrepreneurial behaviour 
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According to the writings of Hoy and Shane (1998) the act of creating a franchise network and 
the act of becoming a business owner through franchising are both entrepreneurial in nature; 
therefore franchise is an entrepreneurial venture. Kaufmann and Dant (1999) have also used 
theories of entrepreneurial behaviour to explain the concept of franchising. For more on 
entrepreneurial theories see Chapter 2.5.2. 
 
 
2.5.10. Social Network Theory and Systems Approach 
 
2.5.10.1. Introduction 
 
Before presenting the conceptual theories that has been adopted in this research work we will 
debate on the various weaknesses of alternative research approaches. We are doing this to justify 
our choice of studying inter-firm alliances from a social network theory perspective. Some of the 
arguments that we have used to elaborate on these weaknesses are: the fallacy of composition, the 
concept of holism, the concept of structuralism, the theoretical debate between substantivists and 
formalists, social capital theory, the argument of embeddedness, the relational research paradigm, 
institutional theory, systems theory and a discourse on different levels of analysis.  
 
 
 
2.5.10.2. The Fallacy of Composition 
 
The first argument concerns the ‘fallacy of composition’; the fallacy of composition is committed 
when a conclusion is drawn about a whole based on the features of its constituents when, in fact, 
no justification is provided for the inference (Engel, 1980: 25-26; Mautner, 1996). There are 
actually two types of this fallacy, both of which are known by the same name. The first type of 
the fallacy of composition arises when a person reasons from the characteristics of individual 
members of a class or a group to a conclusion regarding the characteristics of the entire class or 
group (taken as a whole). The second type of fallacy of composition is committed when it is 
concluded that what is true of the parts of a whole must be true of the whole without there being 
adequate justification for the claim (Engel, 1980: 25-26; Mautner, 1996). 
 
"Should we not assume that just as the eye, hand, the foot, and in general each part of the 
body clearly has its own proper function, so man too has some function over and above the 
function of his parts?" (Aristotle, 384-322B.C. translated by David Ross, 1954: 16)  
 
To commit the fallacy of composition is to reason that what one family or company can (or 
should) do, also can (or should) be done by a whole group of families or companies. This is a 
fallacy because it ignores the possibility that the group of families or households may interact 
(for example, taking away customers from one another) so that the group works differently than 
an individual does. Since interactions of this kind are very common in economics, the fallacy of 
composition is one we have to be on the lookout for (McCain, 1984). 
 
In critical reasoning more generally, the fallacy of composition would be an example of an 
informal fallacy; that is reasoning that does not directly violate any rules of logic, but is hasty and 
inconclusive. One of the objectives of critical reasoning is to find and (if possible) repair informal 
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fallacies (McCain, 1984). 
 
2.5.10.3. Holism 
 
The second criticism to traditional thinking, which is related to the above-mentioned argument, 
concerns the concept of holism. Holism
 
from ‘holos’, a Greek word meaning whole is “the idea 
that the properties of a system cannot be determined or explained by the sum of its components 
alone” (Meyers, 2011, p 36). The holism of Parmenides who argued that at some primary level 
the world is a changeless unity (Schombert, 2006). The ontological holism of Aristotle’s Forms, 
the Aristotelian Ethical Holism, the holism of the one Being of Parmenides and Plato’s holism 
(Popper, 1971) have formed extensively the philosophy of physics specifically quantum physics 
(Esfeld, 2000; Schombert, 2006; Seevick, 2004) and are emerging as an alternative ontological 
approach in studying organizational phenomena as well. Nowadays we come across this concept 
even in documentary films like “Zeitgeist: The Movie” of Peter Joseph (2008) where he argues 
that “it is all one” and that a new conscientiousness is created that views the world as one 
organism and accepts that an organism which is in war with itself is destined to vanish. We will 
discuss about the influence of holism to sociology, economics, physics and finally, alliances. 
 
According to Spinoza, all the differences and apparent divisions we see in the world are really 
only aspects of an underlying single substance, which he called God or nature. Hegel, too, had 
mystical visions of the unity of all things, on which he based his own holistic philosophy of 
nature and the state. Nature consists of one timeless, unified, rational and spiritual reality. Hegel's 
state is a quasi-mystical collective, an ‘invisible and higher reality’, from which participating 
individuals derive their authentic identity, and to which they owe their loyalty and obedience. All 
modern collectivist political thinkers - including Karl Marx - stress some higher collective reality, 
the unity, the whole, the group, though nearly always at the cost of minimizing the importance of 
difference, the part, the individual. Against individualism, all emphasize the social whole or 
social forces that somehow possess a character and have a will of their own, over and above the 
characters and wills of individual members (Schombert, 2006).  
 
The word, along with the adjective holistic, was coined in the early 1920s by Jan Smuts, although 
sociologist Emile Durkheim also used it earlier. Smuts defined holism as ‘The tendency in nature 
to form wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts through creative evolution’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2011) 
 
Emile Durkheim used the concept of holism to oppose the fact that society was a simple 
collection of individuals. Durkheim's holism is evident in his statement that society is not a mere 
sum of individuals; rather the system formed by their association represents a specific social 
reality, which has its own characteristics. It is in the nature of this social reality, not in that of its 
component units, that one must seek the immediate and determining causes of the facts appearing 
there (Tilman, 2002). Durkheim developed an early ‘systems model’ to explain how when men 
come together they create a 'social entity’, the sum of the relationships is greater than the 
individual parts and it takes on a being of its own that exists apart from but through its members 
(Tilman, 2002). Durkheim saw that autonomy of individuals is itself socially generated and 
correlative with the development of the individual personality, social differentiation, and the 
morality of individualism as well as the absurd cult of the individual. Durkheim and Veblen both 
reject the conception of the individual given primacy by the neoclassical economists in whom the 
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hypothetical isolated individual functioning in the exchange mechanism of the market is happier 
and freer than when bonded to society (Tilman, 2002). 
 
Louis Dumont's 1984 essay opposed ‘holism’ to ‘individualism’ as two different forms of 
societies. According to him, modern man lived in an individualist society, whereas Ancient 
Greek society, for example, could be qualified as ‘holistic’, as the individual only lived for the 
whole. Thus, the individual was ready to sacrifice himself to his community, as his life without 
the polis had absolutely no sense whatsoever (Richards and Nicholas, 1976). As we find in the 
writings of Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics a person’s ultimate goal is happiness which is found 
in virtue and rightness and is closely linked to his role in his community and towards his fellow 
citizens (Aristotle, 384-322B.C. translated by David Ross, 1954: 16). Aristotelian Ethical Holism 
in his view of eudemonia. 
 
As we find in the writings of Tilman (2002) and Dingley (1997) the main point of Mayo’s theory 
is that a common morality embracing everyone was necessary to maintain order and social 
cohesion. Such a morality was only possible when a social dimension is realized through 
continuous contact with each other. The concept of social man as a moral phenomenon had its 
origins in the sociology of Durkheim. The contribution of Durkheim to Mayo's work is extensive. 
Social man is the key concept - asserting that man is not just the utilitarian economic animal of 
classical economics and scientific management but that he has other, social needs and that this 
has led to a concern with the social relationships at work as an influence on man's productive 
activity.  
 
The concept of `social man' is attributed to the influential nineteenth century sociologists, Pareto 
and Durkheim. In Durkheim's thinking, the nature of social cohesion was the initial problem of 
sociology. How to create an integrated and cohesive society that didn't fragment into conflicting 
parts by creating a sense of solidarity amongst members of a society; building the concept of 
social solidarity is the focus of his book Division of Labour in Society. Co-operation, harmony, 
unity and common purpose are all products of our feeling of a sense of solidarity with those 
around us. That we are one and part of the same group, unit or society; with known rules and 
functions, our place and purpose understood as are our relations with others. Durkheim argued 
that we feel a sense of social solidarity that constrains and directs our behaviour so that we 
maintain the solidarity of the group. What Durkheim was attempting to do was establish a science 
of morality, for it was morality that provided social solidarity; morality can only exist in a social 
context, morality is a product of society, the only force superior to man (Dingley, 1997; Tilman, 
2002). These social norms and the objective of social cohesion are nowadays paramount to social 
entrepreneurship. 
 
“Durkheim developed an early 'systems' model to explain how when men came together 
they created a 'social' entity, the sum of the relationships was greater than the individual parts and 
it took on a being of its own that existed apart from but through its members. For Durkheim a 
social/moral order had to exist to allow us to enter into contracts, a force (moral) to constrain us 
to keep the contracts, for contracts only had force if there was some higher order compelling 
compliance” (Dingley, 1997:1121). 
 
We find implications of holism in the economic research. Social economics appears to 
presuppose holism - that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. It also presupposes that 
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society is such a whole (social holism), without repudiating individualism.  
 
“To know one another as individuals is to confirm the individuality of one another; thus, 
individualism fully understood presupposes social holism. Given its social holism, social 
economics tends naturally to be particularly ready to recognize that there are interrelationships 
among humans in any real society that are not and cannot be mediated by markets and property 
rights. Recognition of the reality of community as a force in human affairs will require novelties 
of economic theory” (McCain, 1984:92). 
 
Holism is also applied in physics. Holism as an idea or philosophical concept is diametrically 
opposed to atomism. Where the atomist believes that any whole can be broken down or analyzed 
into its separate parts and the relationships between them, the holist maintains that the whole is 
primary and often greater than the sum of its parts. The atomist divides things up in order to 
know them better; the holist looks at things or systems in aggregate and argues that we can know 
more about them viewed as such, and better understand their nature and their purpose 
(Schombert, 2006; Schombert and Bothun, 1987; Seevick, 2004). 
.  
“The early Greek atomism of Leucippus and Democritus (fifth century B.C.) was a 
forerunner of classical physics. According to their view, everything in the universe consists of 
indivisible, indestructible atoms of various kinds. Change is a rearrangement of these atoms. This 
kind of thinking was a reaction to the still earlier holism of Parmenides, who argued that at some 
primary level the world is a changeless unity. According to him, ‘All is One. Nor is it divisible, 
wherefore it is wholly continuous.... It is complete on every side like the mass of a rounded 
sphere’” (Schombert, 2006:1). 
 
“At the point of convergence, and the consequent collapse of proximal ego boundaries, an 
old mystical truth reveals itself as self-evident: all life on earth is one. Any of the boundaries 
drawn between one part of the biota and any other are just as selfmade as the visualization of 
political boundaries" (Pesce 1999:462) 
 
Another example is relational holism in quantum theory; some of the properties of quant emerge 
only through relationship, quantum entities are not wholly subject to reduction either (Schombert, 
2006; Schombert and Bothun, 1987; Seevick, 2004). Michael Esfeld (2000) in his book Holism 
in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Physics analyses Aristotelian Holism in studying 
quantum physics and links under the ontology of holism the thinking of Parmenides, Plato and 
Aristotle: 
 
“... the unchangeable and specifically formed atoms were only the ‘eternal’ of the one 
Being of Parmenidis, of Plato’s Ideas and Aristotle’s Forms, ‘in material form’” (Hans 
Blumenberg in Esfeld:167-168) 
 
“Such an emphasis upon oneness and wholeness- especially of the state; or perhaps of the 
world- maybe described as ‘holism’. Plato’s holism, I believe, is closely related to the tribal 
collectivism…Plato was longing for the lost unity of the tribal life” (Popper, 1971:80) 
 
“The truth is somewhere between Newton and Spinoza. Every quantum entity has both a 
wavelike and a particle like aspect. The wavelike aspect is indeterminate, spread out all over 
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space and time and the realm of possibility. The particle like aspect is determinate, located at one 
place in space and time and limited to the domain of actuality. The particle like aspect is fixed, 
but the wavelike aspect becomes fixed only in dialogue with its surroundings - in dialogue with 
an experimental context or in relationship to another entity in measurement or observation. It is 
the indeterminate, wavelike aspect - the set of potentialities associated with the entity - that unites 
quantum things or systems in a truly emergent, relational holism that cannot be reduced to any 
previously existing parts or their properties” (Seevick, 2004:670). 
 
Methodological Holism as opposed to Methodological reductionism refers to the thinking that 
understanding of a certain kind of complex system is best sought at the level of principles 
governing the behaviour of the whole system, and not at the level of the structure and behaviour 
of its component parts. According to methodological reductionism the understanding of a 
complex system is best sought at the level of the structure and behaviour of its component parts 
(Schombert, 2006; Schombert and Bothun, 1987; Seevick, 2004).  
 
The transfiguration of ontology through structural coupling produces consequent (Pesce, 1999) 
changes in human culture. 
 
As we find in the writings of Berger et al (2006), whose research is on social alliances, holistic 
involvement is an essential concept of social alliances. For a partnership to prosper the managers 
need to be deeply and holistically involved in the partnership. The involvement, they argue, does 
not only have cognitive and relational elements, but is has to also include emotional, social and 
physical elements; it engages the whole person. The sharing of goals and commitment refers not 
only to the individuals that negotiate the formation of the alliance, but to the organizations they 
represent and to the common goals that unite the organizations that form the partnership. 
Organizations are viewed through a holistic approach as entities with expanded purposes and 
more legitimate roles in society (Berger et al, 2006). 
 
2.5.10.4. Alternative Levels of analysis 
 
In the existing literature we saw that in most cases phenomena are being analysed by studying 
one part alone (i.e. in franchising literature that is done by applying the resource-based theory of 
the firm or transaction cost theory to the franchisees only or the franchisors only in order to 
explain franchise formation) or through dyadic approaches (i.e. in franchising literature that is the 
case when agency theory is applied to explain the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees).  
 
When studying phenomena we can distinguish between different levels of analysis the individual 
(Macneil, 1980) or atomised or unilateral level, the dyadic or bilateral level (Bonacich, 1987), 
triads (Granovetter, 1973), the agency or organization level, the network level (Proven and 
Milward, 1995; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), and the collective level (Marsden, 1981). The 
network level has been also often approached through the aggregation or synthesis of various 
dyadic levels (Gulati, 1995b). We will see further down the differentiation between the atomised 
level of formalists and the socialised level of substantivists. Burt (1977, 1992) differentiated 
between the atomistic approach which he characterised as undersocialized and the normative 
approach as oversocialized, he proposed the structural approach in understanding actions which is 
close to the argument of embeddedness of Granovetter (1985). Marsden (1981, 1983) in studying 
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power differentiated between collective actions and atomistic ones. Christakis (2009) was first 
studying dyads until he realised that these simple structures accumulate forming huge nets of 
nodes that are profoundly extended and realised that what was important was to find a way to 
research these complex social formats. Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) support the need 
for research into multi-levels of analysis when studying institutions and entrepreneurship.  
 
 “As elements of ongoing social structures actors do not respond solely to 
individualistically determined interests” (Marsden, 1981: 1210) 
 
“The analysis of social networks is the elaboration of the macro-implications of a small-
scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties… One of the weaknesses of sociological theory is 
that there is no relation of micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns, so we don’t know how 
interaction in small groups aggregates to form large scale patterns… The analysis of process of 
interpersonal networks provides the most fruitful micro-macro bridge” (Granovetter, 1973: 1361-
3). 
 
In studying the influence of embeddedness in the social connection of networks of alliances there 
is a transition from the unilateral to the network thinking (Achrol, 1997). According to Ulf and 
Ulf (1996) when studying alliances it is more productive to research its linkages to the rest of the 
network than to study only the alliance itself.  
 
As we find in the writings of Gulati (1998) the pitfalls of prior alliance literature are that the unit 
of analysis is the firm or the alliance, that the phenomenon has been investigated in an asocial 
context, and that research has been focused on firm-level and industry-level factors. Therefore an 
atomistic notion of the firm has been adopted and little attention has been given to the behaviour 
of other firms or to the relationships in which they themselves are already embedded and to the 
interactive elements of the market. Axinn and Matthyssens (2002) argue that existing theories are 
insufficient in explaining the internationalization of today’s firms, the Uppsala model of 
internationalization of the Nordic School and transaction costs theory have significant limitations 
that need to be solved.  
 
“All traditional theories and models except the network theory are limited by their focus 
on firms per se as opposed to networks or value chains” (Axinn and Matthyssens, 2002: 445) 
 
 
2.5.10.5. Structuralism 
 
Husserl in his writings on judgement refers to the universal being as a higher structural form 
which includes in its essence the idea of a particular being and raises it to a higher form (Rabaté 
in Sturrock, 2003). 
 
“(For Husserl) structure is an abstract model of organization, including a set of elements and the 
law of their composition… what stands out in a structure is that the relationships between the 
elements are more important than the intrinsic qualities of each element. In Husserlian 
phenomenology the genesis of individualities is subsumed under the global idea of the system” 
(Rabaté in Sturrock, 2003: 6). 
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2.5.10.6. Substantivists and Formalists 
 
There can be identified two major schools of thought in analysing economic exchange. On one 
side is the utilitarian tradition of the classical and neo classical economics, supported by the 
formalists, who believe in the rational of self-interested behaviour of actors which is minimally 
affected by social relations (Granovetter, 1985). And on the other side based on the argument of 
embeddedness is the normative approach of substantivists who argue that the behaviour of actors 
and institutions are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to analyse them as independent 
is a serious misunderstanding (Granovetter, 1985). The debate in economic anthropology 
between substantivists and formalists started somewhere in the 60s and 70s. As we find in the 
writings of Sherratt and Sherratt (1993) according to formalists the formal methods of economic 
analysis involving price maximisation were applicable to ‘primitive’ societies, while 
substantivists counter argue that societies have to be analysed in their own terms with reference 
to prevailing mechanisms of distribution. The same debate takes place between historians the 
primitivists (forerunners of substantivists), mostly based on Weber’s writings and the modernists 
(forerunners of formalists), based on Meyer’s thoughts (Frank, 1993).  
 
Formalists are based on the thinking of Adam Smith who claimed that in tribal societies, 
economic behaviour was sufficiently independent of social relations for standard neoclassical 
analysis to be useful (Granovetter, 1985). The same thinking is being supported by the approach 
of the new institutional economics who argue that behaviour and institutions can be better 
understood as resulting from the pursuit of self-interest by rational atomised individuals 
(Williamson, 1975). Influential formalists’ scholars are Le Clair and Herskovits (Frank, 1993). 
Neoclassical economic theorists argue that the effect of social relations on economic transactions 
is either minimal or creates inefficiencies (Uzzi, 1997).  
 
Embeddedness is associated with the substantivist school and is closely linked to the Marxist 
thought (Frank, 1993). One of the major substantivist scholars is Karl Polanyi who saw 
capitalism as an immoral and inefficient system; he argued that the vicious market principle 
according to which market exchange plays a dominant role in society causes dehumanisation and 
increased lack of social rights (Sherratt and Sherratt, 1993).  
 
According to Granovetter (1985) although economic transactions have various degrees of 
embeddedness in social institutions, the profit motive is rarely absent from the social life. He 
disagrees with both schools saying that: 
 
“The level of embeddedness of economic behaviour is lower in non market societies and 
has changed less with modernisation than substantivists think, but that this level has always been 
and continuous to be more substantial than is allowed by formalists” (Granovetter, 1985: 482). 
 
Granovetter (1985) characterises the formalists as employing an undersocialized approach, since 
the economic analysis is based on the behaviour of socially atomised individuals and the 
application of economic principals presumes the inexistence of social relations. When analysing 
behaviour and decision making that is being determined by more individuals, dyads or groups, 
formalists conceive them through an atomised approach. On the other hand he characterises the 
substantivists as employing an oversocialized approach who define economic behaviour as being 
driven only by consensually shaped norms and values. 
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“…because the analysed set of individuals-usually dyads, occasionally larger groups- is 
abstracted out of social context, it is atomised in its behaviour from that of other groups and from 
the history of its own relations. Atomization has not been eliminated, merely transferred to the 
bilateral or higher level of analysis… Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social 
context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of 
social categories that they happen to occupy” (Granovetter, 1985: 487) 
 
Granovetter (1985) argues that purposive actions are embedded in concrete ongoing systems of 
social relations. The argument of embeddedness is based on the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures of such relations (or networks of relations) in influencing the behaviour 
and decision making of actors.  
 
2.5.10.7. Relational Paradigm and The Argument of Embeddedness 
 
Abrahamson (1997) suggests that there are two types of management rhetorics: rational and 
normative. The former is related to upswings and points out the technical aspects of work 
organization. Normative order refers to behaviour which is formed by social norms (Clegg et al, 
2005). Rationalities become institutionalized, as we find in the writings of Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) that developed an institutional theory based on a generic social constructionist 
perspective, which argues that reality is socially constructed and therefore organizations have the 
structures that they do mainly for cultural reasons. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) the 
engine of rationalization and bureaucratization that makes firms more similar, without necessarily 
making them more efficient, is the result of three institutional isomorphic processes: coercive, 
mimetic and normative. The concept of management actions being socially embedded is coming 
from the sociological discipline (Uzzi, 1997). It is first introduced by the substantivists or even 
earlier by the historians so called primitivists. Polanyi (1957) analysed the social structure of 
modern economies through the concept of embeddedness. Even earlier than Polanyi, Emily 
Durkheim and Max Weber studied the close relationship that exists between the economy and the 
society, and the influence of social structures to the economic life.  Within the same thinking we 
have the even earlier works of Marx who highlights the relations between economic life and 
social institutions; his theory that economy and relations of production form the basis of the 
society on top of which social institutions will be created in a way that is coherent with these 
relations of production (Kabounidi, 2007). 
 
Schumpeter (1950) and Granovetter (1985) further analysed and established the important effects 
of social structure on economic life. Granovetter (1985) argued that the institutions and behaviour 
of organizations cannot be studied in an independent basis because they are formed by continuing 
social relations. He focuses on the central role of networks of social relations in producing trust 
in economic life. So he viewed rationalities as being socially embedded. Ronald Coase in the 30s 
shaded some scepticism over the thinking of the neoclassical economic school by debating on 
‘Why do organizations exist’ if agents act individualistically. Granovetter went on by asking why 
organizations form alliances, business groups, rather than acting on their own.  
 
Social norms are strong determinants of social action; they are socially shaped and belong to the 
sphere of informal institutions. Relational and structural embeddedness is the most significant 
functioning through which properties, elements and interplays emerge from systems of networks. 
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It is the main concept both in social network theory analysis as well as in social capital theory 
analysis. Social networks and social capital are often used interchangeably (Manning, 2008). 
Relational and structural embeddedness is also often used interchangeably with relational and 
structural social network theory; though embeddedness is the subject of the study of social 
network theory. 
 
Uzzi (1997) argues that Granovetter’s argument of embeddedness emerged as a potential theory 
for joining economic theory and sociological approaches to organization theory, but fails to form 
concrete propositions of how social relations affect economic exchange, while classical and 
neoclassical economic theories have concrete and rigorous scientific propositions (Heide, 1994; 
Leonidou, 2003; Uzzi, 1997). 
 
 “A well defined theory of embeddedness and inter-firm networks has yet to 
emerge…revisionist economic frameworks have attempted to explain embeddedness in terms of 
transaction costs, agency and game theory concepts… (they) apply conventional economic 
constructs to organizational behaviour… (they) faintly recognize the influence of social structure 
on economic life” (Uzzi, 1997: 36-38) 
 
Inter-organizational relationships do not only involve economic transactions, but also many 
behavioural interactions between the parties involved during which information, social and other 
intangible elements are exchanged (Leonidou, 2003). To overcome the recent stagnation of 
research being driven by the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm several theorists have 
incorporated the perspective of the relational research paradigm of relationship management 
(Hakansson, 1982; Leonidou, 2003). In studying the relational elements of inter-organizational 
relationships theorists draw from various areas, like relational theory, channel relationships, 
network theory, social exchange and the argument of embeddedness in social networks 
(Granovetter, 1985; Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). As argued by Heide (1994) relationship 
management is turning into a core research paradigm in the marketing channels literature as inter-
firm relationships move away from the market paradigm incorporating alternative mechanisms 
for governing exchange. 
 
“Extensive reliance on the neoclassical microeconomic paradigm has been responsible for 
its (inter-organizational research) recent stagnation or even decline…one way to circumvent this 
problem is by augmenting the analysis using the relational paradigm” (Leonidou, 2003:129). 
 
In inter-organizational relationships exchange parties show great dependence on each other’s 
resources, knowledge and expertise, so the way they manage their working relationship is crucial 
to the successful performance of their alliance (Styles and Ambler, 1994). The existence of 
ongoing ties between firms is explained by neoclassical economic theorists as “being more a 
matter of self-interest profit-seeking behaviour than willingful commitment or altruistic 
attachment” (Uzzi, 1997: 36).  
 
Current literature on franchising has focused on seeing this phenomenon from a dyadic 
perspective thus not much research has been devoted in seeing it from a network perspective 
(Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001). The focus of the traditional organization according to 
Achrol (1996) was in maximizing cooperation, which was often viewed as the contractual 
obligations and minimizing conflict and opportunism; while the focus of the network 
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organization is on the relational ties and how to develop mutually reinforcing, long-term 
relationships. Traditional thinking was focused on how to prevent disintegration or how to cajole 
cooperation out of opportunistic partners.  
 
Social networks and the channel of information explain the formation of alliances (Gulati, 1998). 
According to Gulati and Gargiulo (1997) the formation of alliances is due to exogenous resource 
dependencies and to an endogenous embeddedness dynamic, in which the emerging network 
gradually orients the choice of partners. Direct or indirect ties between firms influence the 
formation of alliances, firms that are already allied will form further alliances because of the 
close ties between them and unconnected firms are more likely to form alliances if they have 
common partners or are closer in an alliance network (Gulati, 1995b). Embeddedness, as Gulati 
(1998) argues, influences also the partner selection.  
 
“The information stream of a network provides to firm a priori information about 
prospective partners even if the firms are bound together directly or indirectly” (Gulati, 
1998:301). 
 
The reputation and status of a firm is influenced by its position in a network having direct 
implications to whether it is an attractive partner or not (Gulati, 1998). According to Gulati and 
Gargiulo (1997) high status companies tend to ally with other high status partners which is called 
‘homophile principle’, the initial high status of a company is also influenced by the status of its 
already partners. The study of Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan (1995) indicates that the 
network embeddedness of firms influences the creation of vertical alliances between buyers and 
suppliers. 
 
Research on governance structure has also been focused mainly on transaction cost theory. As we 
find in the writings of Gulati (1998) a major drawback in that way of thinking is that it is static, it 
views alliance governance structure as a discrete independent event occurring in an ahistorical 
context. Network theorists believe that the governance structure may be the result of previous 
alliances and of the prior interaction between partners that may change the thinking of firms 
when forming contracts (Gulati, 1998). The appropriation concerns of firms when forming 
alliances can be minimized either by a detailed contract or by trust and it is argued that network 
embeddedness can promote trust (Gulati, 1998).  
 
Alliance-based cross border ventures including multiple partners need further research attention 
(Dunning, 2000) and Johanson and Vahlne (1990) argue that research needs to be renovated by 
introducing a network view. 
 
“Alliances cannot be explained by the market-hierarchy concept of the transaction cost 
theory, but constitute a distinct structure of governance named ‘network form’ ” (Powell, 1990).  
 
“Transaction cost theory focuses on single party cost minimization, while alliances are 
dyadic exchanges therefore there is the question whose costs are being minimized, and also that 
alliances are about joint value maximization… Transaction cost theory fails to see the issue of 
governance structure as a continuous process resulting from the ongoing relationship of partners” 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
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Christakis (2009) - Professor at Harvard University who has been awarded as one of the one 
hundred most important thinkers in the world by Foreign Policy and by Times Magazine in 2009- 
says that in the course of our lives we interact with many people who interns interact with many 
others thus placing ourselves in a vast human net. This net has many types of immense capacities 
that influence us in ways we are unable to control. These influences, he argues, are so 
fundamental to our existence that have been acknowledged by ancient Greek philosophers, like 
Plato in his work Lysis and Aristotle in his works Ethics Nicomachean, and other thinkers who 
tried to understand human behaviour through the study of groups. The contemporary science of 
social networks helps this discussion go further by dealing with issues like how do individuals 
form networks, what are the objectives of networks, how does the whole exceeds the sum of its 
parts, how does our positioning in a network influences our lives, and so on (Christakis and 
Fowler, 2009: 13-16). The ontological holism of Aristotle’s Forms, the Aristotelian Ethical 
Holism, the holism of the one Being of Parmenides and Plato’s holism (Popper, 1971) have 
formed extensively the philosophy of physics specifically quantum physics which as opposed to 
the study of atoms adopts a holistic methodological approach (Esfeld, 2000; Schombert, 2006; 
Seevick, 2004). The aforementioned theories are emerging as an alternative ontological approach 
in studying organizational phenomena as well. 
 
 
2.5.10.8. Institutional Theory 
 
New institutional theory, largely shaped among others by the work of DiMaggio (1988), 
DiMaggio and Powel (1983) analyse the influence that institutions have in economic 
transactions. In contrast to the classical approaches of organizational theory and new institutional 
economics who disregard the societal context within which organizations and actors interact (an 
argument that has been strongly debated in the previous sections) the institutional theorists argue 
that organizations and actors behaviour is strongly shaped by institutions. Institutions were 
researched by DiMaggio and Powel (1983) to explain the isomorphism and homogeneity among 
organizations. Based on institutional theory the beliefs and actions of principles are strongly 
shaped by logics; logics have been studied in explaining the variance of organizational forms, 
when plurality of logics co-exist, or else called institutional pluralism this can lead to the 
emergence of conflict (Battilana and Dorado, 2010).  
 
New institutional theories support that the relationship between actors, myths and narratives and 
other normative elements influence the formation and development of economic sectors 
(Nicholls, 2010a). Agents through their actions in a process of social change can influence 
institutions and bring about institutional change; the so called institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio, 1988). The ability of some actors to break the boundaries of the very institutions that 
they are deeply embedded in and bring about transformational institutional change is called the 
‘paradox of embedded agency’ which associates to the debate among agency and structure 
(Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). On one hand is the rational choice model of agency and 
on the other hand is structural determinism; what institutional entrepreneurship theories argue is 
that culture, institutions and social relations strongly shape the behaviour of agents, they facilitate 
or impede their choices but that these do not determine the choices of actors. The notion of 
‘enabling conditions’ associated with the characteristics of the environment and with the 
characteristics of actors can support the debate on helping resolve the paradox of embedded 
agency (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). Embeddedness is a central element in 
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institutional theory as it formulates the context within which institutional entrepreneurs exist and 
interact (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). 
 
The plurality and conflict of institutional demands that are imposed on social enterprises strategic 
choices, like balancing between social and economic objectives, has been an element of 
investigation as the latter try to maintain legitimacy and support by responding to these pressure 
(Pache and Santos, 2010). In studying the influence of regulations, introduced by formal 
institutions, in the development of economic sectors the issues of reporting and disclosure are 
important research elements and are seen as products of wider social power structures and norms; 
the latter research approach belongs to the ‘sociology of accounting institutional practices’ 
(Nicholls, 2010a:395).  
 
2.5.10.9. Social Capital Theory 
 
Social capital theory has emerged since the 90s as one of the most significant social science 
theories (Manning, 2008). Social capital theory is often used interchangeably with social network 
theory; both theories analyse the dynamics of relational and structural embeddedness in shaping 
organizational behaviour. Social capital theory views relational and structural embeddedness as a 
mean for actors to acquire resources. The resources that social capital theory deals with are 
power, control and information through their relationships with other actors in their infiormal 
networks and through their structural positioning in these networks that privies them with higher 
status (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). There is some skepticism coming from social 
capital theorists of whether social networks are social capital and to the equation of these two 
concepts, the argumentation against this interchangeability builds on the following arguments: 
firstly network theory is overstretched trying to explain everything through the network lenses; 
secondly, are issues of network content and context, social capital theory is more than seeing 
elements through embeddedness in groups (Manning, 2008) 
 
2.5.10.10. Systems Theory 
 
Leadbeater (2006) argues that social entrepreneurship should be viewed through system-level 
approaches; social entrepreneurs unlike mainstream businesses seek system wide social changes 
which can only be realized through networks that aggregate a number of micro-impacts of 
different social ventures what he called ‘networked, system-level social entrepreneurship’ 
(2006:236). The same argument is supported by Sakaraya et al (2012) research on social 
alliances; they also support the need for the study of institutions in formation issues rather than 
only focusing on resource-dependence arguments.  
 
General systems theory can be divided into philosophy of science, behavioral phenomena and 
methodological. Network theory and social systems theory is part of the second category. 
Systems theory is not one single theory but includes various approaches whose common ground 
is that they all have the system as the unit of analysis (Gunaratne, 2008). Systems theory can be 
explained as the number of interacting components that work together to make a whole. It 
focuses on the components, like technology, that are connected to make a whole (Greenfield, 
2011; Mele, Pels, and Polese, 2010; Von Bertalanffy, 1968); which is called structural 
functionalism (Parsons, 1951). Functionalism focuses on interactions with the environment 
(Greenfield, 2011). Systems have closed boundaries; little influence from the environment, or 
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open boundaries; continuous influence from the environment (Bailey, 2008). A close system 
usually a physical one goes gradually through progressive chaos (entropy), disintegration and 
death (Gunaratne, 2008). An open system, a biological, psychological or social system exchanges 
matter-energy and information with the environment.  
 
According to one approach of first-wave systems theory it is argued that social systems have to 
equilibrate four subsystems the existence of personality system (individual/psychological), social 
(relationships), cultural (values), and organismic (biological) (Gunaratne, 2008). While second 
wave theories dealt mostly with issues like information processing, control and entropy. A 
system possesses physical or abstract components, attributes, relationships, interdependence and 
an environment. According to Gunaratne (2008) study the characteristics of systems are: 
wholeness, interdependence (among its components), hierarchy (subsystems, periphery, like solar 
systems), self-regulation and control, equilibrium/homeostasis (it can never actually reach 
equilibrium or maximum entropy), environment interchange and adaptability, equifinality (a 
system can reach the same particular end goal from different courses, starting points and energy 
needed). 
 
In the Living Systems Theory there are eight hierarchical levels and 20 subsystems; levels are: 
cell, organ, organism, group, organization, community, society and supranational system. Among 
the 20 subsystems only two process simultaneously matter-energy and information these are the 
reproducer and the boundary. The Social Entropy Theory wants to keep entropy in the social 
system at optimal levels below maximum entropy. The system should open to receive matter-
energy and information and to reject useless resources and it should close to protect it from 
threats and losses of valuable resources. The social system regulates 6 key system components: 
which are population, information, space, technology, organization and level of living; it also 
regulates the flow from these components, types of flow are: human population, elements from 
the environment (like plants), energy, culture, technology, information, organization and level of 
living (like wealth) (Bailey, 2008). As Bailey argues social system theorists study the inner 
elements of groups while not dealing with the boundaries of the system, with inflow and outflows 
to the system, with interaction with other systems and the relationship with the wider 
environment.  
 
Traditional systems perspectives see society as a stable functioning arrangement of social 
institutions being in equilibrium. These are interdependent, each relying on and supporting one 
another.  A change in one social institution which causes disequilibrium will influence the whole 
society until it adapts to this change to reach equilibrium again (Beverland and Lindgree, 2007; 
Burnes, 2004; Gunaratne, 2008). So the nature of systems is harmony and dynamic balance a 
concept in line with Asian philosophy and with what the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus 
named ‘palintonos armonia’ (palintonos harmony), that is the harmony that is achieved through 
the unity of opposites through war, he believed that there was a continuous change ‘ta panta rei’ 
(everything flows) and so ‘no man ever steps in the same river twice’ (in Khan, 1979) 
 
The systems perspective of stability was disliked during the 1980s were scholars addressed the 
constant development and changes in systems (Germain and Gitterman, 1980). This brought the 
development of chaos theory (Bolland and Atherton, 1999; Hudson, 2000; Warren, Franklin, and 
Streeter, 1998). Chaos theory stresses that system processes involve changes- sudden, radical or 
rapid- which eventually lead to stability again. Negative changes can be important processes in a 
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system. Chaos theory can facilitate rapid change (Warren et al., 1998). The whole system is 
composed of subsystems (Germain and Gitterman, 1980).  
 
Anthropology and sociology have empirically supported systems theory (Fraser, 2004; 
Hutchison, Matto, Harrigan, Charlesworth, and Viggiani, 2007; White and Klein, 2008) as useful 
for comprehending human behavior holistically. It allows the understanding of a construct at 
various levels: micro, immediate surroundings, e.g. family and peers; meso, connections between 
immediate surroundings, e.g. distance between home and work; and macro, cultural context, e.g. 
values and beliefs. It also promotes multidimensional interventions in order to expect better 
outcomes, thus facilitating change (Hutchison et al., 2007).  
 
Systems theory approaches on the fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology can be 
contrasted to other theoretical approaches to the same fields. Firstly, to conflict theory; conflict 
theory addressed by Marxism focuses on how conflict causes human behavior politically, 
culturally and economically. At all times more than one social conflict occurs, which exists in 
various kinds of groups, like economic, ethnic, religious (Coser, 1957). The difference between 
conflict theory and systems theory is that conflict theory emphasizes a constant struggle because 
of the differences between people’s statuses-like is a continuous conflict over desires, roles and 
goals (Zimbardo, 2007)-, while functionalism claims that different parts of society function 
together towards a common goal for society to work out. Conflict theory posits that society is 
unharmonious because it is controlled by powerful and rich people, creating inequality (Coser, 
1957; Vahabi, 2009). On the other hand systems theory assumes that society has a sense of 
direction and it is rather harmonious.  
 
The similarities between the theories are that they are both macrospective. Both theories view 
society holistically. They consider the components of society, like family, education and how 
people are affected rather than how people affect these components. Both theories claim that 
individuals’ position in society is influenced by their education, which is either equal or unequal. 
Moreover, both theories support that a system consists of social structures; nevertheless, these are 
viewed differently by both theories in terms of their purpose. Systems theory sees them as entities 
that function together to benefit everyone. Conflict theory sees them as social structures that are 
in place, but differ in their advantages relying upon wealth and power of the individuals involved 
(Vahabi, 2009).  
 
Secondly, to social exchange theory; social exchange theory argues that people aim to maximize 
their own advantages and lessen costs (Naidoo and Adamowitz, 2006). Social exchange theory 
differs from systems theory because it believes reciprocal relationships are important in life 
(Hartman, 1995; Meyer, 1993). It assumes interaction happens through the trading of social 
resources that generate obligations (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), while systems theory 
associates interaction with education. Rewards and costs are crucial factors in the social exchange 
theory that the system theory does not consider (Molm, 1990). Both theories similarly believe 
that people in a society are goal-directed and they interact with each other or work together to 
accomplish their goals and progress as a society. However, social exchange theory also thinks of 
people as rational and conscious beings (Becker and Joseph, 1988; Grossman, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, to social constructionism theory; the social constructionist perspective concentrates on 
people’s way of learning through interacting with each other to distinguish parts of the world and 
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their place in it. Interaction is through shared meanings and understandings about the world they 
live in (Kyle and Chick, 2007). It differs from systems theory because systems theory greatly 
emphasized that interaction occurs mainly from education, which allocates people to different 
economic levels. Social constructionism looks more at language, customs, historical and cultural 
contexts that lead to interaction (Charon, 1998). Another difference is that systems theory focuses 
on how interaction through education can help people understand rules, help them economically 
and cooperate. But social constructionism mentions that social interactions generally help the 
person also develop attitudes, and see how the self has developed through social interactions 
(Franklin, 1995). 
 
Fourthly, to psychodynamic theory; psychodynamic theory focuses on how human behavior is 
motivated by needs, drives and emotions (Borden, 2009). With systems theory, the difference is 
that psychodynamic theory places emphasis on emotions that cause human behaviors (McLeod 
and Kettner-Polley, 2004). The psychodynamic theory posits that childhood experiences 
influence people’s behaviors during adulthood unconsciously thought processes (Garner, 2002). 
Different parts of the unconscious mind are constantly struggling with each other creating 
different behaviors. People tend to use their defense mechanisms to avoid facing or accepting 
certain situations (Baumeister, Dale, and Sommer, 1998). Systems theory does not consider how 
people think, but rather how their roles in society create their usual behaviors for maintaining a 
balance. The very slight similarity between the theories is that they both believe human behavior 
derives from a certain factors: Unconscious and childhood experiences, psychodynamic and 
person’s role structure in society, functionalism.  
 
Fifthly, to psychosocial developmental theory; the developmental approach deals with how 
human behavior unravels behavioral changes across the life span. Biological, psychological and 
social processes interact together in a complex way defining the stages of human development 
(Erikson, 1963). Developmental theory differs from functionalism in that it greatly focuses on 
life’s stages that build up from each other and they are all qualitatively different (Erikson, 1963) 
depending on factors such as gender (Borysenko, 1996), sexual orientation (Troiden, 1989) and 
ethnicity. While the developmental perspective deals with progression in life through stages, 
functionalism sees that life progresses through the communication, cooperation and interaction 
between people in a society. Another difference between the theories is that the developmental 
perspective considers that people change their status and roles in society as they progress through 
life stages (Elder and Giele, 2009), but systems theory does not consider specific roles, only the 
existence of inequality.   
 
Finally, to behaviorism and social learning theory; the social behavioral perspective posits that 
human behavior is learnt through interaction with the environment. This happens through 
classical conditioning that is behavior learnt through association (Allen and Madden 1985); 
through operant conditioning, that is behavior as a result of reinforcement (Staddon and Cerutti, 
2003); and though cognitive social learning, that is behavior learnt by observation, imitation, 
beliefs and expectations (Bandura, 2002). Comparing this perspective to functionalism, 
behavioral theory considers that behavior can actually change and be defined depending on 
circumstances (Bouton, 2004; Garcia-Hoz, 2004). Functionalism only considers that people may 
or may not maintain similar values and beliefs, but they all work interdependently to achieve 
what is best for society (Grube, Mayton, and Ball-Rokeach, 2010). One similarity between the 
theories is they both mention about deviant behavior but describe it in different ways. Systems 
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theory sees deviant behavior as creating negative changes in the system and breaking the 
existence of equilibrium (Durkheim and Halls, 1984). Behavioral theory claims that undesired 
behaviors can arise causing human problems (Bandura, 2002), however this behavior as all 
behaviors can be changed (Bouton, 2004).  
 
 
2.5.10.11. Social Network Theory 
 
Network theory derives from systems theory (Gunaratne, 2008) 
 
“The appearance of networks as well defined forms of economic organization brought 
some scepticism in the efficiency of the use of traditional dyadic perspectives for its analysis. 
This is because; the network of relationships in which particular exchanges are embedded has 
properties, which are greater than the sum of its parts and outcomes, which cannot be explained 
by studying its parts alone” (Achrol, 1996:3).  
 
From a mathematical approach networks have been analysed based on the theory of neurals 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
 
Social network theory was indicated the most appropriate in studying motives for social alliance 
formation (Sorensen et al, 2013). Social network analysis is needed in the study of alliance and 
networks in order to view the whole network as one entity and identify the properties that 
influence it (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013). Paswan, Loustau, and Young (2001) used network 
theory to examine the franchise system. They believe that social network and network theory are 
two frameworks that have significant convergence and overlap. Network theory investigates the 
relationships between firms or units in a value added chain while social network perspective 
focuses on the social relationships between decision makers or players. According to Jones, 
Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) the social network perspective is an important characteristic of 
organizations governed on network organization philosophy. The network perspective is based on 
the notion that economic actions are influenced by the social context in which they are embedded 
and that actions can be influenced by the position of actors in social networks.  
 
Underlying embeddedness is the search for information to reduce uncertainty and networks of 
contacts can be important sources of information (Gulati, 1998). Transactions between actors that 
share little familiarity or affect and no prolonged past or expected future social ties, have been 
differentiated from socially embedded transactions, those facilitated by structural social relations 
between the actors (Granovetter, 1973; Hakansson and Ford, 2002; McGinn and Keros, 2002).  
 
According to Gulati (1998) there is a big trend in analyzing firms through the influence of the 
social context; elements of that context have been categorized as structural, cognitive, 
institutional, and cultural. The structural context, according to his research, points out the 
importance of the social networks in which economic actors may be placed and proposes that the 
most important aspect of an organization’s environment is its social network of external contacts.  
 
A social network as we have previously mentioned is defined as: 
 
 “a set of nodes (e.g. persons, organizations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g. 
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friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specified type” (Gulati, 1998: 295). 
 
There are two analytical approaches for examining the influence of social networks the first 
focuses on the differential informational advantages offered by social networks and the second 
focuses on the control benefits that actors can have if they are advantageously positioned within a 
social network. These benefits overlap since the latter provides the former. Informational 
advantages can be provided through two mechanisms: relational embeddedness or cohesion 
perspectives, based on which actors with cohesive ties can possess more common information 
and knowledge that can diminish uncertainty and promote trust and structural embeddedness or 
positional perspectives, which emphasize the position of an organization in the structure of the 
network that provides it with higher informational advantages (Gulati, 1998). The more relational 
an exchange becomes the more it creates a distinct social order within the relationship itself and 
promotes characteristics such as trust, commitment, solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, role 
integrity, harmonization of conflict and restraint of power, which are referred to as Social Norms 
of Governance (Achrol, 1996; Kaufmann and Dant, 1991).  
 
Network theory focuses on investigating how embeddedness of individuals influences their 
behaviour and how the same argument is used for organizations. Organizations can be 
interconnected with other organizations through various social and economic relationships thus 
forming a social network (Gulati, 1998). In the case of inter-firm alliances, as argued by Gulati, 
their accumulation can also become a social network; therefore they can be investigated through 
network theory perspective as both endogenous and exogenous factors. In the first case we see 
the influence of social networks for the formation of an alliance and in the second case we see 
how the effects of social networks explain the accumulation of alliances. 
 
As we find in the conclusion of Gulati’s study (1998): 
 
“…The channelling of information helps organizations to discover new alliance 
opportunities and can affect how often and with whom they form alliances…Social networks of 
prior alliances not only influence the creation of new alliances but also affect their structure, their 
evolution, their successful performance, and the choice of potential partners, as they turn to 
existing relationships for potential ones” (Gulati, 1998: 293-317). 
 
He then argues that when two firms have decided to form an alliance, their proximity in the 
network can influence the governance structure that will be formed. Finally, the level to which 
they will be embedded can influence their behaviour and the future success of the alliance. 
 
Studying the structural perspective of social network we see that direct and indirect or weak ties 
carry information and resources among members (Granovetter, 1973). The structural positioning 
of members in a network influences the dynamics of transferring knowledge and resources, so 
according to Ibarra (1993) network centrality increases cross-boundary innovation. While 
Obstfeld’s (2005) research indicates that weak ties can also be a strong predictor of innovation, 
which is seen as the result of combining people, knowledge and resources. Obstfeld (2005) 
argues that sparse networks that have structural holes, because of the absent of connections 
among many members (Burt, 1992), can offer more opportunities to its members than dense 
networks. The opportunities that sparse networks present are in the creation of new ideas but the 
obstacles that they pose are in actually implementing those ideas, while the opposite stands for 
 132 
dense networks (Burt, 2004). The latter is due to the existence of common interests, aligned 
perspectives, common language and stronger levels of trust among members in dense networks 
(Granovetter, 2005). According to Obstfeld (2005: 102) the solution to the problem could be the 
adoption of ‘tertius iungens’ strategies from the part of networks, that means the commitment 
towards bringing together nodes in your social network by either establishing connection with 
disconnected nodes or by encouraging coordination between already connected nodes.  
 
According to social capital theory there are two different conceptualisations the first 
conceptualisation focuses on the opportunities of sparse networks and structural holes and on the 
control and informational opportunities that the latter offer to brokers or gatekeepers (Burt, 
1992). In line with this conceptualisation is the ‘tertius gaudens’ strategy (Simmel, 1950), or 
disuinion strategy, or active separation of brokers who deliberately keep unique connections with 
firms in their networks that remain disconnected with each other, thus taking advantage of 
structural holes. The second conceptualisation focuses on the benefits of closed, dense, or 
cohesive networks, which include increased cooperation and trust and where exchange of ideas 
and repeated interaction leads to the creation of knowledge (Obstfeld, 2005: 105). The 
opportunities of dense networks as Obstfeld (2005) highlights is in the existence of norms that 
lead to self-regulating behaviour that constrains opportunistic behaviour and make members act 
for the collective good. Other opportunities are the exchange of complex knowledge and the 
creation of action that is necessary for innovation (Obstfeld, 2005). 
  
According to the writings of Donckels and Lambrecht (1997) based on the broad definition of 
networks as organized systems of relationships, they can take many different forms, requiring 
different variables to analyze a network. So based on social, communication, business and moral 
determinants we can find various networks, i.e. a social network is family and friends, a 
communication network is one where there are non trading ties, while moral ties arise from 
entrepreneurs obligation to do everything possible for their partners.   
 
Other ways to view networks that we also find in the research of Donckels and Lambrecht (1997) 
is through: the perspective of informal versus formal; the first case is all possible information 
channels between individuals while a formal network is mostly a link between an entrepreneur 
and an organization, the perspective of indirect versus direct; in the direct tie there is a direct 
contact, and the perspective of centralization versus decentralization; in the first case a core 
enterprise is central in the network and coordinates the activities in the network, this can also be 
evaluated by examining the structure within which the network exerts influence, if influence over 
decisions is concentrated in a single organization then the network is centralized (Proven and 
Milward, 1995). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
In the previous chapter we laid the basis for the following sections by presenting the theoretical 
stand of the research that is being conducted in this thesis. The subject of these chapters was a 
critical review of the conceptual foundations of organizational and inter-organizational relations 
theory; on the various types and forms that these can take and on the development of theories in 
these fields; we elaborated and comparatively assessed theories pertaining to the process of social 
entrepreneurship, social inter-firm alliances, networks and social franchising building on the 
similarities and differences among them and mainstream entrepreneurship, alliances and 
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franchising especially with regards to the issues of formation, partner selection, governance and 
performance; we emphasized the role of formal institutional dynamics, the 
individual/psychological profile of social entrepreneurs and social innovation models; we 
provided an in-depth analysis of the elements of informal institutions specifically social norms 
that emerge from the embeddedness of actors in networks which influence the formation, partner 
selection, governance and performance of alliances and networks; finally we argued through a 
critical review of alternative conceptual theories on the theoretical approaches adopted in this 
thesis.  
 
The primary result of this review is that despite the substantial body of existing research that has 
been published the issue of social franchising has been severely under-researched. Also the 
elements that trigger social entrepreneurship formation need further research attention, especially 
from social network thinking.  The issue of scaling social enterprises has also been under-
researched and finally the influence of informal institutions in alliance and franchising literature 
is an area that needs to be further investigated. Generally the fields would benefit from holistic 
approaches approaches building on systems of institutions and networks. In the following chapter 
we will attempt to address these theoretical shortfalls and provide our conceptual models of the 
factors associated with the formation, partner selection, governance and performance of social 
franchising. This approach also explains the formation of social entrepreneurship. 
3. A Conceptualisation of the Factors Associated with the Social 
Franchise Network  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
At this section we present the conceptual framework of this study as it has been induced from the 
analytic induction of the qualitative data. The preceding chapter reviewed a number of issues, 
which have been extensively tested in empirical studies within the alliance, franchising and social 
entrepreneurship theory. We have reviewed existing research on the sequential strategic stages of 
the phenomenon of (social) franchising: the motives for its formation and partner selection 
criteria, its governance structure, and its performance. We also presented a comparative study 
between the various theoretical approaches on different levels of analysis that have been applied 
in analysing those constructs.  
 
3.2. The Conceptual Framework 
 
“Theorization (or conceptual framing) is the value-added of qualitative research” 
(Llewelyn 2003:662).  
 
Conceptual framing does not exist outside the empirical research, on the contrary it is part of the 
social phenomena that are being investigated; theory and data are interdependent (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Mouzelis, 1995; Llewelyn 2003; Wodak 2001). The theory of this study pertains 
to grounded theories and is induced through analytic induction from the qualitative data that have 
been collected. It is primarily an explorative research in understanding social franchising. It is 
secondarily explanatory with regards only to the dynamics of the system of informal institutions 
and social networks in shaping the behaviour of actors and organization when forming social 
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franchises. The explanatory research has been based on causal hypothesis deduced from theory; 
these hypothesised relationships were also indicated from the exploratory research. Therefore, 
our conceptual theory although it preceded data analysis in the presentation of this thesis it has 
actually proceeded the data analysis processes 
 
3.2.1. The Social Franchise Model 
 
The purpose of this study, as already mentioned, is to explore the phenomenon of social 
franchising through a holistic approach identifying the systems that determine the formation 
growth and success of social franchising. Our qualitative research indicated that the determinant 
factor that differentiates social franchises from mainstream franchises and alliances are social 
entrepreneurship and the socially innovative model of the venture which are both strongly 
embedded and influenced by their contextual political and social environments. Social franchises 
cannot be analysed in isolation from the spheres of social entrepreneurship, social innovation, the 
political context within which they emerge and operate and the social settings of relationships 
they form with other organizations and actors which shape their behaviour through the dynamics 
of relational and structural embeddedness.  
 
The Social Franchise Model- SoFraM (see Figure 3) presents the relationships among the 
constructs of this research. The formation, partner selection, governance and performance of 
social franchises is determined by decisions and policies adopted by formal national and 
supranational institutions, by norms that emerge from the relational and structural embeddedness 
of actors in networks of informal institutions, by elements of the social innovation of the ventures 
and by elements of the psychological profile of the social entrepreneurs. The emphasis on 
subgroups and substructures of the network is considered important when applying social 
network theory (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013). 
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Figure 1 The Social Franchise Model. The SoFraM 
Original work of the author of this study; depicted by Chartered Architect Mr Theodoros 
Gazotzis; ‘ΟΛΙΣΜΟΣ’ stands for the Greek word ‘Holism’. 
 
3.2.2. The National Comparative Advantage Social Economy Sector – The 
Holistic Model of SoFraM 
 
In an economy where the four systems intersect we expect to find best practices of social 
franchises and social enterprises. These economies will develop a comparative advantage in the 
social economy sector concentrating more successful social entrepreneurial ventures that have 
greater prospect of scaling and establishing social partnerships. Organizations and actors who are 
active in an economy where the state has adopted a portfolio of policies enhancing social 
entrepreneurship, when these organizations and actors are advantageously positioned and 
relationally embedded in social networks, given that these organizations have developed a 
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socially innovative business model and that the entrepreneurs are committed to this social venture 
then we expect that these ventures will be stemmed with success (See Figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 National Comparative Advantage Social Economy Sector - The Holistic Model of 
SoFraM 
Original work of the author of this study; depicted by Chartered Architect Mr Theodoros 
Gazotzis; ‘ΟΛΙΣΜΟΣ’ stands for the Greek word ‘Holism’. 
 
At the following subchapters we present the conceptualization of the four systems of our study.  
 
3.3. The Conceptualisation of the System of the Individual/Psychological Social 
Entrepreneur Profile 
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The dynamics of the system of individual social entrepreneur in understanding the phenomena of 
social enterprises and social franchising is a personality system of individual/psychological 
nature and contains elements like traits, knowledge, experiences, background, personality, 
motives and intentions. 
 
Personality traits were investigated and were found to correlate with the accumulation of 
franchise formation (multi-units), with governance modes of franchises and with the performance 
of franchise systems (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). According to the results of their study 
multi-unit franchisees have a significant lower score in personality traits indicating that they 
prefer to be part of organised structured systems, to adhere to system rules and to manage the 
system thus being more system oriented. Though most of the variables scored as not significant 
apart from empathy, emotional intelligence, consciousness, and emotional stability. For 
measuring personality profile of franchisees Weaven, Grace and Manning (2009:95-96) used: 
firstly, the Big-Five personality traits, consisting of a) extraversion, how outgoing a person is and 
how easily they engage in verbal and physical expressions the higher this the more adventurous 
and social a person is, b) agreeableness showing altruism, caring, and emotional support, the 
higher this the more kind and sympathetic and giving a person is as opposed to being 
competitive, self-centred, indifferent and jealous, c) consciousness has to do with the ability of 
person to define goals and objectives and actually meet them, the higher this the person is 
characterised as being an achiever, responsible and focused as opposed to impulsive, d) 
emotional stability is related to stress the higher this score the more calm a person is as opposed 
to being stressful and having anxiety and depressive tendencies, e) intellect which measures 
creativity and openness to new ideas, the higher this score the more innovative a person will be, 
better coping with complexity as opposed to being more conservative and resisting to change. 
(Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). The operationalisation of personality traits in the research 
of Weaven, Grace and Manning (2009) was based on big-five measurement through the IPIP-B5 
of 50 items with 5point Likert-type response scales (Cattell, 1957; Goldberg, 1992; Tupes and 
Chrystal, 1961). 
 
Another important dimension in personality traits is empathy which has to do with how we react 
when we see someone experiencing certain situations, the degree to which we can identify 
ourselves with them. Empathy has four dimensions a) the perspective taking, which has to do 
with the ability of a person to step outside of their shoes and understand the position of the other 
person, the higher this the person will have a better social functioning and higher self-esteem 
because of that; b) empathic concern that is the level at which a person can feel concern for 
others, the higher this score the more sympathetic and non-selfish a person will be; c) fantasy is 
the ability to identify with characters in books and films, the higher this score the person will be 
more sensitive to others, have higher emotional reactivity and verbal intelligence; d) personal 
distress is the degree which a person is emotionally influenced by witnessing the negative 
feelings of others, the higher this score the less self-esteem a person will have and less social 
functioning (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 2009). For measuring empathy they used the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) of 14 items with 5point Likert-type scales (Davis, 1980) 
 
Finally according to the same research the third factor of personality traits is emotional 
intelligence, it is ‘the ability or tendency to perceive, understand, regulate and harness emotions 
adaptively in the self and in others’ (Schutte et al, 2003:523). The higher this score the most 
successful a person will be in many dimensions, it is considered a very important element in 
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analysing personality, intelligence and success of individuals (Weaven, Grace and Manning, 
2009). For measuring emotional Intelligence they applied the Emotional Intelligence Scale (EIS) 
of 33 items (Schutte et al, 1998), they also included age, gender and franchise system. 
 
Other skill identified by research: creativity, collaborative leadership skills, team-work capability, 
socio-moral motivation, long-term community oriented motivation, unique ethics (Bornstein, 
2004; Drayton, 2002; Mair and Roboa, 2006); their capacity to innovatively exploit opportunities 
suddenly identified; their skills in building networks (Nicholls and Opal, 2005); commitment to 
their communities, of team working and collaborative leadership, entrepreneurial personality and 
the ability to see opportunities (Korosec and Berman, 2006); a strong desire to change society, by 
discomfort of the status quo, by altruistic feelings, and by a need to be socially responsible (Mair 
and Roboa, 2006). In terms of behaviour attributes include: accept social criticism, ability to 
appear trustworthy and receptivity to other’s feelings (Mair and Roboa, 2006). Sharir and Lerner 
(2006) identify as motives of social entrepreneurs that are common with main stream 
entrepreneurs were: self-fulfillment, occupational independence, and opportunities for creativity; 
the motives that were unique to social entrepreneurs were: personal rehabilitation, search for 
solutions to individual distress, obligation or affiliation to one’s community.  
 
Social franchisee selection criteria: commitment level, risk-taking ability, innovativeness, good 
team players, personal integrity, ability to persuade, enthusiasm, entrepreneurial skills, 
commitment to social objectives, confidence, willingness to be trained and to maintain quality; 
skills and capabilities like fund raising skills, and knowledge of the local sector and in some 
cases financial robustness (Doherty, 2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003; Sivakumar and 
Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b). 
 
For franchising formation: route into self-employment, individualism, unemployment push, prior 
self-employment and creativity. Complexity of franchisee motivation, like intrinsic/extrinsic 
goals, for franchisees with no prior self-employment experience these are: independence, and 
autonomy act; for those with prior self-employment experience are: security and profitability, and 
the aforementioned intrinsic goals (Stanworth and Curran, 1999). 
 
Findings indicate that trustworthiness (the belief that the partner is worth of the trust of others) 
that is an attribute of an individual partner is positively related to franchise and alliance 
formation, governance and success (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Mollering, 2003; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992; Rotter, 1967); while trust is an attribute of a relationship between partners. 
Mollering (2003) findings indicate that trust and trustworthiness have a very strong correlation.  
 
Networking leadership skills are a significant parameter in the success of social entrepreneurial 
networks: a particular open and inclusive leadership style; that accommodates for other dynamic 
and ambitious leaders to act; leading through persuasion and consensus; good listener skills and 
ability to promote others contributions; and showing direction (Leadbeater, 2006). 
 
Grifitths, Gundry and Kickul (2013) investigated education and gender, their research results 
indicate that while education has no significant correlation to social entrepreneurship formation, 
gender plays a significant role suggesting that the support of the growth of female entrepreneurs 
has positive effect to the growth of social entrepreneurial ventures. Alvord et al (2004) research 
in cross-national best practices of social enterprises also found no patterns in terms of 
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background (coming from poor or rich backgrounds or education), country of origin, gender, 
occupation, and being individuals or groups. What they found as significant was their skills in 
managing constituents from diverse groups and establishing bridges among them; thus in 
establishing social networks.  
 
Mair and Roboa (2006) model of social entrepreneurial intentions suggest that empathy, moral 
judgment (is the cognitive process that motivates an individual to help others in search of a 
common good) which both influence desirability of a social venture, and self-efficacy (the belief 
in one abilities to mobilize resources and meet a target) and support of social groups (ability to 
mobilize resources from networks) which both influence the feasibility of the venture are the 
underlying parameters that lead to social entrepreneurship formation. Mair, Battilana and Cardens 
(2012) and Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) distinguish among principles that guide social 
entrepreneurs’ actions and justifications in conceptualizing the desired social outcome of their 
entrepreneurial activities; they employ a categorization based on ‘orders of worth’ based on the 
conceptualization of Boltanski and Thevenot (2006): a) the world of inspiration (non conformity, 
dream and rebel), b) domestic world (worth is associated with trust and tradition, acts of 
preservation), c) world of fame (worth is seen through the perception of others, exercise influence 
and accomplish recognition), d) civic world (worth is associated with collectivism and 
belongingness, thus mobilize others and acting in groups), e) market world (worth is associated 
with price mechanisms, acts through competition and identification of market opportunities), f) 
industrial world (worth is associated with efficiency and effectiveness, acting through the 
application of plans, models and tools). They found that the four social entrepreneurism models 
that they created are associated with different justifications and principles: the political capital 
model is mostly associated with fame, the human capital model with fame and domestic 
principles, the economic capital model with the market principle and the social capital model 
with the civic principle. The choice to form entrepreneurial ventures is also influenced by 
demographics and psychological characteristics (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). 
 
Zahra et al (2009) research identifies three types of social entrepreneurs: a) the social bricoleur, 
who addresses needs at a small-scale local level, their motives are noble, the level of their ego 
and ambition are limited; b) the social constructionist who attempts to resolve market failures by 
launching innovation that can bring social changes, their motives and aspirations are complex and 
have many facets, their behaviour might become opportunistic and coercive as they try to 
influence others in meeting their goals; and c) the social engineer who identifies failures at the 
social structure and launches actions to target revolutionary transformational change, they are the 
most ambitious, their egos and needs may be ahead of their ventures, they may be individualistic, 
socially deviant and manipulative. These three types are differentiated based on the process they 
follow to identify problems, based on the conceptualisation of the impact they want to bring and 
based on the way they mobilise resources to do that. Their research investigates issues of ethics 
of social entrepreneurs.  
 
RQ1: What is the role of the system of the individual/psychological social entrepreneurship 
profile in the formation governance and performance of social franchising? 
 
3.4. The Conceptualisation of the System of Social Innovation 
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The dynamics of the system of social innovation in understanding the phenomena of social 
enterprises and social franchising has a technological nature and contains elements of technology, 
knowledge, technical, resources, strategies, tools, business models, resource mix, missions, goals 
and other organizational elements 
 
Alvord et al (2004) identified three systems of innovation being building local capacity, 
disseminating a package and building local movements. Their results indicate the existence of 
correlation among social innovation and a) systematic learning (individual or organizational), b) 
the mobilization of existing local resources of disadvantaged groups, c) the relational and 
structural networking skills of the social entrepreneurs in building and managing networks of 
relationships, d) the scaling up strategy, and e) social transformation impact (being economic, 
political or cultural). They found no correlation among social innovation and operational 
organizational context (like size, management systems, staff development, evaluation and 
reporting systems) and among social innovation and individual or groups personality profile (like 
background, age, gender, profession).  
 
Seelos and Mair (2005) identify three elements of innovative sustainable social entrepreneurship 
ventures being: a) satisfying basic human needs (providing health services, farming solutions, 
accommodation), b) establish communities that enhance the creation of norms, rights and 
collaborative action (enhance the role and participation of women, mutual support, solidarity), c) 
promoting the needs of the future into activities that take place now (not to hinder with our 
actions today the opportunities of future generations to make their own choices, protecting the 
environment). 
 
According to Mair, Battilana and Cardens (2012) social entrepreneurial models are based on 
three elements of strategic decision, being: a) define the problem or need (redefine an issue 
outside conventional categorization and boundaries thus approaching an issue from a different 
stand point) they identified 11 categories, b) identify the target constituents (social entrepreneurs 
engage other change actors in their activities these being formal institutions, other organizations, 
beneficiaries, clients), they identified 16 categories etc), c) select the activity (how do they 
organize the change agents, the different constituents in the social change process to address the 
issues identified), they identified 12 categories. Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) identify 
three stages of social innovation: a) to create a vision for divergent change, this means defining 
an issue, conceptualizing it and justifying it b) the mobilization of people of allies and c) the act 
of motivating those people to actually engage in actions to achieve the vision. According to Zahra 
et al (2009) the elements are: a) the process to discovering a problem, b) the impact they want to 
make, c) the mobilization of resources. 
 Mair, Battilana and Cardens (2012) and Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) identified four 
social innovation models: political capital, human capital, economic capital and social capital. 
They also clustered the four social entrepreneurism models based on the justifying rationale of 
social entrepreneurs on ‘orders of worth’. The political capital is mostly associated with fame, the 
human capital with fame and domestic principles, the economic model with market principle and 
the social model with the civic principle. Therefore there is a correlation among the psychological 
profile of social entrepreneurs and social innovation; they found no correlation among geography 
and the emergent social entrepreneurial models.  
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Social innovation models to scale are: branches, affiliation (from loose coalitions to social 
franchises) and dissemination (Dees et al, 2004; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Mair and Sezgi, 
2011). Types of social innovation growth identified in Lyon and Fernandez (2012) (Dees et al, 
2004; Mair and Sezgi, 2011) are: from organic growth: maximising social impact of existing 
provision, diversification (additional services and products), increase penetration though in-house 
growth of services, setting up new branches in other locations, taking over existing businesses 
and converting them to their model, winning contract from local authorities or employers to run 
their model. From affiliations and relationships with other organizations: spin out organizations 
(like the social franchisor can spin out the development unit to control the franchise system), 
social franchising, kite marks and quality standards. Through dissemination: training and 
accredited courses, networks established to share good practice, provision of open source 
material and encouraging learning. 
 
Meyskens et al (2010b:668) in investigating innovation through social venture networks they 
operationalised it through the use of dichotomous variables on secondary data that included the 
following items: new technology, new way of doing things (processes), changing attitudes or 
mindsets, offering new products or services, creating new relationships. Replicability was 
operationalised through a scale of 0-5: 0 being not replicable or transferable, 1 being centre or 
location, 2 being replicable centre, 3 being programme or model, 4 being programme or model 
and replication support, 5 being network.  
 
Results from Meyskens et al (2010b) indicate positive relation of social innovation and social 
networks; this argument has been supported by other research (Alvord et al, 2004; Mulgan et al, 
2007; Murray, Caulier-Grice and Mulgan, 2009; Obstfeld, 2005). Also, social innovation is 
positively related to governmental interventions, especially funding (Mulgan et al, 2007). Social 
innovation is positively related with elements from the social entrepreneurship profile (Doherty, 
2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003; Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b). 
 
RQ2: What is the role the system of social innovation in the formation governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
 
3.5. The Conceptualisation of the Institutional Context 
 
3.5.1. The Conceptualisation of the System of Formal/Central Institutions 
 
The dynamics of the system of central or formal institutions in understanding the phenomena of 
social enterprises and social franchising is divided into two subsystems: of supranational 
institutions, in this study we investigate the EU case; and of national institutions, in this study we 
draw data from the UK and the Greek case. The formal systems nature is political and its 
elements are law, regulation and incentives, like monetary and non monetary (e.g. capacity-
building) (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meet et al, 
2010) 
 
Existence of pro social entrepreneurship formal institutions interventions are positively related to 
social entrepreneurship formation (Dees 1994, 1998; Dorado and Ventresca, 2013; Emerson and 
Bonini, 2003; Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Higgins et al, 2008; Korosec and Berman, 
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2006; Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meek et al, 2010; 
Nicholls, 2004, 2008, 2010a; Pache and Santos, 2010; Sullivan, 2007; Van Putten and Green, 
2010) and to social alliances formation and governance (Arrighetti et al, 1997; Leadbeater, 2006; 
Sakaraya, 2012; Stanworth and Curran, 1999) 
 
The majority of research identified as elements: legal formats (Nicholls, 2010a), the latter used 
secondary data from the legal framework and the reporting information provided by community 
interest companies in the UK. Other elements that are identified as important parameter are: 
taxation (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Meek et al, 2010; Sullivan, 2007; Van Putten and Green, 
2010), regulation (Meek et al, 2010), activities to raise public awareness, educational 
programmes, direct or indirect access to financial capital, activities for the creation of networks 
(Korosec and Berman, 2006), access to the provision of public services and direct or indirect 
access to business support services (Higgins et al, 2008). Stanworth and Curran (1999) identified 
governmental interventions to pro entrepreneurship leading to franchising formation. 
 
Korosec and Berman (2006) operationalised governmental institutions through studying the 
perception of types of support, perception of policy makers of adequacy of support, the roles 
adopted by public officials, and strategies employed drawing from data in the US. They didn’t 
provide hard data on the actual policies employed. 
 
According to Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) the existence of field characteristics, like 
regulatory changes, scarcity of resources, economic and political crises, coexistence of 
contradicting institutions and low degrees of institutionalisation   trigger social entrepreneurship 
formation. Welfare mix based on economic systems has been studied as a motive for social 
entrepreneurship formation (Evers and Laville, 2004; Grifitths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; 
Defourny and Nyssens, 2010b) 
 
Nicholls (2010a) studied reporting and disclosure elements of regulation and their relationship to 
legitimacy of social enterprises through: the regulatory boundaries, the key actors that negotiate 
within this system, and conflicting ideas and debates that emerge though discourse based on 
secondary data from UK.  
 
In operationalising governmental effectiveness Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul (2013) used the 
level of corruption, the index created by Transparency International (see www.transparency.org/). 
The 2009 Corruption Perception Index ranks 178 countries from a high of 9.4 (best) to a low of 
1.1 (worst) by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and 
opinion surveys. Zahra et al (2009) also identify corruption as an important element in social 
entrepreneurship formation. So this findings indicate that corruption is inversely related to social 
networks formation and is also inversely related to governmental interventions effectiveness.  
 
RQ3: What is the role of formal institutions on the formation governance and performance of 
social franchising? 
RQ31: What is the role of the system of national formal institutions in the formation governance 
and performance of social franchising? 
RQ32: What is the role of the system of supranational formal institutions in the formation 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
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3.5.2. The Conceptualisation of the System of Informal/Decentralised 
Institutions of Network Embeddedness  
 
 
The dynamics of the system of informal or decentralised institutions in understanding the 
phenomena of social entrepreneurship and social franchising is studied through relational and 
structural embeddedness of actors in networks and social norms. The system of social norms is of 
social and cultural nature and contains elements like norms, sentiments, values, beliefs, 
behaviour, informal rules and guidelines.  
 
Social norms are socially shaped (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meek et al, 2010) and 
emerge through the relational embeddedness of actors in networks (Granovetter, 1985). 
Relational embeddedness and social network theory explain the role of networks of social 
relations in producing social norms that define social action and shape organizational behaviour 
and economic activity. Embeddedness of actors in networks leads to the emergence of social 
norms; these elements influence the formation of entrepreneurial activity; they also influence 
decision making with regards to the formation growth and success of alliances (Granovetter, 
1973, 1985, 1992; Gullati, 1995b, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Somersen et al, 2013; Uzzi, 1997).  
 
Existence of social norms is positively related to social entrepreneurship formation and success 
(Meek et al, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010) and to social alliances formation and governance 
(Arrighetti et al, 1997) 
 
According to Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) the social position of actors is correlated to 
social entrepreneurship formation; also positioning in networks influences social entrepreneurial 
networks formation (Sorensen et al, 2013). Mair and Roboa (2006) identify support of social 
groups (ability to mobilize resources from networks) leads to social entrepreneurship formation. 
Social franchisee selection criteria were identified as being linkages with the local networks 
(Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 20011b). Mair, Battilana and Cardens (2012) and Battilana, 
Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) found a correlation among the support organizations that actors 
become members of and the social entrepreneurial innovation model (Ashoka is associated with 
the political and social models while Schwab Foundation with economic models) 
 
Social innovation model of growth in most cases is correlated with establishment of social 
networks and social alliances (Dees et al, 2004; Lyon and Fernandez, 2012; Mair and Sezgi, 
2011). Meyskens et al (2010b) results found positive relation among social innovation and social 
networks formation (operationalisation through dichotomous variables on secondary data 
presented at previous section on social innovation)  
 
Mair and Sengi (2011) identify governance (control system) being based on the social norms of 
commitment and trust that have direct impact to the success of the growth strategies adopted. 
These norms are cultivated through: training, communication and mobility of human resources 
among partners. Pache and Santos identify decision making of social enterprises being influenced 
by the institutional logics that prevail in the social systems that they are part of. The power of 
these logics increases through: the centrality of actors in networks; the resources that actors have; 
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the social norms that are cultivated through normative processes by external and internal 
organizational social networks and finally the power of support networks to impose their logics 
on their members (like training, mentoring and socialization activities) (Pache and Santos, 2010).  
 
Nichols (2010b) identified that the social norm of solidarity and the power of social networks 
lead to social entrepreneurship formation. Ghauri, Lutz, and Tesfom (2003) identified that 
willingness to respond together, development of solidarity, coherence and commitment lead to 
social networks formation. 
 
Meek et al (2010) results indicate that the existence of contradiction among social norms and 
governmental interventions leads to conflict offsetting the benefits of the latter interventions 
(Mair and Marti, 2009; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Nicholls, 2010a; Pache and Santos, 
2010). Therefore, social norms (which promote social network formation) are positively related 
to pro entrepreneurship governmental interventions. Social norms are also found to be positively 
related to social innovation (Meyskens et al, 2010b) 
 
The research questions of our explorative qualitative study are: 
RQ4: What is the role of the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms in the 
formation governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ41: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence the 
formation and partner selection of franchising networks? 
RQ42: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence the 
governance of franchising networks? 
RQ43: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence the 
performance of franchising networks? 
 
3.5.2.1. The Franchise Network Model – The FNM  
 
The influence of network embeddedness to the issues of franchise formation, partner selection, 
choice of governance structure and to the performance of (social) franchising has been initially 
investigated through our exploratory qualitative study. The findings of the exploratory study 
indicated the prevailing importance of social networks and embeddedness in shaping the activity 
of actors in (social) alliances and social entrepreneurship. So we attempted to explain the 
relationships among the system of informal institutions and social norms with our main 
constructs through a deductive approach based on our conceptual framework named ‘Franchise 
Network Model- The FNM’ (See Figures 5, 6, 7 and Table 4). The independent variables of our 
research are the social norms of trust, commitment, solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, role 
integrity, harmonisation of conflict, and restraint of power. The dependent variables are 
formation, partner selection, governance and performance. The objective is to produce an 
analytical model that can be used in future research in social enterprise networks and social 
franchises.  
 
 
3.5.2.2. Why investigate these elements? 
 
Social norms consist of eight variables, these being: trust, commitment, solidarity, mutuality, role 
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integrity, flexibility, harmonization of conflict and restraint of power. These elements influence 
the formation of entrepreneurial activity; they also influence decision making with regards to the 
formation of alliances, to partner selection, to the governance modes and to the impact of these 
ventures (Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1992; Gullati, 1995b, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Somersen et al, 
2013; Uzzi, 1997). 
 
One could ask why trust, commitment, flexibility, mutuality, role integrity, solidarity, restraint of 
power, and harmonization of conflict? Why these elements and not others? Why not 
belongingness, reciprocity, parity of power? It is true that wording is a limitation of meaning. We 
have been based on the works of other scholars on network theory and relational 
management/marketing and these elements have appeared in the majority of researches as being 
the core variables of the relational paradigm (See Table 3 in Chapter 2). These elements are 
interrelated and the area that they altogether capture encompasses and describes all the facets of 
the relational aspect including issues like reciprocity and belongingness. It is important to 
emphasize at this point that we do not analyse the exact wording of each item, we analyse the 
concepts, the values and norms. Nor are we debating that etymologically these are the best words 
to describe these concepts. The latter would probably be the subject of a whole other thesis. What 
we are claiming though is that the way we have defined, described and operationalised these 
eight elements represents and measures the relational and partly structural elements of network 
embeddedness. In researching international networks of organizational relationships we should 
take into account the differences of cross-cultural contextual factors, rather than directly 
replicating Western constructs (Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). The latter researchers argue that 
this approach should be rejected because the constructs that are being analysed should capture the 
differences in business behaviours and practices that derive from the differences between more 
collectivistic or more individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 1983). According to Punnett and 
Shenkar (2003) and Boyacigiller et al (2003) the inability to capture the differences of contracts 
in intercountry comparisons could create serious methodological issues; therefore control 
variables have been used in our study. 
 
The network governance form of the ‘FNM’ model is not merely defined by the existence of 
direct or indirect ties between its members, as in that case every franchise would then be a 
network. The network governance form refers to a network where the existence of the relational 
ties and the communication mechanisms among its members create the dynamics that shape 
endlessly the nature and form of the network. These dynamics may also offer control benefits to 
members but this is one of the outcomes of the network and not the ‘raison d’être’ of the 
network. This is the reason why in our conceptual modelling we do not deal with the nodes or the 
actors but we deal with the essence of the network. Therefore the network governance form 
differs from hierarchy and bilateral governance and also from Macneil’s relational exchange, 
though it draws from the latter conceptualisation. 
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Figure 3 The Social Context of SoFraM: The Franchise Network Model-FNM  
Original work of the author of this study; depicted by Chartered Architect Mr Theodoros 
Gazotzis; ‘ΟΛΙΣΜΟΣ’ stands for the Greek word ‘Holism’ (Zafeiropoulou and Woods, 
2012:188; Zafeiropoulou and Koufopoulos, 2013a).  
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Figure 4 The Social Context of SoFraM: The Franchise Network Model – FNM 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Hypothesis of Franchise Network Model- FNM 
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Table 5 The inputs and outputs of the Franchise Network Model- FNM 
 
 
The FNM- The Franchise Network Model 
 
Embeddedness influences 
Franchise Formation and 
Partner Selection  
Direct or Repeated ties between franchisor and 
prospective franchisee lead to franchise formation and 
partner selection 
Indirect or Common ties between franchisor and 
prospective franchisee lead to franchise formation and 
partner selection 
The existence of the network leads to the formation of 
more alliances between already allied partners (Multi Unit 
Franchisee) and to new franchise networks, so to its 
accumulation 
The Embedded network is 
governed by the Network 
Governance Mode 
 
Repeated ties between franchisor and franchisees lead to 
fewer hierarchical controls 
Trust leads to fewer hierarchical controls 
 
The existence of the social norms of commitment, 
flexibility, mutuality, role Integrity, solidarity, 
harmonization of conflict, and restraint of power lead to 
fewer hierarchical controls 
The Embedded Network 
achieves higher 
Performance 
 
The embedded franchise network whose inter-
organizational relations are characterized by trust, 
commitment, flexibility, mutuality, role integrity, 
solidarity, harmonization of conflict, and restraint of 
power leads to higher levels of performance 
 
In the following subchapters we offer a conceptualization of each of our constructs 
independently in order to set the foundations for their operationalisation which follows at 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.5.2.3. Trust 
 
In conceptualising trust we deal with it as a multi-dimensional construct of eight items 
including reliability, integrity, competence, honesty, fairness, responsibility, helpfulness 
and confidence (Meyer and Allen, 1984; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Moorman et al, 1993; 
Mowday et al, 1979). Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001) argue that trust is a combination of 
feelings, it has an affective component deriving from rational thinking and a cognitive 
component; both have to be present in order for trust to exist. Mavondo and Rodrigo 
(2001) used the aforementioned conceptualisation to measure trust based on a four item 
operationalisation. Larzelere and Huston (1980) operationalised dyadic trust through a 
nine items scale similar to the aforementioned approach.  
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Trust based on past ties is the belief that a potential partner is trustworthy and therefore 
would adhere to norms of equity in future ties and avoid acts of self-interest that would 
damage the ties (Jensen, 2003; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). 
 
Trust emerges in two ways; through equity norms and through its utilitarian roots (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). Trust can be promoted firstly because of mutual awareness and 
equity norms, which is called ‘knowledge-based trust’; by being part of a prior network 
firms know each other and by having interacted they may have also developed trust, 
which we can see between individuals in firms when their personal relationship exerts 
pressures for conformity to expectations (Gulati, 1998). Informal, personal connections 
across organizations determine the governance structure used to organize transactions 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Secondly, as we find in Gulati’s research (1998) the 
reputational concerns in a network promote ‘enforceable trust’; this is because the 
expected gains from a given partner and from the shared partners of the network 
motivates good behaviour of the firms, and also because the fact that each firm knows 
that if the other would act opportunistically they would have much to lose promotes 
confidence to each other. If a firm would act opportunistically within a network then it 
could jeopardize losing its reputation in the network and doing business with the given 
partner (Gulati, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  
 
Trust is measured through prior alliances (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1992). Direct ties measure the relational element of social networks, or 
else called relational embeddedness and promote knowledge-based trust because firms 
have learned about each other and have developed trust around norms of equity. Repeated 
ties between actors that have proven to comply with norms of equity lead to the 
emergence of trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). According to a researched conducted 
by McGinn and Keros (2002) embeddedness was operationalised by the existence of 
prior social ties among the actors. As we find in the research of Uzzi (1999) on the 
banking sector transactions between those that were socially tied entailed mutual trust, 
detailed information exchange, and joint problem-solving, which was not the case in their 
relationships with distant others. 
 
Prior indirect ties measure the structural element of embeddedness and promote 
enforceable-trust, since actors are concerned about their loss of reputation and the 
possible dissolution of other alliances if they behave untrustworthy (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). Therefore, repeated interaction between two firms can be an indicator of trust 
among them (Barker, 1990; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Structural relations can exist even in the absence of dyadic 
relations if the actors are tied indirectly through mutual ties with others. In that case 
negotiations taking place between organizations involve socially embedded ties which 
drive many aspects from partner selection to the setting of prices in exchanges (McGinn 
and Keros, 2002).  
 
Prior interaction from social ties-like friendship ties- or economic relationships lead to 
the creation of trust and thus to the formation of inter-organizational relationships more 
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quickly and efficiently as it lowers transaction costs and increases managerial flexibility 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Knowledge based trust and enforceable trust can substitute 
contractual safeguards and therefore trust influences the governance structure of an 
alliance (Gulati, 1998). Also trust has been argued as being an important source of value 
creation in inter-firm ties and thus a motive for the renewal of inter-firm ties (Baker, 
1990; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Mutual trust is the precondition for the rationale 
of a network (Marsden, 1983). Thus trust, from prior ties, is a significant factor for 
alliance formation and partner selection (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 1999; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). 
 
When exchange partners trust each other they are more willing to share information and 
resources (McGinn and Keros, 2002; Uzzi 1999). 
 
In studying inter-organizational trust Mollering (2003) concluded that trust and 
trustworthiness have a very strong correlation at his research at the printing industry in 
the UK. Barney and Hansen (1994) also used trustworthiness to measure trust, 
trustworthiness is the belief that the partner is worth of the trust of others. They argue that 
trust is an attribute of a relationship between partners, while trustworthiness is an 
attribute of an individual partner. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) also used trustworthiness, 
its behavioural element to measure trust. Rotter (1967) argues that people who trust each 
other are also most trustworthy, indicating the direct relationship between the two 
concepts. 
 
Therefore from the analysis provided above we conclude that the most efficient way to 
measure trust is in three ways: firstly as actual trust, secondly as perceived 
trustworthiness and thirdly as the existence of direct and indirect ties. 
 
3.5.2.4. Commitment 
 
Lamsa and Savolainen (2000) in studying commitment they differentiated between 
reward-based and trust-based commitment. The first comes from economic advantages, 
status and social benefits and is material, social or psychological. The trust-based refers 
to the perspective of other than one self in commitment formation through emotional and 
value-added bonds.  
 
According to Leonidou (2003: 135) commitment can be seen through three perspectives: 
the first is managerial commitment, which is the interest and determination by the 
company’s management to promote the inter-organizational relationship. The second is 
resource commitment, which is the gradual release of organizational resources (financial, 
personnel, material, etc) to support the inter-organizational exchange. Finally, the third is 
relationship commitment which is the willingness by one party in a working relationship 
to exert a great deal of effort and accept short-term sacrifices, costs or restrictions 
required by the relationship in order to obtain common results with the other party and 
long-term benefits. 
 
In the writings of Achrol (1997) we find that inter-organizational commitment has two 
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constructs: the attitudinal and the instrumental element. The attitudinal element is in 
terms of affectual commitment, psychological attachment, identification, affiliation and 
value congruence. Inter-organizational commitment according to Achrol (1996) is 
associated with motivation, involvement, and performance and obedience to 
organizational policies. Inter-organizational attitudinal commitment can be cultivated by 
two ways: the one is through the reputational power of networks and the other is through 
interlocking management and interdependency, but not as control mechanisms (Achrol, 
1997).  
 
According to Gundlach et al (1995) the approach that a lot of researchers follow in 
conceptualising inter-organizational commitment is the multi-component approach, the 
three components are: instrumental, attitudinal and temporal. The first exists in relations 
based on economic needs and parties provide input so as to create self-interest stake in 
the relation. The second exists in relations where actors have some normative or affective 
attachment and opt for the maintenance of a long-term relation. And finally, the temporal 
represents the essence of long-term relational commitment where actors become deeply 
involved in the relationship (Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer, 1995; Mavondo and 
Rodrigo, 2001). 
 
Based on a research conducted by Bennett and Gabriel (2001:425) commitment can be 
measured both as an intention to continue the relationship in the future (Nielson 1998) 
and as a willingness to make relationship-specific investments, the latter creates long-
term bilateral interdependence. 
 
According to the writings of Achrol (1996) interdependence is a vital element that holds 
the network into a stable, cohesive and mutually oriented economic system and leads to 
attitudinal commitment which provides the foundation for the development of social 
norms of governance (Macneil, 1981). 
 
Interdependence between partners can vary at one extreme an alliance may have a simple 
division of labour with minimal ongoing adjustments or at the other extreme there may be 
anticipation of a complex and overlapping division of labour that demands mutual 
adjustments between partners and require each partner to link specific activities with 
other partners regularly (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Gulati and Singh (1998)  
conceptualization was also applied in the study of (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013) on social 
network analysis; identified three types of interdependence: pooled; or generalised, 
defines situations when each partner provides contribution to the whole and each is 
supported by the whole, they entail low coordination requirements, communication, and 
effort and is coordinated by standardization,  sequential; defines situations when the 
activities of each partner are separate from the others but serially arrayed, they entail a 
high degree of coordination beyond the pooling of resources,  and reciprocal; defines 
situations when units come together to exchange outputs with each other simultaneously, 
they entail ongoing mutual adjustments, and are more interactive. 
 
In operationalising commitment we used the level of interdependence. The higher was 
reciprocal, then sequential and then pooled. In order to classify actors in each one 
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category we used Gulati and Singh’s method (1998) and Zajac and Olsen’s (1993), which 
are based on the rationale for value creation that the alliance was formed in the first 
place: sharing costs/risks, access to financial resources, sharing complementary 
technology, reducing time span of innovation, joint development of new technology, 
access to new markets, access to new products, sharing production facilities. Reciprocally 
interdependent are if the strategic rationales of the partners included sharing 
complementary technology, jointly reducing the time needed for innovation,  or joint 
development of new technology, marketing or distribution skills. Sequentially 
interdependent alliances are when the output of the one is handed to the other, for whom 
it is an input, expand market access, access to new products. Pooled are when the 
rationale was to share risk and costs, to share financial resources, or to build joint 
production facilities.  
 
We also used a mulit-dimentional approach to measure two dimensions of commitment 
the instrumental and attitudinal commitment based on the researches of Mavondo and 
Rodrigo (2001), Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995). 
 
 
3.5.2.5. Restraint of power 
 
According to Thorelli (1990) power is the central concept in network theory because its 
mere existence can condition the existence of the other constructs. 
 
According to the writings of Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964) it has been proven than in 
order to analyse power we have to see it as a relationship between actors rather than an 
attribute of an actor. The relational conception of power is therefore being applied in all 
level of analysis (Marsden, 1983). On this concept have been based the works of Hickson 
et al (1971), Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), Boje and Wheten (1981) and Marsden (1983). 
The research of the latter three researchers has proven that power is related to the 
different positions of actors within a network of relationships, what is known as the 
structural element of network theory or structural embeddedness. 
 
Based on the writings of Tannenbaum (1968) power can be measured using the control 
graph, which maps the means of the perceived power of each level in the formal 
hierarchy of an organization by averaging the sum of the perceptions of people in the 
organization of the amount of power vested at various levels within it. According to the 
writings of Hickson et al (1971) power can be measured by the use of a formal level. 
They have divided the organization in four functional subunits which are seen as 
interdependent and which are levels of hierarchy. The level of power of each unit is 
drawn by the level of uncertainty that they manage with. Although this approach sees an 
organization on a horizontal rather than vertical axes, which is the case when 
management has exercised power and when hierarchies of order are reinforced by every-
day organizational life. They re-approached the same theoretical problem at a later stage 
correcting the aforementioned problem and produced another measurement of control 
(Hinings et al, 1974). 
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Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) approached power from a resource perspective. They also 
divided an organization in subunits, which were different departments that offered critical 
resources to the organization for which in return they gained power. According to Burt 
(1977) equating power with control over resources is a limited approach to measuring 
power. Kauser and Shaw 2004, Geringer and Hebert 1989 measured control on a 5point 
scale using 22 items considering the scope of control as well as its extent and 
mechanisms based on scales developed by Killing (1983, 1988) and Beamish (1987). 
 
As Achrol (1996) argues decentralized networks as opposed to centralized hierarchical 
control are more responsive to their environment, make more effective use of 
information, and are more innovative. So power is based on the culture of belongingness 
and solidarity and on a solid web of inter-organizational commitment, where committees 
are expected to act in the interest of the common good of the network. Concertive 
control, is based on consensual normative ideology (Barker, 1993), control is linked with 
the notions of teamwork, quality, flexibility, commitment and learning organizations 
(Clegg et al, 2005). 
 
The types of power that are compatible with the evolution of networks and which replace 
the traditional coercive and legitimate power are: the expert, reputational, and referee 
types of power (Achrol, 1996; Boje and Whetten, 1981). In this research we 
operationalised the restraint of power using a multi-item typology based on the research 
of Boje and Whetten (1981): reputational (stability, security, solidarity, belongingness), 
expertise (competitive gains, market positioning, effects of innovations, and customer 
satisfaction are constantly monitored and communicated to the franchisees) and referent 
power.  
 
Based on Cook and Emerson (1978) research findings we expect proved to be inversely 
related to commitment.  
 
3.5.2.6. Harmonization of conflict 
 
As we find in Achrol’s work (1996) in the traditional paradigm conflict is resolved by 
hierarchical controls or by litigation, while in networks mutual sentiments must exist to 
harmonize conflicts. It is based on the presence of solidarity and mutuality and through 
informal means and social interaction that conflicts are expected to be resolved rather 
than through formal institutions and procedures. A way to cultivate harmonization of 
conflict is to offer sales or financial help to members that are facing difficulties which 
could lead to the creation of conflict (Achrol, 1997). A franchise organization could 
create a strong social culture and spirit of accommodation by acknowledging and 
rewarding significant social contributions of its members.  
 
Brown, Chekitan, and Dong-Jin (2000) argued that when there is harmonisation of 
conflict then firms will try to resolve their disagreements in mutually satisfying ways. 
Their research indicates that harmonisation of conflict is negatively related to 
opportunism. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue that alliances that are based on trust will 
resolve dispute internally and therefore it is essential to have an endogenous safe-guard 
 155 
system.  
 
In measuring harmonization of conflict we used two approaches the first one is based on 
the research of Anderson and Narus (1990), Kauser and Shaw (2004), Kogut (1988), and 
Mohr and Spekman (1994) who measured conflict on a 5 point scale using 12 items. The 
second one is based on the approach of Boyle et al (1991), Gundlach and Achrol (1993), 
Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995), Heide and John (1992), Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992), Kaufmannn and Stern (1988, 1992), Macneil (1980), and Noordewier, John and 
Nevin (1990) who measured solidarity, role integrity and harmonization of conflict 
through a six-item approach. According to the latter approach harmonization of conflict 
exists when disagreements arise in a relationship and all facts are reassessed to try to 
reach a mutually satisfactory compromise.  
 
3.5.2.7. Solidarity 
 
There are two types of solidarity, the first is the individual preservation, it refers to the 
safeguarding of memberships in the relationship, and the second is the collective 
preservation, which refers to the safeguarding of the larger relationship. When the social 
norm of solidarity is present in a social network of inter-organizational relations, then it 
means that the contracting parties expect that this relationship will continue for an 
indefinite period (Macneil, 1980).  
 
The same mechanisms that create interdependence and commitment also create 
solidarity. Apart from its internal element of self-preservation, commitment is also an 
externally driven norm that is fortified by being directed against external groups, like 
competitors (Achrol, 1997). The internal element of solidarity is cultivated by offering 
finances, management, technology, sales orders, and deferred payments when it is needed 
to support the franchisee in crisis. It is also cultivated by cross investment, joint projects, 
and participation in joint committees (Achrol, 1996). 
 
We measured solidarity based on the approach of Boyle et al (1991), Gundlach and 
Achrol (1993), Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995), Heide and John (1992), Kaufmann 
and Dant (1992), Kaufmannn and Stern (1988, 1992), Macneil (1980), and Noordewier, 
John and Nevin (1990) who measured solidarity, role integrity and harmonization of 
conflict through a six-item approach. According to the latter solidarity exists when in the 
face of adversity/challenge in an alliance staying together is very important to both firms. 
 
3.5.2.8. Role Integrity 
 
Role Integrity refers to channel members’ expectations for needed future roles (Macneil, 
1980) and suggests that roles expand to cover a multitude of issues not directly related to 
any particular transaction (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). Brown, Chekitan, and Dong-Jin 
(2000) researched the extent to which role integrity includes mutual expectations about 
the proactive sharing of information, about multilevel interactions between firms, about 
mutual coordination and finally about conscientious and honest dealing with each other. 
They concluded in that role integrity has a negative correlation with opportunism when 
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they applied their model on franchise networks. 
 
An important aspect of role integrity is to protect the domain of members from internal 
competition or acquisition. When referring to domain we include issues like identity, 
market, customer, technology, functions and any other responsibilities that define 
members’ roles (Achrol, 1997). 
 
We measured role integrity based on the approach of Boyle et al (1991), Gundlach and 
Achrol (1993), Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995), Heide and John (1992), Kaufmann 
and Dant (1992), Kaufmannn and Stern (1988, 1992), Macneil (1980), and Noordewier, 
John and Nevin (1990)who measured solidarity, role integrity and harmonization of 
conflict through a six-item approach. According to the latter role integrity exists when a 
relationship extends across many complex responsibilities and multiple tasks.  
 
3.5.2.9. Mutuality 
 
Mutuality has two meanings the first is acting for the mutual good and the other one is 
the equitable sharing of future benefits (Achrol, 1997). 
 
The presence of norms of mutuality in networks can make sure that members act in the 
best interest of the network without direct supervision and control (Achrol, 1996; 
Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). The other part of mutuality is that when members can see the 
long term potential, stability, and regularity of benefits they can sacrifice short term gains 
in favour of the network goals (Achrol, 1996; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). 
. 
We measured mutuality based on a two item component (Boyle et al, 1991; Gundlach 
and Achrol, 1993; Gundlach, Achrol abd Mentzer, 1995; Heide and John, 1992; 
Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Kaufmannn and Stern, 1988, 1992; Macneil, 1980; 
Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990). 
 
3.5.2.10. Flexibility 
 
The social norm of flexibility has a dual significance: the first is seeing modification as 
good faith adaptation and the second is seen as understanding the importance of 
environmental changes as motivators for adaptations (Achrol, 1997). Flexibility refers to 
the notion that the terms of the exchange can adapt and be modified by environmental 
changes (Heide and John, 1992).  
 
As we find in the writings of Leonidou (2003) adaptation is a very important aspect of the 
healthy development of a business relationship under the relational approach. They refer 
to substantial adjustments in strategies, structures, processes and procedures necessary to 
fit the needs, capabilities and objectives of the other parties. Adaptation has been 
identified as crucial for the relational governance mode by Heide (1994) and Kaufmann 
and Stern (1988). Larson (1992) and Uzzi (1997) also stretch the importance of mutual 
adaptations to relationships among embedded ties that bring flexibility to the system and 
joint problem-solving.   
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Franchisors can facilitate the creation of the norm of flexibility by sharing research and 
analysis of the environment with its members, and by guaranteeing that franchisees have 
the chance to take part and share in the benefits of changes or adaptations proposed 
(Achrol, 1996). 
 
Mollering (2003) measured flexibility in inter-organizational networks and the extent to 
which trust is related to flexibility in the governance of these relationships. His findings 
indicated that trust is positively related to flexibility.  
 
We used two approaches to measure flexibility the one is based on Mollering’s (2003) 
research who operationalised flexibility in term of attitude towards exceptions made in 
the governance of inter-organizational relationships, through a four-item component. We 
also used the FLEX scale based on the research of Heide (1994) and Kaufmann and Stern 
(1988). 
 
 
3.5.2.11. Research Hypothesis for Formation and Partner Selection 
 
 
According to Gulati (1998) social networks and the channel of information explain the 
formation of alliances. Based on Gulati and Gargiulo (1997) the formation of alliances is 
due to exogenous resource dependencies and to an endogenous embeddedness dynamic, 
in which the emerging network gradually orients the choice of partners.  
 
“Recent research has shown the importance of embeddedness for alliance 
formation, its results indicated that motives were not only financial and technological, but 
also how firms are embedded in social networks between firms” (Gulati, 1998:307).  
 
A study conducted by Gulati (1995b) on alliance formation patterns proposes that the 
social context emerging from prior alliances and considerations of strategic 
interdependence influence the decision of an actor to form an alliance and choose a 
partner. The social context is the accumulation of prior direct and indirect ties which 
creates a social network in which most firms are embedded. There are three issues in 
treating alliance (Gulati, 1995b) the first is the type of alliance, the second is the multiple 
ties between firms and the third is the length of time during which past alliances are 
likely to influence current alliances.  
 
The social network becomes a source of information about new opportunities and at the 
same time it facilitates trust in their existing and potential partners (Gulati, 1999; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1992). It also plays the role of motivator for the accumulation of 
alliances (Gulati, 1998). In the franchising industry we can see that when a franchisor 
forms further alliance ties and extends the network, when a franchisee becomes a multi-
unit franchisee, and when a franchisor/franchisee creates a new franchise network. 
 
The informational advantages to firms from a network can enable the creation of new 
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alliances by three means: firstly access, which refers to information about current or 
potential partners on their capabilities and trustworthiness, secondly timing, which refers 
to having informational benefits about potential partners at the right moment, and thirdly 
referrals, which is the fact that existing partners of a firm may refer it to other firms for 
alliances (Gulati, 1998).  
 
Network theorists as we already mentioned claim that interdependence can explain the 
formation of ties between some firms, but is not adequate to explain the alliance 
formation and thus partner selection (Gulati, 1998). Strategic interdependence between 
organizations describes a situation in which one organization has resources or capabilities 
beneficial to but not possessed by the other, like money, skills, access to markets (Gulati, 
1995b).  
 
According to network theory familiarity with potential partners is likely to lead to joint 
venture formation (Gulati, 1995; Glaister, 2004).  Organizations that decide to form 
alliances face moral hazard concerns (Gulati, 1998), which are due to opportunistic 
(Kogut, 1988) and unpredictable behaviour of partners, and thus alliances are considered 
risky. Also changes to the environment may change a firm’s needs and orientation thus 
making the relationship even more unpredictable. Therefore organizations in order to 
enter into alliances that would help them satisfy their needs and at the same time 
minimize the risks should have information about potential partners, their needs and 
requirements, and their reliability. The decision of an organization to form an alliance is 
closely linked to its decision for an appropriate partner and may even be determined by 
that partner’s availability, it is the network that allows to firms to learn about new 
alliance opportunities and to overcome the fears associated with such partnerships 
(Gulati, 1998; Stuart 1998). So information about partners is instrumental in the 
formation of the new alliance (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Therefore, embeddedness as 
Gulati (1998) argues influences also partner selection that is why we deal with alliance 
formation and partner selection as one construct.  
 
Apart from the influence of the relational element of embeddedness in alliance formation 
and partner selection there is also the role of its structural element. The position of a firm 
in a network influences its reputation and status making it an attractive partner (Gulati, 
1998). Status reduces uncertainty, making it an important source of social identity. The 
difference between reputation and status is that the former relies on past performance 
while the latter on past ties. Relationships of past ties give actors status which works as a 
signal of quality to attract new partners (Jensen, 2003). It is difficult to distinguish 
between them because reputation affects formation of new ties and status affects future 
performance (Gulati, 1995). From this emerges the ‘homophile principle’ when 
organisations form partnerships with others of equal status (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1997). 
Reputation plays an important role in the network for partner selection because prior ties 
enhance reputational concern since one party’s bad behaviour would be reported to the 
common partners (Gulati, 1995a). 
 
Close dyadic ties increase the value of exchanges by facilitating the development of trust 
between exchange partners (Uzzi, 1997) and as we find in the works of Burt (1992) and 
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Gulati (1998) the position of an organization in a network reduces uncertainty by 
providing access to information and by defining status hierarchies. The results of a study 
conducted by Jensen (2003) show that inter-firm market ties and network status facilitate 
market entry. 
 
Trust from prior ties can be an indicator of alliance formation and partner selection. Prior 
ties can also be a negative experience and resulting in firms not forming further alliances 
between them or when it is a positive experience it can help control adverse selection 
problems since firms can have firsthand reliable information about each other and 
promote repeated ties (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993).  
 
From the above we identify two elements of the social structure which are relevant to 
alliance formation and partner selection: the relational element which consists of the 
direct relationships with in which an actor is embedded and the structural element which 
consists of the overall social network within which firms exist (Granovetter, 1992). Both 
elements act as a channel of information about partners and are influential in alliance 
formation. The relational connection between firms is cultivated by prior direct ties and 
creates a strong social connection where knowledge-based trust emerges and increases 
the possibility of a new alliance (Gulati, 1995b). The structural element between firms is 
cultivated by common third party ties which lead to informational advantages through a 
referral network, they create enforceable trust and reputational concerns and all these 
increase the possibility of the creation of an alliance (Gulati, 1995b).  
 
Most of the literature on franchise formation has dealt with motives that are linked to 
recourses and capabilities (Aydin and Kacker, 1990; Baucus et al, 1993; Eroglu, 1992; 
Hall and Dixon, 1991; Huszagh et al, 1992; Lafontaine, 1992; Martin, 1988; Mendelsohn, 
1993; Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001; Sanghavi, 2002; Shane, 1996; Stanworth, 
1995a, 1999; Stanworth and Curran,1999; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996; Walker, 
1989). Therefore we used these as control variables against the influence of relational and 
structural embeddedness in alliance formation and partner selection.    
 
We hypothesise that a firm’s embeddedness in social networks is positively related to the 
formation of new franchises and the selection of appropriate partners -franchisors/ees 
 
H1: The informal institution of network embeddedness is positively related to the 
formation and partner selection decision of franchising networks 
H11: Trust from prior direct ties between firms is positively related to franchise formation 
and partner selection 
H12: In the absence of prior direct ties, the larger the number of the common third-party 
ties of two firms the more likely they are to lead to franchise formation and partner 
selection  
H13: The existence of the network is positively related to the creation of new alliances 
and networks, so to its accumulation 
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3.5.2.12. Research Hypothesis of Governance Structures 
 
We will present hereunder some typologies of governance modes that have been 
identified in the literature. 
 
Research has usually classified governance structure and hierarchy based on the presence 
of equity by assuming that the more the equity the higher the hierarchical controls 
(Hennart, 1988; Teece, 1992). Most recent studies have used binary classification for 
governance modes: equity, non-equity (O’Dwyer and O’Flynn, 2005). In their research 
Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that shared equity provides only a partial assessment for 
classifying governance structure. So in their writings they suggest tree types of alliance 
governance structures: joint ventures, minority investment, and contractual alliances and 
specific types of hierarchical controls that are normally present in each of them. While 
O’Dwyer and O’Flynn (2005) and Contractor and Ra (2002) suggest that the non equity 
domain can take many modes and types, they differentiated between: the one time 
contract, discrete repeated contracting, licensing, strategic supply chain partnership, 
equity joint venture, and wholly own subsidiary. Williams (1997) in studying inter-
organizational cooperation in networks identified four different types of governance: the 
hierarchical, solar, centreless, and swingle. Brown, Chekitan, and Dong-Jin (2000) in 
researching the determinants of opportunism in franchise networks identified between 
four types of governance modes based on ownership: company ownership, franchisee 
minority ownership, company minority ownership, franchised; in the end though they had 
to eliminate the two middle categories because they were very insignificant. Their 
research was conducted only on the hotel industry. Weaven, Grace and Manning (2009) 
measure governance in terms of ownership types of single-unit and multi-unit 
partnerships.  
 
Macneil (1978; 1980; 1981) identifies between two different contractual forms the 
discrete and relational. Heide (1994) identifies between three governance modes: market 
governance, unilateral/hierarchical governance and bilateral governance, the latter type 
being based on the relational exchange of Macneil. Heide operationalised a set of generic 
governance processes which in his research differed systematically among the three types 
of governance modes: market, unilateral/hierarchical and bilateral/relational. Relationship 
Maintenance: role specification, nature of planning, nature of adjustments, monitoring 
procedures, incentive system, means of enforcement; and Relationship termination. The 
operationalisation of flexible adjustment processes was measured by a set of item’s 
describing the parties expected flexibility in response to changing circumstances, The 
FLEX scale was developed by Kaufmann and Stern (1988). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) 
created a different typology of governance modes identifying four alternative modes 
based on the levels of trust and risk: firstly the discrete market transactions, which is 
characterised by low risk, low trust, secondly the hierarchical managerial transactions 
characterised by high risk, low trust, thirdly the recurrent contracting transactions 
characterised by low risk, high trust, and finally, the relational contracting transactions by 
high risk, high trust. In the latter the status of the exchange parties is extensive, unique 
and socially embedded on relations between legally equal and free parties. The 
mechanisms for dispute resolution are endogenous designed by the parties and based on 
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trust and in these inter-organizational relationships, bilateral governance is employed by 
relational contracts.  
 
In a research that Gulati (1995a) conducted he concluded that firms chose contractual 
forms for their alliance on the basis of the activities they include, of the related 
appropriation concerns and of the existence of a prior network in which the partners may 
be embedded. According to Macneil (1981) the more relational an exchange becomes the 
less likely the parties will exercise legitimate or coercive power. According to Achrol 
(1996) network organizations are not organized on centralized hierarchical controls but 
on decentralized authority and initiative at the level of market place, which are based on 
the culture of mutuality and solidarity and on a solid web of inter-organizational 
commitment, where committees are expected to act in the interest of the common good of 
the network. Expert, reputational and referent types of power, which are consistent with 
the evolution of the network organization, replace the traditional legitimate (i.e. 
contractual) and coercive powers.  
 
Knowledge based trust and enforceable trust can substitute contractual safeguards and 
therefore trust influences the governance structure of an alliance (Gulati, 1998). The 
appropriation concerns of firms when forming alliances can be minimized either by a 
detailed contract or by trust (Gulati, 1998). The embeddedness of alliances in trusting 
relationships has as a result that the partners are likely to have greater confidence in the 
predictability of each other’s actions and thus appropriation concerns will be lower when 
forming the alliance. Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that inter-firm trust can control 
coordination costs since partners are more likely to be aware, or to have the willingness 
to become aware, of rules, routines, and procedures without the need of formal 
hierarchical control. Although Mollering (2003) in researching trust and formality of 
governance found no strong correlation. 
 
The presence of trust in alliances can reduce adverse selection problems (Balakrishnan 
and Koza, 1993). Therefore Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that network embeddedness 
can promote trust, which can control both coordination costs and appropriation concerns 
and thus partners are likely to promote fewer hierarchical controls. Powell (1990) and 
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) have also argued that trust replaces hierarchical controls, 
the latter mention that contracts based on trustworthiness are less constrained by ex-post 
contract implications. Granovetter (1985) has argued that embeddedness in a social 
network of trusting relationships results in that the exchange actors anticipate lower 
appropriation concerns.   
 
Gulati (1998) argues that when two firms have decided to form an alliance, their 
proximity in the network can influence the governance structure that will be formed. 
Social networks of prior alliances affect alliances structure. Repeated ties diminish the 
use of hierarchical controls, regardless the type of their prior alliances (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). Their study has considered the implication of relational embeddedness resulting 
from the direct ties in which firms are placed, they also recommend the investigation of 
structural embeddedness resulting from the positions firms occupy in the overall network.  
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Gulati and Singh’s (1998) research resulted in that there are higher levels of trust between 
partners from the same region than cross-regional partners and thus affecting the 
governance structure, but that there are no significant differences in levels of trust and 
thus hierarchical controls between multilateral and bilateral alliances. Although it was 
suggested that increasing the number of partners in an alliance can limit the level of trust 
(Parkhe, 1993b), since it can be more difficult to identify common interests, so it will be 
less likely that all partners trust each other, it is harder when there is a large number of 
partners to monitor free-riding and assess each partner’s contributions and to introduce 
incentive structures that promote trust (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
In operationalising governance modes we used five different approaches. Firstly, based 
on Lafontaine’s (1992) writings who claimed that it is more valid to focus on studying 
the proportion of franchise stores to company owned rather than the terms of the 
franchise contract when studying governance structure, we used this method to measure 
governance structure. Secondly, based on the research of Contractor and Ra (2002), 
Hennart (1988), O’Dwyer and O’Flynn (2005) and Teece (1992) we used the typology of 
Brown, Chekitan, and Dong-Jin (2000) based on equity ownership. Thirdly based on the 
research of Lafontaine (2005), Mendelsohn (1999), Koningsberg (1998) we used a 
typology based on the contractual terms of entry modes commonly used in franchising as 
these have been identified by the European Franchise Federation’ surveys (1997, 1998, 
2004). Fourthly, we used a typology for hierarchical controls based on the research of 
Gulati and Singh (1988) and Mollering (2003): Hierarchical elements can be embedded 
in alliances structure and are: an administrative hierarchy of managers; a command 
structure and authority systems with clearly defined rules and responsibilities; incentive 
systems that facilitate performance measurement and link rewards to performance; 
standard operating procedures that allow quick decisions to be made by anticipating those 
decisions in advance; dispute resolution procedures that bypass courts and markets, a 
major evolution in the organizational mechanism of the network is the creation of a 
quasi-judicial process to resolve disputes internally (Achrol, 1996); non-market pricing 
systems like cost-plus systems for greater precision in remuneration when changes in 
specification are made (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Finally, we used a typology based on 
Kauser and Shaw (2004). 
 
We hypothesise that a firm’s embeddedness in social networks influences the governance 
structure of franchise systems 
 
H2: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness determines the 
governance system of the franchising networks, therefore it is inversely related to 
hierarchical controls in franchising networks 
H21: Trust is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H22: Prior ties between firms are inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H23: Commitment is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H24: Solidarity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H25: Mutuality is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H26: Flexibility is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H27: Role Integrity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
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H28: Harmonization of Conflict is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H29: Restraint of Power is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
 
3.5.2.13. Research Hypothesis of Performance 
 
Social networks of prior alliances influence the evolution and successful performance of 
alliances (Gulati, 1998).  
 
The level to which alliances are embedded can influence their behaviour and their future 
success (Gulati, 1998). The values and norms of an organization affect organizational 
actions and behaviour and thus are closely linked to its performance (Jones and George, 
2003). 
 
According to Gulati (1998) it is important to research the issue of whether alliances that 
are embedded to a greater or lesser degree in various networks perform better or worse 
than others and why; he also argues that the extent to which an alliance is embedded is 
likely to influence its performance. This is because by being in an alliance the partnering 
firms are most likely to share high levels of confidence and trust, both because they have 
greater information and because the network creates a safeguard for bad behaviour that 
would damage reputation. Therefore there are higher prospects for success of the alliance. 
Research has also indicated that alliances with embedded ties may perform better and for 
longer (Gulati, 1998; Kogurt, 1989). Mollering’s (2003) research resulted in that inter-
organizational trust and performance have a very strong positive correlation.  
 
“Trust has been shown to be a determinant of critical factors related to 
performance, like more open exchanges of relevant ideas and feelings, greater 
clarification of goals and problems, more extensive search for alternative courses of 
action, greater satisfaction with efforts and greater motivation to implement decisions” 
(Zand, 1972:229). 
 
Leonidou (2003) argues that firm’s commitment to the inter-organizational relationship is 
positively related to the performance of the relationship.  
 
The findings of Mavondo and Rodrigo’s (2001) research suggest that trust has a 
significant positive effect on performance in inter-organizational relationships.  
 
There are two approaches in measuring performance: the objective, an appraisal that is 
based on facts and is likely to be numerical, and the subjective, an appraisal that is based 
on perceptions of traits, behaviours or results (Jones and George, 2003). Donckels and 
Lambrecht (1997) defined a growing company one that had an increase in sales revenue 
the last three years and expected a similar trend the next three years. They argue that by 
using a period of six years they show the continuous notion of growth so that accidental 
variations do not misrepresent a firm and they also quantify growth as a fact (last three 
years) and a perception (future growth).  
 
Shane (1996) studied franchisor performance in terms of the growth in the number of 
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franchise and company-owned outlets and argued that pricing, age, industry, and 
company-owned outlets variables do not explain the performance of new franchise 
systems.  
 
Objective measures, like financial indicators, market share, survival, and alliance 
duration have been criticized as being too narrow, so researchers have began to use 
indirect criteria for assessing alliance outcomes like fulfilment of major strategic needs 
(Parkhe, 1993b). According to DeCotiis (1977) there are three most popular and effective 
subjective measures of performance: the graphic rating scale-performance is assessed 
along one or more continua with specified intervals-, the behavioural anchored rating 
scale (BARS)-performance is assessed along a scale with clearly defined scale points 
containing examples of specific behaviours-, and the behavioural observation scale 
(BOS)-performance is assessed in terms of the frequency with which specific behaviours 
are performed. It is suggested to use both objective and subjective measures for a more 
accurate measurement (Jones and George, 2003).  
 
Dong-Jin (1997) and Raven et al (1994) used the four-item measure of performance. The 
scale represented growth, contribution, market shares and margins.  
 
Drawing from research on the assessment of the performance of social enterprises we see 
that there are two tools that are commonly uses the balanced scorecard and social 
auditing. The balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) has four perspectives: (1) 
Financial: to succeed financially how should we appear to our shareholders? (2) Internal 
business process: to satisfy our shareholders and customers, what business processes 
must we excel at? (3) Customer: To achieve our vision, how should we appear to our 
customers? (4) Learning and Growth: To achieve our vision, how will we sustain our 
ability to change and improve? Based on these perspectives the company can create its 
vision and by balancing its strategic and financial goals it allows the firm to link its 
strategy with shareholder value creation whilst providing a set of measurable targets to 
guide this process. The adapted balanced scorecard (Jeffery, 2005) suggests that social 
enterprises should target five parameters: (1) Financial, (2) Employee, (3) Social return, 
(4) Customer and Community, (5) Business development. Also there is the concept of 
Social Auditing that targets funders, owners/board, community, potential employees and 
evaluates parameters such as health gains, personal development (self esteem, 
confidence), cost benefit, community benefits, employment policies, practices and 
empowerment actions (Schwarz, 2003). Various tools and methods such as survey’s, 
questionnaires and observation measure these indicators.  
 
In evaluating performance of social entrepreneurship ventures Sharir and Lerner (2006:8) 
measured three criteria: the level at which social enterprises can meet their objectives, the 
capability of the social enterprise to raise resources so as to maintain stability and 
sustainability of the offering (service/product/programme), and the resources available to 
achieve growth and development. The variables and items of their operationalisation 
were: a) for the individual context: socio-demographic background (support of 
background through contribution of family and friends), motives (commitment through 
time and financial investment in the venture and willingness to work without being paid 
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for a long time) and former managerial know-how (binary variable of former 
management position, project initiation, expertise in the specific sector); b) for the 
environmental context: social network (support by intermediaries in raising resources and 
establishment), receptiveness by public discourse (public awareness of issue and place of 
issue in public agenda, lobbying and media activities of entrepreneurs), whether there 
was or not support and infrastructure (support received from public sector, from 
foundations at least three for three or more years and from other nonprofit organizations 
as incubation, funds received or through integration in their operations); c) for the 
organizational context: activity sector, composition and structure of founders (number of 
staff at establishment and employment relationship part-time or full time, also board 
members their contribution in activities and the resources invested by them), resource 
base at various stages (how much money did they raise and was it used to hire personnel); 
and d) for measuring process: identify the need, network creation (actions taken for 
planning the development and expansion of the venture through social network creation), 
planning (business plan creation), establishing alliances (was collaboration established 
with other organization for more than three years), raising resources, market testability 
(receiving revenue for offering product or service or through public contracts).  
 
Their results indicate that the only variables that are necessary conditions to the success 
of ventures were: entrepreneurs’ commitment/dedication and social network, and six 
variables were sufficient conditions: capital base at establishment, acceptance of idea by 
public discourse, entrepreneurial team, alliances, market testability, and previous 
management experience (Sharir and Lerner, 2006).  
 
Based on existing research we identified the major strategic needs and motives of 
franchisees and franchisors for entering into a franchise agreement and we used them to 
measure performance (Aydin and Kacker, 1990; Baucus et al, 1993; Eroglu, 1992; Hall 
and Dixon, 1991; Huszagh et al, 1992;  Lafontaine, 1992; Martin, 1988; Mendelsohn, 
1993; Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001; Sanghavi, 2002; Shane, 1996; Stanworth, 
1995a, 1999; Stanworth and Curran,1999; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996; Walker, 
1989). We combined these motives with the typology and classification of motives that 
have been identified by the literature on network formation by Whipple and Gentry 
(2000) and Ellram (1991). Also Gulati and Singh (1998) identified the following motives 
for alliance formation: sharing costs/risks, access to financial resources, sharing 
complementary technology, reducing time span of innovation, joint development of new 
technology, access to new markets, access to new products, sharing production facilities. 
The latter typology of motives has been used and by Contractor and Lorange (1988). 
 
Network embeddedness is positively related to the performance of franchise systems 
 
H3: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness is positively 
related to the performance of franchising networks 
H31: Trust is positively related to performance 
H32: Commitment is positively related to performance 
H33: Solidarity is positively related to performance 
H34: Mutuality is positively related to performance 
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H35: Flexibility is positively related to performance 
H36: Role Integrity is positively related to performance 
H37: Harmonization of Conflict is positively related to performance 
H38: Restraint of Power is positively related to performance 
 
3.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we presented the conceptualisation of the factors that from our qualitative 
research have been identified as being associated with social entrepreneurship and social 
franchising formation growth and success. We also presented the conceptualisation of the 
factors of informal institutions of network embeddedness that are hypothesised to be 
associated with the formation governance and performance of social franchising.  The 
conceptual models that have been induced in Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 describe 
these relationships. The empirical study attempts to explore if any significant 
relationships exist between these constructs.  
 
From an extensive literature review and from the indications of our data analysis the 
hypothesised relationships are: 
 
Research Questions for the qualitative empirical study:  
 
RQ1: What is the role of the system of the individual/psychological social 
entrepreneurship profile in the formation governance and performance of social 
franchising? 
RQ2: What is the role the system of social innovation in the formation governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
RQ3: What is the role of formal institutions on the formation governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
RQ31: What is the role of the system of national formal institutions in the formation 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ32: What is the role of the system of supranational formal institutions in the formation 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ4: What is the role of the system of relational network embeddedness and social 
norms in the formation governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ41: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the formation and partner selection of franchising networks? 
RQ42: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the governance of franchising networks? 
RQ43: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the performance of franchising networks? 
 
Hypothesis for the quantitative empirical study are: 
 
A Firm’s embeddedness in social networks is positively related to the formation of new 
alliances-franchises and the selection of appropriate partners -franchisors/ees 
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H1: The informal institution of network embeddedness is positively related to the 
formation and partner selection decision of franchising networks 
H11: Trust from prior direct ties between firms is positively related to franchise formation 
and partner selection 
H12: In the absence of prior direct ties, the larger the number of the common third-party 
ties of two firms the more likely they are to lead to franchise formation and partner 
selection  
H13: The existence of the network is positively related to the creation of new alliances 
and networks, so to its accumulation 
  
Network embeddedness influences the governance structure of franchise systems 
H2: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness determines the 
governance system of the franchising networks; therefore it is inversely related to 
hierarchical controls in franchising networks 
H21: Trust is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H22: Prior ties between firms are inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H23: Commitment is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H24: Solidarity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H25: Mutuality is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H26: Flexibility is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H27: Role Integrity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H28: Harmonization of Conflict is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H29: Restraint of Power is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
 
Network embeddedness is positively related to performance of franchise systems 
H3: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness is positively 
related to the performance of franchising networks 
H31: Trust is positively related to performance 
H32: Commitment is positively related to performance 
H33: Solidarity is positively related to performance 
H34: Mutuality is positively related to performance 
H35: Flexibility is positively related to performance 
H36: Role Integrity is positively related to performance 
H37: Harmonization of Conflict is positively related to performance 
H38: Restraint of Power is positively related to performance 
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4. The Empirical Approach 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The theory of this study pertains to grounded theories and is induced through analytic 
induction from the qualitative data that have been collected. It is primarily an explorative 
research in understanding social franchising. It is secondarily explanatory through a pilot 
study with regards only to the dynamics of the system of informal institutions and social 
networks in shaping the behaviour of actors and organization in social and mainstream 
franchising.  
This chapter focuses upon the empirical approach adopted in this research project and 
explains the overall design used. The principal themes that are documented in this chapter 
are: ontological and epistemological stance, empirical research objectives, research 
design, data generation sources and communication methods, operationalisation and 
measurement of variables, sampling methodology and finally, the methodology for data 
analysis. 
 
4.2. Ontological and Epistemological Approaches 
 
Being a qualitative study we should consider that researchers are nowadays not only seen 
as objective scientists but also as good storytellers who narrate persuasive tales of cause 
and effect; high-quality theory involves using many of the same methods as high-quality 
literature. Valid theory nowadays could be a process theory that is not expressed in terms 
of independent and dependent variables. Even if there is no objective means of measuring 
the values of a theory, never-the-less this piece of theory could be received as given truth 
(Elsbach, Sutton, and Whetten, 1999). 
 
Ontology coming from the synthesis of two Greek words "on", genitive: "ontos", which 
means being and the word "logia" meaning study, account, explanation, science. So it is 
the study of being or existence that seeks to describe the basic categories and 
relationships of being or existence to define entities and types of entities within its 
framework. Epistemology comes from the synthesis of two Greek words "episteme", 
meaning knowledge and "logia". It is the theory of knowledge that studies the nature and 
scope of knowledge. In Plato’s Theaetetus (399 BC., translated by Conford, 1960) 
Socrates gives a definition of knowledge he says that it is ‘justified true belief’. 
 
The researcher of this study takes an ontological position described as social 
constructionism and an epistemological position described as interpretivist. 
Constructionism- as opposed to positivism- it asserts that social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being gathered by social actors. It asserts that social phenomena 
and categories are produced through social interaction and are in a constant state of 
revision. Researchers’ own accounts of the social world are constructions; in this sense 
knowledge is viewed as indeterminate. It requires the social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of social action. Science should be focused on meanings, should try 
to understand what is happening, should follow an inductive approach and can use 
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multiple methods to establish different views (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003). For 
constructionism there is no true or valid interpretation; there are useful interpretations and 
these stand over against interpretations that appear to serve no useful purpose (Crotty, 
1998). The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on 
processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. The constructivist paradigm has been argued 
about whether it is really trustworthy (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Murphey et al., 1998). 
The epistemological approaches that are in accordance to objectivism in ontology are 
natural science models like positivism and realism. While the epistemological approaches 
that are in line with constructionism in ontology are interpretivism like phenomenology 
and hermeneutics (Crotty 1998; Gubrium and Holstein 2003). Objectivism is an 
ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an 
existence that is independent of social actors. The research philosophy that reflects the 
principles of positivism will provide quantifiable observations that lend to statistical 
analysis, law-like generalizations, highly structured methodology that can be replicated 
and the researcher’s role will be that of an objective analyst, independent of the subject of 
the research, which he does not affect (Saunders et al, 2009). Realism in epistemology 
asserts that natural and social sciences can and should apply the same approach to 
collecting data and to explanation. According to realism there is an external reality to 
which scientists direct their attention. Realism shares some aspects with positivism, such 
as the objective nature of some macro aspects of society, and with interpretivism, since it 
recognises the importance of socially constructed interpretations and meanings, the 
subjective reality (Saunders et al, 2009; Gubrium and Holstein 2003). 
 
Our research adopts the principles of ontological holism or universalism. We try to 
understand how the behaviour of actors and organizations is shaped through a wider 
system that contains subsystems and elements coming from the external political and 
social context as well as from the organizational and individual context. We see the 
values and norms that govern the behaviour of actors which in turn are viewed through a 
social collectivistic approach that is through systems theory, social network theory and 
the argument of embeddedness. Institutionalism is also a closely linked approach that we 
draw from in this research. Methodological holism as opposed to methodological 
reductionism refers to the thinking that understanding of a certain kind of complex 
system is best sought at the level of principles governing the behaviour of the whole 
system, and not at the level of the structure and behaviour of its component parts 
(Schombert, 2006; Schombert and Bothun, 1987; Seevick, 2004). The research paradigm 
of a study is a cluster of beliefs and dictates. These beliefs influence what should be 
studied, how research should be done and how results should be interpreted. Social 
science consists of competing paradigms and is itself pre-paradigmatic (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Kuhn, 1996; Hassard and Denis, 1990).  
 
 
In line with our research approach is ontological relativism in the sense that the elements 
that we are researching have no absolute value. Social constructionism is relativist 
(Crotty, 1998: 3). 
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The researcher is not seen as an impersonal power figure standing outside the 
phenomena, but simply a person whose thoughts and feelings are involved in the process 
of discovery (Crotty, 1998). ‘Introducing the ‘subjective’ element into the analysis in fact 
increases the objectivity of the research’ (Harding 1987b: 9).  
 
The increase of the importance of qualitative approaches in small business research is a 
real addition to expanding the understanding of how the small business functions as an 
economic and social phenomenon (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). Smaller enterprises are 
actually more difficult to study than larger ones (Dillman, 2007); issues of difficulty 
raising sampling frames; accessibility issues; and low regard to the necessity of research 
by small business owners (Easterby-Smith et al (1991)  Generalization is difficult; 
tailored research solutions are needed (Dillman, 2007). 
 
4.3. Empirical Research  
 
“In a general sense research means finding out…research results in the creation of 
knowledge to solve a problem, answer a question, and better describe or understand 
something….There is little point in carrying out a research project if there is no ultimate 
aim to achieve something as a result” (Clough and Nutbrown, 2012:1).  
 
4.3.1. Research Design 
 
The initial goal of this research was to investigate the new inter-organizational format of 
social franchising which is a scaling strategy employed by social enterprises. The first 
stage of our explorative qualitative research indicated a number of relationships among 
various systems and institutions of the wider environment within which social franchises 
operate. Elements from these spheres of the political, social, organizational and 
individual context shape the decisions and behaviour of social entrepreneurs and social 
franchises with reference to the latter formation, growth and success. These relationships 
were conceptualised, a number of research questions were posed and research 
propositions were induced from our analysis which are all depicted in our theoretical 
framework of the ‘SoFraM’ (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 Chapter 6).  
 
At a parallel level an attempt was made by conducting a pilot explanatory quantitative 
study to assess the influence of the social settings of relationships on actors’ decision 
making through the argument of network embeddedness; a number of causal hypothesis 
were formulated reflected in our theoretical framework of the ‘FNM’ (see Figures 6.3 to 
6.5 Chapter 6). The first objective was to identify the importance of network 
embeddedness as a motive for franchise formation and partner selection. The second was 
to investigate the influence of embeddedness on the governance structure of franchise 
systems. Finally, the third was to assess whether relationally embedded franchise 
networks better perform. The goal of this part was mostly to create a model that would be 
applied in future research to social enterprise networks and social franchises rather than 
conducting a significant large scale quantitative research that would derive strong 
generalisable results; in the latter case a big sample would be needed. One could argue 
that SoFraM is a critical theory while FNM is an analytical one.  
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An attempt to bridge both streams of academic and practitioners research has been made 
as the researcher is interested in dissemination (Gibbons et al, 1994). We are interested in 
seeing the specific incentives that exist in the EC, UK and Greece which could benefit the 
social entrepreneurs and social investors; we are also interested in identifying the specific 
mechanisms that trigger social entrepreneurship formation growth and success in order 
for policy makers and support organisations to design appropriate schemes. For these 
reason our primary data builds on firstly, hard data of policies and regulations; secondly, 
we identify best practices, thirdly, we approach the phenomena holistically investigating 
a broad spectrum of contextual factors; fourthly we identify challenges faced by social 
entrepreneurs and social franchisors as well as emerging needs; finally, dissemination is 
adopted early on as we engage in action research projects with practitioners and 
stakeholders. 
 
Research can be classified as exploratory, descriptive or explanatory, as analytical or 
critical, as predictive or confirmatory, and as action or applied. Exploratory is the case of 
research that tries to find out what is happening, to seek new insights, to ask questions, to 
assess phenomena in a new light and adopts usually a qualitative approach. Explanatory 
is the research that seeks an explanation of a situation or a problem, usually in the form of 
causal relationships and may also follow a quantitative or qualitative approach (Yin 
1994). 
 
We adopt primarily an inductive qualitative approach and secondarily employ deductive 
based means. Quantitative research is often used to validate findings discovered in 
qualitative research (Kaden, 2006). The deductive approach is when the literature is used 
to help identify theories and ideas that will then be tested using data, while the inductive 
approach is when the theory is the result of the data analysis (Saunders et al, 2009).  
 
‘SoFraM’ falls under the area of grounded theories being a middle range theory; the 
method employed has been that of analytic induction of the qualitative primary data 
collected. Analytic induction processes have been applied by the majority of empirical 
studies in social entrepreneurship (Alvord et al, 2004; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair, 
Battilana and Cardens 2012; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meyskens et al 2010a; 
Meyskens et al, 2010b; Sharir and Lerner, 2006; Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Sorenson et 
al, 2013).  
 
In reviewing the relationship between theory and social research we find two types of 
theory the so-called grand theories and the theories of the middle range. Grand theories 
attempt to construct a ‘systemic theory of the nature of men and society’ including many 
abstract and normative approaches (Skinner, 1985:4). Theories of the middle range 
operate in limited domains, vary in purpose or application, fall somewhere between grand 
theories and empirical findings and represent attempts to understand and explain limited 
aspects of social life. Grounded theory, which is the case of this research, is induced from 
data and is often built on cases; an appropriate data analysis method is analytic induction 
(Borgatti, 2006). Grounded theory is mostly focused on case analysis and case 
comparison rather than focusing on variables which helps identify where causal 
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differences may lie. The approach is similar to experimentation in natural sciences like 
action theory and research. Grounded theory is based on the works of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) who argue that a good theory has to be based on a specific steps and a careful 
execution; it refers to theories that are built from qualitative analysis of data (Borgatti, 
2006). 
 
The steps we have followed in our study are: data collection through observation, 
conversation, interview and action research; textual representation of data through ‘note-
taking’ and recording; then follows coding from which theoretical propositions emerge; 
then is the grouping of codes in conceptual categories, spheres from which the theory is 
built. This process moving from data to theory was done in many rounds throughout the 
data collection period which lasted about 2.5 years. These theoretical categories were 
compared to other settings through further data collection to support or modify our 
categorization and its properties. We saw theory as a process rather than as an end 
product. We used analytic induction approach which is appropriate for developing ground 
theories; it entails the systematic assembling assessment and analysis of data to draw 
specific proof for the propositions of the study and the design of categories and their 
properties, of hypothesis and interrelated hypothesis which help redesign theory. The 
result is the generation of an integrated, limited, precise, universally applicable theory of 
causes accounting for specific behaviour (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
We began our research with no prior theoretical framework just some broad research 
questions, as analytic induction commences with a less defined explanation of the 
phenomena to be explored, which does not derive from existing theory. We then 
performed a series of exploratory case studies which resulted to a definition which was 
tested through more interviewing and cases (Yin’s, 1994).  
 
“Grounded theory procedures are designed to build an explanation or to generate 
a theory around the core or central theme that emerges from our data…it is structured and 
systematic…the disaggregation of data into units is called open coding, the process of 
recognizing relationships between categories is referred to as axial coding and the 
integration of categories to produce a theory is labelled selective coding” (Saunders et al, 
2009: 12). 
 
 
4.3.1.1. Qualitative Research  
 
There are four main characteristics in qualitative research that we have addressed through 
our research design: control, replication, operational definition and hypothesis testing. 
Control in figuring out what the causes of our explanations are through our observations. 
We try to figure out the reason for the cause of the social franchise formation and the 
behaviour of actors within this context. We began our exploration by posing a number of 
research questions of ‘how, what, why’ and through our first case studies and 
interviewing with participants, theses questions became eliminated and narrowed down to 
specific topics. Secondly, we have addressed the issue of replicability. Though various 
researchers consider replicating studies to be either important or unimportant; another 
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replication of a study is another partial truth added to research (Horseborough, 2003). 
Thirdly, operational definition can be defined as elements that require a set of processes 
to measure these elements. We considered the following elements and described them 
clearly in our narration: what the purpose of the study is through narrative data; the 
inductive approach; the formation of research propositions; limited literature review prior 
to findings; naturalistic setting; our sampling has been purposive targeted for in-depth 
understanding; measurement has been through narration; our research design has been 
flexible and minimal disturbance; data collection through informal interviews and 
document collection; data analysis through analytic induction of what was said in the 
interviews; finally, data interpretation is speculative and examined on a continuous basis 
(Morgan, 2007). 
  
Finally, in terms of hypothesis testing, our analysis involves stating many research 
questions and sub questions deriving from our central question as opposed on building on 
hypothesis; our aim was to examine numerous factors that may contribute to social 
franchising formation before narrowing it down to specific hypothesis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Ulichny, 1991). We are not focusing on verifying causal relationships 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Levine, 1999).  
 
4.3.1.2. Primary and Secondary Data 
 
Both primary and secondary data have been the sources of our empirical study: primary 
data was collected from interviews, observation, conversation and self administered 
questionnaires. While secondary data came from many sources and in many forms mostly 
from the EU, UK and Greek central and local authorities in the form of reports, research, 
legislation, evaluation reports, strategy reports, specific programmes, public procurement 
bids, organizational reports from our case companies, websites and other.  
 
The pros and cons of secondary data are: fewer resource requirements, unobtrusive, 
longitudinal studies, can provide comparative and contextual data, can result in 
unforeseen discoveries, permanence of data, but on the other hand: may be collected for a 
purpose that does not match our need, aggregations and definitions may be unsuitable, no 
real control over data quality, initial purpose may affect how data are presented (Saunders 
et al, 2009). To control the aforementioned problems we have checked measurement 
validity, methodology used, and try to eliminate the measurement bias, through 
crosscheck verification and triangulation. The absence in many cases of sources to 
provide the data needed to satisfy the requirements of this study lead us to primary 
sources as the most appropriate alternative available for data generation. 
 
4.3.1.3. Inter-country Research 
 
This piece of work is an inter-country research as it examines the issue of social 
franchising and social entrepreneurship formation both in the UK and Greece. The goal 
of this research work is not to compare the two countries but to learn from both 
environments in order to shed more light on the understanding of the phenomena. 
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The choice of Greece as a country for collecting our data is due to a number of reasons: 
a) firstly, Greece is a case where the law on social enterprises was introduced in 2011 so 
we can see the development of social cooperative enterprises and social franchises from 
almost its birth; b) secondly, there is a big research interest in analysing countries based 
on maximum difference (Proven and Milward, 1995; Punnett and Shenkar, 2003). Social 
franchising and social entrepreneurship in the UK and Greece represent two maximum 
diverse environments as the UK is in early maturity (being one of the most mature in 
Europe today) and in Greece the first social enterprises have now emerged and only one 
social franchise has been formed a couple of months ago; the HUB Athens which is a 
master franchisee of The HUB. They also represent two diverse economic environments 
the UK- representing the Anglo Saxon welfare state type of liberal countries (Esping-
Anderson typology, 1999)- and Greece- representing the Southern-European countries 
welfare state type (Evers and Laville, 2004); c) thirdly, the recent European and 
international elevated interest in raising understanding of the Greek situation. If Greece 
would default it would spread the crises to other southern European countries creating a 
risk of the EMU break-up which could trigger ‘the mother of all financial crises’ 
(Fahrholz and Wojcik, 2010:5) also (Eichengreen, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010). 
Argyrou and Kontonikas (2011) research argues that most of EMU countries have 
experienced contagion from Greece and that there is a need for structural and institutional 
reforms at the EMU level that would increase intra-EMU monitoring and coordination d) 
finally, purposive and convenience sampling issues, as the researcher originates from this 
country and their collaboration with ministries and municipalities brought access to 
significant data. 
 
The possible limitations to the implications of this research from focusing in the Greek 
case can be offset by the investigation of the social entrepreneurship sector in the UK 
who represents the richest policy and organizational context globally because of the fact 
that: a) the UK government has adopted the most substantive portfolio of public measures 
to support the formation and growth of the social entrepreneurship sector globally 
(Nicholls, 2010a); b) The UK is the world centre for social investment and the global 
leader in the socially responsible investments market (Eurosif, 2012); c) it has more than 
double the number of social franchise networks than all other European countries 
aggregated (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
The research is devised, evolved, executed, and managed by one person in one country 
and then replicated in other countries by the same person being a ‘safari’ or replication 
research. The advantage of this research is the central control of the project (Boyacigiller 
et al 2003; Punnett and Shenkar, 2003). We considered the issue of collecting data in a 
way to ensure comparability and suitability for international comparison (Mavondo and 
Rodrigo, 2001). Translation has not been an issue as the researcher is considered 
bilingual.    
 
4.3.1.4. Research Method 
 
The explorative qualitative research was based on case studies from both the UK and 
Greece on the social entrepreneurship and social franchising sector; on action research 
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projects conducted in Greece with the local authority of the Borough of Athens, with 
social entrepreneurs, and with European best practice social entrepreneurship centres 
including industry experts and policy makers; and on archival analysis of policies, 
regulation and incentives from the EC, UK and Greece. Primary data were all raised 
through face-to-face interviewing and observation. The explanatory pilot quantitative 
research was executed through a survey in the UK and Greece at the franchising sector 
based on an online self-administered questionnaire. So a mixed method was employed.  
 
The case study referred to the development of detailed and intensive knowledge about a 
small number of social franchises from the UK, while the survey referred to the 
collection of information in standardised form from mainstream franchise systems in the 
UK and Greece (Jankowicz, 2000). Case research methodologies are the most appropriate 
when investigating new research areas concrete context dependent knowledge is needed 
to understand the phenomena (Alvord et al, 2004; Sivakumar and Schoormans, 2011a; 
20011b; Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009) argues case studies support qualitative approaches as 
they allow for rigorous case investigation and multiple cases allow for theory building. 
Comparative analysis of cases allows for new understanding of complex phenomena like 
social entrepreneurship formation though the cost is the complexity in making systematic 
comparisons and inducing unambiguous results (Alvord et al, 2004). In-depth 
interviewing and observation are appropriate research techniques in the case that detailed 
information is needed (Sivakumar and Schoormans 2011a). Iinterviewing techniques 
allowed us to clarify questions and encourage participation and involvement.  
 
While the survey allowed us to collect more structured and standaridised data that were 
easily compared and correlated. (Saunders et al, 2009:4). The disadvantages according of 
the survey techniques that we have addressed are that data may be affected by the 
characteristics of the respondents and by the interactions of interviewer/respondent and 
that respondent’s may not report their beliefs and attitudes accurately, also fearing that 
their responses are not anonymous (Robson, 2002). On the other hand they provide a 
relatively simple and straightforward approach to the study of beliefs and attitudes, they 
may be adapted to collect generalizable information, there are high amounts of data 
standardization.  
 
4.3.2. Conducting Our Empirical Research 
 
4.3.2.1. Mixed Mode Strategy 
 
Mixed methods approaches were used by the majority of researchers in social 
entrepreneurship and social alliances studies; their methodology indicates that data were 
collected in multiple rounds of data collection and from a variation of sources: participant 
observation, retrieval of archival data, in-depth interviews and case studies (Alvord et al, 
2004; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair, Battilana and Cardens 2012; Mair, Marti, and 
Ventresca, 2012; Meyskens et al 2010a; Meyskens et al, 2010b; Sharir and Lerner, 2006; 
Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Sorenson et al, 2013). We collected data through a mixed 
methods approach at several stages that lasted two years covering the period from 
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January 2011 to March 2013; our sampling units derived from an activity we performed 
and called ‘Mapping of the Social Economy Sector’, these were:  
1) initially we started collecting primary data in January 2011 through in depth 
interviews with social entrepreneurs in Greece and in the UK; we totally 
interviewed 123 social entrepreneurs and social franchisors  
2) parallel to that we got the green light to meet with the first social franchisor in 
March 2011 at Green Works premises; we performed altogether six case studies 
of social franchises in the UK. Secondary data from more cases of social 
franchises through governmental evaluation reports in the UK and Scotland were 
collected, analysed and incorporated; 
3) at the same time we conducted in depth interviews with altogether 20 policy 
makers and social economy sectoral experts that played the role of investigators in 
the triangulation of our findings;  
4) parallel to that and up to date we conduct archival analysis of secondary data from 
various sources including Europa, UK and Greek governments, organizations, and 
local authorities;  
5) the next decisive stage in our study which happened a year after we started our 
empirical study in September 2012 was to enter in an action research project with 
the local authorities of the City of Athens. The researcher assumed the role of the 
Project Manager of ‘Athens Social Economy Initiative’ and in line with action 
research protocol they engaged in solving the identified issue; the identified need 
of the client was to trigger the creation of the social enterprises sector in Athens. 
The action research project opened up many opportunities in collecting more data 
so more in depth interviews were conducted and more secondary data were 
available supplying more data to the previous ongoing stages. It also provided the 
means to perform the following action research projects:  
6) a 30 hours’ workshop with 30 prospective social entrepreneurs and social 
franchisors in Greece in addressing the issue of helping them set up their own 
social enterprises and social franchises;  
7) a three days workshop with 7 CEOs of best European practices of social 
entrepreneurship centers and hubs (some of them participate in the GECES 
experts group of the EC), 2 policy advisors experts from the EC, 2 experts 
members of the Social Business Initiative of the EC,  and 14 representative from 
Greek formal institutions;  
8) Finally we conducted a pilot online survey through a quantitative approach 
following Dillman (2007) ‘tailored design’ protocol in franchise systems in the 
UK and Greece to provide a quantifiable tool for future research in evaluating and 
explaining the influence of the system of informal institutions of relational and 
structural embeddedness on franchise formation, partner selection, governance 
and performance. 
 
The mixed method design allows for each methodology to target different perspectives on 
the objective of the study thus dealing with different enquiries.  
Our research design of social network analysis differs from other research in five areas: 
firstly, sampling units refer to the social system within which the network operates and to 
the entities that are selected as nodes; secondly, the relational content encloses the 
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properties of the relationships among entities, every relational context is viewed as a 
distinct network or different types coexisting in the same network and many types of 
relations can exist in forming multiplex networks; thirdly, relational forms emerge from 
the direct or indirect, strong or weak ties that link actors; fourthly, the level of data 
analysis is seen as ‘complete’ as opposed to egocentric, dyadic or triadic approaches; and 
finally, the networks boundaries are defined by the actors who are chosen through 
snowball sampling allowing for the network to emerge through their own connections 
representing the realities of its social settings, this is called a ‘realist’ approach (Sloane 
and O’Reilly, 2013). As we saw in earlier chapters when discussing about systems 
theory, the boundary of each system is of paramount importance as by setting its 
boundary the system is differentiated from the environment; therefore we are in fact 
defining it and operationalising it (Bailey, 2008). Each system of our research has been 
clearly defined and boundaries have been set at the previous chapter. 
 
As it can be argued one of the differences between realism and pragmatism is that the 
former seeks reasoning of why things are the way they are, while the latter accepts things 
as they are and examines them. The use of a mix of methods helps by ensuring that the 
weaknesses and blind spots of one approach are compensated by the strengths of one or 
more other approaches (Saunders et al, 2009). Confidence in the conclusions is higher 
when different approaches have produced similar results. The use of our mixed research 
design is a more pragmatic approach depending on the problem we are researching, our 
skills, preferences and resources available (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). 
Epistemological and methodological pluralism is a solution to the debate between the two 
research paradigms for many small business researchers. We are not simply crude mixing 
of two, on the contrary constructing interpretations and explanations which combine the 
results of the two paradigms is more difficult than when employing a single paradigm. 
We suggest the use of qualitative methods to explore meaning and then confirm or 
validate the findings by a quantitative study (Crotty, 1998; Curran and Blackburn, 2001; 
Saunders et al, 2009).    
 
Triangulation has been extensively applied by using multiple methods of investigation, 
sources of data, multiple observers and theoretical perspectives in researching these 
social phenomena. We are cross-checking findings that result from both quantitative and 
qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). The advantages of mixing modes can be 
very significant (Bryman, 2006; Dillman, 2007). The use of mixed method approach is 
becoming more popular the last years. ‘There is much to be gained from a research 
design that ad initio incorporates complementary methods and that is framed within the 
typology and practice of mixed methods’ (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013:626). 
 
In the following sections we will build our methodology for both our qualitative study 
and our qualitative study; so we will differentiate among these two and offer the steps 
and decisions made for each one. 
 
4.3.2.2. Action Research 
 
The case of the City of Athens that was one of the sources of primary data collection was 
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through action research. The researcher was invited by the CEO, Mr Alexis Galinos, of 
the only development agency that is owned by the local authority of the municipality of 
the city of Athens- ADDMA to design, organise and implement policies in order to 
trigger the formation of the social enterprise sector. The researcher assumed the role of 
the Project Manager of ‘Athens Social Economy Initiative’; participants to the project 
were drawn from purposive and snowball sampling through referencing. The project is 
presented and described at the data analysis section in Chapter 8.  
 
A second action research was through a capacity building 30hours training programme 
and mentoring services to prospective social entrepreneurs and franchisors which took 
place at the Vocational training centre owned by the local authority of the city of Athens. 
We all co-signed a psychological contract with the participants at the first meeting which 
addressed issues of confidentiality and the goal of the project. The need for such a 
contract was raised by some of the participants. The selection of participants was from 
our ongoing interviewing and mapping activities and it was based on their need to start 
up- or being at an early start up phase of- a social enterprise. There need was to access 
pro-bono support on how to establish a social enterprise. A second objective was to 
create a pipeline of the first social enterprises for the city of Athens.  
 
Another action research project was a three days seminar with 7 CEOs from the best 
practices centres of social entrepreneurship (these centres included research, incubation, 
service provision, consulting, resource provision and ongoing support to social 
enterprises in their regions); participants were identified by the EC task force 
committee’s expert on social entrepreneurship Mr Gerhard Braunling. Other participants 
from local stakeholder groups were identified by the CEO of Athens Development 
Agency (ADDMA). The objective of the project was to raise knowledge on the practices 
of these centres in designing a business support centre for the municipality of Athens and 
also to establish strategic partnership with one of these centres.  
 
Action research is a grounded theory method using many of the processes used in 
analytic induction (Gill and Johnson, 2010). This allowed us to test our research 
framework. We followed a data-theory-implementation process by gathering 
systematically data about the specific issues and going back and forward to theory and 
data collection by changing variables and then bringing those changes to our theoretical 
systems. So it was a continuous process among diagnosis-planning action and 
intervention- implementation- evaluation of effects of implementation and so on. We 
assumed a dual role of that of a consultant and a ‘scientist’. Action research provides a 
bridge among consultants and scientists into repositioning the latter in organizational 
practitioners’ settings. Action research fills the gap among theory building and research 
on practical problems that practitioners’ implement in their organizations; the latter as 
argued by Argiris (1985) has driven organization away from deductively based research. 
It is a ‘participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in 
the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes... it has become increasingly popular’ (Gill 
and Johnson, 2010:96) 
 
There are no set methodological protocols or rules; it encompasses a very diverse range 
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of approaches according to the research paradigm of each study. Action research was 
conducted in everyday social settings, like the city of Athens everyday activities and the 
capacity building training programme; findings emerged out of these contexts and at the 
same time we tried to resolve the social issues identified. We selected participants from 
different stakeholder groups with different levels of power who are affected by this social 
issue; we were involved and not detached from the process. The action research with the 
city of Athens was targeting community transformation through empowering people and 
other activities while the capacity building programme was targeting organizational 
reforms of participants. In the beginning in all action research projects we established 
either a psychological or a written contract among ourselves and the clients; including the 
issues identified and described, the participants involved and the action plan to address 
those issues.  
 
We took a holistic methodological approach by understanding the social system first, 
then addressing the parts and then moving back to the whole; when there are divergences 
among the parts and the whole a reconceptualisation takes place (Gill and Johnson, 
2010).  By collecting data from different stakeholders we understand the whole system 
and not the single perspective of each part. For the implementation to be effective the 
client has to be committed therefore to agree with the diagnosis and the actions taken. 
The actions required a reinterpretation of how stakeholders view specific social issues 
through the application of specific theoretical schemes; the biggest challenge was to 
persuade those in power to change as their motives proved to be different than initially 
stated. Our theory was empirically tested through practical intervention experimentation 
of the research propositions identified by our previous research. It has been suggested 
that action research resembles to experiments therefore demanding for the use of control 
groups to test the internal validity and rule out extraneous variables. The availability of a 
control group has been problematic within the organizational context as it would have to 
intervene with the social setting and maybe offsetting interventions benefits by 
appointing control groups. Therefore, as Argyris and Schon (1989) put it the action 
researchers are encountered with a ‘dilemma’ having to make a choice between ‘rigour or 
relevance’, thus science or action research. 
 
4.3.2.3. Research Techniques 
 
Our empirical study includes observation, face-to-face and phone interviewing, 
documents, and online self-administered questionnaire; interviewing being semi-
structured and open-ended technique, while the questionnaire constructed being a fully 
structured technique (Dillman, 2007; Jankowicz, 2000). The postal survey technique was 
used by the majority of researchers in franchising literature that dealt with similar issues 
(Alon, 2000; Boje and Whetten, 1981; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Douglas and Craig, 
1983; Jensen, 2003; Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001; Proven and Milward, 1995; Taylor et 
al, 2000; Whipple and Gentry, 2000) which is now replaced by online techniques. The 
internet is especially useful mean in international management research as it saves a lot of 
time and money (Dillman, 2007; Punnett and Shenkar, 2003). We will present hereunder 
a set of surveying problems that we anticipated in advance and addressed through our 
research design.  
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4.3.2.4. Addressing Errors and Constraints 
 
Reliability is associated with consistency and replicability of findings and data. There are 
three threats for reliability: participant error; participant bias; and observer error. Validity 
is concerned with whether the research findings are really about what they appear to be 
about. Threats of validity are history; testing; instrumentation; mortality; maturation; 
ambiguity and causal direction. Finally there is the issue of generalisability which is also 
referred to as external validity whether research findings may be equally applicable to 
other research settings (Saunders et al, 2009). Generalisability was not our primary focus 
as our purpose was to try to explain what is going on in social franchising. The following 
sources of error that could diminish the quality of our empirical research have been 
addressed: 
 
We adopted various techniques to achieve validity. These are unobtrusive measures, 
respondent validation, and triangulation. It is argued that the validity of qualitative 
research is not much of a concern for researchers because the goal of qualitative research 
is to understand the other person and their perceptions when interacting with their 
environment. Walcott (1994) called qualitative research ‘rigorous subjectivity’, as it 
searches for plausible explanations, opinions and interpretations rather than obsessing 
over the correct answer to something (Richardson, 1994).  
 
Unobtrusive measures refer to the natural setting. We gave much attention to building the 
natural setting of each interview and establishing rapport with the interviewees (Seymour, 
2006); quietness, comfort, seating were considered; empathising and building trust 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Dundon and Ryan, 2010). The 
physical place was either their offices or quite rooms in the premises of the city hall, of 
university rooms or NGOs premises. 
 
We also addressed the issue of respondent validation, also known as member validation, 
by demonstrating to the interviewees the goal of the interview and the explanation of our 
findings. The goal of this account is for the participant to confirm or invalidate the 
conclusions of the researcher (Atkinson, 1997; Barbour, 2001; Mays and Pope, 2000; 
Torrance, 2012) guaranteeing that there is an association between our findings and the 
experiences and perspectives of the participants.  
 
Triangulation is amongst the most popular measurements used in qualitative research 
(Torrance, 2012). The most known types of triangulation are method, investigator, and 
time. We used methodological triangulation by using mixed-methods (Barbour, 2001); 
this increased our accuracy and depth (Anderson, 1997; Thurmond, 2001). The 
disadvantages are in terms of time, cost and human resources; in lack of human resources 
other than the writer of this thesis it took us about less than two years and a half to raise 
all data and the cost was leveraged by the fees raised through the action research projects. 
The spam of time allowed us to see how events occur naturally (Thurmond, 2001) to see 
if findings are similar in different time intervals increasing the validity of our findings. 
Time triangulation was also applied in single cases; the participants that were part of our 
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action research workshop had been the focus of interviewing throughout these 2.5 years 
period of time so we managed to see their needs in different times in setting up their 
social ventures, how these needs changed (Denzin and Lincoln, 1995), what were their 
challenges, how they addressed them, how they interacted with their networks, how their 
behaviour was shaped and changed through these interactions from the political and 
social sphere.  
 
We also used investigator triangulation by including interviewers from different 
stakeholder groups. So we interviewed industry experts, policy makers, and other 
researchers from other countries with whom we discussed our findings and who had no 
prior discussion or collaboration among them.  When they proposed different categories, 
definitions or meanings to properties, we incorporated their suggestions and redefined our 
model which was then re-tested through further empirical study. This produced greater 
validity for our study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1995); the findings can become more credible 
(Thurmond, 2001); investigator triangulation brings minimal biases when collecting, 
reporting, and analysing the data and internal validity (Thurmond, 2001).  
 
Interviewer distortion and subversion may occur (Novick, 2008). Inter-interviewer bias 
can occur both in face-to-face and telephone interviews in arranging and explaining the 
concept of the study, even when the unstructured component is limited (Curran & 
Blackburn, 2001).  Secondly, bias can occur during the data collection, as the researcher 
has to be present during the data collection process of the interview. Initially to control 
this source of bias we recorded the interviews in the process we understood that recording 
changed interviewees behaviour made them more reluctant and reserved so we kept a 
written record on our portable device. Individual skills can impact the study negatively 
depending on biases, experience and reactions. Individual skills of the researcher are 
useful for carrying out qualitative research. The quality of the qualitative research is 
dependent on the researcher’s biases and idiosyncrasies too (Novick, 2008). The 
researcher’s reaction to the data they receive from the interviews can lead to some form 
of bias depending on how it is interpreted. To ensure rigour we provided scrutinization of 
the topic in a plausible and coherent manner, through adequate descriptions in our data 
analysis of their assumptions and techniques to overcome researcher bias (Mays and 
Pope, 2000). Subjects’ responses can be affected, as the researcher is present during the 
data collection. Biases can emerge and this is unavoidable.  
 
Ethical issues of anonymity and confidentiality can lead to problems. There is a chance 
that certain respondents may have trust issues with disclosing information, if they suspect 
violation of trust and who views the information provided. Ethical issues have been 
considered and anonymity has been granted in all studies; informed consent has been 
obtained by all participants. 
 
Qualitative sampling methods are more focused on reflecting the diversity within the 
groups that are studied, instead of accomplishing representativeness (Delmar, 2010; Mays 
and Pope, 2000). However, qualitative procedures have been criticised because of their 
lack of transparency. This is because researchers saw qualitative research as having 
opaque systemic procedures carried out, opaque analytic structures used, opaque guiding 
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principles and opaque consistencies to methodological frameworks (Mays and Pope, 
2000).  There are no specific rules for the size of the sample, and so it is common for 
qualitative research to recruit a small sample size through purposive sampling. And from 
this small sample, detailed and in-depth information can be obtained and analyzed. 
Dillman (1978: 41) argues ‘a representative sample can be drawn regardless of the data 
collection method’. 
 
We have addressed sampling issues by targeting a rather large sample size for a 
qualitative research from various sources and by following a snowball purposive 
sampling technique. In line with our approach on the definition of social networks we 
allowed for the respondents to reference us to other actors and organizations they were 
aware of or collaborating with or trusting or considering role models and best practices; 
so we allowed for our sample networks to construct themselves which reflects the 
influence of the social settings. We did that with various social entrepreneurs. Through 
our data analysis we saw that two different systems of social enterprises in Greece 
emerged with diverse characteristics from one another which were very useful research 
wise.  
 
With regards to our quantitative study: Firstly, there is sampling error which derives from 
the fact that the accuracy of sample survey predictions is limited by the quantity of units 
in the survey population that are being surveyed (Dillman, 2007). Secondly, there is 
coverage error which occurs when a sample does not represent equally all elements of the 
population (Dillman, 2007). In order to draw a representative sample of the population all 
members of it must have a known chance of being included. Both have been addressed by 
building two representative sampling frames of our population of franchise systems from 
the members to national franchise associations of the UK and Greece and from the 
international franchise fair participants in Greece in two consecutive years. All units from 
these sampling frames were invited to participate in our research.  
 
There is measurement error which occurs when the respondents’ replies to survey 
questions are not accurate, precise, and not comparable to other respondents’ replies 
(Dillman, 2007). Data are affected by the characteristics of the respondents and those 
respondents will not necessarily report their beliefs and attitudes accurately (Robson, 
2002). This was addressed by following the protocol of Dillman (1978, 2007) ‘tailored 
design method’ (Dillman, 2007, 1978) in constructing the self- administered 
questionnaire of the survey and by operationalizing the items of the study based on 
existing scales from literature. Ambiguities and misunderstandings of the questions 
cannot be detected in self-administered questionnaires, and that respondents may not treat 
the exercise seriously which we will not be able to detect (Robson, 2002: 233). These 
issues have been addressed by constructing an easy to use self-administered 
questionnaire, also by triangulation and mixed methods. Misrepresentation of true beliefs 
is also an issue in qualitative research which was addressed through investigator 
triangulation, a larger sample size from various sources and mixed methods 
 
With reference to response issues mail surveys often achieve very low response rates 
(Dillman, 1978) than face-to-face that have the highest response rates and telephone 
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surveys who are a close second. Mail surveys have a higher problem with response 
selectivity that have telephone and face to face surveys (Dillman, 1978). Nonresponse 
error occurs when a considerable amount of units in a sample do not respond to the 
questionnaire and have different characteristics than those that have responded to the 
questionnaire (Dillman, 2007). To avoid unknown bias from refusals is to know that 
those who did not respond do not differ greatly from those that did respond. The potential 
of non response bias can be checked by comparing early respondents with late 
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) so a chi square test was performed. Also 
through our pilot-testing using an email questionnaire the participants suggested the use 
of online survey. So we constructed an online questionnaire using survey monkey 
platform. This helped us achieve faster responses, lower item nonresponse, and more 
complete replies to open-ended questions (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998). The issue of low 
response rates was compensated through the mixed method.  
 
With reference to methodological issues of error socially desirability bias can be avoided 
(Dillman, 1978) through online questionnaire that ensures greater success in anonymity 
and confidentiality and avoids bias due to social desirability of answers (Jankowicz, 
2000). Also multiple informants that have been used in this research facilitate isolation of 
informant bias (Kumar, Stern and Anderson, 1993). Interviewer distortion and 
subversion; inter-interviewer bias is avoided since the lack of investigator bias ensures 
adequate objectivity in data generation (Dillman, 1978, 2007). This risk of contamination 
by others is higher with online questionnaires because the respondent can ask from 
someone else to complete it or to ask for advice from others while completing it. Through 
the settings of our online survey we secured answers from the specific email addresses 
that we send the invitations to. Consultation that is dependent on motivation and interest 
is another issue with online questionnaires (Dillman, 1978). Both of the above biases 
were controlled through our face-to-face interviewing.  
The issue of questionnaire construction is critical to web surveys (Dillman, 1978); as ‘it 
may take only one glaring flaw in the construction and design of a mail questionnaire to 
stimulate rejection’ (Dillman, 1978:61). The ‘tailored design’ protocol being a structured 
standardized method can provide greater feeling of anonymity, may require less skill and 
sensitivity to administer and allows the respondent more time to think for their responses. 
Bearing in mind that the constructs of this research are relational in nature and encompass 
feelings and behaviours, it is considered to be an even stronger advantage (Dillman, 
2007; Selltiz et al, 1981). Web surveys provided us with visual and interactive 
capabilities. Length is an issue and our questionnaire being a pilot study had many items, 
though Dillman (1978:54) argues that when the ‘total design method is followed response 
rates have shown no significant variation for questionnaires up to 12 pages and up to 125 
items; while exceeding those limits can have serious effect on response rates. The online 
questionnaire has a disadvantage on the use of open-ended questions (Dillman 1978: 58) 
which was addressed from the open ended questions posed through face-to-cafe methods.  
 
The lack of resources are mainly financial, skilled personnel and time (Dillman, 1978). 
The use of electronic e-mail for self-administered questionnaires eliminates the cost of 
paper, postage, mail-out, and data entry costs; it offers the possibility of passing over 
national frontiers; it diminishes the time demands of survey implementation (Dillman, 
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2007).  
 
4.3.3. Conducting Qualitative Research 
 
Interviews are more effective when drawing relational data as it helps establish trust 
(Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013). The interviews increased in focus and depth over the period 
because of the interactive and cumulative nature of the fieldwork. Our first interviews 
were more of a conversation; we had as few questions as possible and engaged in 
identifying what is this sector, how does it work, who are the constituents, what are the 
motives of each stakeholder group, etc. We took biographical accounts from all 
respondents addressing background and motivational issues. In biographical account 
research three dimensions can be found important to investigate the ethnic culture of the 
entrepreneur, their background, motives, traits, their biographical narration and personal 
evolution, alongside the story of the development and growth of their sustainable 
business venture. This is how we collected data on the individual/psychological profile 
and on the social innovation model. As the process of data-theory analysis proceeded we 
started focusing our questions around specific themes that had been already identified. In 
the beginning we had a very limited knowledge of existing research and theories and it 
was only after many stages that we resorted to literature. The full length of literature was 
only examined prior to the final stage of data analysis of selective coding to produce and 
build the final theory. So categories, properties, relationships and spheres had already 
emerged; it was after open and axial coding processes.  
 
Our initial questions were: what is social franchising? How does it work? How does it 
differ from mainstream franchising? Why did it emerge? How do social franchises 
emerge? What are the determinants to their formation? What are the specific mechanisms 
that have been adopted? Who are its constituents? How do networks select members? 
How is it organised? What are its results? What do they do and where? How can it be 
more successful? What is its value? Who else can you reference to us? Who are the 
people you partner with? Once we got replies we kept asking: who, how, what? Similar 
questions were addressed to social entrepreneurs who hadn’t scaled up their model yet. 
To policy makers we asked: What are your goals? Why do you implement reforms? Also 
we asked questions to identify knowledge of the sector, biographical narration, reasons 
for being appointed to this agenda, opinion on specific social enterprises, etc. 
 
Each interview lasted between one and a half hour and three hours following a standard 
protocol for capturing emerging themes in field research, when the interviewee consented 
it was recorded and always transcribed verbatim. We took an extra 20 in depth interviews 
with external informants of major stakeholder groups like policy makers the same period. 
The inclusion of various sources of data collection and social enterprises from different 
sectors helps to identify through comparison the variables that are present or absent from 
all cases, and those that are salient in explaining formation. Respondents were asked if 
they had partnered with other organizations and then their partners were also asked to 
verify that. They were asked about reputation and trust of others which was also cross-
checked. They were asked about the reasons that drove them to partner with others and 
they governed these relationships. They were asked about the contribution of formal and 
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central institutions to their ventures. They were asked the type of resources they had to 
provide and what were in need of in growing their ventures.  
 
Throughout the interview phase we used a comparison strategy to compare among 
informants and identify essential points of synergy or contrast. Throughout the process 
we refined emerging themes and asked respondents to comment on these new themes. So 
the questions that we asked ware developing through time following a protocol that was 
being in parallel developed with the research project. The use of external participants 
who were asked to state what they knew about specific enterprises and network practices 
and effectiveness and to reference us to other entrepreneurs alleviated the potential bias 
of respondents and allowed us to draw more meaning from the data.  Also to avoid bias 
we ensured anonymity and that the use of this data was strictly for academic use and 
would not be distributed to the Greek authorities. Parallel to that we were collecting 
various types of secondary data, like online reports, authority’s strategic plans, research 
reports and evaluation studies, historical reports, legal and political documents. This 
provided us with hard copy material of the institutional context interventions and 
policies. So triangulation was accomplished to attribute reliability to our data and validate 
our findings (Yin, 2008). The process that we followed in conducting our empirical study 
which is known as analytic induction is also reported in similar research studies 
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair, Battilana and Cardens 2012; Sharir and Lerner, 
2006). 
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews during the interview we added-on questions or 
changed the questions according to the flow of the conversation and the respondent’s 
responses. We used descriptive, structural and contrasting questions. We appeared with 
no predefined theoretical framework; there were no hypothesis formed. In many cases we 
had to explain what social entrepreneurship is and how are social enterprises defined as 
the majority of the participants didn’t know that they are social entrepreneurs or hadn’t 
heard of the term. It was highlighted to them the significance of the area of the research 
as well as the importance of their contribution to the study; this seemed to increase their 
participation and their willingness to reveal more information. Because we were keeping 
a written record of the interview many interviewees after sharing sensible information 
were preoccupied with anonymity, confidentiality, sharing their business secrets or 
revealing issues to the local authorities that would jeopardise their relationship with them. 
So we would relax them by emphasising issues of ethical research within the university 
regulation. The fact that the university was a UK institution seemed to provide greater 
assurances.  
 
4.3.3.1. Qualitative Sampling Design 
 
In qualitative research we used a purposive sampling technique. We are therefore seeking 
to have richness in our data, and so the sample is recruited purposefully (purposeful 
sampling) instead of randomly, which was the aim of this qualitative research (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2006). The reason was so that the entrepreneurs could be interviewed 
specifically. The initial sample of five social franchises in the UK is a small sample this 
is because: a) firstly, according to social network analysis’ principles the focus is on the 
 186 
specific social system elements and this helps to ensure some generalisability to the 
population of this system and addresses issues of external variation  b) secondly, at this 
stage we evaded the inclusion of many interviewees so as not to create saturation by 
considering data that wouldn’t add value to our theory c) thirdly, at this stage too much 
data gathered from more social franchise cases would make our data more complex and 
thus more difficult to interpret (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Meyskens et 
al, 2010a). At the next stage were some understanding had been already raised and first 
categories had been already formed we raised a much larger sample.  
 
We identified informants by sampling from various types of social enterprises from a 
variety of economic sectors and from various stakeholders. We performed an activity 
which we called ‘Mapping of the Social Economy Sector’ in this list we raised units from 
four different groups: social entrepreneurs, social investors, opinion leaders and the wider 
public (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Sampling Frame: Mapping of the Social Economy Sector 
 
Through the key informant sampling technique we targeted these units. Social 
entrepreneurs included existing social enterprises, social franchises and various types of 
social enterprise partnerships and networks, prospective social entrepreneurs and early 
stage start-ups. Existing social enterprises included third sector organizations that meet 
the requirements of the definition proposed in Chapter 1.5. Social investors included 
organizations with active social responsibility profile that support third sector 
organizations, it included community and cooperative banks that have expressed 
Social 
Entrepreneurs 
 Social 
enterprises 
 Social 
Enterprise 
Networks 
 Potential 
social 
entrepreneurs 
 Early stage 
start-ups 
Opinion 
Leaders 
 Politicians 
 Industry 
Experts 
 Business 
Support 
Centers 
 Academics 
 EC & Public 
Officials 
 Journalists 
 Celebrities  
&Artists 
Social Investors 
 Socially 
Responsible 
Corporations 
 Foundations 
 Philanthropist
s 
 Financial 
Institutions 
 Formal 
Authorities 
The 
Wider 
Public 
 Social 
consumers 
 Commu
nities 
 Informal 
groups  
 social 
network
s 
 
 187 
willingness to support social enterprises, foundations and philanthropists and formal 
central or local institutions that manage social economy funds. The third category of 
opinion leaders included academics in the field, support organizations and social 
economy experts, journalists, celebrities, artists and journalists that support the social 
economy sector and can influence public opinion, politicians with an expressed agenda 
on social economy and EC and national officials that manage social economy agendas. 
The wider public includes social consumers, communities, individuals, informal groups, 
social networks and others. 
 
We asked from the interviewees to recommend us to other similar like social 
entrepreneurs through a snowball sampling. Given the exploratory nature of this study the 
participants selected had to represent the primary actors embedded in social franchises so 
that findings could be extended to other populations of social franchises and social 
venture networks. This allowed us to include actors that are not part of formal networks 
and that were unknown to experts, so we have a complete view of the network. This is 
line with our theoretical conception that a network is a socially constructed entity. Also 
the goal in network analysis is to investigate the existence and nature of ties among 
enterprises. Our sampling design decisions are in line with previous research studies in 
our filed (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Meyskens et al 2010a; Sharir and Lerner, 2006; 
Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Sorenson et al, 2013). 
 
In selecting respondents within sample units in both quantitative and qualitative studies 
we targeted through the key informants purposive technique the owners or CEOs of all 
the organizations we investigated; because these people have the deepest knowledge of 
the issues that we are investigating. ‘Opening the door’ to enterprises was a very difficult 
task. A pre-notification letter was send to the social franchises of our case study (see 
Appendix B) and then follow up calls were needed until we managed to reach the owners 
and book face-to-face interviews with them.  
 
In the case studies of the social franchises in the UK we had to insist many times through 
several phone calls and emails in order to manage to book an appointment with the 
owners of the social franchises. In the case where the franchise systems where not located 
in London we raised the data through phone interviews. Still it was very difficult to 
execute the study in the UK.  
 
On the other hand in Greece there was no need for pre-notification letters because we 
were referenced through our social networks to our targeted population. After the initial 
phase participants were very easy to contact and book a face-to-face interview. We also 
found that the communication of our capacity building programmes through the pubic 
media sources (newspapers, radio and online media) and the action research with the City 
of Athens (which was in turns generated through our pubic media exposure and word of 
mouth) gave us very easy access to securing face-to-face interviews with social 
entrepreneurs. These actions gave us credibility and trustworthiness. In many cases we 
were approached by the social entrepreneurs themselves asking to meet with us and 
support them, so this gave us the opportunity to interview them for the needs of our 
research. This was due to the fact that social entrepreneurship in Greece was a very novel 
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concept in 2011 (and still is) and we realized that we were among the first people to raise 
this topic in pubic media. The word of mouth was also very strong as people we met 
would talk to their networks about us and members of the latter would contact us. These 
reflect our theoretical assumptions of the dynamics of social networks and of relational 
and structural embeddedness that we are investigating. We also used a number of 
opportunities to create our sampling frame and raise respondents, like responding to the 
invitation to attend as guests the annual TEDX event in Athens that is considered a very 
popular event worldwide and the Corporate Social Responsibility Annual BRAVO 
Awards. Other events were the ‘Fair of Nature’ that took place in one of the most popular 
private colleges in Athens; and various local events like the ‘Sustainability Summit’ 
conference in the island of Crete, the first inaugural forum of the Ministry of Labour on 
social cooperative enterprises and local forums by communities and municipalities in 
rural areas 
 
4.3.3.2. Qualitative Data Analysis Techniques 
 
Data analysis was conducted in stages which helped us to go back and forth and avoid 
premature analytical bias. Firstly, in stage one we presented a narrative account of our 
findings by ordering raw material per social unit, it included quotes. To substantiate our 
understanding we checked the accounts with investigators from the opinion leaders 
group. We used data from these groups and from an archival analysis to support and 
balance those findings. In the beginning we tried to identify patterns by counting the 
frequency of words and phrases in data sets to see any repeated ideas and themes. 
Secondly in stage two we identified themes and coded them. Using content analysis we 
produced categories (variables) of our constructs, we didn’t use any existing 
categorization from other research thus allowing for categories to emerge from our data; 
this inductive open coding approach is appropriate for theory building; these codes are 
called first-order codes (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair, Battilana and Cardens, 2012; 
Sharir and Lerner, 2006). These codes deal with storing, labeling and retrieving the data. 
We used data displays to facilitate us through graphs, diagrams, and drawings. The 
categories that we displayed consist of the data, coded data, and revised codes. Our 
coding scheme built out a map. Our scheme included a categorization of various spheres 
that emerged which were formal institutions, social institutions, organizational context 
and individual context. It included descriptions, labels using interviewees own words, 
relationships. In constructing codes we asked the questions that we have mentioned 
above. The first stage resulted in creating codes for individual profile categories, social 
innovation model categories, formal institutions interventions categories and network 
embeddedness categories. We were interested in seeing where these categories intercept 
and the linkages that are created between the various spheres within which actors interact. 
Then in stage three we kept on collecting data and comparing with existing codes and 
categories to identify similarities and contrasts, relationships and patterns. Any new 
codes that emerged were grouped around the spheres we had identified. Codes were 
grouped together in broader codes or reformed. We reviewed codes and categorized them 
into broader codes (using words from the interviewees) and when codes seemed similar 
we grouped them under one coding name. This process is called axial coding (Mair, 
Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Pratt, Rockmann and Kaufmann, 2006). The use of tables 
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and matrices to compare patterns across cases is a common method used in qualitative 
data analysis (Alvord et al, 2004). At a later stage we went to existing theory to compare 
the emerging themes of our findings with other research findings. The final stage was a 
confirmation of these refined themes and relationships with the broader set of data that 
we had gathered through all our research methods. The results from this process are 
presented in the formulation of propositions; the fact that these propositions are common 
across all cases strengthens their plausibility (Alvord et al, 2004). 
 
Content analysis was performed on the secondary data and reports we gathered through 
the archival research method comparisons were made with the primary data and other 
studies (Sharir and Lerner, 2006). Content analysis is used to classify the sampling units 
and quantify the data gathered from textual sources through a systematic process that 
helps identify specific characteristics through a process that ensures the validity, 
reliability and replicability of the study results (Stone et al, 1966). Content analysis is 
widely used in mixed method approaches as an appropriate method to perform 
quantitative analysis in qualitative research studies of new areas of interrogation 
(Meyskens et al, 2010b) and is often based on qualitative data analysis that has been 
performed initially for other purposes (Krippendorf, 1980). Binary variables are often 
used in content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980). General Inquirer is the software usually 
used in the execution of computerized content analysis. We used no software and 
performed a qualitative analysis of secondary data. Existing theories also suggest the 
application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) which is becoming popular in analysing 
networks and alliances and provide rich data to extent the understanding of networks 
(Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Somersen, 2013). Software packages through computational 
and visualisation techniques, such as Ucinet and Pajek allow for the quantitative analysis 
of network data and the visualisation of network structures (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013) 
 
4.4. Conducting Quantitative Research 
 
Following the ‘tailored design’ protocol (Dillman, 1978, 2007) we developed the self 
administered questionnaire (see Appendix A) (Tomaskovic-Devey et al, 1994). In 
forming the questions we addressed issues of information sought, question structure and 
question wording (Jankowicz, 2000). We included mainly close ended questions with 
ordered choices allowing for open-ended choices and in the final section we added some 
open-ended questions which were replied only by a few respondents (see Appendix for 
full questionnaire). We always offered a similar choice to ‘other, don’t know’. According 
to existing research on social norms and alliances we used 5 point Likert-scales (Brown 
et al, 2000; Dong-Jin, 1997; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001; 
Mollering, 2003; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Rotter, 1967; Whipple and Gentry, 2000). We 
used both the behavioural anchored rating scale (BARS)- the variable is assessed along a 
scale with clearly defined scale points containing examples of specific behaviours-, and 
the behavioural observation scale (BOS)-the variable is assessed in terms of the 
frequency with which specific behaviours are performed (DeCotiis, 1977). 
 
To obtain validity we formed our operationalisation based on prior research studies 
(Dubin, 1978) through adaptation of scales or direct application; this has also been the 
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practice of prior research (Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). Since our study was a pilot 
study we used different multi-item scales for the same variables to test their significance. 
To test the extent to which a conceptual model is empirically valid survey investigations 
have to be executed in a way to determine its accuracy. Control variables were also 
included (Gulati, 1995b). 
 
Hereunder we present the operationalisation of our variables (for Questionnaire see 
Appendix A). 
 
4.4.1. Operationalisation of Variables  
 
Franchise Formation and Partner Selection 
 
Use of ordinal and nominal variables Question 1, 2 and 11: As we have argued trust can 
be measured through prior direct or indirect ties. Direct and indirect ties are measured by 
an independent binary variable which indicates the presence of ties by coded one or 
absence by coded zero, 0= first time, no prior ties, 1= prior ties (Jensen, 2003; Gulati, 
1995). Direct ties were named repeated ties and indirect ties were called common ties. 
Repeated ties or Common ties were direct social ties and direct work ties (Boje and 
Whetten, 1981).  
 
Ordinal variable Question 5 and 6: We also measured tie strength (Granovetter, 1973)  
 
Use of ordinal and interval variables Question 3 and 4: We operationalised motives for 
franchise formation that are linked to acquiring resources and capabilities for our control 
variable, which we used as control variables against the influence of relational and 
structural embeddedness in alliance formation and partner selection.   Based on existing 
research we identified the motives of franchisees and franchisors for entering into a 
franchise agreement (Aydin and Kacker, 1990; Baucus et al, 1993; Eroglu, 1992; Hall 
and Dixon, 1991; Huszagh et al, 1992; Lafontaine, 1992; Martin, 1988; Mendelsohn, 
1993; Paswan, Loustau, and Young, 2001; Sanghavi, 2002; Shane, 1996; Stanworth, 
1995a, 1999; Stanworth and Curran,1999; Stanworth and Kaufmann, 1996; Walker, 
1989). We combined these motives with the typology and classification of motives that 
have been identified by the literature on network formation by Whipple and Gentry 
(2000) and Ellram (1991): financial, technological, managerial, and strategic. Used 
typology of  Gulati and Singh (1998), Contractor and Lorange (1988) and Whipple and 
Gentry (2000) through 5points Likert-type scale 
 
 Nominal and ordinal variables Question 2, 5 and 9: We also measured accumulation 
effect of networks in alliances.  
 
Operationalisation of Governance structure 
 
Ordinal and interval variables Question 7: A typology for hierarchical controls based on 
the research of Gulati and Singh (1988): Hierarchical elements can be embedded in 
alliances structure and are.  
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Extracted from Question 18 and 19: According to Lafontaine (1992) it is more valid to 
focus on studying the proportion of franchise stores to company owned rather than the 
terms of the franchise contract when studying governance structure. So we used this 
method also to measure governance structure.  
 
Ordinal variable Questions 8 and 10: We also used the typology based on equity 
ownership and on entry modes. 
 
Operationalisation of Trust 
 
Ordinal multi item variables Question 20: Trust can be measured by the existence of prior 
direct and indirect ties as it has been use in testing Hypothesis 1 at the first questions. 
Brockner et al (1997) operationalised and measured interpersonal trust by 4 points likert 
type scale, a=o.75 and had three items that we have included: actual trust, fairness and 
confidence. Study 2 of Brockner et al (1997) based on Rousseau (1988) measured trust 
by 5 point likert type scale, a=.74, the items measured trustful/distrustful and family-
like/uncaring. Havila et al (2004) based on Moorman et al (1993) operationalised trust on 
5 point scale with two items: actual trust and confidence. Operationalisation of trust, 
commitment and values by Zabkar and Brencic (2004) based on scales developed by 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) which were also used in the researches of Joshi and Stump 
(1999) Jap (1999) and Heide and John (1992) on a 7point scale. Kauser and Shaw 2004 
measured trust on a 5 point likert-type scale using 13 items of which 11 were good, 
a=.94. Mollering (2003) measured trust in two ways by perceived trustworthiness and 
actual trust and found them to have a strong correlation. 
 
Operationalisation of Commitment  
 
Using Question 3 and 4: In the case that in a network the one partner’s interdependence 
classified as sequential and the other’s as reciprocal, it was coded with the higher cost as 
reciprocal (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Two dummy variables were used to measure 
interdependence, reciprocal and sequential, the default category included instances of 
pooled interdependence. (Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013) 
 
Ordinal variables Question 23: Brockner et al (1997) based on O‘Reilly and Chatman’s 
(1986) measured organizational commitment with a 7 point likert-type scale and four 
items: value congruence, attachment, identification, and affiliation. Kaumer and Shaw, 
2004 based on Porter et al (1974) Mowday et al 1979, Randall, 1990 measured 
organizational commitment on a five-point scale using 28 items, a=.92 on three 
dimension being commitment to the alliances goals and objectives, commitment to make 
an effort for the alliance, commitment to stay in the relationship. Havila et al (2004) 
Salancik (1977) measured commitment on a 5 point scale using tree items: bound 
investment, long-termness, strength of commitment. The following is the 
operationalisation of the two dimensions of commitment the instrumental and attitudinal 
commitment Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001) Morgan and Hunt (1994) Gundlach, Achrol 
and Mentzer, 1995 
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Ordinal variable to test validity Questions 21 and 22: a test was incorporated to test the 
nomological validity of commitment 7 point likert type scale for validation variables 
(Gundlach, Acrol and Mentzer, 1995) 
 
Operationalisation of Mutuality 
 
Ordinal variable Question 24: Operationalisation of social norms (Boyle et al, 1991; 
Gundlach and Achrol, 1993; Gundlach, Achrol abd Mentzer, 1995; Heide and John, 
1992; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Kaufmannn and Stern, 1988, 1992; Macneil, 1980; 
Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990). Relationship is based on mutual benefit and trust 
 
Operationalisation of Flexibility 
 
Ordinal variable Question 24: Mollering (2003) operationalised flexibility in term of 
attitude towards exceptions made in the governance of inter-organizational relationships. 
Also used FLEX a= .73  (Heide, 1994; Kaufmann and Stern, 1988): 
 
Operationalisation of Solidarity, Role Integrity, and Harmonization of Conflict 
 
Ordinal variable Question 24: We used a six-item measure for these relational norms 
(Boyle et al, 1991; Dong-Jin, 1997; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). Operationalisation of 
social norms (Boyle et al, 1991; Gundlach and Achrol, 1993; Gundlach, Achrol abd 
Mentzer, 1995; Heide and John, 1992; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Kaufmannn and Stern, 
1988, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990)  
 
Ordinal variable Question 24: Conflict was measured (Kauser and Shaw 2004 Anderson 
and Narus 1990, Kogut 1988, Mohr and Spekman, 1994) on a 5 point scale using 12 
items a=72. At Dong-Jin’s study all factor loadings were significant (p<0.01) with a 
mean completely standardized factor loading of 0.82. 
 
Operationalisation of Power 
 
Ordinal variables Questions 25 and 26: Restraint of power: reputational (stability, 
security, solidarity, belongingness), expertise (competitive gains, market positioning, 
effects of innovations, and customer satisfaction are constantly monitored and 
communicated to the franchisees) and referent power. Reputational power enhances 
referent power according to a research conducted by (Boje and Whetten, 1981). 
Reputational power was measured by joint program networks, joint advisory councils, 
formal and informal communications (Boje and Whetten, 1981). Referral power was 
measured in terms of referral sent and referral received (Boje and Whetten, 1981). 
Brockner et al (1997) and Brockner et al (1995) 5 point likert type scale  a=.87: 
 
Operationalisation of Performance 
 
Ordinal variables Question 12: We used the same motive as in the formation 
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measurement to measure performance; in terms of meeting expected goals of partners.  
 
Ratios Questions 14-19: For objective measurement we took 6 years period and checked 
the following: (Moorman and Miner, 1997 and Hewett and Bearden, 2001, Kauser and 
Shaw, 2004, 5 likert-type scale1= to a very little extent 5= to a very great extenent, 
a=.90), sales, return on assets, profit margin, return on investment, market share.  
 
Ordinal variable Question 13: We also assessed overall relationship satisfaction: (1=my 
firm has not achieved this objective, 5=my firm has definitely achieved this objective, 
Whipple and Gentry, 2000) For satisfaction used (5 point scale Mollering, 2003), also (5 
point scale, Dong-Jin, 1997, Kauser and Shaw, 2004) 
 
Categorical/nominal and ordinal variables Question 27-Questions 36 raising demographic 
data: Control variables have been used which are known to affect the alliance activity of 
firms, but are not included in the discussion of the hypothesis. These include 
organizational characteristics and personality profile. (Gulati, 1995b). There are some 
questions that are important to be made in order to analyse the sample into subgroups and 
eliminate the impact of sectors to the findings. Like the position that one holds in a 
company, how many years they have in business (Dong-Jin, 1997), sex, age, the sector in 
which the company is active, the country of origin of the network and the country in 
which it operates. We used dummy variables like organizational rank  (see Appendix A) 
 
4.4.2. Constructing the Questionnaire 
 
The next issues according to the ‘tailored method’ (1978, 2007) that we considered in 
constructing our questionnaire were: 
 
The question wording; we phrased our questions so as to be uniformly understood; not 
vague; to avoid bias; to avoid hypothetical questions; double questions or too demanding 
questions (Rotter, 1967). We used Instructions and labels in different colours. With 
reference to translation we produced the same questionnaire in Greek. As Dillman (1978) 
points out the overall effect of the questionnaire is very important because it boosts the 
motivation of the respondents. Using the survey monkey platform helped us create a 
respondent-friendly questionnaires (Dillman, 2007; Robson, 2002), easy to fill out, with 
simplicity of design and structured in a way to maximise cooperation. It is also suggested 
to use coloured pages, different colour for instructions. Front page had only the letters of 
support from high accredited organizations and ministries and a graphic illustration of our 
conceptual model. First questions were easy to answer; we also put the most important 
and useful first. We put the more difficult questions in the middle. We also group 
questions that are similar in content together. Then we group them according to answer 
formats, we also create a sense of logical flow and continuity to the questionnaire. 
Demographic questions were placed at the end. We included transitions to next sections.  
 
The issue of providing ‘Social Exchange’ through rewards, to avoid costs for respondents 
and building trust were also considered. We provided intangible rewards by expressing to 
them their significance to the research being part of a carefully selected sample; by using 
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personalization techniques aalowed through the online platform; we expressed verbatim 
appreciation and asked for their opoinion; stressed studies social usefulness; finally 
tangible rewards were offered by offering them the opportunity to chose to receive results 
and individual consultation. In building trust we provided letters of appeal to participate 
to the study from the the British Franchise Association and the Greek Franchise 
Association, and the Greek Ministry of Labour.  
 
Pre-testing 
 
We conducted a pre-testing to seven academics from different fields including 
psychology, politics, economics, engineering and organizational science. Some very 
important points were made which were all incorporated, like the introduction of several 
control variables and the use of two critical incident open ended questions that would 
allow the sharing of former experiences and challenges encountered by participants. As 
already said open ended questions were rarely answered but this limitation was addressed 
through our face-to-face qualitative research.   
 
We also performed one cognitive interviewing to a unit drawn from our sample in Greece 
and one pilot testing through e-mail to a Social Franchise in the UK; the latter drawn 
from our case study sampling frame. The cognitive interviewing was performed face-to-
face, we asked from the participant to read out loud the questions and share with us any 
thoughts and feelings he had. It was a very value adding process; it allowed us to test the 
phrasing of questions, understanding of meaning, clarity of instructions. Several issues 
were identified and changes were made.  
 
Important elements that affect respondent bias emerged: 
 
“the ‘strongly agree’ response choices makes me wonder whether to reply based on what 
is actually happening or on what I actually believe should happen; ‘strongly agree’ relies 
to my beliefs” (Owner of Loumidis Franchise System) 
 
He also argued that if it was anonymous it would be easier to him to reply truthfully. He 
also stated that when his truthful choice is ‘no’ he selects ‘indifferent’; when something 
hasn’t happened he chooses ‘don’t know’. A second important contribution in terms of 
administrative plan came from a UK system that prompted us use an online platform like 
survey monkey as the use of excels through emails made it very hard to perform the task 
of completing the questionnaire.  
 
Finally our administrative plan was based on the steps of the tailored method, like the 
pre-notice email one week before the first invitation to the study, three weeks after the 
first invitation the second one is sent and seven weeks after the third follow up. Before 
sending the pre-notice letter we has the chance to meet most of our Greek sample units 
face-to-face at their associations board meeting and at the international franchise fair. 
Follow up calls as suggested by research would have increased significantly our return 
rate. Unfortunately due to the time consuming process of the qualitative study’s 
interviewing and its focus as being the primary research method we didn’t have time to 
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do follow up calls; bearing in mind that this was also a pilot study.  
 
4.4.3. Quantitative Sampling Design 
 
In selecting a representative sample for our pilot quantitative study the actions employed 
were to define our target population which were the franchise systems active in the UK 
and Greece. Our sampling frame was drawn from the members of the national franchise 
associations both in the UK and Greece; in Greece we also included the franchise systems 
that participated in two consecutively years at the international franchise; similar 
directories were used by prior research in the franchising field (Dong-Jin, 1997; Hackett, 
1976; Huszagh et al, 1992; Martin, 1988; Walker and Cross, 1989; Walker and Etzel, 
1973).  
 
On the 29th of February 2011 the list of participants at the international franchise fair in 
Athens included 142 companies of which 27 were not yet developed at the Greek market; 
so 115 fully operational franchise networks at the Greek market and 18 fully operational 
franchise networks at the UK market. The list of members to the Greek Franchise 
Association included 51 fully operational franchise networks at the Greek market. 
Among these 51 networks 22 took part in the international franchise exhibition. So in 
aggregation we had a sampling frame of 144 Greek franchise systems. From the list of 
members at the British Franchise Association we had another 97 full members.  
 
We targeted all units of our sampling frames. From each organization we targeted 
through the purposive/judgmental technique of the key informant the owners of the 
companies or if this was not possible the CEOs. We made a list with their personal data 
and emailed them directly. The online platform allowed us to restrict replies from other 
email addresses so we decreased respondent bias by having others in ranking answering 
our questionnaire.  
 
Another issue in business surveys is going through gatekeepers, the existence of survey 
policies, and reaching the right respondent (Dillman, 2007). We faced this challenge in 
all studies. In the case of the online survey we secured Letters of Reference and Support 
from the British Franchise Association, the Greek Franchise Association and the Greek 
Ministry of Labour which urged their members to participate in the study (see Appendix 
A). We also followed the ‘tailored design’ by first addressing an invitation to participate 
to the study (see Appendix B), when this was not successful we established connection 
through the phone. In the Greek sample we joined the board meetings of the Greek 
Franchise Association and visited the international franchise fairs to establish face-to-face 
connections with the owners of the franchise companies and described to them the 
purpose of the research.  
 
Issues with non-probability sampling are that: findings can only be generalized to the 
population from which the sample was taken, findings may be specific to the 
characteristics of the population, findings may be locality specific, and findings may be 
temporally specific. The sources of errors in survey techniques are: sampling error, 
sampling-related error, data collection error, and data processing error. There is also the 
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sampling frame error, the random sampling error and the non-response error. All these 
have been addressed at the previous section on errors and constraints.  
 
 
4.4.4. Quantitative Data Analysis Techniques 
 
Our study includes binary variables, categorical or else called nominal and multi-item 
ordinal variables of five point Likert scales which we analysed through SPSS.  
 
We tested our scales to see which were significant and could be used in future research. 
Having too many variables we eliminated non significant items from scales. In line with 
previous research we had to eliminate the least significant ones (Boje and Whetten, 
1981). We then performed factor analysis. And the regression analysis was used to test 
our hypothesised correlations among variables. Dealing with ordinal variables correlation 
based on Pearsons r is not appropriate since it treats them as interval variables and can 
end up in wrong correlation findings. So chi square is the appropriate method to deal with 
ordinal variables.  
 
We performed univariate descriptive statistical analysis on data; represented through 
frequency tables, diagrams, measures of central tendency, arithmetic mean to show the 
average distribution, median and the mode, which is the value that occurs most 
frequently. The bivariate factor analysis can be done by the use of many techniques and it 
depends on the nature of the two variables being analysed, e.g. two ordinal measures can 
be analysed Pearsons r; in the case of binary with interval variables we used t-student 
(Robson, 2002). We performed factor analysis to further investigate variables and scales 
significance before using them in regression analysis. In line with previous research: 
According to Stimpert and Duhaime (1997) theory-trimming techniques can be applied 
on  the theoretical model allowing it to be re-tested after removal of non-significant 
hypothesised relationships from the original model. Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001) used 
initially exploratory factor analysis to establish the principal constructs and then used 
confirmatory factor analysis to establish convergent and discriminant validity. Dong-Jin 
(1997) in analysing relational norms in international strategic alliance formation used 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
There are two methods to apply multivariate techniques, the first expresses a set of 
variables as being related to other variables, the first are the dependent and the second are 
the independent variables, like multiple linear regression, multivariate analysis of 
variance and covariance, multiple discriminant analysis, automatic interaction detection 
and conjoint analysis. The second method is to analyse them all as equal without the 
existence of dependent variables, like principal component analysis, cluster analysis, 
multidimensional scaling and correspondence analysis. Since our variables were interval 
variables we applied regression analysis. In the case were the independent variables were 
binary and the dependent interval we applied t-student to investigate causal linkages and 
the significance of such causal linkages.  
 
Mavondo and Rodrigo’s (2001) findings support the use of path analysis as opposed to 
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multiple regressions, because of conclusions that could not have been picked up in 
multiple regression technique. Path analysis allows for the examination of dynamic 
relationships among dimensions and their complex impact on the issues that are being 
analysed. The limitations of the use of path analysis are that it assumes that variables are 
measured with perfect accuracy, even if the reliability of constructs based on Cronbach 
alphas are bigger than 0.7 suggesting equivalence of samples it does not mean that 
subsamples are identical as there are differences in means and regression weights 
(Mavondo and Rodrigo, 2001). 
 
4.4.4.1. Scale Reliability and Validation 
 
Another important issue is whether we can trust the quality of the data we have collected. 
There may be deficiencies of the existing or collected data that we must anticipate. 
Otherwise we may conclude wrong results or generalize interpretations that are of a 
specific range.  
 
As cited in Saunders et al (2009) this means that attention has to be made to two 
particular emphases on research design: reliability and validity. Reliability is about 
whether the results would be the same in another occasion, whether the observations 
would be the same by other observers and whether there is transparency in how sense 
was made from the raw data. There are four threats to reliability: subject or participant 
error, subject or participant bias, observer error, and observer bias. 
 
While validity is concerned with whether the findings are really about what they appear 
to be about; whether an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. The threats 
to validity are: history, testing, instrumentation, mortality, maturation, and ambiguity 
about causal direction. How to offer validity to qualitative research using a seven-criteria 
model found in Curran and Blackburn (2001): statement of the problem, key problems 
and assumptions, methodological adequacy, analytical adequacy, interpretation clearly 
situated, the claims are universal or of a specific range, implications for policy and 
practice, finally respondent validation.  
 
Other issues that would harm the credibility of our findings are the issue of 
generalisability and the assumptions made. Generalisability has to do with the probability 
that patterns observed is a sample will also be present in the wider population from which 
the sample is drawn; in qualitative research it has to do with the likelihood that ideas and 
theories generated in one setting will also apply in other settings. 
 
4.4.4.2. Control Variables 
 
We used a number of control variables that are related to the organization years, region 
and sector, as well as a number of control variables that are related to the respondents 
demographical and background information ( Boje and Whetten, 1981) on an 
intercountry comparison on networks in Australia and Japan they conducted two tests to 
determine whether country characteristics contaminate their analysis. First they used 
dummy variables for each country, which were added to the regression equations. In their 
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study betas were not significant and the addition of the dummy variables added only 2% 
to the R
2
. They also controlled various indicators such as poverty, economic activity and 
network size and they were all found to be insignificant. 
 
 
Also control variables have been used which are known to affect the alliance activity of 
firms, but are not included in the discussion of the hypothesis. These include sector, 
industry trends, and firm-level attributes (Gulati 1995b). 
 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have presented our empirical approach by referring to our 
epistemological approach and attempting a debate between the different schools of 
thought, we have provided an extended argumentation on the choice of our specific 
research design and have attempted to control any errors and problems that could arise. 
We have explained our mixed method approach, our research techniques, sampling 
design, the way we conducted our research and our data analysis techniques of both our 
qualitative and quantitative studies. We have presented the construction of our 
questionnaire through the operationalisation of our constructs, which has been done in 
most cases via multi-items 5 point Likert-type scales. The operationalisation has been 
based on existing items from the literature, some have been directly applied and others 
have been slightly adapted to match our samples characteristics. We have also presented 
the administration of our questionnaire, our sampling design and finally our data analysis 
methodology. 
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5. Qualitative Data Analysis  
5.1. Introduction 
 
At this section we present the analysis and discussion of the primary and secondary data 
of our qualitative research. We collected data through a mixed methods approach at 
several stages that lasted thirty months covering the period from January 2011 to March 
2013, these were: initially we started collecting primary data in January 2011 through in 
depth interviews with social entrepreneurs in Greece and in the UK; we totally 
interviewed 123 social entrepreneurs and social franchisors. Parallel to that we got the 
green light to meet with the first social franchisor in March 2011 at Green Works 
premises; we performed altogether six case studies of social franchises in the UK. 
Secondary data through governmental evaluation reports in the UK and Scotland were 
collected, analysed and incorporated; at the same time we conducted in depth interviews 
with altogether 20 policy makers and social economy sectoral experts that played the role 
of investigators in the triangulation of our findings; parallel to that and up to date we 
conduct archival analysis of secondary data from various sources including Europa, UK 
and Greek governments, organizations, and local authorities; the next decisive stage in 
our study which happened a year after we started our empirical study in September 2012 
was to enter in an action research project with the local authorities of the City of Athens. 
The researcher assumed the role of the Project Manager of ‘Athens Social Economy 
Initiative’ and in line with action research protocol they engaged in solving the identified 
issue; the identified need of the client was to trigger the creation of the social enterprises 
sector in Athens. The action research project opened up many opportunities in collecting 
more data so more in depth interviews were conducted and more secondary data were 
available supplying more data to the previous ongoing stages. It also provided the means 
to perform the following action research projects: a 30 hours’ workshop with 30 
prospective social entrepreneurs and social franchisors in Greece in addressing the issue 
of helping them set up their own social enterprises and social franchises; a three days 
workshop with 7 CEOs of best European practices of social entrepreneurship centers and 
hubs (some of them participate in the GECES experts group of the EC), 2 policy advisors 
experts from the EC, 2 experts members of the Social Business Initiative of the EC,  and 
14 representative from Greek formal institutions;  
 
In analysing formation, partner selection, governance and performance of social 
franchises and social enterprises our data were grouped around four systems: the 
individual context, the organizational context, the political and the social context. In 
those spheres subcategories emerged through various coding stages as explained in the 
preceding chapter. We hereunder present the results of these coding techniques and the 
themes that arose. From this analytic induction process the propositions of our research 
emerged which are also depicted in our conceptual framework SoFraM. 
 
5.2. Definition and characteristics of Social Franchising 
 
One of the results of our empirical research is the definition and the characteristics of 
Social Franchising.  
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“Social franchising is an inter-organizational format essentially consisting of a 
business, often a social enterprise, (the franchisor) with a standardised model with 
primarily social objectives that are delivered through the offering of a product or service, 
or through the organization or production processes that serve the community’s social, 
societal or environmental interests whose surpluses are primarily reinvested for these 
purposes, that is entering in a continuing contractual relationship with the franchisees, 
independently owned and managed often already established third sector organizations or 
enterprises formed by disadvantaged groups, operating under the franchisor’s trade-name 
to offer the social concept by producing and/or marketing goods or services according to 
a format specified by the franchisor and to provide specific social outcomes. The ‘social 
concept’ must demonstrate some sort of socialite innovation and a market orientation 
irrespectively of the partners’ legal forms (private company or charity) and resource 
strategies (being not for profit or for profit)”. (This definition is the original work of the 
writer of this thesis) 
 
Hereunder we offer a typology of types of social franchising: 
 
a) Conventional Social Franchising. In UK and Europe social franchising is used 
to describe the replication of a social enterprise, charity or project through some 
form of franchise agreement including those that do not make a profit. A 
successful social purpose organisation that enables at least one independent 
franchisee to deliver their proven model under license. 
 
“… Which is (social franchising) a franchising system that uses commercial 
franchising principles to attain social goals” (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a:214) 
 “A successful social purpose organisation that enables at least one independent 
franchisee to deliver their proven model under license” (Richardson and Berelowitz, 
2012:6) 
“Social franchising: Social enterprise enters into a contractual relationship with 
other entities operating under or using the social enterprise’s trade name and model” 
(Richie et al, 2011:5) 
“Franchising creates an obligation to perform on both sides – the franchisee has 
an obligation to deliver the defined social enterprise model to agreed-upon standards of 
quality, and the franchisor has an obligation to provide support and maintain quality 
across the network of franchises” (UnLtd in Richie et al, 2011) 
 
According to the European Social Franchise Network: 
“To be considered a social franchise it must meet the following six criteria: 1) an 
independent organization that replicates a social enterprise business model, the social 
franchisor; 2) at least one independent social franchisee that has been replicated by the 
social franchisor; 3) a common brand under which the social franchisees operate; 4)an 
interchange of knowledge between members; 5)an agreement that regulates rights and 
obligations and secure the sustainability of the franchise as a system; 6)both the social 
franchisor and the social franchisee must be social enterprises sharing the same values” 
(ESFN, 2011:5) 
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b) Income Generation Social Franchising: the franchisees can either be social 
enterprises and non for profits that are looking for a revenue stream and so they 
become members of a mainstream franchise to generate an income-based strategy. 
In the US it is often seen where charities take on a mainstream franchise as a fund 
raising strategy with preferential contracts. (Higgins et al, 2008; Richardson and 
Berelowitz, 2012; Richie et al, 2011; Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a). In 
2006 in the US there were more than 100 such cases, the most popular example is 
Ben and Jerry’s through its PartnerShop programme it sets up social enterprises 
and has a policy for employing disadvantaged youth (aged 16-26) (Higgins et al, 
2008). 
 
c) Socialised Conversion Franchising: the franchisor could be a mainstream 
business format franchise that converts to deliver social objectives or establishes a 
second brand 
 
d) Corporate Socially Responsible Franchising: mainstream companies that want 
to integrate a socially responsible and sustainable business agenda and so they 
become members of a social franchise to meet social objectives or create their 
own social franchising model 
 
e) Microfranchising mostly in developing countries where disadvantaged groups, 
are supported in starting up a franchised business to generate living/survival 
income. In the UK such a scheme is currently run by Franchise Works which 
provides support to unemployed people to start-up a franchised business 
(programme funded by Big Society Capital) 
 
f) Microfranchising Public Private Partnerships: the franchisors are state owned 
companies and the wider public sector who provide (or spin out) social franchises 
to local actors in order to reduce public deficits, to reach the whole country, to 
increase innovation, to provide income to disadvantaged groups. Seen often in 
developing countries to help for the provision of public services to the whole 
country, like in the education sector, postal services and health care (Bishai et al, 
2008; Leite and Carvalho, 1998; Prata, Montagu and Jefferys, 2005; Sivakumar 
and Schoormans, 2011a). 
 
g) Community Franchising especially among church communities but is not a 
sustainable financially model and the franchisees need to provide ongoing 
funding. 
 
h) Open Source Franchising or Dissemination Franchising: the franchisors are 
social enterprises, voluntary organizations, community organizations and 
companies who create an open network with their franchisees (being individuals 
or organizations or communities) especially through technology and social media 
and share their business model and know-how without a fee. Training, 
standardization of a package and communication are part of such a system. Also a 
written contract may exist between the franchisor and the franchisees. Within 
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such a platform the whole network could be seen to exchange freely its resources 
with the rest of the network with the goal of accomplishing a common social 
mission.  
 
In the UK it is mostly an alliance among non for profit organizations and social 
enterprises, where the franchisor is a social enterprise and the franchisees are usually 
already established non for profit organizations. Social franchises generate surpluses 
though the focus is on achieving social aims (Sivakoumar and Schoormans, 2011a). The 
social franchisor specifies the social outcomes and by incorporating small social or 
private providers into its network it provides them with the capacity to attract physical 
capital and supply chains, with networking opportunities, training, quality supervision, 
marketing and promotion (Bishai et al, 2008). Such social outcomes could be: work 
integration for vulnerable groups, to encourage local development, recycling and 
environmental activities, provision of social and personal services, health care, care for 
elderly and children, ethical finance, fair trade, consumer rights, cultural creation, 
education, training and research, and international development (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2010a; Papaoioanou et al, 2009).  
 
There are also other approaches to what social franchising maybe which evade from the 
standardised business concept of franchising. To quote from Philip Radley-Smith the 
Trustee of Tasha a UK social enterprise, he said that “Social franchising are the channels 
that allow people who feel that they want to give something back free to the society, 
through the use on new technologies and social media, where there is collective 
ownership of what you offer, where people share information/services/products... people 
feel part of something it becomes part of their identity”. We called this dissemination or 
open source franchising; dissemination as we saw above is a common scaling strategy for 
social enterprises. 
 
Social franchises are characterised by a duality of objectives pursuing at the same time 
both commercial and social objectives which are both situated at the core of their 
business activities (Bishai et al, 2008; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). The social franchisor can 
use donations, subsidies or grants to meet the social objectives that often are passed on to 
its franchisees (Bishai et al, 2008); while revenue can also be raised from customers. 
Social franchises could span from not for profits to for profits, as is the case for social 
enterprises (Defourny and Nyssens, 2006b).  
 
Microfranchising model of social franchising has been successfully used in the 
developing countries as a growth strategy of state-owned companies through a creative 
format of public private partnerships. Social franchising in health care is an effective 
strategy to increase health provision to developing countries, it has been a practice for the 
last 15 years, evidence from research suggests that it is viable and beneficial to those 
living under poverty, it provides employment, it helps standardize services offered from a 
diverse group of providers, it increases quality, it lowers the cost and increases access, it 
resolves market failures that have lead to health inequalities and overcome public budget 
constraints  (Prata, Montagu and Jefferys, 2005). Some research indicates that it achieves 
higher quality of services and increased access to the public; successful examples have 
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been the educational sector and the postal services in Brazil (Leite and Carvalho, 1998), 
as well as health care services in Pakistan, India and Nepal (Bishai et al, 2008). Other 
research suggests that there are limitations to these advantages (Shah, Wang, and Bishai, 
2011; Stephenson et al, 2004).  
 
Table 6 Definitions and Characteristics of Social Franchising 
(Source: Zafeiropoulou and Koufopoulos, 2013; 2012; Zafeiropoulou and Woods, 2012) 
 
Social franchising is an inter-organizational format essentially consisting of a business, 
often a social enterprise, (the social franchisor) with a standardised model with primarily 
social objectives delivered through the offering of a product or service or through the 
organization or production method that serve the community’s social, societal or 
environmental interests whose surpluses are primarily reinvested for these purposes, that 
is entering in a continuing contractual relationship with the social franchisees, 
independently owned and managed often already established third sector organizations 
or enterprises formed by disadvantaged groups, operating under the franchisor’s trade-
name to offer the ‘social concept’ by producing and/or marketing goods or services 
according to a format specified by the franchisor and to provide specific social 
outcomes. The ‘social concept’ must demonstrate some sort of socialite innovation and a 
market orientation irrespectively of the partners legal forms (private company or charity) 
and resource strategies (being not for profit or for profit) (This definition is the original 
work of the writer of this thesis) 
A successful social purpose organisation that enables at least one independent franchisee 
to deliver their proven model under license (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012:6) 
Income Generation Social Franchising: the franchisees can either be social enterprises 
and non for profits that are looking for a revenue stream and so they become members 
of a mainstream franchise to generate an income-based strategy. Usually offered a 
preferential contract 
Socialised Conversion Franchising: the franchisor could be a mainstream business 
format franchise that converts to deliver social objectives or establishes a second brand 
Corporate Socially Responsible Franchising: mainstream businesses (even big 
organizations and multinationals) that want to integrate a socially responsible and 
sustainable business agenda and so they become members of a social franchise to meet 
social objectives or create a social franchising model 
Microfranchising: the franchisees are people from disadvantaged or socially excluded 
groups that join franchise networks to generate a living/survival income, usually in 
developing countries 
Microfranchising Public Private Partnerships: the franchisors are state owned 
companies and the wider public sector who provide social franchises to local actors in 
order to reduce public deficits, to reach the whole country, to increase innovation, to 
provide income to disadvantaged groups.  
Community Franchising especially among church communities but is not a sustainable 
financially model and the franchisee need to provide ongoing funding. 
Open Source Franchising or Dissemination Franchising the franchisors are social 
enterprises, voluntary organizations, community organizations and companies who 
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create an open network with their franchisees (being individuals or organizations or 
communities) especially through technology and social media and share their business 
model and know-how without a fee. Training, standardization of a package and 
communication are part of such a system. Also a written contract may exist between the 
franchisor and the franchisees. Within such a platform the whole network could be seen 
to exchange freely its resources with the rest of the network with the goal of 
accomplishing a common social mission.  
A duality of objectives pursuing at the same time both commercial and social objectives 
which are both situated at the core of their business activities (Bishai et al, 2008; Tracey 
and Jarvis, 2007). The social franchisor can use donations, subsidies or grants to meet 
the social objectives that often are passed on to its franchisees (Bishai et al, 2008).  
A high degree of autonomy, although they may depend on public subsidies they should 
not be managed by public authorities; A significant level of economic risk which is 
assumed by social franchisors and franchisees; A minimum amount of paid work;  The 
social purpose of the franchised concept should meet the following four criteria: a) an 
explicit aim to benefit the community; b) a decision-making power not based on capital 
ownership, although the owners of capital are important when social franchises have 
equity capital, the decision-making rights are generally shared with the other 
stakeholders; c) a participatory nature, which involves various parties affected by the 
activity; d) a limited profit distribution, so social enterprises not only include 
organizations that are characterized by a total nondistribution constraint, but also 
organizations which, like co-operatives, may distribute profits, but only to a limited 
extent, thus allowing to avoid a profit-maximizing behaviour (Defourny, 2001: 16-18; 
Defourny and Nyssens, 2006b:5) 
 
 
It is important to distinguish among business format franchising and social franchising 
(see Table 11). Although there are some distinct differences to the two formats there are 
also some similarities, like the need for: a standardized business model with a social 
concept which must be described on an operational manual, a legal-binding franchise 
agreement, a franchisors brand name, training and support to the franchisee, a market 
tested concept that has a demand to be replicated elsewhere, a quality monitoring system, 
a franchisee fee structure where possible, an open communication system, exchange of 
information and a mutually shared culture. 
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Table 7 Differences among Business Format Franchising and Social Franchising 
 
Characteristics Actors: 
Frchsor/ 
Frchseees 
Business Format Franchising Social Franchising 
Entrepreneur Both Mainstream entrepreneurship, 
self-fulfillment, occupational 
independence, opportunities for 
creativity, survival motives, 
innovation and opportunity 
grasping 
Social entrepreneurship, 
institutional entrepreneurship; 
actors with distinctive profiles in 
having more altruistic motives, 
community oriented motivation, 
social responsibility,  collaborative 
leadership, networking skills, 
managing diverse constituents, 
fund raising skills, desire to bring 
transformational social change, 
desire to do something that matters 
Business Model Franchisor Raise and combine resources to 
meet organizational objectives 
primarily profit maximization 
Social innovation; raise and 
combine resources to achieve social 
impact through meeting societal, 
social and environmental objectives 
through a sustainable business 
model; employing or satisfying 
needs of excluded/disadvantaged 
groups; capacity building of  
excluded groups, dissemination of 
packages, local movements; 
meeting unmet social needs; 
mobilization of resources through 
non financial means; highly 
dependent on voluntary resources 
especially during start-up; 
mobilizing alliances and networks; 
leveraging financial resources 
through alternative means; 
evaluating performance of social 
impact 
Inter-linkages with 
political and social 
environment  
Both Inter-related with their political 
and social environment; 
Influenced by formal 
institutions and social norms; 
mostly influenced by the 
economic environment and 
market conditions 
Highly dependent on their political 
and social environment; address 
market failures; operate under 
market failure conditions so should 
leverage costs incurred in achieving 
social impact through income 
generated from central authorities 
or other sources; highly dependent 
on institutions and at the same time 
targeting change of institutions; 
strongly influenced by formal 
institutions interventions; 
collaborating with central and local 
authorities; highly dependent on 
social settings of relationships 
mobilizing and forming networks 
and alliances; highly dependent on 
social norms and informal 
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institutions; mobilizing resources 
(financial, physical, human, social 
capital) from various sources, like 
communities, churches, 
foundations, philanthropists, local 
authorities, governments, 
corporations, social investment 
market 
Characteristics Actors: 
Frchsor/ 
Frchseees 
Business Format Franchising Social Franchising 
Start-up cost of 
franchise network  
Franchisor Cost of standardization and 
manual creation, obtain staff 
for supporting the network, 
training of franchisees, 
logistics and quality controls 
All these plus more time and 
resources to support franchisees 
lack of organizational and social 
competences and lack of financial 
resources. May need to support 
financially franchisees 
Raise capital Franchisor Own capital, attract investors, 
use of loans, start up subsidies 
Own capital, donations, and 
subsidies. Very high difficulties to 
attract investors or bank loans due 
to various distortions and different 
countries legislation for non for 
profits; raising resources from 
social investment market (like 
micro-financing, community banks 
and social investment 
intermediaries), from supranational, 
central and local authorities, from 
foundations, philanthropists, 
international organizations, 
corporations, communities and 
individuals (like crowd funding 
platforms)  
Investment  Risk Both Both actors assume risk Social franchisees usually do not 
share investment risk (Sivakoumar 
and Schoormans, 2011a) 
Resource strategy  Both Sales of goods and services Sales of goods and services to 
customers. When goods/services 
offered to beneficiaries  need for 
donations, subsidies, grants and 
other social investment products 
Legal structure Both Private Corporations, 
Public Corporations,  
Sole Proprietorships, 
Partnerships,  
For Profit Businesses, Community 
Interest Companies, Social 
Enterprises, Cooperatives, Non for 
Profits:  Associations, Mutual 
Societies, Voluntary Organizations, 
Foundations 
Threshold corporate 
goals 
Both Produce a product/offer a 
service 
Social aims and objectives through 
production/operational models and 
through product/service offering  
Main functional goal Both Maximizations of profits Maximization of social impact 
while often pursuing an earned 
income approach 
Operations Both Rule based Value based 
Target Group Both Customers Beneficiaries, customers, and 
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funders/donors  (especially when 
ongoing financial contribution is 
needed) 
Characteristics Actors: 
Frchsor/ 
Frchseees 
Business Format Franchising Social Franchising 
Demand/ 
Competition 
Franchisor Price Mechanism/ Strength of 
brand name/ increased quality 
Inflexible higher prices due to lack 
of efficiency from achieving the 
social objective and sometimes- as 
stated by interviewees- worse 
quality due to employing 
disadvantaged unskilled personnel. 
So to compete conventional 
commercial businesses has to raise 
social awareness of customers 
Strong fund raising capabilities to 
compete on donors and social 
investors 
Financial obligations 
between parties 
Both Franchisees pay royalties, entry 
fees, purchase products 
Franchisees may not be able to pay 
any fees on the contrary the 
franchisor may use subsidies and 
donations to financially support 
franchisees in meeting social 
mission 
Motives for 
Formation 
Franchisor Financial, Technological, 
Managerial,  Strategic,  
Primarily: Social, like increase 
number of beneficiaries  
Increase social results 
Increase quality of product/service  
Secondarily: Strategic, 
Technological, Managerial, 
Financial 
 
Criteria for Partner 
Selection 
Franchisor Find appropriate individuals 
that can replicate the business 
model and meet the financial 
objectives 
Franchisees often are established 
third sector organizations or people 
from disadvantaged groups 
Difficulty in finding appropriate 
franchisees committed to the cause 
to offer social value 
Difficulty in training non for profits 
franchisees to meet commercial 
objectives 
Difficulty to train for profits 
franchisees the function of 
fundraising and delivering social 
objectives 
Difficulty with third sector 
organizations to manage 
established culture and practices 
Incentive structure 
and alignment of 
objectives 
Both Alignment around financial 
incentives and objectives 
A double or triple bottom line. 
Need of relational and structural 
embeddedness that keeps the 
network together. 
Governance 
Structure 
Franchisor Hierarchies, legal agreement, 
contract mix and contract 
terms, mix of company owned 
Social contract (Sivakoumar and 
Schoormans, 2011a) 
Lack of financial incentives for 
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and franchised outlets,  franchisees and alignment of 
objectives with franchisees 
Reduced investment risk for 
franchisees 
Higher risk of moral hazards and 
less compliance, high opportunism 
risk from franchisees 
Need of social norms, of relational 
and structural embeddedness to 
govern the social franchise 
network: trust, commitment, 
restraint of power, harmonization 
of conflict, role integrity, 
flexibility, mutuality, and solidarity 
Characteristics Actors: 
Frchsor/ 
Frchseees 
Business Format Franchising Social Franchising 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Franchisor Direct and indirect 
performance indicators 
measuring mostly financial 
performance 
Measure both financial 
performance and social impact 
Difficulty in measuring social 
achievement of franchisees 
Difficulty in measuring end-user 
experience 
Ongoing improvement of the 
offered social results 
Difficulty in evaluating 
relationships of contracting actors 
 
The table is the original work of the authors of this research it is based on their 
knowledge that derived from the interviews and the secondary data gathered from the 
case companies, from the works of Bishai et al, 2008 and Tracey and Jarvis, 2007, as well 
as from their professional experience in dealing with social and business format 
franchises. 
 
Replication of social ventures should be differentiated from social franchising so the 
important elements are that: there is a binding legal contract, there is exchange of 
knowledge among franchisor and franchisees, a brand proposition delivered by at least 
one franchisee, and the franchisee is an independently managed enterprise from the 
franchisor. Social franchises are hybrid governance structures that incorporate elements 
of both markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1991); they are characterized by bilateral 
dependency of the partners (Glaister, 2004) and are mostly relationally embedded 
network organizations (Achrol, 1997; Granovetter, 1985; 2005; Hakansson and Ford, 
2002; Paswan, Loustau and Young, 2001; Stanworth and Curran, 1999; Thorelli, 1986; 
Uzzi, 1997). Social franchising ownership structures can vary from independent separate 
organizational forms to joint ventures and to quasi equity structures where the social 
franchisor takes an equity investment on the social franchisee, like the case of CASA in 
the UK which takes a 26% minority equity stake on each social franchisee. Also 
governance structures can vary from charity-centred, like Foodbank, to network 
structures (or else called federal structures), like the Hub and Emmaus, and to 
hierarchical relationships. 
 
 209 
There are already some examples of social franchises that have grown internationally like 
Emmaus from France in the UK and School for Social Entrepreneurs that has grown in 
Ireland and Australia.  Barriers to international expansion are the way social enterprises 
are constituted and managed, and legal barriers (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). Also 
barriers to social franchise formation are firstly, cultural barriers influencing motivation, 
the  drivers of social entrepreneurs are often to run their own ventures, secondly the 
suspicion of social entrepreneurs of anything that is commercial (Richie et al, 2011),  
 
“.... many players in the so called third sector see themselves as ‘social change 
agents’... they prefer to focus their energies on the development of new approaches. 
Imitating those of others is considered ‘not sexy’” (industry expert in Richie et al, 2011: 
7) 
 
“.... as if our legitimacy can only come from that which is brand new, as if each 
and every approach must be without precedent…that social enterprise can only succeed 
as a manifestation of a single heroic individual, able to discard and surmount all failure, 
all the discredited past” (social entrepreneur in Richie et al, 2011:7) 
 
Thirdly, barriers are resource constraints, fourthly ‘ignorance and ineptitude’ the ability 
to apply knowledge consistently and correctly (Berelowitz, 2012:42) 
 
According to European Social Franchise Network research on 20 social franchises in 
Europe (ESFN, 2011) the social franchise development process has three stages: stage 
one is ‘Forming’ this entails the set up of the social enterprise until it reaches viability 
which could take up to three years. The costs are on average €130,000; stage two is 
‘Development’ this stage includes the preparation of all the information that is needed 
like codifying all learning, preparing operational manuals, branding, legal documents, 
business plans, quality systems. Also the social franchisor is set up as a distinct entity 
from the social enterprise; the first social franchisee is recruited until it reaches viability. 
The second stage could take from 1-3 years and on average €150,000, the main source of 
funding was ESF through EQUAL which doesn’t exist. 43% of social franchisors offer 
loans to their social franchisees which is a low proportion compared to mainstream 
franchises And stage three is ‘Expansion’ all learning from the pilot has been internalised 
and codified, the model has now reached its final form and the social franchisor can have 
a rapid expansion. Dees et al (2004:30) identify the 5 Rs elements in deciding which 
scale strategy to select, these are: readiness (is the innovation ready to be spread, what are 
the core elements and key success factors of the innovation), receptivity (what strategy is 
needed for the innovation to be received by other communities depending on its 
complexity, the challenges it poses to existing norms, the existence of local demand), 
resources (the investment in resources needed by partners, resources availability of social 
entrepreneur, resource sources, affiliation fee structure), risks (to society and 
organization), and returns (evaluation measurement parameters of reaching more people, 
quality issues, financial sustainability) 
 
Evidence from Berelowitz (2012) report highlight that the four key elements in social 
franchising success are: firstly, start-up resource strategy charitable vs commercial: 
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whether the replicability of a model will be more viable if it is based on a grant-funded 
approach or on an enterprise approach or maybe a mixture of these; secondly, partner 
selection individual vs group: whether the replicability of the model is more sustainable if 
the social franchisees are individuals or groups; thirdly, business model funds inwards vs 
funds outwards: whether the business model should rely on cash inflows from social 
franchisees towards the franchisor in the form of entrance fees and royalties or the other 
way around with the franchisor supporting financially the franchisees to deliver the 
business model; fourthly, governance flexible vs control: whether the model can be 
sustainable and maintain high quality levels based on a tightly systematized processes or 
by allowing more freedom and building on social norms of governance and network 
structures. A key strength is the community engagement which could benefit mainstream 
franchises as well.   
 
Legal structure variety private ltd companies, societies, companies ltd by guarantee, 
registered charities, CICs 
 
Governance of the whole network: federation of mutually supportive franchisees, a 
central charity supporting a network of franchisees, arms length. The federation is when 
all franchisees are part of the wider franchise network and contribute cooperatively to the 
development of the network this is the case for Emmaus and The Hub. Central charity 
supports the network of social franchisees. The Food bank franchises are spin outs from 
the Trussell Trust the charity is in control of the network.  
 
Intellectual property issues due to ‘open source’ in the social sector. Due to informal 
learning and new projects will have different branding and adapt business model 
significantly so hard to establish ownership as a result of ‘open source replication’. 
Suggestion to operate open source way to members in the case when profit making is not 
the purpose of the franchise network. Another suggestion was for intellectual property 
intermediaries that could buy the IP of an enterprise and then use it to build a network 
(Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
Examples of social franchises in the UK and Europe are: SSE founded in 2002 has 12 
franchised units; Citizens Advice Bureau founded in 1939 has 394 franchised units Free, 
independent, confidential and impartial advice to everyone on their rights and 
responsibilities; Daily Bread coop founded in 1980 has two franchised units it employees 
people with learning disabilities; Emmaus founded in 1949 in France that has grown in 
the UK has 22 franchised units, communities running recycled units and providing home 
and occupation for homeless people; FoodBank founded in 2004 has 200 franchised units 
it tackles food poverty through distribution of food to charities and those in need. It grew 
from 55 to 200 over 18months; Care and Share Associates CASA found in 2004 delivers 
health and social care services; Pack-IT founded in 1988 has three franchised units, offers 
direct mail and third party logistics services employing people with disabilities. ‘Fruit to 
Suit’ founded in 2007 offering healthy snacks to primary school ‘tuck shops’ and 
management training to pupils so that they can run the tuck shops themselves; it charges 
£2.500 entry fees and 4% royalties and now also charges school enterprise training thus 
being able to have a grant-free growth. 
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In Europe Le Mat in Italy founded in 1995 has ten franchised units, hotels employing 
people with learning disabilities and mental health issues; Villa Wagen Ut! in the 
Netherlands founded in 2003 has 15 franchised units, a variety of social enterprises 
employing excluded groups; GDW SUD – Cap Supermarkets in Germany founded in 
1999 and has 82 franchised units, employing people with learning disabilities; 
KOMOSIE in Belgium founded in 1994 from a federation of second hand shops who 
didn’t know at that time that they were setting up a social franhcise, it has two franchise 
systems: De Kringwinkel, maybe the largest social franchise in Europe and the world, is a 
federations of 108 shops selling used goods and Energiesnoeiers(‘Energy cutters’) install 
energy saving equipment in home by employing disadvantaged groups has 33 franchises. 
JobAct founded in 2005 has 28 franchised units, offers training programmes to the long-
term unemployed; Barka in Poland founded in 1989 has entered the UK, the Netherlands 
and Ireland provides educational, training to excluded and disadvantaged groups 
especially housing for homeless people and Eastern European migrants, vocational 
schools for unemployed and development of social enterprises (Berelowitz, 2012; ESFN, 
2011; Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
Examples of successful social enterprises that have now created a scalable model that 
needs to be franchised ready and then can be scaled up: The Farm Shop which is a farm 
inside an empty building transformed into a farm that promotes local food growing, it 
produces vegetables, fruits, chicken and fish. The ‘Pie in the Sky’ vegetarian restaurant 
run by Food Cycle volunteers using food that would be thrown away to provide cheap 
nutritious meal in the community. In South Africa a fish farm in a shipping container that 
has the potential to create livelihoods as well as protein for protein deficient 
communities. (Norton in Berelowitz, 2012) 
 
Examples of mainstream franchises in the UK that have strong social elements that could 
be part of Socialised Conversion Franchising or be Income Generating Franchising for 
charities are: Banana Moon Day Nursery, Computer Xplorers (ICT training to children 
aged 3-13), Dig It (outdoor ‘play and learning’), Energy and Carbon management (energy 
broking and consulting business), Green Assess (providing energy performance 
certificates and renewable energy supplies), Green Care Solar franchise (distributing 
solar panels), Little Kickers Football Classes (ages 18 months to 7 years old), Playtime 
Nursery, Tumble Tots (physical play programme for children 6months-7 years old), and 
Witty Day Nursery. This could apply to many other franchises which provide 
employment like maintenance, cleaning repairing services that could easily be 
transformed into social franchises only by offering employment to people from 
disadvantaged groups. These could be potentially Microfranchising systems. (Richardson 
and Berelowitz, 2012) 
 
5.3. Τhe Case Companies Background 
 
A description of the case companies that were included in our qualitative analysis is: 
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Table 8 Qualitative Analysis Case Companies Background 
 
Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Action Aid NGO CEO Gerasimos Kouvaras, institutional 
change and poverty alleviation 
Dissemination free to beneficiaries revenue 
raised from international organization 
Aeiphoria NGO co-founded by Petros Kokkalis is a 
partnership among Organization Earth - ElCulture 
founded by Nikos Ververidis and K2 Foundation under 
establishment by Konstantinos Korletis; incubator on 
green entrepreneurship; supported by sister organizations: 
Kokkalis Foundation, Organization Earth and Athens 
Institute for Technology; established in Organization 
Earth; prototyping & experimentation of green start-ups 
service package to green start-ups capacity-
building, space, organizational development 
support, accelerator free to beneficiaries; 
PWC, Apostolou Law Office, Hellas On 
Line Telecommunications 
Alumni of Moraitis School Association founded by 
alumni society of Moraitis Private High School; raise 
funding through collaborative activities for charities, 
charitable activities, environmental protection, 
dissemination of arts and science, personal developments 
services through capacity-building programmes 
dissemination, service package customers 
pay, fund raising for charity donations 
Arktouros NGO co-founded by Boutaris, CEO Tina Dritsa 
animal protection of bears and grey wolves; 
environmental, research and educational objectives; 
supports local communities economic development 
environmental and animal protection no state 
grants funds raised from selling own label 
merchandise, entrance to the animal shelters, 
memberships, donations 
ARSIS NGO founded by Katerina Mpoutou; support 
youth and children mainly 15-21 years old against their 
social exclusion and to protect their rights; runs 4 
accommodation centers; capacity building for youth, for 
prisoners, for immigrants; collects and distributes food 
and clothing; dissemination and raising awareness; 
institutional political and cultural change; branches in 
Greece 
service packages; capacity building; 
accommodation; food and clothing; 
dissemination; revenues from state grants 
and programmes 
Atenistas informal community organization organizing 
activities to promote everyday life in Athens, raise 
awareness of historical sites, ameliorate parks and squares 
dissemination free activities based on 
volunteering work 
Athens Psychological Support/ OPANAD NGO  service package free to beneficiaries grants 
and donations 
Avalon Sole Proprietorship founders Kermitzoglou and 
son; ecommerce, eculture; organise festival on movies; do 
a documentary; cultural entrepreneurship 
service package customers pay (local 
authorities or end user) 
Bank of Memories co-founder Marina Sarlis, you put all 
your memories in a platform intrageneration 
communication 
dissemination open source no revenue stream 
BIC NGO member of the European Business Innovation 
Network affiliated to EC; is a regional institution 
service package and dissemination 
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Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Bike Kitchen voluntary organisation co founder Dimitris 
Kokkinakis, Sophie Labrou Bozo, incubated within the 
hub; Part of The Hub Bikekitchen; recycling & reuse of 
cycling part, repairing bikes, collective craftsmanship of 
creative reuse to produce furniture; enhancing movement 
of cycling, campaigns 
product package customers pay; 
dissemination of cyclist movement 
Biolea social enterprise for profit legal status family 
business successor Chloe Dimitriadis, founder father 
George Dimitriadis in Crete island; agriculture producton 
n distribution of biological olive oil 
agriculture; production, collection, 
processing n distribution of biological olive 
oil 
BIOS NGO & Company founder Vasilis Charalampidis; 
group of companies NGO and for profits bars and graphic 
design services 
service package; incubator in the sector of 
creative industry; dissemination 
Boroume NGO co-founded by Alexandros Theodoridis, 
Xenia Papastavrou & Alexia; bridge the gap between 
surpluses of food and deficits in charities and 
communities; regular meals to charities; poverty 
alleviation; food 
service package based on voluntary work 
and donations from corporations, Greeks 
from abroad, Niarxos Foundation, a Ship-
owner; possible income stream from 
designing CSR strategies for big 
corporations 
Brace Social Coop co-founder Maria Stamataki offering 
training n support to carers through Marte Meo 
international programme and financial training to children 
through Aflatoun 
Service package customers pay; for Aflatoun 
sponsorship needed 
Centre of Life NGO supporting the lives of HIV patients service package free paid by grants and 
programmes and donations 
Child it Sole Proprietorship founder Natali Sampas 
internet portal for parents on children activities, 
interactive element of parents exchanging things; 
information; directory; eco and bio products for children 
and babies 
dissemination open source portal  
Close the Loop Sole Proprietorship founder Panagiotis 
Panagiotakopoulos offers eco labeling accreditation 
service package customers pay 
Co-Lab partnership co-founded by Spyros Kapetanakis, 
co-working space mainly for technology professionals 
service package, space, customers pay 
Desmos NGO providing food to charities and 
organizations in need; bridging the gap between surpluses 
in organizations and deficits; food; poverty alleviation 
youth entrepreneurship  
service package free supported by members 
and corporation donations based on 
volunteering work 
Diaplous Social Cooperative Enterprise supporting people 
with mental health 
service package state grants and public 
procurements ministry of Health 
DIOTIMA NGO founded by 9 feminists, co-founded by 
Maria Liapi, equality of women; two branches one on 
dissemination of research on gender resource centre 
targets political and cultural transformation and one on 
capacity building and service provision for providing 
access of women to employment 
service package and dissemination, free to 
beneficiaries through state grants and 
programmes and donations 
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Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Edra NGO founded by Oikonomou, in Mental Health and 
Learning Disabilities; 2 rehabilitation houses, 2 sheltered 
apartments, centre for alternative; occupation, 11 children 
psycho pedagogical centers. Created Drasi Social 
Supermarkets now running city-farming and capacity 
building on farming, building processing infrastructure of 
agricultural products 
service package free to beneficiaries income 
raised through state grants and programmes, 
national insurance scheme 
Efzin Social Cooperative Enterprise supporting people 
with mental illness; mental health centers and catering 
services 
service package and product package; state 
grants and public procurement from Ministry 
of health minimum income raised through 
catering facilities 
Ekati Social Cooperative Enterprise co-founder Aris 
Stratakos & Giannis Sarros, agriculture, city-farming, 
green roofs, recycling of biomass, green management. In 
search of revenue streams and project implementation 
service package in search of revenue streams 
Elea Med Sole Proprietorship Anna Merti informal Social 
enterprise; production of biological soaps 
craftsmanship- production of eco soaps 
Equal Society NGO co-founder Spyros Frementitis; offer 
legal advice employment, insurance, education 
sponsorships; many branches already; possible revenue 
stream consulting  
service package free sponsors pay, leverage 
through state grants; dissemination 
Erumanthos NGO founder Vasilis Taktikos, social 
activism press, has create the P.E.S.K.O. NGO that it is a 
federation of Social Enterprise Partnerships (aka 
development partnerships or cooperatives), 
dissemination free press revenue from state 
grants 
ESA (European Sustainability Academy) in Crete founder 
Sharon Jackson CSR trainer in big schools and big 
organizations; ecological management training centre; 
dissemination of sustainable business management 
capacity-building programme; dissemination 
Every Saturday in Athens voluntary organization to 
ameliorate every day life, enhance good neighbouring, 
provide recreational and learning activities to local 
community 
dissemination and activities based on 
volunteering work 
Eurocharity Sole Proprietorship founder Peter Heilmann, 
directory of sustainable businesses and NGOs, donates 
grants to NGOs 
service package free directory raises 
revenues from memberships 
Fair Trade Hellas founder Marina Sarlis has two shops 
and an e-shop; Marina is in the BD of Concorde 
product package customers pay; supply chain 
for responsible producing 
Fair Solidary Greek Products early start up, co-founder 
Marina Sarlis; enhance craftsmanship of disadvantaged 
groups; forward supply chain; intermediaries fee 
capacity-building package in craftsmanship 
Fisika social enterprise for profit legal status women 
entrepreneurship co-founder Filio Sika in Crete island; 
producing soap n toiletries from biological olive oil 
through natural production processes 
Product; production unit of soap n toiletries 
from natural biological ingredients through 
natural processes 
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Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Future Leaders NGO co-founders big companies; 
provides free consulting n support services to NGOs while 
offering placement n training to student graduates 
building professional n soft skills 
Service package offered for free; ownfunded 
by equity members n membership fees big 
companies CSR 
Friday Tone Social Cooperative Enterprise early start up 
child company of Conte Media Group Ltd founded by 
Maria Kalafati; free members press and online news 
platform on social economy and economy and trade 
dissemination online platform and free press 
Generation Generous UK social enterprise founder 
Natasha Athanasiadou produces fashion bags from 
ecosustainable material (recycled plastic bottles) and 
provides support to NGOs 
Product; fashion garments 
Giardino Gardens Partnership founder Panagiotis 
Gkounidis offers gardening services protecting the 
environment through longetivity and naturalistic 
approaches 
product package customers pay 
Goulandri Museum NGO entering in partnerships with 
social cooperative enterprises to support their activities 
social alliances and partnerships 
Green-Project co-founders Giannis Tzortzis & Thodoris 
Anagnostopoulos spread renewable energy good practices 
through art; eco travelling, photography, documentary; 
affiliations with local small villages living under poverty 
dissemination renewable energy open source 
best world practices platform no fees- 
donations 
Hellenic Hope UK Charity co-founder Tina Mavraki, 
Giannos Livanos, Ino Vei; a UK based charity of Greek 
bankers helping children through donating to charities in 
Greece n fund raising from London; targeting change of 
charities practices; micro isntitutional change 
dissemination; reshaping OB of Greek 
charities and offering donations through 
funds raised in Europe 
Homeplay Sole Proprietorship founder Natali Sampas 
play therapy for children overcoming traumatic 
experiences and capacity-building ages 2-9 at home 
service package customers pay 
Human Grid child project of TEDX co-founders Stathis 
Haikalis Dimitris Kalavros open source mapping of all 
non profits and voluntary organizations in Greece that 
have a web presence to ensure transparency 
dissemination open source platform no fees 
I for U: Greek Mentoring Network founder Danai 
Bezantakou, enhance female entrepreneurship,  mentoring 
and networking services 
mentoring and networking services 
Includability Social Enterprise Network start-up founded 
by Vasilsi Kalyvas and Sakis Kostaris; providing access 
to employment of people with disabilities; making 
companies and spaces accessible to people with 
disabilities, dissemination of access of disabled people 
issue 
service package customer company pay 
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Resource Model 
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INE/GSEE NGO child company of GESEE that is the 
National Confederation of Greek Employees (third level 
members are federations of employees and unions); 
conducts research, capacity building and lifelong learning 
to employees and unemployed; state and European grants 
and programmes 
service package of education and capacity 
building; dissemination of research; free to 
beneficiaries, revenue streams from state and 
European grants and programmes 
IME/GSEVEE NGO child company of GESEVEE that is 
the National Confederation of Professional Craftsmen and 
Merchant of Greece; Ilias Georgopoulos Direct on 
Entrepreneurship, Petros Protopapadakis Official; 
conducts research, capacity building and lifelong learning 
to organizations and employers; state and european grants 
and programmes 
service package of education and capacity 
building; dissemination of research; free to 
beneficiaries, revenue streams from state and 
European grants and programmes 
KETHEA NGO supporting people with drug addiction; 
accommodation; employment; food 
service package free to beneficiaries, state 
grants and donations 
Klimaka NGO founder Kuriakos Katsadoros, Director 
Olga Theodorakopoulou; mental health centers, mobile 
mental health units, homeless centers, accommodation, 
catering, support, access to employment, open line against 
suicide; branches in Greece 
service package free to beneficiary, public 
procurement, grants, donation from 
corporations, small revenue stream from 
Klimax Plus 
Klimaka Plus Social Cooperative Enterprise the first 
founder Kuriakos Katsadoros; Director Akis Dimopoulos; 
processing and service activities for homeless and mental 
health patients; recycling unit, social restaurants, catering, 
furniture production  
product and service package customers pay, 
income based strategy to support Klimaka 
and provide employment to its beneficiaries 
KMOP NGO founded by Papadimitriou mental health 
centers; other services to unemployed 
service package based on grants and public 
procurement 
Little Giants Social Cooperative Enterprise founder Natali 
Sampas; art to children in disadvantaged groups providing 
employment to artists 
service package free; donations from 
corporations 
Living Wholeness Institute early start-up founder Maria 
Skordalios. Prior start-up Siz failed an in a year moved to 
Volos and established a second start-up. Offering training 
n support to cooperative  
Service package; customers pay n fund 
raising needed 
Loft to Work Limited by Guarantee founder Sofia Desiri, 
failed in 2013, was the first co-working space; active in 
Greece, Coordinator Konstantina Zoeherer; co-working 
space, research dissemination, bring community 
development and entrepreneurship cultural change 
service package customers pay, 
dissemination of research 
Logoupaignion informal organization co-founded by 
Elena Lambrou, youth entrepreneurship, organise 
activities in schools for creative learning 
service package students pay 
Mainalon Social Cooperative Enterprise founder Ioannis 
Lagos, renewable energy, pellet production Collects 
biomass for the production of pellet by cleaning and 
preserving the forest 
renewable energy production customers pay 
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Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Medecins Sans Frontieres Association BD President 
Chrisots Christou, branch of international MSF, medical 
humanitarian organization offering international aid acting 
on crisis situations 
service package of free medical aid funded 
by sponsors and grants; recently started 
income based strategies from co-selling of 
consumer products 
Medecins du Monde Non Profit Association BD President 
Anna Maili; independent structure from international 
MDM but affiliated; offers medical services and welfare 
services; 5 medical centers, accommodation to homeless 
and excluded and food catering to disadvantaged 
service package free to beneficiaries revenue 
stream mainly from donations of 
corporations and communities; no state 
grants 
Metavallon NGO founder Alexandra Choli, incubator, 
capacity-building, co-working space 
service package customer pay on incubation 
stage, donation form foundations and 
corporations 
Mikros Planitis Social Coop co-founder Galatia 
Papacharalambous offering experiential excursions to 
children n parents 
Service package customers pay 
Migdonia Social Coop co-founder Stella Goudinoglou 
Lagadas Thessaloniki; production of soaps n herbal oils 
women entrepreneruship offering labour to unemployed n 
songle mother women 
Production unit customers pay 
One child one world NGO co-founder Rozaliza 
Lycourezou, Helps children through supporting the 
families of immigrants and people living in poverty 
service package free donation from a 
German Foundation 
Organization Earth NGO co-founded by Petros Kokkalis, 
Christos Zouras & Sergios Fotiadis; Supported by 
Kokkalis Foundation; dissemination of environmental 
consciousness and sustainable development; a big 
prototyping park 'Centre Earth' with eco-farming, animals 
and experimentation practices where school visits and 
children interact; collective cooking and open dining; 
Develop a Green University on Technology & 
Agriculture; target cultural transformation and green 
economy 
dissemination entrance fee to the park, 
selling of own label merchandise; various 
social partnerships 
Panel Group founder former MP Elena Panariti on 
property rights in Peru n Latin America, now through 
Thought for action targeting structural and institutional 
change in Europe n Greece 
dissemination free (sponsorship) 
Plant-a-tree sole proprietorship founded by Giorgos 
Atsalakis; reforestation environmental protection 
service package addressed to corporations 
customers pay  
Praksis NGO spin off from Medesins Sans Frontiers in 
2004 co-founded by Tzanettos Antypas; offering 
humanitarian and medical support;  welfare services; 
enters in Social Enterprise Networks; medical centers, 
accommodation to ex-prisoners, offers legal services; 
children services; youth actions; branches in Greece 
service package free to beneficiaries revenue 
stream from state and European grants and 
donations 
Prodrasi Social Enterprise Partnership-TOPEKO, 
members Local Authority City of Athens-ADDMA, KEK 
Diastasi,  
service package, capacity-building 
programme for the creation of social 
enterprises, state grant 
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Social Enterprise Name, Interviewee, Business Model 
& Description 
Resource Model 
Prosvasis Social Enteprise Parthership- TOPEKO; 
members 2 NGOs (ELEPAP- POSGAMEA), Athens 
Chamber of Commerce, 1 private consulting company 
(Mentoring Ltd); managing a public grant/programme for 
creating social enterprises  
service package, capacity-building 
programme for the creation of social 
enterprises, state grant 
Quality Net NGO founder Chrysoula Exarchou, MD 
Ioannna Fratzeskaki; child company of for-profit 
consulting firm goal to become social mediator: identify 
needs, evaluating SE programmes, verifications, promote; 
Organize annual CSR awards, measure CSR, want o 
develop sustainability index 
dissemination free sponsorships from 
corporations; Bravo CSR Annual Awards 
Romanzo Bios social enterprise NGO is na incubator for 
Creative industry start-ups founder Vasilis Charalabidis 
owner of BIOS.  
Service package, space, incubator; fees of 
participants n public procurement calls n 
sponsorship from foundations n big 
companies 
Systemic Innovation Zone Siz-Hellas co-founded by 
Maria Skordaliou, Mary Tsimioula, Nikos Roubakis & 
Maria Bakakou; disseminate a new alternative economy 
system, incubator and capacity-building, networking 
activities through 'systemic innovation zone' tools; vision 
to set up a SE incubator community in Pilio 
service package of networking activities and 
capacity-building no income raised yet,  
SciCo NGO founder Thodoris Anagnostopoulos 
disseminate science through art and innovative funny 
schemes, theater, books, interactive learning, 
documentaries 
dissemination of science usually no fees 
from customers grants from foundations and 
corporations 
TEDX Athens NGO co-founder Stathis Haikalis, Dimitris 
Kalavros & Avraam Tsouvalidis; affiliated to 
international TEDX; targeting cultural change of 
entrepreneurship and behaviour of institutions 
dissemination; conference and activities 
promoting innovation through social media 
sources and live events 
Together for Children NGO child welfare, President 
Christos Bartsokas; is a partnership among 10 NGOs; 
voluntary based work 
charity donations and dissemination; 43% 
raised from charity events, 55% from 
donations of corporations and civil society, 
2% from memberships 
Traid Now Ltd incorporated in Cyprus co founder 
Marianthi Stavridou; barter economy using trade system 
from online platform; affiliation International Reciprocal 
Trade Association; institutional economic change 
service package online free trading platform 
of barter economy raises revenue from 
membership fees of big corporations 
Under Poverty is a Social Enterprise Network, co-
founders Maria Liapi from Diotima, Katerina Mpoutou 
from Arsis and Tzanettos Antypas from Praksis; a 
federation of NGOs on tackling poverty 
social enterprise network; dissemination of  
best practices 
Up Greek Tourism co-founder Stathis Haikalis Yorgos 
Kleivokiotis and Onic Palandjian founding team in NYU; 
voluntary organisation of Greeks around the world to 
promote Greek tourist sector and to change Greek 
reputation damage from crisis 
dissemination; advertising campaigns 
through crowd funding and social media 
platforms 
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& Description 
Resource Model 
Volunteers for Greece NGO co-founder Mirto 
Papathanou; a bridge between charities and volunteers 
through online platform; provides human capital 
dissemination free open source platform, 
voluntary activity 
Vytina Tomorrow Mutual Society  co-founder Takis 
Kapsalis, Sustainable Development of Vytina; follows 
community development approach; institutional change, 
community transformation and economic development 
dissemination open source no revenue 
stream, voluntary activity 
Women on Top Social Coop co-founder Stella Kasdagli; 
women entrepreneurship offering mentoring services to 
women  
Service package mentoring to women; 
customers pay 
Eloise Touni and Benzamin Gillstart-up of environmental 
friendly construction, sustainable buildings, green 
buildings 
pre-start up stage 
Eva Patapatiou open source platform for branding creation 
and new product development 
prototyping stage customer pay 
Dimitris Mpouroutzoglou cooperative of management 
consultants to enhance greek entrepreneurship free to 
organizations; teamed up with Andreas Galatis from the 
capacity building programme 
pre-start up stage 
Porifera Partnership co-founders Nomikos and Zoi Zervou 
supply chain for Greek products and local products of 
Limnos to international channels 
service package exporting of Greek products 
raising commission as intermediaries 
City Unity College Social Cooperative; support services 
to students; social youth tourism, educational grants, 
psychological support; career opportunities; 
accommodation; immigrants; research and dissemination; 
'do something that matters' movement 
service package and dissemination free to 
beneficiaries offered through City Unity 
College 
Alkisti Bourantinou recycling of glass; failure attempt to 
collaborate with Klimax Plus and Giardino Gardens 
pre-start up stage 
Big Issue in the North; parent company Big Life Group 
founded by Fay Salivan. Big Life Group is a holding 
company that owns five social enterprises: Big Life 
Company, Big Issue in the North, Aisha Childcare, Big 
Life Employment, Open Door and three charities: Self 
Help Service, Big Life Centers and Big Issue North Trust. 
product package customers pay 
FareShare, charity supporting communities to relieve food 
poverty by tackling both food poverty and food waste; 
Founded in 2004 has 17 franchisees.  
product package for free; donations from 
communities and voluntary work 
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& Description 
Resource Model 
Green Works, award winning charity with the aim of 
turning redundant office furniture into an asset and a 
resource; it aims in reducing, reusing, remanufacturing, 
and recycling furniture to divert it away from landfill. 
Founded in 2002 by Colin Crooks; In Sept 2011 it merged 
with London Reuse Network; it now has 21 franchises  
product package customers pay 
The School for Social Entrepreneurs (SSE), founded in 
1997 by Michael Young in London, first franchised in 
2002, has 10 social franchisees in the UK and 2 in 
Australia, it provides a yearlong Action Learning 
programme to social entrepreneurs who are working on a 
live social project  
capacity building programme customers pay 
n sponsors 
FoodBank founded in 2004 by Trussel Trust has 400 
franchised units it tackles food poverty through 
distribution of food to charities and those in need.  
product package for free; donations from 
communities and voluntary work 
The Hub was first set up in the UK and then the 
governance and ownership was given to the whole 
community of the Hub franchisees, there are 54 social 
franchise Hubs in the whole world in all continents; it 
offers capacity-building programmes to sustainable 
entrepreneurship 
service package customers pay 
The Hub, Athens Ltd  co-founders Dimitri Kokkinakis & 
Sophie Labrou; Franchisee of the The Hub, a start-up 
laboratory (incubator) for sustainable entrepreneurship 
provides space, programming, global networking & 
investment; creative consultancy art of hosting and design 
thinking methodologies; entrepreneurship cultural change 
service package customers pay, capacity-
building programmes to sustainable 
entrepreneurship 
In school canteens Sole Proprietorship founded by Maria 
Seitopoulou wants to grow through Social franchising; on 
healthy food for children; already first unit established 
2009 wants to grow SFr to achieve bigger scales n 
overcome barriers by legislation, local authorities 
product package customers pay 
coffee women craftsmanship shop founded by Maria 
Karadimitriou wants to grow through Social Franchising 
with women craftsmanship lab pre start-up very 
financially viable driven from the beginning 
product package customers pay n 
craftsmanship lab customers pay; pre-start up 
Drasi Social Cooperative Enterprise founded Oikonomou 
want to growth through Social Franchising child company 
of Edra NGO;  2 Social Supermarkets 
product package customers pay 
Social Supermarket cooperative of farmers founded by 
Ekati co-founder Giannis Sarros want to grow through 
Social Franchising ; From the Farmer to the Consumer 
basket; in search of revenue streams 
product package customers pay, pre start-up 
stage 
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& Description 
Resource Model 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre, 
Companion, Sweden, Ingrid Bexell PR & Communication 
Manager 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre CAN-online 
London CEO Andrew Croft 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre DenokInn, 
Baskan Country, Spain Director Carlos Fernandez 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre i-propeller 
Brussells Co-founders Marieke Huysentruyt (she is a 
member of the Social Business Initiative GECES experts 
group of the EC)  & Johan Moyersoen 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre IQ-Consult 
Berlin CEO Norbert Kunz 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Best Practice Social Entrepreneurship Centre EURISCE 
Trento Italy CEO Gianluca Salvatori 
service package European and national 
grants; funds raised from customers 
Tasha UK Philip Radley Trustee mental health offers 
psychological support 
service package free NHS pays the fee 
Best practice Micro-finance inner city Planet Finance 
NGO France 
Financial Package; Investment Fund to 
support creation of social enterprises in 
communities in France 
Opinion Leaders & Support Organizations Institutions & Activities 
European Commission Social Entrepreneurship Policy 
Advisor Gerhard Braunling 
Policy Advisor European Commission 
Public Official Cheretakis creator of legal framework of 
SE advisor to the Minister of Labour 
Public Official Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security 
EY-KEKO Director Rania Oikonomou Director of Equal 
and Managing Social Economy Agenda 
Social Economy Department, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security 
Director Kostantinos Geormas, sociologist PhD in Social 
Economy 
Directory of Social Enterprises, Ministry of 
Labour 
We interviewed members: Gerhard Braunling from EC-
TROIKA, Kostantinos Geormas from Ministry of Labour, 
Dimitris Chatzantonis from SEV, Stamatis Vardaros from 
IME-GSEVEE 
Technical Steering Committee 2012-2013 on 
Social Entrepreneurship Strategy Ministry of 
Labour 
MP Greece Elena Panaritis Social Entrepreneur Member of the Greek Parliament 
EU MP Chrysogelos Eco-Green Party, Social 
Entrepreneurship Agenda, dissemination of practices, 
raising awareness activities 
Member of the European Parliament  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
Opinion Leaders & Support Organizations Institutions & Activities 
Giannis Nasioulas founder of Social Economy Institute 
Ltd in Thessaloniki region, dissemination and networking 
activities 
European Commission, Social Business 
Initiative, GECES Experts Group 
Candidate Mayor for City of Athens Tasos Kromydas 
Eco-Green Political Party; Prospective social entrepreneur 
in renewable energy 
Candidate for City of Athens Mayorie Eco-
Green Party 
Mayor City of Athens George Kaminis Mayor of City of Athens 
ADDMA Ltd, Development Agency of the City of 
Athens- CEO Alexis Galinos, Operations Director 
Aggeliki Vasiliou; activities for the economic and 
touristic development of Athens; creating revenue stream 
for the Local Authority of the City of Athens; designing 
and managing bids and public procurement projects 
Development Company of Local Authority 
of the City of Athens; enters in social 
enterprise partnerships TOPEKO with NGOs 
raising revenue from state grants and 
programmes; manages Local Authorities 
Fund from EC grants 
Deputy Mayor City of Athens & Director of the 
Vocational Training Centre of Athens Tzini Gennimata 
(attended our action research capacity building 
programme)  
Vocational training Centre of Local 
Authority; capacity building programmes 
free to students through state and EU grants 
Local Authority of Acharnai in Attiki, General Secretary 
to the Mayor Nikolaos Krimnaniotis, PM Pantazopoulos 
IT 
social enterprise partnerships with NGOs 
TOPEKO, TOPSA; state and EU grants and 
programmes 
Local Authority of Alexandroupoli Thraki Region North 
of Greece, Leonidas Skerletopoulos research student in 
City Unity College, co-founder of the Social 
Entrepreneurship Centre in Alexandroupoli 
Social entrepreneurship centre within the 
local authority premises 
Hellenic Federation Of Enterprises- SEV; Director of 
Entrepreneurship Dimitris Chatzantonis & Director for 
Social Innovation Giannos Mitsos 
capacity building programmes and 
dissemination; enters in social enterprise 
partnerships with NGOs TOPEKO, state and 
EU grants, income raised from membership 
Academic on Social Economy Gabriel Amitsis Assistant 
Professor of Social Security Law, Technical Educational 
Institute of Athens 
Academic on Social Economy, contractor for 
ADDMA 
Petros Petridis owner of the Axon educational centers was 
president of the Greek Franchise Association in 2012 and 
was indicated interest in developing a social franchise 
President of the Greek Franchise Association 
 
In more detail a description of the social franchise case companies:  
 
Green Works (now merged with London Reuse Network) is an award winning charity 
with the aim of turning redundant office furniture into an asset and a resource; it aims in 
reducing, reusing, remanufacturing, and recycling furniture to divert it away from 
landfill. It was founded in 2002 by Colin Crooks in 2011 it had four franchises around the 
UK. In September 2011 it was merged with London Reuse Network and Colin assumed 
the role of the CEO. It now has 21 franchises in the UK. Green Works business model 
provides a quality furniture removal service to blue chip organisations. They then 
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reinvest these funds into their retail operation where they provide high quality furniture at 
the lowest cost to those who need it most; helping people, businesses and the 
environment. They are also donating their second hand furniture to developing countries. 
Green Works provides paid employment and volunteer training posts to disadvantaged 
groups.  
 
The School for Social Entrepreneurs (SSE) was founded in 1997 by Michael Young in 
London and was first franchised in 2002 it now has 10 Associate Schools (franchises) 
around the UK, it has been internationalized in Australia (master franchisee) where it has 
two Associate Schools one in Sydney and one in Melbourne. It is now starting up another 
five schools in the UK. SSE provides a yearlong Action Learning programme to social 
entrepreneurs who are working on a live social project; the programme includes action 
learning on an entrepreneurial project, study sessions, tutorials, mentoring, etc. The 
Associate Schools are the franchisees of the system who replicate the business model 
under the guidance of SSE who provides them with project development services on 
programme outline, recruitment of staff and students, marketing, training and support, 
brokering resources, and strategic planning. Students are usually funded by grants, or 
bursaries, or are supported to generate income.  
 
The Big Life group is a collection of charities and social businesses. It’s CEO Fay Selvan 
was nominated in 2011 ‘Social Enterprise Leader of the year for England’. Fay motivated 
by the severe problems of her community and being in a social network of people who 
wanted to find a solution. She was inspired to start up in 1991 a charity with two other 
members of staff and with some money from the council, in 1996 they became a 
registered charity, and in 1998 they set up a trading company which was rebranded in 
2002 to Big Life Group. Big Life Group is a holding company that owns five social 
enterprises: Big Life Company, Big Issue in the North, Aisha Childcare, Big Life 
Employment, Open Door and three charities: Self Help Service, Big Life Centers and Big 
Issue North Trust. The main concept of the group is self-help in battling social issues, 
their purpose is to bring about social justice and their mission is to change the world. Big 
Issue in the North magazine is a social franchise that gets distributed through vendors 
who are themselves homeless people or in life crises situations. Aisha Childcare was 
another social business that the group tried to franchise but failed.  
 
FareShare is a national charity supporting communities to relieve food poverty by 
tackling both food poverty and food waste. It has been operating since 2004 as an 
independent charity and has 17 franchisees around the UK. Its business purposes are: to 
redistribute surplus from food and drink industry to networks working with 
disadvantaged people; to provide training and education through an ‘eat well 
programme’; and to promote the message: ‘no good food should be wasted’. Fare Share 
National based in London is the social franchisor who collects, stores food centrally and 
redistributes it; Fare Share Central are franchisees in large territories who collect, store 
and redistribute food regionally for Fare Share, they engage themselves in other activities 
apart from operating FareShare’s model; Van Franchisees operate under the FareShare 
Central, but licensed by the FareShare National, in each region to collect and distribute 
the food; Customers are Community Members who receive, store, prepare, and serve the 
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food and offer it to the End Consumers who are disadvantage people suffering from food 
poverty.  
 
The Hub was first set up in the UK and then the governance and ownership was given to 
the whole community of the Hub franchisees, there are 54 social franchised Hubs in the 
whole world in all continents; it offers capacity-building programmes to sustainable 
entrepreneurship. Impact Hub, Athens Ltd  co-founders Dimitri Kokkinakis & Sophie 
Labrou; Franchisee of The Hub, a start-up laboratory (incubator) for sustainable n social 
entrepreneurship provides space, programming, global networking & investment; creative 
consultancy art of hosting and design thinking methodologies; it targets entrepreneurship 
and cultural change. 
 
FoodBank founded in 2004 by Trussel Trust has 400 franchised units it tackles food 
poverty through distribution of food to charities and those in need. It grew from 55 to 200 
over 18months. It’s run by communities charities built on their existing work run by 
volunteers and a part-time paid coordinator. They collect food from the community 
(people, supermarkets, schools, churches) and distribute it through voucher systems.  
 
Care and Share Associates CASA found in 2004 it has six franchises in the UK; it 
delivers domiciliary health and care services. Social franchisees are existing 
organizations who hire a management team to manage the franchise. Beneficiaries either 
pay on their own or through contracts with local authorities and care trusts.  
 
 
5.4. Individual Context: System of Individual/Psychological Social 
Entrepreneur Profile 
 
RQ1: What is the role of the system of the individual/psychological social 
entrepreneurship profile in the formation governance and performance of social 
franchising? 
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Table 9 Data Analysis of the Sphere of the Individual/Psychological Profile of Social 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Individual/Psychological Social Entrepreneurship Profile 
categories definition codes examples 
background the influence of elements from the 
background environment were 
social entrepreneurs grew up 
family ‘I was brought up in a 
farming place in Pilio where 
everything was done through 
cooperatives' Siz ' I was 
broughtup not to throw things, 
not wasting. I get frustrated to 
see all these things get wasted 
and all this talent in people 
get lost because they have no 
skills no opportunities' GW 
'I'm a doctor from a family of 
doctors i've been brought up 
wioth the problems of the 
NHS, I knew the problems 
with the complaint processes' 
Patient Opinion UK.  
    environment 
brought up 
‘she was brought up in 
deprived area so she came 
back to alleviate poverty' SSE 
'I was brought up in a place 
with drugs, violence, families 
in crises I wanted to solve 
this' BLG 
professional 
experience 
  same industry   
    public services   
    international 
experience 
 ‘I went to the US to see how 
can we be sustainable for two 
years i worked there. Then  
came back and made it 
happen' BLG. 'We went to the 
UK to see how other hubs 
work. We studied it and then 
came back to Athens to build 
our own' BIOS 
    prior 
community 
work 
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categories definition codes examples 
demographics   age Age makes no difference 
    gender Gender makes no difference 
but we noticed that there are 
as many women as men while 
in our quantitative research in 
conventional franchises it was 
mostly men owners and 
CEOS 
    education The vast majority of social 
entrepreneurs were highly 
educated, they had PhDs and 
MSc 
prior 
experiences 
a success model that social 
entrepreneurs were exposude to 
through their former emloyement 
or internships 
fascinated ‘I learnt them through AISEC 
at university, I was excited by 
what they did, I went for an 
internship to work with them 
in Berlin and my girlfiend in 
Madrid, I stayed two years 
and we came back to do it in 
Greece' The Hub Athens. 'I 
worked with them and I was 
fascinated with the Coop, 
their model, the challenge that 
you give back. I saw it; it 
worked. It was easy. It made 
me reflect' SSE.  
    frustrated, 
dissapointed  
‘I worked for the public but I 
was dissapointed but learnt a 
lot' Action Aid.  
motives   rewarding ‘I wanted to do something 
that has values, meaning' 
Trade Now. 'its what turns her 
on' Quality Net.  
    want to give  ‘My aim is to help others that 
cannot help themselves' 
Tasha.  
    survival, 
unemployment 
  
traits   empathy ‘Inspire people by what they 
would like to do to find 
supporters' 
    committed ‘Committed in a narrow way 
to something in 
particular'SSE  
    risks ‘Take risks with own 
resources and own 
reputation'SSE 
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categories definition codes examples 
    resilient ‘They are knocked down and 
bounce up again' SSE. 'You 
have to be prepared to have a 
disaster and move on again' 
BLG.  
    not reflective, 
intuitive 
‘Intuitive thinkers not logical 
thinkers' SSE. 'In a 
competitive environment you 
have to do and then allow the 
thinking'  
    persistent ‘You have to learn to live 
with resource constraints' 
BLG 'we are working hard, 
testing doing and then testing 
again and doing'' In the 
beginning it was a second job, 
I  paid myself from other 
work' GW 'Doers are 
passionate about what they 
do. Have a continuing spirit. 
Do not hear others when they 
tell them off' TEDX Social 
Entrepreneur 
 
 
 
 
    active oriented, 
doers 
‘You cannot teach someone to 
become a social entrepreneur. 
You either do it or not. Its a 
specific DNA. He is holistic 
he knows all risks. He just 
wakes up one day and do it' 
Panel Group. 'take this idea 
from in you and put it in 
space' 
    assertive ‘I don't like when we don't do 
it!' 
    social skills   
    ingenuity ‘Create a story. Take a step 
back and view the story 
holistically. See yourself in 
the context' TEDX Social 
Entrepreneur 
    vision   
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categories definition codes examples 
    confidence self-efficacy and self-
feasibility 'She didn't believe 
she could address the issue 
she wanted to solve, she didn't 
believe she was a social 
entrepreneur. So she kept 
control of the whole venture. 
She had to live. When she left 
the venture grew' SSE 
    credible, 
trustworthy 
the need to show they are 
capable, they need to have 
legitimacy 
    practical realists ‘I have to see that it leads to 
actions and results. No talking 
and theory'. 'It is the process 
you are after. Small steps that 
bring you t the next. What can 
you do in the next 24h?' 'u 
need a group of like-minded 
people, you need a business 
plan and you need revenue 
streams to mae it worth your 
effort' Giardino 
    consciousness 
and maturity 
‘A social entrepreneur comes 
from maturity and 
consciousness of the exact 
elements of the problem' 
Panel Group 'We will not 
change the world we need to 
be conscious' Human Grid 
    altruistic   
    consistent to 
ethics 
‘As a Social Cooperative I 
can’t attract capital from 
foundations. They want me to 
convert to a NGO. I will not 
do that. We maybe the first 
but we will fight this change' 
Little Giants 
individuals vs 
groups 
    Sometimes it was groups and 
other times it was one person 
that drove the whole thing but 
relied and recruited supporters 
Serial Social 
Entrepreneurs 
we identified the existence of 
serial social entrepreneurs whith 
specific features 
set up and then 
live 
‘He would set something and 
then sell it or live it drift off. 
He had loads of ideas. Ideas 
to solve problems in society' 
(about Michael Young) SSE 
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categories definition codes examples 
    trusted   
    supporters   
    many ideas    
opportunism opportunistic behaviour of social 
entrepreneurs in developing 
activity at the SE sector 
opportunism ‘SE is a new thing, there is 
high opportunity, how can we 
get in? We need to get in!" 
Quality Net. 'What is this 
coaching? How can we do it?' 
Ekati 
 
Background 
 
'brough up in a family of cultural justice' BLG 'got married to an activist CEO in 
multinational NGOS' Fair Trade 'mother psychlogist father entrepreneurs, she is a serial 
entreprenerus that combines psychology with enterprises' Little Giants, Childit, Home 
Play ' 'I'm a son of professors i want to be a social entrepreneur not a cold hearted 
entrepreneur, to offer valuable ethical services. But we miss the entrepreneurial spirit the 
market knowledge' close the loop . ' This is inline with entrepreneurial supply (Cochran, 
1964) which argues that entrepreneurship urges are associated with the environment 
where the person was brought up. 
 
Professional experience and Prior Experiences 
 
'i was in the army i wanted to give but it wasnt rewarding now i can meet my ambitions' 
GW. 'i was in the public sector but i felt that it didn't have impact now i feel it has' BLG. 
'I was teaching in the MBAs for years but I didnt feel they learnt' SSE. In accordance 
with the arguments of human capital theory that education and experience are positively 
related to the emergence of entrepreneurial activity (Becker, 1975; David and Honing, 
2003; Korunka, Frank, Lueger, and Mugler, 2003). 
 
Motives 
 
Rewarding. Many social entrepreneurs characterize their ventures are being: fun, a 
hobby, a passion'if you want it you will do it, it burns you, i felt nothing could stop me' 
GW. 'It's the freedom of soul. Get to an older age that nothing burdens you and leave with 
a free soul' Giardino.  
 
Want to give. 'We are in our 40s all succesful executives we want to do something 'good' 
otherwise we stay in our corporations and be 'yes men'' Trade Now. 'We are in our 30s 
why wait others to do it, we have the ability and the time to deliver something valuable' 
Volunteers 4 Greece. 'I have retired it's time for me to give something back and use all 
the knowledge i have, to help my palce of origin that i never used to go all these years' 
Vytina Tomorrow. 'We are in our 20s we are frastrutated from everyone telling us that we 
are the future. We dont feel like that we are in the present. We have values. Its trendy to 
have your own project and collaborate. We feel duty and responsibility. We need to 
survive. We want to do it now.' BikeKitchen and The HUB Athens. 
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Maximisation of profits is not a motive. 'we need money but not tons of money. They 
take salaries they aren't ashamed to publicise. A social entreprenerus should take the 
professional salary he would take as an empoyee in doing this job' SSE 'A social 
entrepreneur should be happy with a 2-3% of profit' BLG. 
According to Social School for Entrepreneurs an entrepreneur is someone with the 
imagination to identify new opportunities and the determination to bring them to fruition 
(SSE, 2010). A social entrepreneur is someone who does this for public good rather than 
private profit. Tracey and Jarvis (2007) describe social entrepreneurs as social value 
creators who exploit market opportunities though non-profit organizations and generate 
profit to meet their social missions, they reinvest their surpluses to fulfil these missions. 
 
This is in line with motivational theories that there is a relationship between 
entrepreneurship and achievement (Johnson, 1990; McClelland, 1961; Shaver and Scott, 
1991). Sharir and Lerner (2006) search for solutions to individual distress, obligation or 
affiliation to one’s community.  
Mair and Roboa (2006) and the perception of whether a social entrepreneurial activity is 
feasible which is influenced by social support and the trait of self-efficacy. Empathy. 
creativity, collaborative leadership skills, team-work capability, socio-moral motivation, 
long-term community oriented motivation, unique ethics (Bornstein, 2004; Drayton, 
2002; Korosec and Berman, 2006; Mair and Roboa, 2006); their capacity to innovatively 
exploit opportunities suddenly identified; their skills in building networks (Nicholls and 
Opal, 2005). motivated by a strong desire to change society, by discomfort of the status 
quo, by altruistic feelings, and by a need to be socially responsible, ability to appear 
trustworthy (Mair and Roboa, 2006) 
 
Traits 
 
Persistent. Many social entrepreneurs have another job to raise income, while the social 
enterprise venture is a parallel job. 'Be focus it doesn’t matter if it takes time'  
 
Doers. 'Your dream doesn’t exist you must create it. You must build in trust' TedX.  
Supporting trait theories argumentation that that entrepreneurs have innate qualities that 
naturally make them an entrepreneur (Hornaday and Aboud, 1971; Low and MacMillan, 
1988; McClelland, 1987; Shaver and Scott, 1991; Solomon and Winslow, 1988). 
 
‘hero entrepreneur’(Nicholls, 2008).  output of groups (Alvord et al, 2004). leadership 
skills (Leadbeater, 2006). 
 
Opportunism 
 
There SE that were founded only because they heard that there would be grants. So many 
NGOs created a Social Cooperative enterprise without any activity just waiting to absorb 
capital when the grants would be given. This was also documented by the Director of the 
Registry Dr Geormas. There were also other SE that couln't find an activity. They heard 
ideas from here and there and then they claimed that they did them or they tried to close 
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deals with the local authorities to offer them, but in reality they had no activity and no 
attempt was made to show any activity. It was mere networking. They were looking to 
attract collaborations and free ride. 
 
Hereunder we will present some figures on entrepreneurship comparing the average EU-
27, the results from Greece (hereafter EL) and from the United Kingdom (hereafter UK). 
According to the Eurobarometer Survey in Entrepreneurship (2012b, 2012c, 2012d) only 
37% (50% El and 33%UK) would rather be self-employed and among the non self-
employed only 30% find it feasible to become self-employed in the next five years 
(30%El, 26%UK); motives for not being self-employed in EU-27 indicate that 21% 
capital restraints, 12% negative environmental (economic) climate, 8% lack of skills, 7% 
lack of innovative/business idea, 6% family constraints (not be able to cope with family 
commitments), 5% fear of failure, 4% red tape barriers and 55% other reasons. The risk 
of failure has dropped by 6% from 2009 but is still in 46% of cases. Only 24% have taken 
part in an educational course on entrepreneurship, the rates are lower for both Greece 
(17%) and the UK (15%). To Greek respondent financial constraints are higher than 
average EU being 26% (13% in the UK) and the economic climate much more significant 
barrier 33% (9% in the UK), on the other hand very few believe they lack innovation/ 
business idea 3% while this is 7% for the UK. On the other hand in the UK most of the 
respondents stated other reasons 64%, while in Greece only 34% stated other reasons. To 
the UK population the economic climate, red tape, skills and access to financial resources 
were not that important. Risk of failure is greater 10% higher in Greece than in the UK 
(52%-43%).  
 
25% of EU-27 respondent have started a business or are in the pre-start up process (4%); 
in Greece this is 32% and in the UK 24% respectively. The reasons for starting their 
business was 87% having a business idea (innovation), 84% having access to financial 
resources, 68% having found a partner (network embeddedness), 62% having a role 
model (network embeddedness), 61% addressing an unmet social or ecological need and 
55% were dissatisfied with their previous work. The desirability of independence as a 
motive for self-employment was chosen among 62% of respondents, while to contribute 
to society only 2% (the figures are equal for EL in the UK contribution to society is 1%). 
The majority of entrepreneurs say now that they did it because they grasp an opportunity, 
65% created it from scratch and 74% live out of it. (Europa, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d) 
 
Colin’s (CEO of Green Works social franchise) upbringing highlighted the importance of 
recycling and social values. He always felt he wanted to do something to help society, so in the 
beginning of his career he served in the Territorial Army, then in the police and in the wider 
public sector. But he didn’t find those jobs to be rewarding; ‘they were too formal and lacked 
creativity’. He wanted to find other more productive ways to offer good to his community. He 
then worked for ten years in the paper recycling industry and as a waste consultant. That is how 
his business idea emerged. He knew the players of the industry, he knew the challenges, and he 
knew the people. So when starting up he knew which companies to call and ask them if they 
wanted to pay to have their furniture waste removed. The big challenge in the beginning was the 
restraint of financial capital, so for quite some time he had to keep two jobs: his former job as a 
waste consultant that paid for his wage and his job for the creation and development of Green 
Works. It was not until much later that Green Works was able to finance his own salary. 
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When asked about the importance of financial capital Colin didn’t hesitate when he said 
that nothing could stop him from doing what he really wanted to do.  
 
“When you really want something, when it is your passion you will find a way to do it… 
because it burns. It was an electric feeling nothing could stop me” Colin Crooks. 
 
Colin Crooks the CEO of Green Works was been brought up with the value of not 
wasting stuff. He cannot stand the idea of people and things being wasted. He gets 
frustrated to see all this talent in people getting wasted because they lack of formal 
certificates, qualifications, and proper education.  
 
‘The labour market as it functions today creates very big inequalities. Poor 
people have no confidence in themselves they do not know what they can d’ Colin Crooks 
 
The most important resource for Green Works is relational capital; as Colin mentioned 
there is a hundred percent positive relation between the existence of trust, loyalty, and 
strong ties among all constituents of Green Works and the success of its sustainable 
model. Institutional capital was also important as there have been many attempts to copy 
Green Works model and the trademark has been proven very significant. The ethical 
values of Green Works have never been undermined even if that has meant that sometime 
customers cannot be fully satisfied. Profit margins could grow if more skilled personnel 
would be employed, but this is against the principles of the company and so it is 
something that Colin is not interested in doing. Through many conversations that Colin 
has had with clients he has learnt that in many cases they are choosing Green Works 
because of the high levels of trust they have to Green Works as opposed to other 
companies. The underlining culture of Green Works that reflects Colin Crooks values is 
transparency, straightness and honesty:  
 
 “Everyone knows where they are, there are no differentials, no one is offered 
special arrangements, and there are no privileges. The model is very consistent” Colin 
Crooks 
 
As Colin mentions some customers have left because they don’t like this model but the 
ones that have stayed are coming back, they are loyal to Green Works and happy to 
reference it to others. The model of Green Works that Colin started hasn’t changed at all, 
it is pretty straight forward: 
 
 “We will 100% recycle, we will employ low skilled people, train them and respect 
them, and we will treat customers evenly” Colin Crooks 
 
There are many stories of customers that after they had bought from Green Works they 
found out about its sustainable model and they were pleasantly surprised and this made 
them come back. When Colin first started there was zero awareness about sustainable 
enterprising, this is gradually changing. The change is very slow and there is no pattern 
yet of society preferring sustainable enterprises as opposed to the rest. According to Colin 
the recession made things even harder and showed that sustainability is less viable to 
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customers as they were not willing to pay higher prices. Colin believes that big global 
organizations could actually make an impact if they decide to add value to their global 
supply chains by purchasing products from socially sustainable enterprises but this has to 
be a top down decision. There are a lot of intrapreneurs in the big companies that could 
take such decisions but they lack authority and legitimacy, so the decision has to come 
from the top of the hierarchical pyramid. Colin’s experience shows that when a big 
company decides to change its culture and adopts such principles then its executives are 
very willing to implement them.  
 
“But big companies do not make changes in their supply chain, they don’t like 
complexity and new things, they kind of keep a routine in their purchases and show a type 
of inertia” Colin Crooks 
 
5.4.1. Proposition 1 
 
Proposition 1: The influence of the dynamics of the system of the individual social 
entrepreneur in the formation, governance and performance of social franchising 
 
5.4.2. Summary of Results for Proposition 1 
 
Demographics didn’t reveal any significance apart from the fact that women participated 
almost in equal numbers as men. Evidence from Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul (2013) 
research indicate that gender is a significant parameter in social entrepreneurship 
formation; their research indicates that the enhancement of female entrepreneurship leads 
to an increase of social entrepreneurship as women tend to be more motivated to address 
social objectives rather than financial ones in contrast to men. There seems to be a 
relationship among the background of social entrepreneurs and the social impact 
identified. In line with human capital theory education and experience are positively 
related to the emergence of entrepreneurial activity (Korunka, Frank, Lueger, and 
Mugler, 2003). 
 
Evidence form Alvord et al (2004: 272) research identified the existence of leadership 
patterns of individual or groups abilities to ‘work with and build bridges among very 
diverse stakeholders’. Individual or groups abilities to relate with people from different 
backgrounds, occupations or personalities provided social enterprises with the skills and 
resources to be able to communicate and manage very diverse constituents, to build 
relationships and linkages with them and among them. So a very important element is 
their relationship management skills and their networking skills (Alvord et al, 2004). 
Social entrepreneurs that had weak relationship building skills (like problems with local 
groups, government actors and donors or problems with external groups of interest) had 
difficulties in scaling up the impact of their venture (Alvord et al, 2004; Sharir and 
Lerner, 2006). 
 
Other skill identified by team-work capability, socio-moral motivation, long-term 
community oriented motivation, unique ethics (Bornstein, 2004; Drayton, 2002; Korosec 
and Berman, 2006; Mair and Roboa, 2006); their capacity to innovatively exploit 
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opportunities suddenly identified; a strong desire to change society, by discomfort of the 
status quo, by altruistic feelings, and by a need to be socially responsible (Mair and 
Roboa, 2006). In terms of behaviour attributes include: accept social criticism, ability to 
appear trustworthy and receptivity to other’s feelings (Mair and Roboa, 2006); search for 
solutions to individual distress, obligation or affiliation to one’s community (Sharir and 
Lerner, 2006). Quoting from our interviewees: ‘I was in the army I wanted to give but it 
wasn’t rewarding now I can meet my ambitions'; 'I was in the public sector but I felt that 
it didn't have impact now I feel it has'; 'I was teaching in the MBAs for years but I didn’t 
feel they learnt' SSE. Many social entrepreneurs characterize their ventures as being: fun, 
a hobby, a passion; 'if you want it you will do it, it burns you, i felt nothing could stop 
me'. Evidence for Sharir and Lerner (2006) research indicate that the dedication and 
commitment of the social entrepreneurs to the venture, as well as their ability to 
formulate networks of support are the only two variables that were necessary conditions 
for success. These results were also supported from our analysis. 
 
What is important to see is that social entrepreneurs from four different age groups had 
exactly the same motivation which they thought was related to their age: 'I have retired 
it's time for me to give something back and use all the knowledge i have, to help my 
palce of origin that i never used to go all these years' Vytina Tomorrow. 'We are in our 
40s all succesful executives we want to do something 'good' otherwise we stay in our 
corporations and be 'yes men'' Trade Now. 'We are in our 30s why wait others to do it, we 
have the ability and the time to deliver something valuable' Volunteers 4 Greece. 'We are 
in our 20s we get frustrated from everyone telling us that we are the future. We don’t feel 
like that we are in the present. We have values. It’s trendy to have your own project and 
collaborate. We feel duty and responsibility. We need to survive. We want to do it now.' 
BikeKitchen and The HUB Athens. 
 
A considerable risk that we identified was those that were free riders and opportunistic in 
their behaviour. They didn’t care about giving something back or creating impact. They 
have realized that social entrepreneurship is a novel concept and they are waiting for the 
grants that will be given.  
 
5.5. Organizational Context: System of Social Innovation 
 
RQ2: What is the role the system of social innovation in the formation governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
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Table 10 Data Analysis of the Sphere of Social Innovation 
Social Innovation 
categories definition codes examples 
opportunity   idenitfy an issue We saw that NGOs deal with many issues but 
noone with labour and insurance politics, no one 
provides legal and employement orientation 
advice' Equal Society. 'Furniture was being 
dumbed no one cared. I couldn't stand this idea" 
GW 
    novelty They usually idenitfy a niche or a gap in the 
market or they create bridges among existing 
market strucutres. 'We created a new model' 
Close the loop 'We created bridges which didn’t 
exist' Boroume, Desmos 'we forced a new market' 
GW. 'There are hundreds of school canteens than 
nobody deals with and they are left close' School 
Canteens.  
    experimentation testing, testing, testing' BIOS SSE School 
Canteens 
resources   financial resources if i had resources I would be committed from the 
beginning' GW 'I started with no money, just me 
some volunteers, but with commercial principles 
from the beginning' GW 
    internet technology use the internet to create a network model from 
home' Little Giants. 'Patient Opinion used its 
webbased software for other social solutions and 
gave it away to other countries in the developing 
world' SSE student 'How can I create a virtual SE 
wgere collaboration happens through the Net? 
Where unemplyed mothers work from their 
homes' Childit 'SE need a good IT structure to be 
able to manage their netowrks and share their 
values' SSE  
    volunteering Volunteering cannot be performed by 
unemployed people, survival has to be paid for' 
Trade Now. 'I do everything through volunteers 
and friends of my entworks all around the world' 
Elea Med 
    know-how We built on research, community, impact and 
then action' BIOS. 'Research, collaboration, 
community, action' Loft2Work. 'We apply the 
earth guide tool in community development and 
follow the steps of the model' Vytina Tomorrow. 
'I use sepcific econometric model to target 
institutional change in real estate in Latin 
America' Panel Group. 
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categories definition codes examples 
    partnerships and networks You seed customers from any networks. Our first 
customers were people I knew from my previous 
work' GW 'I want partners from the developing 
world to be bale to build long term relationships. 
They bring local knowledge which decreases 
time and cost, this brings scales and cut costs and 
brings higher impact' GW. learning curve through 
partners decreases costs 
    community   
legal types   mostly NGOs in Greece Foundations do not support you if you do not 
have a non for profit legal entity, so its very hard 
for social coperatives to attract capital' Little 
Giants 
    formal vs informal legat 
types 
I don’t like informal movements. They have to 
assume responsibility and incorporate a legal 
entity' Equal Society 
characteristics 
of the model 
  clarity precision 
simplicity 
You need a clear view to do something in 
specific'. 'The model was to complex requiring 
too many resources, space, products, staff. We 
had to start from something simpler' Little Giants 
initially wanting to establish a Toy Library 'We 
keep the model straight forward and we havent 
changed it as we grow and scale' GW 
sustainability   self help apporach Money gets spent you need to help them find jobs 
not give them food and blankets' Equal Society. 
'Independent element not parental to marginalised 
people. Give them responsibility, make them 
learn. This empower them and has knock on 
effects on direct ties' SSE Klimaka BLG GW 
Metavallon, Loft2Work, BIOS, Medicins Sans 
Frontiers 'Poverty alleviation is an indirect effect 
by changing peoples position' Tasha 
'Disadvantaged people that enter in a capacity-
building programme now there is a network of 
people they can rely on, this gives them 
confidence, empowerment, which is spread back 
to their communities and to those with whom 
they have a strong tie; there is a knock off, ripple 
effect, this is viral learning whne you teach others 
through the learning of your participants' SSE 
    equal responsibility treat everyone as if everyone has equal 
contribution, evenly manage everyone' SSE BLG 
    transparency The model is transparent. No differentials no 
favours' GW SSE 
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    reputation, trust  our model is based on reputation, no logistics, 
strong networking, media coverage, synergies, 
securitising product offering, keeping third 
category accounting books, transparency and all 
these have created trust to our donors and more 
and more organisations and people are calling us 
to contribute to our cause' Boroume 
nature of 
impact 
  labour intensive (people 
oriented) 
provide jobs and train people 'give opportunity to 
people to learn new skills, they come to do 
something that they know they can do, like 
warehousing and they end up realising that they 
like photographing or sales' GW 
    social goal oriented (goal 
driven) 
  
    profit margins (solvency) we want healthy profit but we will never achieve 
it cause of employing marginalised people and 
selling at lower prices' GW.  'We need 
sustainability' BLG. 'We need to be solvent but 
we don’t measure profit margins' SSE. 'we need 
economies of scale' Women Craftmanship Caffe. 
'We need scales' Volunteers 4 Greece 
    investors (sustainability n 
growth) 
'We need margins to be able to attract investors' 
SSE. 'Social investors have conditions. They 
want something tangible out of it, it may be a 
marekt entrance, it may be meeting their CSR 
goals, or to interact their personnel with social 
entrepreneurs and get emaning out of their lives, 
not being narrow and increase their innovation; 
especially companies like WPC were the 
employees have a very narrow job' SSE 
income based 
strategies vs 
grant 
dependent  
  commercial vs non 
commercial principles 
(financial logics) 
 If we want to become commercial we have to 
change our structure' Boroume 'We were grant 
reliant on the local council we had no 
commercial objectives. This was a barrier. I went 
to the US to learn how we can become 
sustainable, came back and did it, now we are 
50% based on grants and 50% from trading' BLG 
    service package   
    capacity-building 
programme 
  
    product package   
    dissemination of 
packages or programmes 
  
type of impact   social movements   
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    institutional change   
    economic development We want to built Vytina in 20 years from now to 
be economically viable and growing. So we do a 
community development apporach to build the 
vision, design the strategy and then take actions' 
Vytina Tomorrow 
    cultural change We put meaning into life' a social entreprenerus 
from SSE school 
scale of impact   scales small vs big The model cannot be based on ad hoc activities 
we will achieve nothing in this way. it needs to 
be structured and scalable' School Canteens. 
'They want to address small issues, there is no 
innovative component, there is inertia. They 
attach to the past' Tasha 
    time Wait for the right moment to build your social 
venture' GSEVEE Panel Group School Canteens 
TEDX 'You need time to implement a change. 
Michael (Young) was disappointed because they 
didn’t grow as he wanted to make big impact. 
But now they have grown.' SSE  
pricing   free to beneficiaries vs 
beneficiaries/customers 
pay 
  
funding   donations from 
corporations vs state 
grants 
  
afilliations   internationally linked vs 
locally linked 
  
    fractions vs sole riders   
scaling models   organic growth new service/new product development or new 
market development of existing serves/products 
to other disadvantaged groups or 
related/unrelated diversification through new 
concepts 'We started as through mental health 
centres for children, now we have moved to 
many other sectors. I want to offer holistic 
services to children, from employemnt to their 
parents to health at home to their grandparents, 
through to food from our social supermarket, 
even to process and produce this food' Edra-Drasi 
'For every employment postition we offer, they 
are responsible to create 5 more. This is how we 
have grown and has created a ripple effect' 
Klimaka-Klimax Plus 
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    branches (new locations)   
    international loose 
affiliations 
  
    project/goal based 
alliances 
  
    social enterprise 
networks, development 
partnerships 
  
    social franchising   
    social joint ventures with 
local partners 
  
Failure   lack of financial capital   
    lack of defined scope   
    lack of partners   
    opportunism  use the internet, make it widespread and win a 
cash cow' Tasha partner 'people (customers) 
would feel it is a self-governing area but I would 
maintain control, I'd have the power to change it'  
    lack of ownership they didn’t believe into the solution designed for 
the issue, it didn't match their logics' Social 
entrepreneurs in SSE 
 
In 1999 Colin Crooks CEO of Green Works saw an opportunity to create a business that 
could give jobs to disadvantaged people and save the country from all the furniture waste. 
The idea was simple he would be paid by blue chip companies to remove the furniture 
they didn’t need which then he would direct from landfill to places that were in need of 
furniture. The business venture was labour intensive which gave him the opportunity to 
alleviate poverty by locating his businesses in underdeveloped areas. He started off with a 
capital of £300 and a rented van. The consulting advice he got in the beginning was 
completely disappointing, he was told that his business would be a failure, that it would 
be a disaster story, and that what he thought as being a gap in the market was actually not 
an opportunity and there was a reason why capital had not been directed to this activity. 
Despite all that Colin believed strongly in his idea and founded Green Works; by doing 
so he created a new market and a successful business model that has helped him give 
value to the public and run many projects in the developing world by donating furniture 
and education in places like Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Sudan. The franchisees that have 
joined the network are charities with an experience in offering training opportunities and 
employment experiences to disadvantaged people; Green Works offers them an income 
based strategy to raise money that will then be used for their other social activities. Green 
Works offers the successful and profitable business model, the brand name, marketing 
support and training. The Franchisees pay a fixed rate per truck delivered in their 
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premises. All franchisees are social enterprises themselves so they know how to operate 
as businesses, the challenge was to train them and change their culture to be able to 
manage operationally and commercially bigger volumes. They had to train them to be 
more assertive and to work under conditions of lower control over suppliers and 
customers. 
 
 
5.5.1. Proposition 2 
 
Proposition 2: The influence of the dynamics of the system of social innovation in 
the formation, governance and performance of social franchising 
 
 
5.5.2. Summary of Results for Proposition 2 
 
The unmet needs identified by social enterprises are any type of needs that have not been 
successfully tackled by governments, society, organizations or corporations. Social 
ventures create both social value (like work, personal or community development, 
environmental protection, and institutional transformation to solve failures within a 
political, cultural, or social context) and economic value (to provide income, wealth and 
capital accumulation to individuals, organizations, and communities). This social and 
economic value is spread to actors of the entire network in which social enterprises are 
embedded (Meyksens et al, 2010a). The core element that defines social entrepreneurship 
activity is its social mission and the entrepreneurs’ creativity in building an innovative 
operational process that can meet this mission (Nicholls, 2008) and bring societal 
transformation (Alvord et al, 2004). The social mission can be viewed in two levels, as 
the operational context and as the outcome and impact of a social enterprise; it is either 
seen as an opportunity to satisfy an unmet social need or to create a new social value 
(Dees, 1998). Social entrepreneurs innovate through established systems in the short-term 
and create new social arrangements in the long-term to achieve sustainable solutions to 
social issues (Alvord et al, 2004). This is strongly supported by most of the cases of our 
research.  
 
This is in line with the argumentation of institutional entrepreneurial theory (Battilana, 
Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio, 1988) that agents bring about institutional 
transformation. With reference to the ‘enabling conditions’ of Battilana, Leca and 
Boxenbaum (2009) our research indicates that a necessary condition for the institutional 
transformational activity of social entrepreneurs overcoming the paradox of embedded 
agency of actors in institutions is actually their structural and relational embeddedness in 
networks, while x conditions are field characteristics no demographics but psychological 
factors, like commitment, resilience. Supporting innovation theorists arguments on the 
capabilities of creating new products and processes to respond to market opportunities 
(Davidson and Honing, 2003; Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012). As well as economic theory 
argumentation that views entrepreneurship as being driven by the opportunities detected 
in the market which trigger entrepreneurial activity to create changes in the market 
(Drucker, 1985; Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990) 
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At a first glance the innovations of each venture seem quite diverse what they have in 
common is that they try to resolve different issues, focus on different target groups of 
disadvantaged people and apply different interventions. There are five patterns that 
emerge: firstly, the innovation can take one or all of these three forms ‘building local 
capacity to solve a problem’ (identify and utilize local resources of disadvantaged groups 
for self-help), ‘disseminating a package to solve common problems’ (create an offering to 
help resolve a social issue) and ‘building local movements to deal with other powerful 
actors’ (build networks of support). Secondly, the innovation mobilises existing resources 
of disadvantaged groups. Thirdly, the initiative is build on systematic learning of the 
individuals or of the entire social enterprise indicating that an innovative element needs 
for training of its constituents and that the interest is to invest on organizational learning 
of local social groups to embrace the innovation. Fourthly the social enterprise is build on 
the relationship and networking skills of the entrepreneurs indicating a pattern among 
relational and structural embeddedness and social norms with innovation. Fifthly the 
scale up strategy is related to the innovation systems indicating a relationship among 
innovation and franchise formation. (Alvord et al, 2004: 267). Also Meyskens et al 
(2010b) results support the correlation among innovation and replicability; the more 
innovative a social venture is the higher the knowledge transferability element is (that is 
associated with the systems that a venture has in place to be able to transform tacit 
knowledge to explicit knowledge that can then be transferred) and thus social ventures 
increase their potential to replicate their model. 
 
Social innovation is positively related to the existence of research and development 
resources and to the investments in human capital leading to the increase of innovative 
ventures (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013). This is a great weakness in the Greek case 
study and a great strength in the UK case. Technology is positive related to entry in social 
entrepreneurial activity (Van Putten and Green, 2010); technology and technological 
parks need a high upfront investment that needs the support of formal institutions. Even if 
this money is not directly invested through public grants, governments can succeed the 
mobilization of venture capital resources to invest in research and development through 
public private partnerships (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013). Financial resources, 
social innovation and networks have been found to be significantly related (Meyskens et 
al 2010b); being part of social venture networks social enterprises increase their social 
innovation elements (Meyskens et al, 2010a) on the other hand the more innovative they 
are the more attractive they become as potential partners for social venture networks and 
as investment choices for social investors (Meyskens et al, 2010b). This is in line with 
resource based approaches that underline the role of resources in the appearance and 
growth of entrepreneurial activity (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Clausen, 2006) 
 
Types of social innovation growth identified in Lyon and Fernandez (2012) (Dees et al, 
2004; Mair and Sezgi, 2011) are: from organic growth: maximising social impact of 
existing provision, diversification (additional services and products), increase penetration 
though in-house growth of services, setting up new branches in other locations, taking 
over existing businesses and converting them to their model, winning contract from local 
authorities or employers to run their model. From affiliations and relationships with other 
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organizations: spin out organizations (like the social franchisor can spin out the 
development unit to control the franchise system), social franchising, kite marks and 
quality standards. Through dissemination: training and accredited courses, networks 
established to share good practice, provision of open source material and encouraging 
learning 
 
Failure cases of social enterprises are associated to poor planning (Sharir and Lerner, 
2006), low levels of commitment and lack of skills in raising resources. 
 
5.6. Political Context: System of Formal Institutions  
 
RQ3: What is the role of formal institutions on the formation governance and 
performance of social franchising? 
RQ31: What is the role of the system of national formal institutions in the formation 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ32: What is the role of the system of supranational formal institutions in the formation 
governance and performance of social franchising? 
 
Table 11 Data Analysis of the Sphere of Formal Institutions  
Formal Institutions 
categories definition codes examples 
legislation   legal framework on 
Soc Coops 
 'The third sector in Greece, the first generation 
social cooperatives were all interlinked with the 
state and local authorities. The EC asked us to give 
the money back, they put a lot of pressure. We 
don't have the money. So we had to make the law 
to legitimate those cooperatives and make them 
part of the new legislaton. That is why we created 
this law. We allow pubic authorities to enter in SE 
with 20% ownership, but no to loacal authorities' 
Public Official Creator of Legislation Mnistry of 
Labour. 'the legal framework in Greece is 
problematic, you cannot do your social enterpise 
model' Gree MP, School Canteens 'the legalistic 
framework in \greece is bad and the reasoning 
behind is that we cannot give you directly money, 
so we name you SE and go get the money' Greek 
MP 
regulations 
and 
programmes 
  taxation The governemtn needs to introduce tax incentives 
for SE to give back to the society and also to 
change the social insurance systems. I cannot use 
local people in Crete because they donot have the 
proper documentation. It would be illegal to pay 
thems.  
    policies  Social intrapreneurs need policies and need space 
to be able to implement changes. It has to come top 
down' GW 
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    provision of space The local authority has to provide space' Edra-
Drasi 
    education  Awareness. ' The role of the state is to educate' 
ESA Close the loop, Quality Net, Loft 2 Work. 
'You cannot teach social norms only by experience 
and practice' MP 'You cannot teach 
ecosustainability from 5* hotels (so she built an 
ecobuilding in Crete)'ESA. There is no 
environmental sustainability. People don't care. 
People need to be educated. the govenrment needs 
to put it in its agenda' Close the loop. 'You need to 
attract talent non conventional people, the 
government needs to raise awareness' Human Grid 
'Awareness and understanding has been raising 
very very slowly in communitites' GW 'The 
government must make entry into the SE sector. 
The government needs to understand what SE so 
that people gain trust and built legitimacy' ESA. 
The Eco-Green political party is active in raising 
awareness of the public through the organizatio of 
a series of activities and fora 
    financial capital If I had money in the beginning I'd commit from 
start all my time' GW. 'We are trying to push for a 
microfinancing tool of 0-2% interest but no bank 
agrees' Creator of Legal framework Minstry of 
Labour. 'I don’t belive in grants. It's like Faust. 
You end up losing more' Human grid Up greek 
tourism TEDX. 'grants have now dropped 
considerably in the UK' SSE 'it's very important for 
grants to be very small pots of money' SSE 
    business support 
services 
We couldn't afford consultants for the franchise 
model, but we needed them' GW 
logics   necessity of 
interventions 
SE is dependent 60% on the state, 20% on 
corporations, 20% on civil society' Human Grid Up 
Greek Tourism TEDX 'Top-down initiatives are 
wasteful' SSE 'We need to create a friendly 
environment for SE. You cannot impose their 
formation. There is an evolution that leads you 
there' Greek MP. 'Top-down initiatives are 
wasteful' SSE. The need of bottom-up apporaches 
are highlighted as the most efficient.  
    self-help logic Governments should address issues and at the same 
time use this issue to give marginalised people 
confidence, skills 'a can-do attitude'' SSE 
    income based logic 
of non profits 
'They don't understand our logic of income based 
strategies or the fact that it is a groups with 
affiliated for profit activities. We have received 
tangible support from the British Council and the 
Institut Franchais' BIOS 
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    negotiation  The government to take you seriously you have to 
be seen as a national venture. Social Franchise 
gives you that. It gives you aggregated  numbers' 
SSE 
economy   recession during the recession we saw a drop in our sales, 
cause we are not considered efficient' GW 
institutional 
voids and 
failures  
  low entrepreneurism Entrepreneurship in greece is not a dynamic 
environment' Trade Now. 'innovation happens 
between chaos and order. In Greece we have chaos 
and control' SIZ 'Greeks don't understand what 
entrepreneurship is. They don’t know how to plan, 
how to communicate, how to commit to dates and 
prices. Tehre are high uncertainty levels. Deals and 
the owrk is done last moment. There is low 
education on project planning and skills.' ESA 'The 
main issues that entrepreneurism faces in Greece 
are: know how, communication, collaboration and 
transparency' Human Grid TEDX Up Greek 
Tourism 
    inertia there is inertia in people and organizations to 
accept the new model' School Canteens GW 'It's 
hard to bring change in institutions'  
    individualism the problem in Greece is that everyone works for 
themselves only' Panel Group. 'Greek is an 
individualistic society. It is a hospitable society 
with myriad bads: selfish processes, bad 
entrepreneurhsip. People don’t allow their fellows 
to become visible. People are afraid that others will 
steal their ideas and glory. It is a society that lives 
in fears and individualism' limaka-Klimax Plus. 
'You need to be afraid it pushes you ahead' TEDX 
Social Entrepreneur. 
    distrust We came (responded to the loacal authorities 
invitation to participate in 'Athens Social Economy 
Inititative')out of curiosity and the hope that maybe 
something could happen' BIOS. 'I don't want to see 
the same faces' TEDX. 'Distrust in greece is an 
issue, they view me as visionary-crazy- so they 
don't support me' School Canteens 'We have 
serious trust issues' Siz 'People overcharge you 
systematically. You agree and then they change 
their prices. This is how they do business. How did 
they survice up to now? Was it by luck? The 
solution we found was to do the project planning 
ourselves through the use of contracts. In the 
beginning people hated it, but now it empowers 
them' ESA. 'In small communitites in Greece there 
is higher success in SE because people trust each 
other and collaborate with each other' Equal 
Society.  
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    corruption  We cannot protect Soc Coops from opportunism' 
Creator of Legal Framework Minstry of Labour. ' 
NGOs in Greece are associated with corruption 
right to the top of the governmental hierarchy. How 
will the government protect SE from these people?' 
ESA, Equal Society, Close the loop, Edra-Drasi.  
    inefficiency of 
formal authorities  
Don't go to the ministries with your project. It will 
never be realised, it will be burried under the 
drawyer by the next administration. There is no 
contituity in Mnistries. Go to trade associations and 
foundations.' Creator of the legislation Minstry of 
Labour. 'Central and Local Authorities have bad 
public management. We made the mistake to enter 
in a social enterprise partnership with the City of 
Athens and assume the coordination role. Nothing 
is moving. We cannot communicate with them. We 
are in many partnerships together and they are not 
delivering anything. We are waiting a year now to 
provide us with a space for the accomodation to 
homeless people. They say they cannot find a 
space!' Klimaka-Klimax Plus 'We are fed up with 
them. I dont know if they do it on purpose or out of 
incompetency. We have entered a partnership with 
them, they were supposed to provide us the space 
for the accomodation to people living under 
poverty. Nothing!' Medecins Du Monde 'We 
entered in partnership for the creation of the 
technological park (incubator) in Lavrio. It was a 
complete failure because the state never 
implemented the infrustructure projects they had 
programmed; neither the port that was supposed to 
be moved from Pireaus to Lavrio nor the train that 
was supposed to link Lavrio with the tube in 
Athens.' BIC 'The government started to talk about 
SE through the TOPEKO which is on the wrong 
foot. You need intermediary institutions first which 
are more organised. You need impact 
measurements and evaluation. You need a 
Memorandum of Agreement among the civil 
society actors. We have entered in state grants and 
TOPEKO to survive. they will not create social 
enterprises' DIOTIMA.  
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    local authorities SE partner with local authorities' 'The Hub in 
Westmnester has a joint venture with the Borough 
of Westmnster' The Hub 'Local authority needs a 
long time until they will be able to collaborate with 
SE and they can not provide space' SEV- Hellenic 
Federation Of Enterprises. 'We have never received 
any tangible support from the local authorities. 
they just give us their literal support' BIOS. many 
local authorities in Greece adopt a SE agenda 
through top-down creation of SE. The Local 
authority of Acharnai that has entered 5 TOPEKO 
grant programmes is designing to a Universit to 
conceptualise and design the business plans of the 
SE and then it will ask from the participants to the 
programme to implement it.' General Secretary 
Local Authority of Acharnai. 'These practices 
create unfair inner comeptition conditions in the 
community. The grocery across the street will have 
to compete the SE grocers who will have been 
offfered the premises from the local authority, they 
will not be paying bills' Official at the Local 
Authority of Acharnai.  
    conscientious 
societies 
you need to have a society that has awareness and 
is conscientious. When the society rejects deviant 
behaviour then this will lead to SE formation. ' 
Panel group  'I started off with two staff, council 
modey and people working together to solve issues 
of drugs. there was a strong network around me of 
people who wanted to find solutions already' BLG  
    lack of collaboration We struggle to survive. We are a regional body co-
founded by the EC to support the local authorites, 
the chambers of commerce. The problem is the 
lack of collaboration among all these institutions 
and formal bodies. The local authorities have 
provided no support as is the case in other EU 
member states. They didn't provide us with space.' 
BIC 
    social economy 
sector 
I don’t believe that SE will ever grow in Greece' 
Greek MP 
 
Low entrepreneurism. 'The failure in Greece is because there is no collaboration and no 
networks, there is a fragmentation of activities. There is high bureaucracy, low know-
how and grants gophotographed to specific NGOs that are purposufely created to absorb 
the grants. In these NGOs there are minsters and MPs. There is nepotism and corruption. 
These partnerships that are created to absorb the grants include private companies as well 
and they divert the money to their private opearations.' Erymanthos. 
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Individualism. 'You have a society that lacks of respect, punishment is not the solution. 
People care about who will prevail, who will dominate; the winner takes it all. SE brings 
you to a trusting society where you try to make impact for the others way from the above 
thinking. You have a hyperbureacratic state where everyone talks with acronyms' Greek 
MP 
 
Corruption. 'The bids in Greece are given to friends' School Canteens. 'There are high 
levels of nepotism, favouritism,  lack of transparency in public procurement procedures, 
lack of auditing procedures. 'We have to know which of the incubators have succeeded 
and why they are funded. The state and the local community need to set realistic goals, 
adopt an action framework, design a strategy and use evaluation metrics' BIOS. 
'Screening and annual auditing of how you have contributed in the local communities 
need to be allpied' ESA. 'There have to be auditing procedures mesauring the systems and 
criteria screening' DIotima.  
Moritz Waldstein and Martin Elwert were puzzled that the coffee farmers produce 
one of the best coffees in the world, but have to live on approximately two dollars a day. 
Felix Weth, the initiator of Fairnopoly, came across the social problem of corruption dur-
ing his internship at Transparency International. The internship motivated him to become 
personally active in the combat against corruption. He states: “Corruption is the main 
reason why there are many social problems worldwide. Often it is an obstacle for the 
success of good initiatives.” 
 
When formal/central institutions are absent or weak then local institutions like social 
norms, culture and religion are the important determinants of the entrepreneurs’ activity; 
in the case where there are market failures and formal institutions are weak or contradict 
local social institutions then we have the phenomenon of institutional voids, in that case 
social inequalities will continue to exist (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012).  
 
The Development Agency of the Local Authorities that manages all the funds has a very 
obscur behaviour and agenda indicating the existence of corrupted behaviour. The CEO 
has created their own group of consultants and administrators. This was not allowed 
through the loacal authority budget and procedures. Therefore the CEO is remunerating 
these people through wages that come from NGOs that are in partnerships with ADDMA. 
These people work from the premises of the local authority. This executive team 
responds to different agendas, of different interest groups which alters on an almost daily 
basis. The latter are the interest groups that backed up their current political positions. 
There is a lack of management skills, specialised skills, understanding and knowldge on 
the items of the agenda that they are managing. There logic is mostly accommodating for 
various conflicting interest groups. The Mayor themselves stated 'I want you to close 
down your fractions'. But the Mayor has low support from the employees of the local 
authority, has low political support from the big political parties. The Mayor is stressed 
over time (time that passes and he is not able to present a series of actions and measures) 
that would help him be re-elected. The Mayor also wants to avoid conflict creation and 
wants to avoid coming in confrontation which is needed to make changes. Esepcially in 
the SE sector where the local authorities are reacting fiercefully afraid of losing their jobs 
and public services being replaced by SE 
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5.6.1. Legislation and Regulations 
 
The UK government has incorporated the most inclusive programme of public policies to 
support the growth of the social entrepreneurship sector (Nicholls, 2010a) reflected in the 
‘Big Society’ act. Including new organizational legal forms, initiatives and new 
institutions in social finance, public sector innovation, consultancy, capacity building and 
research. Unlike other countries formal institutions interventions whose goal is to develop 
new methods for the resolution of welfare issues, the UK government targets the growth 
of the social enterprise sector per se (Nicholls, 2010a). These policies have had direct 
spreading effects in the influence of other formal institutions, like in the USA the Obama 
Agenda, in Ukraine, and in Asia (Nicholls, 2010a). Italy was the first country to introduce 
a legal framework for social enterprises the ‘Social Solidarity Co-operative’ in 1991; the 
UK government introduced the ‘Community Interest Company’ (hereafter CIC) in 2005, 
then followed Spain and France. The Greek government introduced the ‘Social Co-
operative Company’ in 2011.  
 
5.6.1.1. EU 
 
According to the Social Business Initiative of the European Commission Social 
businesses are companies that have a positive social impact and address social objectives 
as their corporate aim rather than only maximising profit. A social business is managed 
by social entrepreneurs in an accountable, transparent, and innovative way by involving 
workers, customers and stakeholders affected by its business activity. Its main objective 
is to achieve significant impact on the individual, on society, on the environment and the 
local community. Social enterprises are innovative because they satisfy needs that have 
not been met yet by responding with smart solutions; these ventures target smart 
sustainable growth (Social Business Initiative, 2011). 
 
“(Social enterprises) seek to serve the community’s interest (social, societal, 
environmental objectives) rather than profit maximisation. They often have an innovative 
nature, through the goods or services they offer, and through the organisation or produc-
tion methods they resort to. They often employ society’s most fragile members (socially 
excluded persons). They thus contribute to social cohesion, employment and the 
reduction of inequalities” (European Commission, The EU Single Market, 2012).  
 
“Europe is undergoing a deep unemployment and social crisis at present, but social 
economy and social enterprise represent an important source of inspiration and energy for 
a recovery” (European Commissioners in Borzaga et al, 2013:4). 
 
The European Commission has adopted a number of mechanisms, legislative actions and 
other tools to support the growth of social entrepreneurship and its eco-system. In 2011 it 
launched the Social Business Initiative and its consultative multi-stakeholder expert 
group named GECES to support its goal of designing a strategy on the growth and 
regulation of social enterprises in Europe; there are also discussions about an Act on the 
 249 
Common Social Single Market (Europa, 2011; European Commission, 2012; Nasioulas, 
2012; Social Business Initiative, 2012).  
 
The Social Business Initiative of the European Commission contains a number of actions 
to support its further development, it’s goal is to contribute to the creation of a favourable 
environment for the development of social business in Europe, and of the social economy 
at large (European Commission, 2012). The Social Business Initiative has proposed three 
major measures: firstly, to improve the access to funding for social businesses through a 
common regulation, microcredit, the creation of a financial instrument of 100mil euro 
which are financial intermediaries with equity, debt, and risk-sharing instruments, the 
European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. Secondly, to 
improve the visibility of social businesses though mapping enterprises of the civil 
society, public database of labels and certification, learning and capacity-building, 
information and exchange platform. Thirdly, to improve the legal environment of social 
businesses through the creation of a European Foundation Statute (Social Business 
Initiative, 2012). These  packages of proposals for more responsible businesses builds on 
the Single Market Act, in which the European Commission has formulated 12 
mechanisms to re-launch the Single Market for 2012 for sustainable, smart and inclusive 
growth. Part of these proposals were the creation and development of small and micro 
enterprises, by introducing smart regulation and cutting red tape, and the creation of an 
eco-system conducive to the development of social entrepreneurship (Europa, 2011). The 
Communication on Social Entrepreneurship forms the beginning for a series of legislative 
and non-legislative initiatives that will be launched the following two years (Europa, 
2011).  
 
5.6.1.2. UK 
 
“social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses 
are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather 
than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and other owners” UK 
Government (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.18) 
 
“We want a bigger, stronger society. One where communities and citizens have 
more power to shape their lives and determine their destinies. Pushing power away from 
the centre to local government, and beyond local government into the hands of 
neighbourhoods and citizens, will help to catalyse local social action. We want social 
ventures to take full advantage of these opportunities and create positive change in our 
society… the lifeblood of our economy… will be with social enterprises” (Rt. Hon 
Franchis Mod Minister of the UK Cabinet in Cabinet Office, 2013c:5) 
 
In 2000 the Social Investment Task Force is established (Cohen, Chairman of the UK 
Social Investment Task Force and Big Society Capital, 2010). In 2005 the Community 
Interest Company (hereafter CIC) act is introduced, establishing a specific legal format of 
incorporation to facilitate the set-up and growth of social enterprises. It is of limited 
liability: either a company limited by guarantee- which is the majority 75% of CICs- or a 
company limited by shares, it cannot take the form of charity or cooperative or IPS, but a 
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charity can have as subsidiary a CIC (Nicholls, 2010a). Their initial growth was only 200 
companies per year and from 2008 onwards almost 1,000 annual growth in numbers 
reaching in 2012 4,500 CICs population. Each CIC must go through a community interest 
test ‘An organisation satisfies the community interest test if a reasonable person might 
consider that it carries on its activities for the benefit of the community or a section of the 
community’ (CIC Regulator, 2013:4); there is an asset lock which restricts the transfer of 
assets out of the CIC so that assets remain for the benefit of the community; there are no 
tax reliefs like in the case of charities since it is allowed to make profits; there is a 
dividend cap that was raised to 20% in 2010 and 35% today and an interest cap (Cabinet 
Office, 2013c) 
 
“The CIC structure provides a clear signal to investors that the enterprise operates 
for the benefit of the community, and that this social purpose is protected by law” 
(Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
 
The Labour government in 2006 established a Social Enterprise Unit within the 
Department of Trade and Industry and an Office for Civil Society (OCS) within the 
Cabinet Office with a dedicated Minister (Nicholls, 2008). In 2006 Capacitybuilders was 
established as a non-departmental government body to run the governments Changeup 
Programme targeting the reform of the voluntary sector infrastructure; during its 
existence it allocated around £150mil, it was closed down in 2011; this fund was 
originally allocated in 2004 through the Home Office targeting among other actions the 
creation of 6 ‘hubs for expertise’ to boost charities technical skills. Capacitybuilders 
replaced the plan of six hubs with nine National Support Services to which £16mil were 
allocated from 2008-2011 (Civil Society, 2012).  
Legislation, Regulations and Policies on social entrepreneurship: 
a) the Social Enterprise Business Support Improvement Programme run in 2011 by the 
Office for Civil Society;  
b) Capacitybuilders run the Social Enterprise Programme from 2008-2011 
c) The Mondernizing Commissioning Green Paper published December 2010 and the 
White Paper on open public services, which include the rules for social enterprises 
bidding for public contracts; the tool 
(https://online.contractsfinder.businesslink.gov.uk/) is a easy to use central finder of 
all pubic contracts of more than £10,000 value 
d) Cutting red Tape task force to facilitate the establishment and management of social 
enterprises;  
e) the Giving Green Paper in 2010 to facilitate social enterprises access to people, time 
and money; 
f) introduction of LEPs and Enterprise Zones  
g) Social Enterprise UK (SEUK) the national body for social enterprise 
(socialenterprise.org.uk) renamed in 2011 from social enterprise coalition.  
 
 (Cabinet Office, 2011; 2013c; Rocket Science, 2011) 
 
The Conservative government’s (elected May 2010) vision is a locally-driven ‘Big 
Society’, which lies in: the design of a new infrastructure where charities, co-operatives, 
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social enterprises and mutuals are a strong vehicle in running public services; in 
empowering individuals and strengthening community involvement; in private sector-led 
growth; in boosting charitable giving; in transferring central power to local authorities; in 
cutting government budgets. All publicly-funded support that was prior administered 
through Business Link will be replaced from the new government with Business 
Coaching for Growth, at the moment Big Business, Business Accelerator and 
Mentrorsme have been launched and are all referenced through GOV.UK. Restructuring 
also aims in the set up of a National Call Centre, in the setup of a central network of 
40,000 mentors and in the creation of a New Enterprise Allowance Scheme aimed at new 
business start-ups from unemployed people. Social enterprises are part of this agenda.  
 
A new format has been introduced ‘business-led Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs) 
which aim in replacing Regional Development Offices with the goal to strategically drive 
local economic development through private sector-led growth, job creation in their areas 
and business support through existing local networks. Social enterprises should be part of 
LEPs and growth hubs. There are 24 LEPs formed among local authorities and local 
business leaders.  
 
As part of the ‘Big Society’ vision the government has launched its strategy on the 
growth of the social investment market to fund social ventures (Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
which includes the review of tax incentives and regulation for social investment as well 
as the establishment of an independent ‘Big Society Bank’. Social enterprises to be able 
to attract capital from the new scheme need to become investment ready, for this reason 
there is a need for an effective business support environment that is easily accessible to 
them (Cabinet Office, 2011). As part of the UK’s G8 presidency in 2013 Prime Minister 
David Cameron initiated the organization of the first Social Impact Investment 
Conference which took place on the 6
th
 of June, 2013. Social impact investment market 
recognizes the value of social entrepreneurs’ activities and supports them through the 
supply of private capital to social enterprises on the basis of both their social and 
financial returns (Cabinet Office, 2013b): 
 
“I want to use our G8 Presidency to push this agenda (social impact investment) 
forward. We will work with other G8 nations to grow the social investment market and 
increase investment, allowing the best social innovations to spread and help tackle our 
shared social and economic challenges” (UK Prime Minister David Cameron in Cabinet 
Office, 2013b, p.1) 
 
The social enterprise national picture in the UK includes: The Office for Civil Society, 9 
Regional Social Enterprise Networks whose coalition is SEKE (social enterprise 
knowledge exchange), Social Enterprise UK (former known as Social Enterprise 
Coalition) which is the national body for social enterprises, Co-ops UK, Development 
Trusts Association, Social Firms UK, National Housing Federation, Association of 
British Credit Unions, CIC Association which represents all community interest 
companies (Social Enterprise North West, 2011), Regional Development Agencies 
(replaced gradually by LEPs), Business Link support providers through GOV.UK, the 
recently established Big Society Trust, and the institutions of the social investment 
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market including the Big Society Capital, community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs), community development funds, social impact bonds, and other explained 
below. 
 
Social franchise.  
“How to make social franchising happen in the UK… Policy makers and social 
investors alike now need to think how (to) implement some of the other 
recommendations, including developing a ‘pipeline’ of social franchises, and establishing 
a dedicated social franchise investment fund.” (Nick O’Donohoe, Chief Executive Big 
Society Capital in Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012:5) 
 
European Social Franchising Network was founded in the UK in 2010 sponsored by the 
EU’s Equal Programme. It organised the first European Social Franchise Conference held 
in London in 2011 with the participation of social franchises. The International Centre for 
Social Franchising was founded in London in 2010 by Dan Berelowitz and Michael 
Norton; the latter is a known serial social entrepreneur who is co-founder of UnLtd that 
has been replicated in India and currently in South Africa (Richardson and Berelowitz, 
2012). In 2007 the Social Franchise Summit took place in Berlin identifying as issues: 
lack of understanding, lack of experience, lack of role models, history of failure, and lack 
of investment, managerial expertise and other resources (Richie et al, 2011). As early as 
1994 Michael Norton organised a Charity Franchising Conference with the Directory of 
Social Change influenced by the example of Crossroads Care and Home Start which were 
among the first social enterprises to ever grow through a franchise model (Berelowitz, 
2012). According to the International Centre for Social Franchising in the UK there are 
reported 95 social franchises today, in Europe there are 45 (Richardson and Berelowitz, 
2012). Based on a tighter definition of the European Social Franchising Network there 
are 63 franchise systems totally in Europe employing about 22,000 people and generating 
€600m (ESFN, 2011). 
 
The CIC legal structure provides many benefits for social franchises as it allows for a 
director salary, so the owners of CIC can be members on the board be paid and retain the 
control; asset locks prevent the assets to be distributed to the shareholders or members; 
both physical and legal entities can be owners of a CIC; it can be financed by loans or 
bonds and by stakeholders taking shares, like The Hub Westminster is 50:50 between the 
Hub World and the City of Westminster; investors can receive returns but there is an 
interest cap and a dividend cap, latter 35%. So barriers to venture finance, also they have 
fewer fund raising opportunities from trusts than charities; they do not have the tax reliefs 
that apply to charities, like Gift Aid on donations and rate relief on premises.  
Companies ltd by Guarantee LCG that have a charitable purpose can take a charitable 
status which offers them higher fund raising potential but limits there trading activities 
and loan financing. They cannot raise finance through shares but solution to this is long-
term loan arrangements. 
Industrial and Provident Societies IPSs is appropriate for community cooperatives 
especially for raising share capital.  
Cooperatives are also another legal structure that do not have to be IPS 
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Limited Liability Company and Limited Liability Partnership are for profit formats that 
allow for limited liability of shareholders (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012) 
 
5.6.1.3. Greece 
 
Based on the Greek government:  
 
“(Social Cooperative Enterprises are) partnerships with a social purpose that are 
allowed by law to operate as businesses” (Law No 4019/2011, Greek Government). 
 
 
5.6.2. Funding 
 
All evidence from research highlights that the biggest constrained of social enterprise 
formation and growth is access to capital (Cabinet Office, 2013c). To meet the objective 
of building bigger and stronger societies there is a need for societies to support social 
entrepreneurs’ ventures in combining social return with financial sustainability. Therefore 
governments need to leverage this cost that social enterprises incur. On the other hand the 
fall in charitable revenues and the pressure of public services towards ‘value to the 
taxpayer’ leads to the necessary externalization of social enterprises from parenting 
bodies (Jeffery, 2005; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007).  The role of governmental funding to the 
formation and growth of social enterprises through grants and vouchers is being 
significantly constrained due to serious cost-cuttings (Cabinet Office, 2011). Funding 
from trusts and foundations is also constrained as their own investment income falls; in 
2009 in the UK it fell by 13.6% and their contribution to charities fell by 7% (Big Society 
Capital, 2012a). The solution is through the growth of the social investment market, 
through the channelling of private money to social ventures (Cabinet Office, 2013b; 
2013c). Social enterprises are considered risky investments due to the failures of the 
voluntary sector (Cabinet Office, 2011); therefore there is a need for the existence of 
guarantee funds. This is the reason for the need of the creation of Social funds around the 
world to play this role.  
 
“Big Society Capital could be a game changer if its resources could be used to 
encourage investors to back what is considered to be more risky ventures. Nobody wants 
to be the first person to put money in” (Faisel Rahman, founder of Fair Finance, a social 
enterprise providing microfinance loans to poor, in Neville and Moules, 2012) 
 
Existing funding to social enterprises comes from state budgets through grants and 
vouchers, from donations, from social venture capitals, from asset finance, from peer to 
peer lending, from business angels, from mezzanine finance, from micro financing, from 
crowd funding platforms, and from social investment funds (Cohen, 2010). In 2009 The 
Rockefeller Foundation established the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) with 
commitment of $38.5m to raise the effectiveness worldwide of social investment. The 
micro-finance market in 2008 was estimated overall of $39bill value with over 76m 
borrowers (Cohen, 2010). Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Funds have emerged 
globally, in Europe according to the study SRI 2010 of the European Sustainability 
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Forum (Eurosif) on 14 European countries in 2011 SRI were €6.7tril of these the size of 
social investment (in the study called impact investment) is €8.75b (Eurosif, 2012); of 
these 55% is microfinance, 19% social business entrepreneurs funds, 18% community 
investments, and 8% other alternative investments.  
 
The SRI funds in Europe are 6% of all retail investments which are 31% of all invested 
assets; the composition of the SRI funds is 33% equity, 51% bonds, 9% alternative assets, 
like hedge funds and venture capitals which decreased from 12% over the increase of 
liquid monetary assets which are 7%. The UK is considered a global leader in the SRI 
market, its value was €1,235b in 2011 and a world centre for social investment (Eurosif, 
2012). According to the UKSIF (Sustainable Investment and Finance Association) up to 
2008 £754b have been invested in these funds in the UK (Cohen, 2010).  
 
In 2011 Boston Consulting Group alone recorded to have invested £165m in social 
investments (Neville and Moules, 2012). JPMorgan made o global commitment to invest 
in the social investment market. Its research in 2010 drawing from data from the GIIN of 
the Rockefeller Foundation estimates that in the next decade the market could reach from 
$400m to 1 trillion with potential profits of $183m to $667m for just the five segments of 
affordable urban housing, rural access to clean water, maternal health, primary education, 
and microfinance (JPMorgan, 2010). According to the same study it was identified that in 
the US 99 impact/social investors had committed $8bil in 2012 in the market with the 
objective to commit $9bil in 2013, estimates revealed that in the next decade 
impact/social investments would constitute 5-10% of portfolios (JPMorgan, 2013).  
 
“In 2007, J.P. Morgan launched its Social Finance business to provide capital, 
financial services, and research to the growing market for investments and businesses 
creating positive social impact. Since that time, we've seen the impact investment market 
gain significant momentum with the entry of greater numbers of mainstream 
investors. The development of uniquely skilled professionals and intermediaries, 
specialized industry associations and networks, and standardized metrics points to the 
emergence of impact investments as a burgeoning asset class in its own right” Nick 
O’Donohoe, Global Head of Research for J.P. Morgan in JPMorgan (2010:1) 
 
"There is an increasing number of emerging business models where the pursuit of 
social or environmental impact is a mutually reinforcing goal alongside financial return. 
These are the types of business models that impact investors actively target" Amy Bell, 
head of principal investments for J.P. Morgan Social Finance in JPMorgan (2013:1) 
 
According to the study social investors comprise: foundations, commercial banks, 
development finance institutions, private wealth managers, boutique investment funds, 
high net worth individuals, and pension fund managers. The invested sectors consist of: 
energy, health and education, accommodation, agriculture, water, education, and 
financial services. Among them the two thirds expect market rates of return, whereas one 
third believes they are concessionary, or that they are willing to sacrifice a slight rate of 
their financial return. A 60% considers that a trade-off among impact and financial 
returns is not required (JPMorgan, 2013). Social Investment Finance Intermediaries 
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(SIFIs) are the organisations that create the channel between social investors and frontline 
social enterprises and social ventures. SIFIs are mostly social enterprises themselves, 
they comprise of social banks, social investors and support providers. They have 
difficulty generating fee income from social enterprises and there operating gap is a 
median 35% which is covered by donations, grants and endowment income. SIFIs source 
of capital in the UK in 2011 was 63% from the government, 12% from trusts and 
foundations, 7% from wealthy individuals and 7% from commercial finance. Social 
banks balance sheet funding came 45% from individual investors. (Big Society Capital, 
2012a).  
 
5.6.2.1. EU 
 
The European Commission has adopted a number of financial instruments like in 2013 
the European Social Entrepreneurship Fund (EuSEF), earlier than that the European 
Social fund and the European Regional Development Fund and other tools to support the 
growth of social entrepreneurship and its eco-system (Europa, 2011; European 
Commission, 2012; Social Business Initiative, 2012).  
 
The European Union’s financial contribution to social enterprises coming from the 
European Social Fund, was characterized as weak (Nyssens, 2006) what strengthened it 
was the EU regulation for public contracts which privileges social enterprises and allows 
the consideration of social dimensions in the procedures for the award of public contracts 
(Nyssens, 2006).  
 
The European Commission announced on 7
th
 December 2011 its proposal on the launch 
of a EU-wide fund “European Social Entrepreneurship Fund” (EuSEF) which is the 
brainchild of the Social Business Initiative. 
 
5.6.2.2. UK 
 
Social entrepreneurs in the UK in 2012 had limited awareness of the existence of 
alternative means of finance and even lower on how to find these sources: 57% were 
aware of venture capitalists but only 33% knew how to find them, 44% were aware of 
asset finance, round 30% of business angels, peer to peer lending, and 20% of mezzanine 
finance (Cabinet Office, 2013a). 45% of start-up and new frontline social enterprises 
cited lack of capital as their primary barrier to setting up and 44% of established front 
line social enterprises cited it as primary barrier to sustainability and growth; in 2011 the 
finance gap of the sector was £0.9bn-£1.7bn (Big Society capital, 2012a).  
 
In 2000 the Social Investment Task Force was established to “to set out how 
entrepreneurial practices could be applied to obtain higher social and financial returns 
from social investment, to harness new talents and skills, to address economic 
regeneration and to unleash new sources of private and institutional investment” (Cohen, 
2010, p.2). The works of the task force resulted in the following outcomes. The Charity 
Bank is established in 2001. The same year the Community Development Finance 
Association (CDFA) and the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) are established 
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to provide support for the establishment of Community Development Finance Institutions 
(CDFIs), which are social enterprises offering support advice and finance to 
disadvantaged businesses, individuals, social ventures, and homeowners covering the 
gaps of market failures; the first 11 CDFIs are launched in 2003 certified by CITR, today 
there are 60 CDFIs (CDFA, 2013); in 2005 they are all transferred to the responsibility of 
the Regional Development Agencies. By 2009 CDFIs have invested £472m and the CITR 
has raised £58m. (Cohen, 2010) 
 
“Hull Business Development Fund promotes and supports enterprise in every 
shape and form. One of the enterprises it helped with a loan was Atlas Leisure Homes, a 
Hull-based caravan manufacturer, which went on to create an additional 60 jobs as well 
as boost the local supply chain. The lending is made possible by a number of investors, 
including Unity Trust Bank” (CDFA, 2013) 
 
“Big Issue Invest finances social enterprises that are helping to tackle poverty and 
inequality. It supported Highlands Home Carers, an employee-owned business which 
provides high quality care in remote areas where others aren’t willing to go, and enabled 
it to grow. Big Issue Invest successfully raised investment from corporates, individuals 
and foundations – including the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation” (CDFA, 2013) 
 
“Scotcash works to address financial exclusion in Glasgow, by providing 
affordable loans, access to bank and savings accounts and debt advice. It works in 
partnership with a local housing association, NG Homes, to reach more people – such as 
Marie Nicol, who took, and repaid an affordable loan instead of using a payday lender” 
(CDFA, 2013) 
 
“Wessex Resolutions improves the health and well-being of people by enabling 
them to carry out essential repairs to their home. It provides home improvement finance, 
in partnership with local authorities such as Teignbridge District Council. The finance 
enabled the Smethursts, a young couple in Devon, to install central heating and 
insulation, transforming how they live” (CDFA, 2013) 
 
Another objective of the task force was the creation of Community Development Venture 
funds (CDVs) through the model of venture capitals, of long-term equity management 
(Cohen, 2010). In 2002 Bridges Ventures create the first CDV with £20m raised through 
venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, banks and local authorities pension funds and got £20m 
government matching; Bridges II of £75m is launched in 2007 with no government 
funding. In 2008 Bridges Social Entrepreneur Fund is launched providing equity capital 
to social entrepreneurs. Until 2013 the £20m of government spending has led to £300m 
private sector investment through Bridges Venture Funds whose portfolio consists of 
sustainable growth funds, sustainable property funds, social sector funds, social impact 
bonds, and social enterprises funds. (Bridges Ventures, 2013; Cohen, 2010) 
 
Between 2001-2010 a number of CDVs and CDFIs are launched with government 
matched funding, like UnLtd with £100m from the Millenium fund; the Prince’s Trust; 
the Financial Inclusion Fund £120m from government; the Breakthrough social 
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investment programme by  CAN and Permira;  in 2007 the Department of Health 
launches the DH Social Enterprise Investment Fund of £100m; in 2008 Triodos Bank 
launches the Triodos Social Enterprise Fund; the Esmee Fairbairn foundation Social 
Investment Social Fund of £15m (originally piloted with CAF Venturesome); Impetus; 
Private Equity Foundation; CAF Venturesome; Investing for Good; ClearlySo; Big Issue 
Invest; WHEB Ventures; Communitybuilders of £70m; Catalyst (with £5m cornerstone 
commitment from Barclays).   
 
“Since it was established over 40 years ago by teacher John Mulcahy to provide 
holidays for disabled children, KIDS has become a leading provider of respite services 
and inclusive nurseries. The charity now helps thousands of disabled children and their 
families each year. In October 2007, KIDS received a £250,000 unsecured loan from 
CAF Venturesome to rescue it from a serious cash flow problem: the charity had run into 
financial difficulties because it had made operating losses over a number of years which 
had decimated its cash reserves. By October 2009, KIDS had transformed itself by 
eliminating loss-making contracts with local authorities; refinancing property assets; 
maintaining efficient management of costs; and exceeding fundraising targets. By 
January 2010, KIDS was making healthy surpluses, with an increase of income year on 
year of 18%, and was able to repay its entire CAF Venturesome loan three years early” 
(Cabinet Office, 2013c:22) 
 
“We were told social enterprises need patient capital to grow, scale up and 
replicate. We felt investing in an intermediary would give us a specialist team of people 
who could support enterprises better than we could. It could also attract other funding 
spreading the risk with a group of investors. That led us to invest £750,000 in Big Issue 
Invest… We look to invest in social enterprises that embody the ethos of Big Issue – a 
hand up not a hand out. We liked the business model of HHC, the passion of staff and 
their commitment to delivering really good quality care. They are able to help people in 
very remote areas and so people are receiving home caring where no one else is willing to 
provide it” (Danyal Sattar Social investment Manager at Esmee Fairbain Foundation in 
CDFA, 2013) 
 
“Alt Valley Community Trust (AVCT) is based in an economically deprived area 
of north-east Liverpool and focuses on creating training and employment opportunities 
for local people. Working with two sister organisations, AVCT runs a community-based 
training facility, the Communiversity, which is housed in a former old people’s home and 
offers a broad curriculum, including subjects such as IT, construction, digital design and 
mechanics. AVCT received initial social investment in 2003 of £200,000 (£100,000 loan 
and £100,000 grant) to develop and expand the community site by building a recording 
studio, conference centre, café, crèche and study support rooms. In 2006, AVCT received 
an investment of £1 million to develop a vocational training centre for 14 to 19-year-olds. 
It has subsequently increased its training and learning contracts and turnover has grown 
from £0.7 million in 2003/04 to £1.8 million in 2009/10. AVCT has used this income to 
make loan repayments and to invest in providing additional services to the local 
community” (Cabinet Office, 2013c, p.23) 
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A third objective of the task force was the launch of social impact bonds which result in 
the decrease of money spent on crisis interventions by investing money on early 
intervention and preventative actions which also increase social cohesion and wider 
benefits to society. Specifically, a social impact bond identifies issues that create a 
considerable cost to the taxpayer, like re-offending, hospital admissions of elderly people, 
at-risk children admitted into care. The bond enters in a long-term contract with the 
government which agrees to pay money saved from the positive outcome of the social 
organizations activities funded by the bond. The bond raises investment from the private 
sector based on the contribution that will get from the government. The activities that are 
funded by the bond are long-term preventative actions from the funded social 
organizations addressing the roots of the cause of the social problems identified. The 
investment return is linked with the successful outcome of these actions thus increasing 
social innovation. The investment is directed to social organizations thus increasing the 
revenue of social sector organizations. In 2010 Social Finance ltd launched the first 
Social Impact Bond with the Department of Justice to target the decrease of re-offending. 
(Cohen, 2010) 
 
“There is a growing social investment market which is prepared to blend financial 
return with social impact. However, it is embryonic and needs support… With added 
support from the largest UK banks, we are on the brink of realising the vision for the Big 
Society Bank. We believe that it will be an important catalyst for growing the amount of 
private capital available to support our social entrepreneurs… In the same way that 
finance flowing to business start-ups is the lifeblood of our economy, so it will be with 
social enterprises” (in 2011 Rt. Hon Franchis Mod Minister of the UK Cabinet in Cabinet 
Office, 2013c:5) 
 
“Our vision calls for the creation of a new ‘asset class’ of social investment to 
connect social ventures with mainstream capital” (Cabinet Office, 2013c:17) 
 
“This new class of investments cannot be ignored by institutional investors 
seeking to diversify their investment strategies and satisfy a broader range of investor 
demands. For a pool of capital with defined financial and impact objectives, there are 
interesting ways to test the market and gain experience as products in this asset class 
increasingly become available” Amy Bell, head of principal investments for J.P. Morgan 
Social Finance in JPMorgan (2013:1) 
 
The task force’s further objective was the creation of a social investment bank, in 2008 
Social Finance ltd establishes an embryonic social investment bank (Cohen, 2010) and in 
April 2012 the UK government launched the Big Society Capital (BSC, also known as 
big society bank) with £600m to invest on social enterprises ventures that prove their 
ability to generate income (Easton, 2012); £400m come from dormant accounts and 
£200m from Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS. This is the first such investment 
institution established in the world which invests via intermediaries in social enterprises, 
social impact bonds and other similar businesses (Neville and Moules, 2012). The Big 
Society Capital group consists of three organizations: The Big Society Capital ltd, the Big 
Society Trust ltd by guarantee, and the Big Society Foundation ltd by guarantee charity. 
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The Big Society Capital shares are 60% owned by the Big Society Trust whose sole 
objective is to safeguard the realization of the BSC’s mission it holds an 80% voting 
rights needs 75% consensus and, its board comprises of executives from social, business 
and government roles, and 40% owned by Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland; the collective voting rights of the latter are capped at 20% 
(Easton, 2012). The chairman of the fund is venture capitalist Sir Ronald Cohen former 
Chairman of the Social Investment task force. (Big Society Capital, 2012a) 
 
“(Our vision is) A strong, diverse, well-capitalised and sustainable social 
investment market in the UK, through which social sector organisations can access 
appropriate and affordable finance and support to grow their impact on society” (Big 
Society Capital, 2012a:3) 
 
It is independent from the government but has a ‘locked in’ mission, it is a wholesale 
bank, transparent, self-sufficient in the long-run from the yield on its investments though 
in the beginning it takes higher risk more patient investments of lower yield; it invests 
through providing loans, co-investing (to match-funding, first-in, last-in) , underwriting 
(like with social bonds to be the first to buy in and hold before distributing it in the 
market) and  guaranteeing (to secure investments if they underperform). BSC assumes 
the role of champion in the social investment market through a gateway portal, 
supporting creation of networks of social investment institutions, consultative role to 
boost governmental reforms to design social investment policies and models, commission 
and disseminate research, share expertise, promote embeddedness of social impact 
assessment, propagate best practices, encourage geographical growth of the social 
investment market in the UK and abroad. (Cabinet Office, 2013c; Big Society Capital, 
2012a). Critics highlight that the size of the fund is much smaller than government 
budget-cuts, when the voluntary sector is losing £1.2bn per year and that charities with no 
revenue stream are excluded from this market (Easton, 2012) 
 
BSCs customers are the SIFIs (social investment finance intermediaries). The 
beneficiaries of the activities of the BSC through the SIFIs and front line social 
enterprises are: children and families, community regeneration, disability, education, 
employment, financial exclusion, health and social care, housing and shelter, 
infrastructure, mental health, young people and children. When the social ventures that 
receive investment prove an impact on resolving social needs then the government will 
pay the fund some of the money it would spend on tackling these issues; e.g. when a 
social enterprise that deals with unemployed released prisoners delivers its goal by 
improving their lives and finding them jobs, then the government saves money by 
reduced benefits, decrease in offenders returning to jail, community gains by the social 
inclusion of this groups and by less criminal actions. In that case the government will 
give back some of this money to the fund (Easton, 2012). Types of investment products 
include: ‘angel’ financing for start-ups; venture and equity-like financing for growth; 
from semi-equity to full-equity investments; property investment; loans; grants; patient 
capital; structured investment products; retail banking for large-scale working; and 
investment capital finance (Cabinet Office, 2013c; Cohen, 2010). Crowd funding (also 
called crowd financing or crowd source capital) it is based on the collective collaboration 
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of people to support a venture through the internet, this provides the venture with a 
support group for its development and reduces the risk of invested fund; is the most 
unsecured type of financing (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
It is expected that the Big Society strategy will encourage the reform of the financial 
management of the £95bn assets of charities and foundations, which up to now have been 
conservatively managed, by channeling them towards social enterprises (Nick Hurd, 
Minister of Civil Society in Neville and Moules, 2012). Another important investor could 
be individual citizens’ investment on social enterprises, e.g. by acquiring shares from 
their local pub, shop or post office (Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
 
 “Our vision could eventually see individuals and families choose some social 
investments as part of their ISAs (Individual Saving Accounts) or pension fund” (Cabinet 
Office, 2013c, p.7)  
 
Reforms for the funding of social enterprises and the growth of the social investment 
market include: 
 tax incentives to social investment: CITR (Community Interest Tax Relief) 
provides yearly 5% tax offset over 5 years for money going to CDFIs; Enterprise 
Investment Scheme for social enterprises that issue shares set 20% cost of shares 
against individual income liability; Venture Capital Trust to set 30% of the cost of 
shares against individual income liability and relieving the income tax burden on 
dividend liability; Decrease of small profits tax rate (up to £300,000) to 20% 
(marginal relief upper limit £1.5m), main corporate tax to 23% in 2013 reaching 
20% in 2015, and unit trusts and special open-ended investment companies 20%; 
Reducing national Insurance contributions the threshold at which employers begin 
to pay NI rises from £110 to £137; Doubling the amount of tax rate relief for 
small firms for one year 
 regulation and legal framework for social investment, White Paper on open public 
services; the Local Growth white Paper in 2010 encourages social enterprises to 
seek funding from the Regional Growth Fund of £1.4bil to enter in markets that 
are dependent on the public sector; commitment that 25% of new government 
contracts will go to SMEs; Localism Bill includes ‘Community Right to Buy’ to 
bid for acquisition of community assets, ‘Community Right to Challenge’ to show 
interest for a public service that will lead to the design of a procurement; ‘Rights 
to Provide’ 2so that public service employees can spin out public services and 
create their own social/mainstream enterprises through innovative ownership and 
investment models such as joint ventures and partnerships that the Government is 
encouraging; the Mutual Support Programme of £10m to support mutuals 
attracting social investment; Merlin programme by Department for Work and 
                                            
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/215523/dh_128458.pdf 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/215662/dh_128174.pdf 
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Pensions is a new supply chain management tool to encourage prime contractors 
investing in capacity building of their sub-contractors who are often social 
ventures; expand Payment by Results (like in social bonds) in other public 
services thus providing early working capital to providers; exploit social 
investment in various areas through Early Intervention approach (pilot run 
Graham Allen MP on breaking inner-generational underachievement through 
scaling up programmes on babies, children and the young); rules on financial 
promotion for investment to be approved by Financial Services Authority  
 Legal structure for social enterprises: The Community Interest Companies 
introduced in 2005 there are now 4,500 CICs,  
 Expansion of the community shares market to attract equity investment for local 
projects within the communities 
 introduction of a Community Reinvestment Act to enhance the flow of capital to 
disadvantaged groups and areas though the disclosure of information on lending 
by banks and other financial institutions, like the US practice; the act will enhance 
transparency, social fairness and partnerships 
 reform regulation on charity investments to seek a combination of financial and  
social returns 
 increase application of social returns measurements and investment readiness of 
social enterprises through business support 
 the support for the creation of a trade association for venture intermediaries 
 the establishment of a ‘Social finance city’ the clustering of all these 
intermediaries could create a social investment hub 
 the support for the creation of Community Development Financial Institution 
(CDFIs), Community Development Venture funds (CDVs), Social Impact Bonds, 
Community Banks, Community Loan funds, and Micro-loan funds; Partnerships 
between local authorities and local business owners through introduction of LEPs;  
 support of Social Investment Finance Intermediaries (SIFIs) who are funded by 
the BSC 
 the establishment of the Big Society Capital to leverage social investment, to 
provide access to social investment for social entrepreneurs, and to facilitate the 
entry of financial intermediaries, wealth and pension managers, charities and 
philanthropic foundations, high street banks, and ‘high net worth’ individuals to 
the social investment market  
 ‘Merlin’ banks agreement with the government to improve their positive 
contribution to society and economic recovery established in 2011. The Merlin 
banks are Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and RBS they are investing 
permanent equity in the Big Society Capital 
 individual citizens to acquire shares on social enterprises, like their community’s 
shops  
 the creation of a social investment trading platform; a social stock exchange 
market (Cabinet Office, 2013a; 2013b;2013c; Cohen, 2010) 
 
As previously said in 2011 the finance gap of the sector was £0.9bn-£1.7bn; SIFIs 
provided £0.2bn to the sector so they can partially offset this gap (Big Society Capital, 
2012a) 
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The major challenges that the social investment market faces are: 
a. major challenges of Social Investment Financial Intermediaries are: capitalization 
and balance sheet growth, risk and working capital, sustainability and operational 
growth, market mechanisms and infrastructure, advice skills and information 
b. lack of viable products/options 
c. lack of investment readiness of social enterprises  
d. fragmented deal flow as investments are mostly targeted towards scaling up rather 
than start-up and early growth 
e. lack of standardised deal types, they take 9-18 months from first contact as 
opposed to 3-6months for mainstream SMEs 
f. high transaction costs, estimated to be £5000 which is relatively high and is the 
same regardless of investment value (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) as the 
investment value is usually low  
g. the size of the funds is small raising performance concerns and they lack a 
developed track record of performance 
 
“More data exists on investments in renewable energy, micro-finance, and support for 
small and medium enterprises in frontier countries... Impact investors and business 
owners are continuing to identify new models of intervention that can generate return and 
positive impact and deepen the track record with time... Theory of Change is a 
methodology for planning and evaluating social intervention” Amy Bell, head of 
principal investments for J.P. Morgan Social Finance in JPMorgan (2013:1) 
 
h. there is still ambiguity over terminology and market definition 
i. there is a lack of generally accepted measurements of social returns and 
performance benchmarks of social enterprises 
 
“The impact mandate, or "theory of change" as it is sometimes called, is a key 
concept in establishing benchmarks, as it helps establish specific objectives and targets 
for the desired impact. A framework to evaluate investments against objectives may 
include, among other factors: how an investor defines its targeted population or issue, the 
approach or intervention model for improvement, and evidence of ongoing commitment 
to achieving the impact mandate” Amy Bell, head of principal investments for 
J.P. Morgan Social Finance in JPMorgan (2013:1) 
 
j. externalities as value is accumulated in third parties rather than the investor or 
investee 
k. the market requires a clear structure and existence of diversity of organizations 
like in the case of the mainstream financial market; there is a need for qualified 
advisory/corporate finance functions, specialize investment banking, and 
secondary markets  
 
“With a lack of indices and exchanges and few intermediaries in the impact 
investment market, large investors are turning to banking partners or boutique advisors 
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for help in navigating this space” Amy Bell, head of principal investments for 
J.P. Morgan Social Finance in JPMorgan (2013:1) 
l. Mistrust and concern about green washing 
m. Risk concerns; cultural and behavioural barriers, like towards risk perceptions and 
risk aversion to social investments  
n. imperfect information,  
o. imperfect competition, barriers to entry and exit 
(Cohen, 2010; Cabinet Office, 2013c; Eurosif, 2012; JPMorgan, 2013) 
 
Social franchising Funding: The first schemes that received funding from the Big 
Society Capital of £3.6m were:  ‘Think forward social impact’ that helps young people 
into work and education; ‘Franchising Works’ that supports unemployed people on how 
to run franchise businesses; and the ‘Community Generation Fund’ which supports 
renewable energy plants for local communities (Easton, 2012). The BSC commissioned a 
research on social franchising sector, part of its objectives is to fund the replication of 
successful social ventures and to support the creation of platforms for social franchise 
formation and the creation of a social franchising fund that would  fund the scaling-up 
(Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). According to the report funding should be directed 
towards the centers that have run the programmes on social franchise creation introducing 
here an element of bias and excluding consulting firms with vast expertise on franchising; 
also that need right balance of grants, patient capital and loan finance based on the high 
social costs of the venture. Break even could vary from 2-5 years or more and capital 
start-up from nothing to £1.5m; grant funding is preferred than loans. (Higgins et al, 
2008; Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
The Social Franchise Investment Fund could leverage default and risk if funding 5 
different options: 
1) 25% of existing social franchisors need capital to expand capacity. Big Issue Invest 
invested £200,000 on MyTime CIC and CASA seeks £500,000 
2) Fund recruitment of new franchisees, so fund franchisees, set up cost for a new social 
franchisee from £5,000 to £1.5m. Start up cost according to EASN 11 Social franchises 
was £103,000 
3) Fund the first franchisee, which is the highest risk investment. But high social return 
investment. Recommend a feasibility study on 10-50 social enterprises that could become 
franchises, 20% would develop fully, ‘pipeline’ of franchisable social enterprise needs 
long terms.  The cost is average £134,000 to make them franchise ready but this varies 
BlueSky 10,000 CASA 500,000. For mainstream businesses 30-50,000 excluding costs 
running the pilot.  
4) Invest in charities running a mainstream franchise for earned income strategy (income 
generation model) and joint branding high sales, low property of charities high values for 
franchising, as long as it doesn’t conflict with its social aims 
5) Investing in mainstream franchisees running social aims; socialized version of 
commercial franchises. Possibility of 10% running a socialized version. But this could 
raise costs to 21.3% when employing disadvantaged groups like homeless people based 
on a study on social enterprises if running on purely commercial basis the variation 
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though was 10% increase by 40% of respondents and 70% increase for 14% of 
respondents (Higgins et al, 2008; Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
Need to create a Social Franchise Investment Intermediary consisting of a specialized 
social franchise support body (that would also account for management consultancy on 
the field) and a specialized social investment support fund. These two need to be separate 
for avoiding potential conflict of interest but working closely to avoid as possible the 
default rates of funds. Develop a challenge to raise awareness and a pipeline of scalable 
sustainable social enterprises (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012; Richie et al, 2011) 
 
 
5.6.2.3. Greece 
 
5.6.3. Business Support Centres 
 
Evidence shows that the social enterprises that seek advice from business support centers 
do better than those that don’t (Cabinet Office, 2011; 2006). Business Support 
Programmes contribute to an increase to the social enterprise model and to a positive 
change to the environment of business support services offered to social entrepreneurs 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). There is a great need for pre start-up and start-up support. 
 
 
5.6.3.1. EU 
 
Bergek and Norrman (2008) define a business incubator as a ‘protected space’ for start 
ups and fledgling companies made up of four main components: (1) shared office space, 
which is rented under more or less favourable conditions to the users of the incubator; (2) 
a pool of shared support services to reduce overhead costs; (3) professional business 
support or advice (‘coaching’) and (4) network provision, internal and/or external. The 
concepts of ‘protected space’ and ‘shared office space’ can also be extended to a ‘virtual 
space’, considering the progress in new technologies and the opportunity to have a virtual 
office space. So business incubators provide tenant companies with several facilities, 
allowing the start-up to concentrate on its business plan. From the side of the university 
there is usually a Technology Transfer Office or Knowledge Transfer Office that 
oversees the cooperation between the university and the business incubators In spite of 
the diffusion of business incubators in Europe, it is still unclear whether the business 
incubator model has been successful in fostering the establishment and growth of 
research-based spin-offs. Some authors are very critical about the effectiveness of 
business incubators. Tamasy (2007)64 for example claims that technology-oriented 
business incubators tend to fail in supporting entrepreneurship, innovation, and regional 
development and, therefore, do not fulfill their expected role as policy instrument. The 
evaluation results she reports upon show that incubators can be a costly policy 
instrument. First, they have a low motivating effect and it seems likely that business 
incubators have only provided minor stimulus for individuals starting a business. Second, 
the empirical results suggest that business incubators do not increase the likelihood of 
firm survival, innovativeness, and growth. Third, the costs of incubators seem to be 
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positively correlated with the level of funding without a hard budget constraint. Finally, 
the business incubator idea in practice is actually a very modest contributor to regional 
economic development. She concludes that these findings do not legitimise the use of 
public funds to support the incubation industry. Italy suggest a more positive view of 
science parks and business incubators. Italian parks managed to attract entrepreneurs with 
better human capital, as measured by educational attainments and prior working 
experience. In addition, on-incubator firms show higher growth rates than their 
offincubator counterparts. (Europa, 2012a). Their performance relies on their type and 
objectives.  
 
5.6.3.2. UK 
 
In 2010 in the UK 54% of social enterprises asked for business support and 16% used a 
business mentor, which dropped to 50% and 9% respectively in 2012. The survey 
indicated that social entrepreneurs were more likely not to know where to seek for 
financial advice and were more than average likely to ask colleagues for business advice. 
On the other hand they would less than likely ask advice from accountants and financial 
experts and would turn to a bank, though in lower rates than conventional entrepreneurs 
(Cabinet Office, 2013a). Many social enterprises have particular weaknesses in “business 
planning and marketing and sales skills” (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
Weaknesses of the business support environment for social enterprises 
The weaknesses that have been identified for the development of social enterprises in 
terms of business support are: difficulties for social enterprises accessing publicly/private 
funded business support; inability or unwillingness to pay for business support services; a 
lack of understanding and expertise in supporting social enterprises amongst publicly-
funded and mainstream business support staff; the inability of social enterprises to 
purchase high quality business support; need to increase trust among social entrepreneurs 
and publicly-funded business support; and a lack of advisor and organisational 
capacity/standards among the social enterprise support agencies (Cabinet Office, 2011; 
2013c). Also there is a need for more available research and analysis on the market; a 
web-based portal (could be the task of the Big Society Capital); development of better 
measures of social returns 
 
The environment for business support to social enterprises is provided in the UK through:  
 
a. Mainstream business support centres and services that were traditionally offered 
through the Business Link 
b. Local business support not-for-profit local enterprise agencies delivering services 
funded by public and private sector companies 
c. Mainstream professional services (lawyers, accountants, etc) 
d. Public and private pro bono corporate support through various programmes 
e. Support bodies specifically for social enterprises: consulting agencies, like Eastside 
Consulting; trading platforms like Social Enterprise Mark Company; training 
centres, like Social Enterprise Training and Support; hubs, like ‘Enterprise Burn’ of 
Bromley by Bow 
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f. Financial advisory and support intermediaries  
 
Programmes run for business support provision that include social enterprises to address 
the issue that social entrepreneurs are facing are: 
a. On social franchising the programmes that have run with co-funding from the 
European Social Fund EQUAL programme have been:  
1. the Banstalk programme delivered through CAN (Community Action 
Network) which helped the set up of five franchise systems: Law for All, 
Big Issue, Timebank, CAN Mezzanine, TACT (living services for 
handicap people) 
2. the Flagship programme delivered through Social Firms UK they 
supported the creation of 11 social franchises, 2 have failed. Supported the 
set up of six social franchises: Aquamacs (rental and maintenance of 
aquariums), Soap-Co (handmade soaps), Wholefood Planet, Pack-IT, Cafe 
Ciao, Wood recycling 
3. The Plunkett Foundation which is the leading foundation on agriculture 
also supported the development of five social franchise models: Farmers’ 
Market Operation, Wood for Heat and Power, Charcoal Products, Local 
Food for Food Service, Local Fruit and Vegetables 
4. Inspire run between 2005-2008 was co-funded by the ESF’s EQUAL 
programme it supported the creation of three social franchises: Care and 
Share Associates- CASA, Community Renewable Energy, Option C car 
club now renamed Commonwheels. It also supported the creation of the 
ESFN  
5. In 1994 the Directory of Social Change organised a Charity Franchising 
conference 
6. UnLtd and Social Enterprise UK have published reports and manuals on 
social franchising 
7. Now the centres offering support for social franchise creation are: 
international centre for social franchising  ICSF, European social franchise 
network ESFN, social enterprise coalition SEUK, Ashoka UK, CAN, 
Centre for Innovation in Voluntary Action CIVA, and Plunkett foundation 
(Higgins et al, 2008; Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012) 
b. Mainstream business support centres and services are offered though the new 
initiatives of Business in You joined with Great Business, GrowthAccelerator, 
Mentrorsme (which is targeting 40,000 mentors referenced through its web portal), 
Business Link Helpline, the Manufacturing Advisory Service, and the Growth 
Voucher Programme all providers are referenced through the GOV.UK website. 
c. Within ‘Inspiring the future Initiative’ enterprise champions being young 
entrepreneurs going to schools and talking about their example; ‘Enterprise 
Village’ support teachers to set-up a school business; ‘Premier League Enterprise 
Academy’ enabling football clubs to enhance entrepreneurship in young people; 
‘Tenner’ provides school children £10 to fund a business idea and earn money; 
support of student-led enterprise societies in all universities and colleges; Start-up 
loans to aged 18-30; Social entrepreneurs have also access to all available funding 
that is available for mainstream businesses.  
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d. New Enterprise Allowance for unemployed people to start-up their businesses 
provides access to mentoring and £2000 
e. Establishment of 24 Enterprise Zones administered by Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) establishing a business there provides: financial benefits up to 
100% business tax rate relief up to £275,000 over 5 years, capital allowance for 
investment in plant and machinery, lease payment holidays, low-rent incubators, 
development funding; on site customer base there are clusters formed and some are 
focusing in specific sectors; straight-forward planning process like automatic 
planning permission; business ready infrastructure; ‘soft-landing packages of low 
cost business support;  
f. The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) Social 
Venture Intermediary Fund, provide grants to a portfolio of intermediaries to 
support them to become sustainable and scalable businesses  
g. Every Business Commits launched in 2010 is named ‘Trading for Good’ helps 
SMEs businesses go beyond social responsibility to obtain a robust community and 
pro social entrepreneurship agenda specifically goals of actions are: improve skills 
and create jobs; decrease carbon and protect the environment; to help the 
community; improve quality of life and wellbeing of employees; and support SMEs 
to grow 
h. the Social Enterprise Business Support Improvement Programme run in 2011 by 
the Office for Civil Society which distributed £5.9mil equally to all English regions 
through Regional Development Offices, Regional Social Enterprise Networks 
(RSEN) and Business Link regional providers; The programmes outcomes were: to 
Identify needs through research and mapping; to Improve supply; to Stimulate 
demand; the National Evaluation of the programme. (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
i. The Capacitybuilders Social Enterprise Programme of £6mil from 2008-2011 
(source Rocket Science, 2011). The programme targeted the infrastructure of the 
business support providers for frontline social enterprises through the funding of 35 
projects delivered by the 9 Regional Social Enterprise Networks, the Social 
Enterprise UK and 26 support organizations, among which was the social franchise 
School for Social Entrepreneurs. The programme targeted two outcomes: 
Organizational effectiveness (72% of funding) “Support services are better able to 
provide social enterprises and entrepreneurs with the resources, knowledge and 
support they need to increase their effectiveness in delivering a triple bottom line 
(people, planet, profit)”; and Voice and Influence (28% of funding) “Support 
services are able to enhance market opportunities for social enterprise and influence 
the development and delivery of policies and programmes.” The programmes that 
were funded were: 
1. a knowledge management programme at a national level through SEUK to 
encourage and facilitate knowledge exchange for the social enterprise support 
sector, through the creation of SEKE (Social Enterprise Knowledge 
Exchange) which was a network of the RSEN 
2. development of regional networks through the funding of the nine RSEN to 
identify needs in their region, select and fund a project, assist the entire 
programme in its implementation, participate in the SEKE, invest on their 
sustainability 
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3. 35 specific projects in each region around an identified issue in the provision 
of business support services to social enterprises, such as mentors, networks, 
specialist advisors, producing and promoting learning resource, producing 
service directories, facilitating events. The project that the social franchise 
School for Social Entrepreneurs got funding to run was ‘Social Enterprise 
Peer Support’. The project ‘Selling Added Value Franchise’ was run by Social 
Enterprise Support Centre in Yorkshire for £105,000. More than the majority 
of the projects were themed around formation of networks. 
 
Specific Actions that are applied to resolve social enterprises and support service 
providers’ challenges are: 
 
a. Identify Needs  
 
The identification of needs in the social enterprise sector is achieved through two actions: 
research on the issues identified by stakeholders and mapping of the social economy 
ecosystem 
 
b. Improve Supply: 
a. Improve capacity and provision of advisor support.  
Social enterprise support can be delivered through mainstream business support centres 
as long as there is sufficient specialism in technical aspects of social enterprises, ability to 
demonstrate empathy with social and environmental aims, ability to communicate in an 
easily understood language, ability to inspire, motivate and enthuse, participation of 
social enterprise champions/ambassadors and specialists of the relevant sector. Problems 
with business support have been documented as being: lack of empathy, lack of follow-
up, lack of understanding the business model. Activities included: training for business 
support staff; social enterprise visits; employment of specialist business advisors to act as 
social enterprise champions; accreditation for specialist providers 
 
“Xxxx is really good as he has personal experience of running a social enterprise, 
so he really knows what it is like” Social Enterprise, East of England (Cabinet Office, 
2011, p.27) 
 
“I am much more inclined to spend the remaining training budget on developing 
an internal team of social enterprise advisers, which could operate as a team within the 
company or, if things change, operate as independent specialists” Business Link 
Representative (Cabinet Office, 2011,p. 28) 
 
Improve market opportunities or demonstration of value through: improve understanding 
of successful public sector contract winning, improve understanding/research of market 
opportunities (like, social enterprise business model or growing market such a health 
commissioning or prison management), improve awareness among public sector 
procurers/commissioners of the value of social enterprises, improve 
awareness/understanding of social value assessment tools and impact measurements to 
improve their ability to demonstrate value, improve ability for consortia formation, 
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improve regional distribution or access to market opportunities 
 
b. Increase quality 
 
Activities include: provision of learning opportunities for advisors, increase the number 
of trained advisors, improve regional distribution or access to support, improve 
mechanisms for referrals to advisors. Choosing the right supplier; there is an Information, 
Diagnostic and Brokerage (IDB) service which refers customers to business support 
providers based on the needs identified. Important tool is also the Customer Satisfaction 
Survey rating of the Business Link. The existence of compulsory accreditation of 
business support suppliers is difficult, but a feedback mechanism like customer rating 
database to increase quality and standards. UK provided bursaries to suppliers to obtain 
accreditation through Small Firm Enterprise Initiative and Institute of Leadership and 
Management.  
 
c. Direct funding to social enterprise networks and business support centres 
 
The funding from Capacitybuilders was used for were sector network development, 
resource development, and production of marketing and promotional material. The 
networks used this funding to: expand their capacity, invest in their activities, improve 
their business model, and target financial sustainability knowing that from 2011 there 
would be serious cost cuts on intermediaries. The programme increased organisations’ 
“visibility” and, more importantly, their “credibility”. Half of the support organizations 
documented that they would continue 40-30% of the funded activity after the funding has 
ended. There were also synergies created among support organizations which will add 
value by reducing duplication, encouraging complementary work, and facilitate 
collaboration and cross-promotion. They documented that they improved their fund 
raising skills on creating projects and winning EU funding thus developing sustainable 
income sources. 
 
“We have been able to use the Capacitybuilders money to really support our 
sustainability going forward” (Rocket science, 2011, p.26) 
 
“SEEE has been using its development money for visits with their members. 
These visits are conversations between SEEE and SEEE members and can be beneficial 
to SEEE by building up the Regional Network’s knowledge of its member organisations 
and putting together a clearer picture of the region so they are better able to target new 
work” (Rocket science, 2011:26) 
 
“SEL have been trying to increase their membership base. Since 2008 they have 
moved from 1000 members to approximately 2300 members. This allows SEL to engage 
with more social enterprise, offer more social enterprises their services and better 
understand the movement in London. SEL have also improved and expanded their 
support offer through developing and trying out new services” (Rocket science, 2011:26) 
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“[B:RAP’s capacity,] It definitely is [increased]: it has increased skills internally – 
not least because some staff within BRAP have undertaken the training to be mentoring 
themselves…. Our reach across the West Midlands – much more reach into rural areas - 
has been improved. 80% of people that benefited from this project were outside our 
existing networks.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.28) 
 
 “The DTA is used to working with quite large, multipurpose organisations 
through this programme we have been able to work closely with smaller rural community 
organisations.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.28) 
 
“It has really helped us reach out to a large number of organisation who we didn’t 
know about and who would not have known about us” (Rocket science, 2011, p.28) 
 
“It has given us peer support [between regions]: ‘how are people dealing with 
their job” (Rocket science, 2011, p.30) 
 
“We were able to cross fertilise examples of good practice to support weaker 
social enterprise links or relationships”. (Rocket science, 2011, p.30) 
 
d. Stimulate demand though funding 
 
Grant and voucher schemes should be targeted to high growth social enterprises to make 
transformational changes that will have all economic, social and environmental impacts. 
Start-ups should get a loan thus overcoming access to finance and at the same time 
encouraging their commercialisation. Until 2011 they were given vouchers and grants of 
£1000 to £4000 for business support: legal, business plans, marketing and website 
creation; on a ‘claim back’ approach and they were very popular. It is highlighted that 
there should be a distinction between grants that are targeted for consulting services, 
which develop business skills and grants that are targeted for support services and 
tangible products like website creation, marketing leaflets, etc. Evidence suggests that 
grants and vouchers has a significant value for social entrepreneurs, it helps them face 
challenges and develop their businesses. Evidence also suggests that social enterprises 
need funding to compensate for their social and environmental contributions and to 
overcome market failures; bearing in mind the risk of creating a grant dependency 
culture. It should be viewed as investment and be linked with transformational change of 
social enterprises. 
 
“The consultants did a good job, but £1,500 doesn’t really buy a lot of 
consultancy time, so they just had to “parachute in” and do what they could in the time 
that they had” Social Enterprise, East (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.38) 
 
c. Ongoing adult learning schemes.  
 
To improve learning activities that were adopted include: increase volume or access to 
learning resources (incl. databases, online information, information packs, examples of 
best practices), increase sharing of information and understanding (knowledge 
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management) among social enterprises, support provides, and third sector organizations, 
improve regional distribution and access, increase training.  
 
There is an increase in demand for prestart-up and start-up support provided locally 
(Rocket Science, 2011) apart for complex social enterprise business models. Workshops 
have much lower success than master classes. “One-off training events have only limited 
impact” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.28) In rural areas difficult to attract attendees; success 
heavily reliant on facilitator, success rises if they have personal experience in managing 
social enterprises-what is called ‘Experts by Experience’ when on social enterprises 
premises, where workbooks available, and when they move from generic to specialist 
knowledge. It is also recommended to add a fee so that to increase their perceived value.  
 
“This is very different from the “sheep dip” approach, which did not really work. 
There are more people who are engaged with social enterprise “behind the scenes”, but 
having a limited number of champions helps to maintain their quality” Social Enterprise 
Network Representative (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.28) 
 
“The „First Steps‟ workshops that were organised by Social Enterprise East 
Midlands (SEEM) were aimed at helping people to understand the social enterprise 
business model, find out about governance and legal structures and developing a business 
plan. The workshops introduced the support that was available via mainstream Business 
Link services and included a “guest speaker” from an established social enterprise. These 
workshops proved popular within the region and resulted in a waiting list of people 
wishing to attend them. First Steps In Social Enterprise in the East Midlands (Cabinet 
Office, 2011, p.40) 
 
Masterclasses are considered much more successful, they are more specialists, building 
ongoing relationship and mutual support of social entrepreneurs. Masterclasses should be 
structured around a workshops programme that leads to action learning sets and deals 
with specific issues, especially on impact measurements, asset management, procurement 
assistance and financial diversification. There is a strong need for business support on 
training social entrepreneurs to develop social and environmental impact measurements. 
Social entrepreneurs need impact measurements and investment readiness protocols to be 
able to attract money from the social investment market, from the Big Society Bank, to 
be able to win public bids, and to get pro bono support from public and private sector. 
They should be delivered by social enterprise champions on social enterprise premises 
and be based on a peer to peer learning approach.  
 
“A programme of masterclasses was developed in the North West region, 
following a consultation exercise with the sector on its specific support needs. The 
masterclasses covered topics, such as Strategic Business Planning, Human Capital 
Management, Workplace Learning, Impact Measurement and Skills Auditing. By the end 
of 2009/10, 40 masterclasses had been held with 280 participants. All participants are 
provided with learning materials and the option to join an Action Learning Set after the 
workshop so that they can continue their learning and maintain contacts that they made 
during the masterclass” Masterclasses in the North West (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.40) 
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“The Brampton and Beyond Development Trust is an umbrella organisation for 
Sustainable Brampton and its action groups. It wants its action groups to become 
sustainable businesses. Tim Coombe, Director at the Development Trust, attended a 
Masterclass on Strategic Planning. This involved being taken through an approach called 
“appreciative inquiry”, which takes a positive approach to business planning. Since 
attending the Masterclass, the organisation has changed its approach to business planning 
and this has resulted in initiating a series of projects that have begun to bring in new 
revenue” Case Study: Strategic Planning Masterclass for Brampton and Beyond (Cabinet 
Office, 2011, p.41) 
 
“Attending the marketing masterclass had a big impact on our organisation. It was 
very relevant to our needs and pitched at the right level. It changed the focus of 
marketing our enterprise” Social Enterprise, North West (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.41) 
 
“I attended two masterclasses, one on Strategic Business Planning and another on 
Training Needs Analysis. Both were excellent. They enabled me to bring a lot of new 
ideas back into the organisation and to network with a lot of people with different issues 
and concerns” Social Enterprise, North West (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.41) 
 
Evidence suggests that  masterclasses: improve business planning; they help social 
entrepreneurs to incorporate new practices to face challenges; they are inspiring and 
motivational; they lead to the formation of inter-organizational relationships among 
social enterprises; and they are much more effective than one off interventions 
 
d. Mentoring 
 
Both peer to peer networks and mentoring are highly valued by social entrepreneurs. 
Social network of mentors includes existing social entrepreneurs, the mentoring 
relationship has to be established and monitored. The way it structured is that an 
experienced social entrepreneur is matched with a start-up for a specific period of time 
for which they will receive a fee. Personalised mentoring support is costly so should be 
co-sponsored by private funds and self-funding. 
 
“Mentors are paid £2,000 to provide six half days of mentoring time to the 
mentee, in addition to an initial introductory session. In many cases the relationship 
between the mentor and the mentee has continued after the end of the six-month period. 
There is significant value attached to having an “external sounding board” that helps to 
improve motivation and self-confidence amongst mentees.” Mentoring in Yorkshire and 
Humberside.  (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.35) 
 
“Don Derrett, the Chief Executive of Self Direct Ltd took part in the mentoring 
scheme in Yorkshire and Humberside because he wanted to “scale up” his social 
enterprise. He had a number of mentoring sessions with an experienced social 
entrepreneur that gave him the opportunity to “reflect with someone else”. Since taking 
part in the mentoring scheme, Self Direct has taken on two new employees and 
practically doubled its turnover” (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
 273 
 
The method of peer to peer learning has been identified as one of the most favourite 
methods of social entrepreneurs. Peer to peer networks provide opportunities to get 
acquainted with, be taught by and collaborate with other social entrepreneurs that speak 
the same language and face similar problems. Usually these networks offer the context 
for the development of long-term relationships. Networks need to have continuous 
investment, to be dynamic, actively managed, sufficiently open not to isolate members. 
When social enterprise networks are valued by their members then they become self-
sufficient and self-funded (Cabinet office, 2011). To improve peer support and 
networking opportunities activities that were adopted are: improving formal and informal 
networking, improve number of trained peer mentors, improve training of peer mentors, 
improve regional distribution and access to peer mentors, improve mechanisms for 
referrals to peer support mentors 
 
“The London Development Agency (LDA) provided funds were used to increase 
the membership of the Social Enterprise London (SEL) network to 2,000 and OCS funds 
were used to broaden the range of support activities that were provided to members. 
Members include both social enterprises and other interested organisations and the 
network provides members with a fortnightly newsletter and access to a range of events 
and activities. There are different levels of membership that entitle members that enable 
members to access the range of services that they need, including one-to-one advice and 
support, advertising space in the Social Enterprise Directory and access to SEL‟s legal 
service, professional training and mentoring partnership. The more challenging economic 
climate has meant that members are increasingly expected to make a contribution towards 
SEL activities, which enables them to take a more business-focused approach to 
engagement” Peer to Peer Networks in London (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 36) 
 
e. On-line specialist business support material  
 
This is useful but is insufficient on its own even by active users; there is need for 
personal face to face contact. 
 
“At best, on-line resources enable social entrepreneurs to access support at a time 
that suits them. There may be significant advantages of using virtual approaches to 
overcome challenges faced in attracting people to workshops, which mean they spend 
valuable time away from their enterprises. This could include developing discussion 
forums, posting workshops on Youtube; developing interactive diagnostic tools; making 
better use of social media to improve networking opportunities and providing some form 
of personalised on-line content” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.53) 
 
“A considerable amount of OCS funding was used by London to develop on-line 
materials in 2009/10. The aim was to create a legacy from the programme that could be 
used once the funding had finished. The toolkit includes more than 50 practical social 
enterprise guides and an interactive business planning tool. It has been developed by a 
wide range of partners, including Red Ochre, UnLtd, Social Enterprise London, London 
Rebuilding Society; the School for Social Entrepreneurs; the London Development 
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Agency and Business Link in London. It was launched in Spring 2010 and its impact on 
social enterprises in the capital will be evaluated in 2010/11” Developing On-Line 
Materials in London (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.42) 
 
“Jeyanthi Kalairajah has plans to set up a fashion design social enterprise that 
involves trading with India. She accessed the Business Link in London business planning 
tool to help her to clarify her business objectives. Working through the interactive tool 
made her think more clearly about why she wanted to set up her social enterprise, Anjali, 
and gave her the confidence to speak to people about her plans more confidently. 
Jeyanthi particularly liked the fact that she was able to go back to the tool to review her 
progress at a time that suited her. She now has a clear business plan that sets out the steps 
that she intends to take to set up her enterprise” Case Study: Using an On-line Business 
Planning Tool (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.42) 
 
Evidence suggests that online tools are not so successful and people do not participate on 
social media sources, they follow them but they do not interact or actively engage though 
them:  
 
“We have a Face book page and a Twitter site. Although we have plenty of 
members/followers, they don’t really tend to be used. People seem to like to read what 
has been written, but are less keen to contribute, so they don’t really work that well” 
Social Enterprise Network Representative (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.42) 
 
 
Important parameters of programmes: 
 
a. Regionality 
 
Regional approach of programmes rather than national one has greater value to social 
enterprises and support organizations as it helps them respond to specific regional needs 
and strengthen inter-regional activity 
“[Co-ordination] could not have been done nationally…it is the nature of the 
beast” (Rocket science, 2011, p.34) 
 
“This has allowed better regionally relevant advice.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.34) 
 
“There is a closeness between all the contracted bodies in the region” (Rocket 
science, 2011, p.34) 
 
b. Flexibility 
 
Programmes that are outcome-based and not output-based provide the flexibility to move 
resources to different objectives as circumstances change and thus increase the 
effectiveness of the funding 
 
“SEEE identified in the last 12 months that “right now what we need to do is influence 
LEPs and that is what social enterprises need”. After confirming they were able to 
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transfer some resources to this they have been able to provide a much needed service” 
(Rocket science, 2011, p.35) 
 
“RISE has found that the flexibility has allowed much more in the way of innovation and 
collaboration not least because the various delivery partners are “much less precious 
about which outputs ‘belong’ to them” (Rocket Science, 2011, p.35) 
 
Flexibility of funding was a great strength of the programme which allowed for the 
incorporation of EU funding from the European Regional Development Fund, of other 
OCS funding, of funding for mainstream businesses and funding of regional providers 
from their Single Programme funding. (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
 
c. Power Distribution: Accountability and Coordination 
 
The coordination role and accountability when being at the national level created 
imbalances especially to experienced regional partners.  
 
“At the end of the day we are very small players in Capacitybuilders’ world – 
only £6m. In this region the VCS Capacity programmes are taking up a lot of their time. 
They can think social enterprise can get on with it themselves.” (Rocket science, 2011, 
p.36) 
 
“Capacitybuilders come out when there are problems. If I was having a problem I 
would know where to go.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.36) 
 
“The regional networks have no coordination role and it is clearly the role of 
Capacitybuilders to micromanage the projects…while not having this role takes the 
hassle out of this. But it would have been better for the regional networks to have that 
coordinating role.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.36) 
 
“We are finding it really hard because we don’t have any teeth [ie contractual 
accountability of the projects to the Regional Networks]” (Rocket science, 2011, p.36) 
 
The issue of trust because of prior direct ties was identified as being an important 
determinant of governance of social inter-firm partnerships: 
  
“It is clear that the balance is difficult, and more complex than it seems at first. 
On the one hand the Regional Networks wish for more control, for which they perceive 
that they can return added benefits to themselves and the programme. On the other, 
Capacitybuilders do not have a history of working with the Regional Networks which 
would provide evidence of their abilities to be held accountable in this way, and are 
experienced funders. The conclusion may be that in future to those regions which are 
better placed to take on this role be fully empowered to do so, including contractual 
accountabilities and a portfolio of projects fully commissioned by the Regional 
Network.” (Rocket science, 2011, p.37) 
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d. Conflict resolution 
 
“We would advise all organisations in any way involved with grant funding to: 1. 
always endeavour to identify and resolve potential issues about contracts, contractual 
conditions or IPR before they arise and 2. have in place a mutually agreed policy defining 
the mechanism by which such matters will be resolved (e.g. mediation, mutually binding 
arbitration or other options)” (Rocket science, 2011, p.36) 
 
5.6.4. Proposition 3 
 
Proposition 3: The influence of the dynamics of the system of formal institutions in 
the formation, governance and performance of social franchising 
 
Our research into social franchising coincided with the strategic political interest of the 
EC to actively support the growth of social enterprises in Europe and especially in 
Greece, because of the financial crises in the latter and its significance to the European 
Union (hereafter EU) (Argyrou and Kontonikas, 2011; Fahrholz and Wojcik, 2010; 
Eichengreen, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2010). 
 
 “…what is the role of social enterprises in Greece to help exit its horrible 
situation and to empower the financial and social structure of the country…I encourage 
you to participate in solidarity actions for the growth of social enterprises in Greece” 
European Commissioner Lazlo Andor (5
th
 June, 2012:2) at the first meeting of the 
GECES experts group, which is the specialized consultative body of the EC on the design 
of policies on social entrepreneurship in the EU. 
 
Most of the social franchises that we studied were part of funded governmental and EU 
programmes either through direct grant funding and through publicly funded support 
centers that consulted them and supported them in building their networks. SSE, CASA, 
Big Issue, Pack-IT. Fareshare gots charity funding. Not grant funded only one: Green 
Works? 
 
In 2012 in the UK social entrepreneurs identified as obstacles to the success of their 
business issues form the external environment: 81% the economy, 56% regulations, 53% 
taxation and contributions, 49.3% competition, 48% obtaining finance which was much 
higher than in average SMEs, and 15% pensions. While from their internal environment 
organizational issues were found less important as obstacles to success, them being: 28% 
shortage of skills, 25% recruiting staff, 25% availability/cost of premises, and 15% 
shortage of managerial skills/expertise. With reference to the economy the specific issues 
that were mostly identified were: 74% increased energy cost, 69% drop in demand, 69% 
pressure to reduce prices, 61% increased cost of raw material; while less important 
factors were: around 35% overseas economy and low levels of inward investment, around 
20% cheap imports and exchange rates, and 17% lower labour costs overseas (Cabinet 
Office, 2013a). 
 
The innovative sustainable solutions to social problems through social entrepreneurs’ 
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ventures are substantial to governments and societies today (Cabinet Office, 2013c). A 
government’s role is not to generate itself private growth or social enterprise growth, but 
what it can do is to establish the conditions for this to take place (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
It does that through a number of interventions: legislation, regulations, policies and 
infrastructure, funding, and business support services. Specifically:  
a. regulation and legal framework for social enterprises 
b. open up and decentralise public services;  
c. increase opportunities to social enterprises to deliver pubic contracts;  
d. facilitate the creation of the environment for the boost of social procurement of 
private organizations through the provision of services and products from social 
enterprises 
e. facilitate purchase of community assets by social entrepreneurs 
f. facilitate access to capital through the growth of the social investment market    
1. tax incentives to social investment 
2. regulation and legal framework for social investment 
3. reform regulation on charity investments to seek a social return 
4. increase application of social returns measurements and investment 
readiness of social enterprises through business support 
5. establishment of Social funds to leverage social investment, to enhances 
the creation of a structured social finance environment, and to provide 
access to social investment of social entrepreneurs 
6. facilitate the entry of financial intermediaries, wealth and pension 
managers, charities and philanthropic foundations, high street banks, and 
‘high net worth’ individuals to the social investment market 
7. the creation of social trading platforms through social stock exchange 
markets 
g. enhance the design of an efficient business support environment for social 
enterprises 
1. publicly funded business support 
2. grants and vouchers for business support 
3. improve capacity, quality and access to business support centers 
4. improve learning, mentoring and peer learning of social entrepreneurs and 
service providers 
5. facilitate networking; facilitate social enterprise networks,  consortia 
social inter-firm alliances and social franchises creation 
6. enhance the financial sustainability of business support centers 
7. enhance the entry of mainstream financial institutions and mainstream 
consulting houses to the market 
 
(Cabinet Office, 2013c) 
 
Ferri and Urbano (2010) research supports that government interventions foster the 
development of social entrepreneurial activity. Tax incentives enhance social 
entrepreneurship activity (Van Putten and Green, 2010). Corruption hinders social 
enterprises formation and performance (Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Tonoyan et 
al, 2010) which lowers through economic development (there is a negative relationship 
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between GDP levels and corruption levels), reinforcement of democratic practices and 
openness of trade. 
 
Sharir and Lerner (2006) results indicate that the supportive environment for social 
enterprises to succeed is incremental, such as provision of technical advice, investment 
readiness, incubators, training, access to networks; their research indicated poor planning 
and poor governing of unsuccessful social enterprises. Their results also indicate the 
problem of social enterprises to raise capital especially at the establishment phase were it 
is mostly needed to achieve success.  
  
5.6.4.1. Formation 
 
The formation of networks has been a strategic goal of the Office of the Civil Society 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). Networking was both at the heart of and an additional outcome of 
many OCS projects; even projects that their primary objective were other outcomes they 
engaged in boosting networking opportunities and actually were rated by social 
entrepreneurs as delivering them high impact from that (Rocket Science, 2011). All 
programmes in business support for social enterprises include activities for the creation of 
networks, mostly: activities on developing consortia, networking events, peer to peer 
mentoring. Evidence shows that mentoring schemes have the potential to create social 
inter-firm alliances and networks (Cabinet Office, 2011).  
 
“The UK doesn’t suffer from a surfeit of large but mediocre social organisations. 
It suffers from a surfeit of small but great social organisations. We need more of these 
organisations to grow and ‘reach scale’. Social Franchising could be part of the answer - 
helping the social sector scale, whilst remaining response and adaptable at a local level.” 
(Nick O’Donohoe, Chief Executive Big Society Capital in Richardson and Berelowitz, 
2012:5) 
 
“Nearly every problem has been solved by someone, somewhere. The frustration 
is that we can’t seem to replicate (those solutions) anywhere else.” (Bill Clinton in 
Bradach, 2003:1) 
 
In 2012 within the Big Society Capital’s first five funded schemes was the social 
enterprise ‘Franchising Works’ which is a support organization supporting and 
accelerating through its License fund the creation of franchise businesses by unemployed 
people (Easton, 2012; Franchising Works, 2013). They got £1m from the Big Society 
Capital; they provide: free seminars, free individual mentoring (incl. business plan 
creation, identification of franchising networks) and funding up to £7,500 for start-ups 
and up to £30,000 for growth from their Licence Fund. Their vision is to expand 
nationally through the method of social franchising (Franchising Works, 2013). 
 
Big Society Capital’s goal is to support scaling up social enterprises by replicating their 
successful models in other regions (Neville and Mules, 2012), thus to support the 
formation of social franchises and various formats of social inter-firm alliances. The BSC 
commissioned a research on social franchising sector-executed by the International 
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Centre on Social Franchising (ICSF), part of its objectives is to fund the replication of 
successful social ventures and to support the creation of platforms for social franchise 
formation and the creation of a social franchising fund that would  fund the scaling-up 
(Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
In 2008-2011 Social franchising was one of the 35 funded projects of Capacitybuilders 
(national body to reform the voluntary sector) Social Enterprise Programme in the UK 
(Rocket Science, 2011). 
 
There are already some examples of social franchises that have grown internationally like 
Emmaus from France in the UK and School for Social Entrepreneurs that has grown in 
Australia but barriers to that are the way social enterprises are constituted and managed 
as well as legal barriers (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). 
 
The value of networks for social entrepreneurs can also be highlighted by the following 
contradiction which was identified at the same region:  
 
“The service that I received was excellent, but overall support that is available for 
social enterprises is quite poor” Social Enterprise, South West (Cabinet Office, 2011, 
p.32) 
 
 “There is support out there especially if you network and link with the right 
people” Social Enterprise South West (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.32) 
 
Capacitybuilders Social Enterprise Programme funded the creation of a national network 
the Social Enterprise Knowledge Exchange (SEKE) consisting of the nine Regional 
Social Enterprise Networks with the participation of representatives from the Social 
Enterprise UK. The programme invested in supporting the nine RSEN by 30,000 per 
annum per network. It invested in the Social Enterprise UK (former social enterprise 
coalition). It invested in Social Franchising project. The direct impact of the programme 
to social enterprises was positive by increasing learning, networking, training and 
resource provision.  
 
Value can be gained by the participation of mainstream businesses as well which can 
exchange technical expertise with social enterprises of the same sector (Rocket Science, 
2011). Overembeddedness of networks can limit their learning and trading opportunities 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
The mechanisms that are funded to accelerate formation of social enterprise 
networks: 
a) Facilitate both formal and informal networking activities of social enterprises, 
social entrepreneurs and potential social entrepreneurs, such as: peer to peer 
learning, attendance to events and visits of social entrepreneurs, improve access to 
peer support provision, improve regional distribution of peer support mentors, 
improve mechanisms for referrals to peer support, improve number of trained peer 
mentors, improve training of peer mentors, improve training of advisors, increase 
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sharing and exchange of knowledge (knowledge management), directly funding 
existing social networks to expand and increase sustainability, improve ability for 
consortia formation (Rocket Science, 2011).  
b) Business support on developing social return measurements, investment readiness, 
better manage cash flows, funding to access business support 
c) Access to capital through the social investment market; capital to start-up, funding 
for growth, invest in equipment and facilities; the Big Society Capital; financial 
products are: ‘angel’ financing for start-ups; venture and equity-like financing for 
growth; structured investment products; retail banking for large-scale working; and 
investment capital finance 
d) Institutional, regulatory and legislative reforms to open up provision of public 
services, to simplify set-up and management of social enterprises, to facilitate 
acquisition of public assets,  
e) Social procurement of private companies through the provision of services and 
products from social enterprises  
 
Identified motives for the formation of social enterprise networks 
From the data analysis we identified these: 
 
a) Sharing of technical knowledge. Evidence suggests that social enterprises as 
opposed to mainstream businesses need the sharing of technical knowledge 
among them which suggests the value of the development and facilitation of 
social enterprise networks and inter-firm relations. (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
b) To inspire, motivate and enthuse social entrepreneurs (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
c) Influence the service design and delivery of business support services. (cabinet 
Office, 2011) 
d) To raise the profile of social enterprise in their region (Social Enterprise North 
West, 2011) 
e) To represent the interests of the region’s social enterprise sector. (Social 
Enterprise North West, 2011) 
f) To encourage mutual support (Social Enterprise North West, 2011) 
g) To create new market opportunities by boosting inter-trading (Rocket Science, 
2011; Social Enterprise North West, 2011) 
h) To share best practices (Social Enterprise North West, 2011) 
i) To increase training and development opportunities between social enterprises. 
(Rocket Science, 2011; Social Enterprise North West, 2011) 
j) To work with local, regional, national transnational bodies to strengthen the social 
enterprise sector and its voice (Social Enterprise North West, 2011) 
k) To increase capacity of exploiting opportunities from growing ethical 
consumerism, increased offerings from the social investment markets, and public 
reforms 
 
According to Meyskens et al (2010a:444) research the formation of partnerships among 
social enterprises and governmental bodies helps social enterprise to acquire financial 
capital resources, while governmental agencies obtain access to social innovation through 
human capital that has developed best practices on how to serve certain communities. 
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These relationships will continue as long as both parties feel that they meet their social 
and economic objectives and the length and strength of this collaboration is dependent 
upon the relationship of individuals from social enterprises and governmental agencies 
that interact in this network.  
 
Public measure policies play a preeminent role to the increasing rate of growth of social 
enterprises, they act as ‘catalyst, customer and champion’ of the creation of this sector 
(Dees 1994, 1998; Nicholls, 2006, 2008, 2010a). The legal framework of the creation of 
CIC organizational form enabled the formation of social enterprises (Nicholls, 2010a). 
 
5.6.4.2. Performance  
 
According to evidence networks produce a high impact to social enterprises (Rocket 
Science, 2011). Their funding is now diminishing as more funding is directed to direct 
frontline social enterprises rather than intermediaries so they will have to strengthen their 
commercial activities (Rocket Science, 2011). Evidence suggests that networks should 
increase their knowledge management and inner/internetwork knowledge transfer. 
Networks should focus on developing economic activity and performance through 
developing complementary specialism and through exploiting market niches, such as new 
service development in specific sectors and not so much focusing on the geographical 
boundaries of each network. 
 
Investment readiness and business planning through an impact plan. The parameters of 
the plan are: the change you want to make An investor will want you to be able to very 
clearly articulate the change that you intend to make with the capital that you are asking 
for., who will benefit, An investor will want to see that you can define your main 
beneficiaries (for example by their particular needs or where they live) and the number of 
people you are seeking to help.  linking activities and revenues, An investor will want to 
see how your products, services and interventions are intrinsically linked to your ability 
to generate revenue from the social activities that you deliver.  measuring and reporting, 
There are many systems for measuring and reporting impact. Front-line organisations are 
often in the best position to identify and select the things that are most important for 
tracking and evidencing their own impact. learning, improving and moving forward, A 
good impact plan will give you and your investor essential information for performance 
managing, learning and improving. (Big Social Capital, 2012a)  
 
Social Impact Tests and Threshold Assessment that the Big Society capital applies.  
 
Table below applies to both SIFIs and the frontline, with the exception of criteria in 
italics, which are relevant to SIFIs only. (Big Society Capital, 2012b) 
 
Social impact components: a) social mission; what is the promise of change? Specific 
tests concern the strategy and the context; b) governance; what is the governance of 
change? Specific tests concern mission locks, Board/IC and exit; c) Activities; how will 
the organisation deliver its social mission? Specific tests concern track record, 
management, congruency and alignment, d) Impact; what is the extent of the change that 
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will be delivered? Specific tests concern depth of impact, breadth of impact, innovation 
and change, and frontline organizational development e) Impact assessment and 
measurement; how will the SIFI evidence the change it is making and learn from it? 
Specific tests concern impact assessment and screening, planning and targeting, 
monitoring and reporting, auditing, and learning 
 
Social returns are measured using the Bridges Ventures IMPACT Scorecard and reported 
to investors alongside their financial returns. Our Sustainable Growth Funds deliver 
social returns across four impact themes:  
a. Underserved Areas. Location in an underserved area located in the most deprived 
25% of the country, as measured using the Government’s Index of Multiple 
Deprivation; 
b. Fostering entrepreneurs. Managers in investee companies acting as role models 
that inspire others Bridges Ventures works hard to augment boards and 
management teams;  
c. Creating jobs. Growth in and quality of direct jobs in company within target area 
Number of people taken out of unemployment;  
d. Creating economic dynamism. Spending on suppliers and employees plus 
additional spending generated within local economy. Growth in economic activity 
of company within target area and impact of this on economic activity of supply 
chain.  
1. Economic activity created by construction;  
2. Environment Measures and practices that minimise the environmental 
footprint of business operations (e.g. The Office Group installing a green 
roof and a water harvesting system)   
3. Education and Skills Promotion of the education of a business’ customers, 
employees or local community (e.g. New Career Skills retrains plumbers 
and electricians)  
4. Health and Well-being Promotion of the health and well-being of the 
business’ customers, employees or local community (e.g. Chill Factor 
giving a discount to school children during off peak hours to encourage 
them to do sporting activity) (Bridges Ventures, 2013) 
 
Performance framework of the CDFA with the support of RBS group named ‘Change 
Matters’ assesses three areas: impact by testing the mission with link to outputs and 
outcomes; financial activity of the organizations; business activity through compliance 
with the code of practice and appropriate policies and procedures of the sector (CDFA, 
Performance Framework, 2013) 
 
“A theory of change is a methodology for planning and evaluating social 
intervention. Just as Six Sigma starts with the end in mind, a theory of change starts with 
an intended goal and builds a pathway to it. It does so by using assumptions to build a 
hypothesis about how change will occur—based on an analysis of all the identifiable 
causes of change and their interconnections. The process is participatory—with 
stakeholders articulating a shared long-term vision—and outcomes-based, with each 
outcome tied to an intervention on the roadmap for change. For many impact investors, 
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the value set of an individual or organization commonly drives an impact thesis and can 
reference a theory of change, often naming clear objectives such as access to clean water 
or affordable housing. It can reference a target population, business model or set of 
outcomes through which the investor intends to deliver the impact” Amy Bell, Head of 
principal investments for J.P. Morgan Social Finance in JPMorgan, 2013, p.1 
 
The CIC regulation is based on a ‘light touch’ logics of reporting and disclosure practices 
and has significant limitations and challenges: a) in terms of the disclosure practices and 
organizational legitimacy of many CICs who provide very little information on their 
performance and could end up in jeopardizing trust in the sector; b) also the disclosure 
information that is required by the CICs is not in line with the social impact 
measurements that the social investment market requires; c) many agents that are looking 
for information on CICs have to resort to other sources to find this information like the 
websites and anecdotal information which is beyond the limits of control of the regulator; 
d) the information provided is insufficient for policy makers and the government to draw 
results and be able to design new policies for the sector (Nicholls, 2010a).  
 
Rocket Science was commissioned by the government to evaluate the business support 
programme, The evaluation has used a variety of consultation methodologies: online 
surveys through self-assessments, 30 telephone interviews to further investigate self-
assessments items, face-to-face interviews, output monitoring to stakeholders to check 
the self-assessments viability, three group workshops with funded organisations, and 
online survey to social enterprises to check the viability of the workshops results from 
funded organizations (Rocket Science, 2011). 
 
the National Evaluation of the programme. Cabinet Office, 2011) 
a. Baseline phase to identify potential learning opportunities 
b. Interim phase to identify and share best practices. Stakeholder workshops 
and 10 case studies. 
c. Final phase to identify best practices in mainstreaming business support 
market and evaluate success of the programme. 80 indepth interviews with 
service providers, 8 waves of customer satisfaction survey total 2,500 
social enterprises, 140 indepth interviews with business support services 
customers, 4 stakeholder workshops from all different groups of service 
providers, 3 meetings of Delphi Group of social enterprise experts. 
 
5.6.4.3. Summary of results for Propositions 3  
 
Institutions through their presence or absence play a central role in the growth of market 
economies and in determining the behaviour of actors (Dorado and Ventresca, 2013; 
Griffiths, Gundry and Kickul, 2013; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). Institutions and 
institutional logics influence social action through rules and regulations, normative order, 
social expectations and culture thus formulating or restraining organizational behaviour 
(Pache and Santos, 2010). Social entrepreneurship is not a mechanism to address the 
fallacies of economic systems but rather an institutional format for these systems to 
achieve survival and existence (Nicholls, 2008). Social entrepreneurship targets social 
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change through a highly embedded political institutional context (Alvord et al, 2004): 
firstly, they have a very close relationship with the public sector either working with 
public bodies or receiving public funding. Even in the case of the UK where the 
social/impact investment market is the most advanced; the funding of the Social 
Investment Financial Intermediaries (who provide financial input to social enterprises) 
comes 63% from the government (Big Society Capital, 2012a). Secondly, social 
entrepreneurs shape various types of micro-level political structures to overcome 
institutional barriers in bringing societal change through the formation of networks they 
build on the strength of their social norms (Alvord et al, 2004; Nichols, 2010b).  
 
The role of central institutions in the formation and growth of social entrepreneurship has 
been documented and evidence suggests that there is a clear positive relationship (Ferri 
and Urbano, 2010; Dees 1994, 1998; Korosec and Berman, 2006; Nicholls, 2004, 2008, 
2010a; Sullivan, 2007); public measure policies play a preeminent role. The innovative 
sustainable solutions to social problems through social entrepreneurs’ ventures are 
substantial to governments and societies today (Cabinet Office, 2013). A government’s 
role is not to generate itself private growth or social enterprise growth, but what it can do 
is to establish the conditions for this to take place (Cabinet Office, 2011). It does that 
through a number of interventions: legislation, regulations, policies and infrastructure, 
funding, and business support services. Our research supports that if a government wants 
to direct entrepreneurial activity in the social enterprises sector then this can be done with 
the design of a basic legal system, through regulation interventions and incentives, such 
as tax reliefs (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Meek et al, 2010; Sullivan, 2007; Van Putten 
and Green, 2010). Through the provision of technical advice, investment readiness 
protocols, incubators, training and education, access to specialized business support 
services, provision of space, policies to raise public awareness, access and facilitation of 
social enterprise network formation, alliances and partnerships (Sharir and Lerner, 2006). 
It can directly provide financial resources to social ventures, it can provide services to 
social enterprises to help them apply for grants (Korosec and Berman, 2006), access to 
public procurement market.  
 
The legal framework of the creation of Community Interest Corporations organizational 
form introduced in 2005 in the UK enabled the formation of social enterprises (Nicholls, 
2010a). The same effect had the Social Cooperatives law that was introduced in 2011 in 
Greece. The lack of any other public policies to support the social enterprise sector in 
Greece and the annulations of the tax incentives that were introduced by the 
aforementioned legal framework have restrained the development of these enterprises and 
the entry of new ones. In the UK case an extensive portfolio of policies and programmes 
have supported the growth of the sector while in Greece the absence of policies and 
support structures have resulted in many of them being inactive. The problem of social 
enterprises to raise capital- especially at the start-up phase when it is mostly needed- 
(Sharir and Lerner, 2006) has not been supported by formal institutions although an 
amplitude of programmes and grants have been available through the EC, like the 
European Social Fund. The EC experts have been providing extensive consultative and 
support services to the Greek Ministries and municipalities which have not been 
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implemented by the latter. The reasons identified through our research have been the law 
skills and expertise of public officials, structural voids and corruption.  
 
Corruption hinders social enterprises formation and performance (Griffiths, Gundry and 
Kickul, 2013; Tonoyan et al, 2010) which lowers through economic development (there 
is a negative relationship between GDP levels and corruption levels), reinforcement of 
democratic practices and openness of trade. Quoting from our interviewees: 'The bids in 
Greece are given to friends'; 'There are high levels of nepotism, favouritism, lack of 
transparency in public procurement procedures, lack of auditing procedures’; 'We have to 
know which of the incubators have succeeded and why they are funded’; 'Screening and 
annual auditing of how you have contributed in the local communities need to be 
applied'; 'There have to be auditing procedures measuring the systems and criteria 
screening'. Informal institutions ‘determine the rule of the game and, importantly, who is 
allowed to play’ excluding certain groups (Mair et al, 2012). Our action research projects 
with the Development Agency of the Local Authority of Athens revealed the co-existence 
of many conflicting agendas of the management team and many unethical almost illegal 
practices. Such examples are: the team of consultants and managers that the CEO 
employees in the premises of the local authority are being remunerated from non for profi 
organizations; the latter being suppliers of the local authority. The ‘Athens Social 
Economy Initiative’ was running a number of programmes and community development 
activities and manage to get 5m€ grants from the European Social Fund (hereafter ESF) 
to implement those programmes. On the same day the management team of the 
development agency closed the programme! The rumour was that their scope was to 
absorb those funds through ‘own interest organizations’. Similar events have happened at 
the Ministry that manages the ESF funds; because of the tight control from the EC 
officials the grants couldn’t be absorbed in a favourable way to the officials so the grants 
after four years were returned back to the ESF unexploited. 
 
 
5.7. Social Context: System of Informal Institutions of Network 
Embeddedness 
 
RQ4: What is the role of the system of relational network embeddedness and social 
norms in the formation governance and performance of social franchising? 
RQ41: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the formation and partner selection of franchising networks? 
RQ42: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the governance of franchising networks? 
RQ43: Does the system of relational network embeddedness and social norms influence 
the performance of franchising networks? 
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Table 12 Data Analysis of the Sphere of Informal Institutions 
Social Norms: Relational and Structural Network Embeddedness  
categories definition codes examples 
motives formation of 
social 
franchising 
and 
partnerships 
economies of 
scale, margins 
We lack of resources, we don’t know the 
local marekt, the risk is very high so we 
work with local organizations existing ones 
to help them build their businesses and also 
offer jobs locally' GW. 'We need economies 
of scale' Women craftsmanship café.  
    increase impact   
    resources 
acquisition 
raise fees to cover franchisor costs 'The fees 
allowed us to have supprt staff to assist the 
growth of the system and leave their current 
positions in the school and cover our costs' 
SSE 'You need to network with everyone so 
that you can win bids get grants from 
programmes and then use this money for 
your other activities to beneficiaries' Equal 
Society Klimaka  
    knowledge 
acquisition 
Acknowledge that you dont know something 
and find the best people that know it to work 
with' BLG 
    feasibility and 
sustainability  
How can I instead of sitting alone in a room 
and thinking of all these ideas and reflecting 
can I through seeing others mobilise myself 
and make it happen?' Little Giants social 
entrepreneur reflecting on the necessity of a 
capacity-building programme, in the end she 
joined and was from the first to create 
straight after the courses a social enterprise. 
'Convince others you need a team' Social 
Entrepreneur. 'SE is like a marriage. You 
marry with constraints and act on them 
collaboratively' Equal Society 'You need an 
idea and then yuou need people around you, 
groups, supporters, the local community' 
BLG ESA, School Canteens  
    influence policy 
makers 
They wouldnt allow me in the school to 
implement my model of healthy eating to the 
children, so i left someone on my foot and 
had to go out to get in touch with ministries 
and association and find a way to convince 
them' School Canteen.  
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categories definition codes examples 
Acccumulation effect   serial social 
entreprenerurs 
Everything comes from experience. The one 
leads to the other. I talk with people and get 
ideas and that is how I do something else. I 
work in groups' Edra-Drasi 
criteria partner 
selection 
  market 
knowledge 
our partners are existing NGOs and social 
enterprises in the furniture sector' GW 
    local 
knowledge 
They need to be committed, to have a 
passion and to have local experience' BLG 
    values and 
personality 
Members are selected based on common 
values, even our customers are selected this 
wa and we offer one month experiential trial' 
The Hub Athens. 'we choose the person' SSE 
Equal Society 
    unsolicited 
inquiries from 
direct and 
indirect ties 
We were apporached by unsolicited 
inquiries from people we didnt now but we 
didnt do it, how can we trust them? will they 
maintain wuality? will they keep our logic? 
they dont have resources, how will we 
control them? ESA. 'unsolicited inquiries 
from community pushed us to grow we were 
initially informal, then became a charity, 
then a trading company and then a group of 
social enterprises' BLG 'Our growth to 
Australia was an unslicited inwuiry from a 
former partner of Michael (Young) who was 
insisting, when we changed CEO it finally 
happened' SSE. In these cases the social 
franchise can be seen as an emergent 
strategy 
    referencing- 
indirect ties 
reputation positioning, homophile principle 
'brokery, we use intermediaries from our 
networks who can reference us to local 
partners that can be 'champions' there' SSE 
'we use references from the local 
communities from our networks to find 
partners' FareShare 'At the moment we are 
prostetuting until i can find money and get 
well suited and longterm partners' Tasha 
    direct ties partners grow from inside, in the beginning 
there are relationships, then joint activities 
and then we form joint ventures' BLG 
governance  how to keep 
control? 
operations 
manual 
  
    signed written 
contracts 
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categories definition codes examples 
relationships governance 
through 
network 
relationships 
informal 
governance 
we control through relationships, we have an 
open door and self-help policy' BLG 'There 
is a symbiosis of partners' SSE 'There is 
100% link among relationships networks 
and success' GW. 'we don’t have governance 
in the conventional way only informally' 
BLG 
    consistency  You have to build relationships, spent time 
with peple and be consistent at all costs' 
ESA. ' To succeed in a SE you have to be 
seen as trustworthy in your social context 
and need to be consistent. You can make 
mistakes but not consistently. When you say 
I can do something you must be able to do it 
successfully. You have to have transparent 
relationships no favouritism not to be 
manipulating. To be believable, capable and 
inclusive' SSE 
    transparent 
equitable 
realtionships 
Transparent relationships and practices have 
helped us create trust' GW ' Why collaborate 
with the sharks? They will devore us. there 
has to be mulktiplier effects' Diotima. 'they 
must seem trustworthy, they must be 
transparent and cosistent. When they say 
something they must do it succesfully' SSE 
'A succesful partner is confident, has 
legitimacy, is capable and credible he builts 
on trust' SSE. 'How do I balance friendship 
and my responsibility as a social 
entrepreneurs when my friend doesn't 
perform well?' social entrepreneur. 
    trust You need trust in SE. Sponsors need to trust 
you without having to see the beneficiaries' 
Equal Society. 'I'm proud of the 
relationships we have built... Our clients 
trade with us because they trust us' GW 
    commitment We map capabilities and we see what 
capabilities are missing from the eco-system 
in order to invite appropriate members to 
join' The Hub Athens 'Sometimes we bid 
money together with partners' BLG SSE. 
The federation governance mode of The 
Hub. 'We all have ownership of the whole 
global network. There is one annual meeting 
where all members take part and have equal 
voting rights. There we design our strategy. 
There si annual conference of the 
Community of practice' The Hub Athens 
 
 
 
 
 289 
categories definition codes examples 
    solidarity We create a pot of money and we all invest 
in members' 'We built an eco-system and we 
are all there for each other' 'When a Hub is 
created in a new location there is a sister 
Hubs that helps and supports it to build its 
ecosystem' The Hub Athens. 'The first years 
we do things together (with franchisees)' 
SSE 'Our partner tells us their intentions and 
we help them on fund raising' SSE. 
'Solidarity is essential to offer protection to 
members where governments fail' Panel 
Group. 'The ecosystem influences 
entrepreneurship. Be there for each other, fly 
people in, mentor each other, learn from 
success and failure. Have role models' Bind 
Karia TEDX.  'We need to create an 
epidemic blast of solidarity' Medisins Sans 
Frontiers 'SE is love, solidarity, giving to 
others, collectivism. Its nets of love' 
Giardino 
    mutuality joint boards memberships 'One of us is a 
member in each franchisees boards. And we 
are member in our Master franchisees board 
but not in their franchisees, it is them that 
are so we are indirectly' SSE 'We do 
community events, ecosystem building, we 
build the realtionships, we do peer 
mentoring' The Hub Athens 
    role integrity 'Once we expressed interest to create the 
Hub Athens we have to produce a 
sustainability study, they offer us two years, 
they wait for us' The Hub Athens. 'Each 
member in the Hub can offer their own 
services to the others, there is free exchange 
of services in the community, they create 
their own ventures and offer them in the 
platform' The Hub Athens  
    flexibility We have a framework but we discuss it with 
them (franchisees) we do not impose it' SSE 
'You need flexibility in SE' Panel group 
    restraint of 
power; expert 
Training 'We need to train them to to change 
their culture in being commercially 
operational, in sellling'GW 
    restraint of 
power; 
reputation 
Reputation is an objective higher than profit 
and solvency' Boroume, SSE 
    restraint of 
power; referent 
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categories definition codes examples 
    harmonization 
of conflict 
  
    value 
congruence  
ethical morality honesty self-responsibility 
    collectivism the main elements in our SE are collective 
intelligence, community leadership, 
participatory methodology, partiipatory 
leadership' Siz 'you need collective 
consciousness and self-organization' 
medecins Sans Frontiers. 'relational 
embeddedness is the most important. See the 
maffia societies, people had no jobs, they 
had no space, so they formed netowrks in 
small spaces and they altogether increased 
the space' Panel Group 
    independence Partners are independent from us' BLG 
'There is a problem with existing franchisees 
that in the beginning were dependent on a 
NGO to open up but now the NGO doesn’t 
allow them to become independent. So we 
will apply a rule that franchisees get their 
independence from parent organizations in 
3-5 years' SSE 
    representative 
democracy 
We built our activities on representative 
democracy, we mutually define the vision, 
the goals, the strategy and then we will 
apply action' Vytina Tomorrow 
performace  benefits from 
social 
franchises 
legitimacy 
credibility 
a succesful model evaluation need to gain 
credibility or requires legitimacy, if others 
view it as succesful' SSE 
    no big revenue I don’t believe in will never get big revenue 
streams, but getter better people, grow, 
linked up' SSE 
    relationships 
networks 
scale brings relationsips and networks, inner 
trade and share good practices' SSE 
    attract better 
quality people 
  
    increase 
reputation 
  
    inner trade   
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categories definition codes examples 
    financial 
benefits 
franchise fees 'we struggle with franchise 
fees in the first year and early second. Once 
they get sponsorships and communtiy 
support we have no problem' SSEentry fees 
'we charge an entry fee to pay our costs and 
support them' SSE 'Entrance fee is 15,000 of 
which 5,000 go to the sister HUb' The Hub 
Athens 
overembeddedness 
risks 
  fractions they have created fractions that dominates 
the market. They all talk nonsense, do 
superficial talking, no impact made, they 
just absorb the grants and projects. They 
need each other to keep them in the system. 
They are afraid of people who know because 
this will make their incompetence visible 
Failure  cases   luck of trust we incurred costs because we trusted the 
wrong partners and we didn't have contracts. 
Now we trust but with cautious' BLG 
    no legal 
documents 
  
    poor franchise 
model 
No standardised franchised model. We made 
three experiments that turned into failure in 
the beginnning. We didn't have the system. 
It wasn't standardised. We had a por 
franchise model. You have to focus in being 
the franchisor and not go on with your own 
strore. You have to focus on the role of 
support' GW 'We tried to franchise Aisha 
child care but it failed the mdoel was not 
sustainable. Now we are looking for what 
can be replicated' BLG 
    lack of quality it was a bad collaboration. The wanted the 
name but not the programme. So we now 
created a quality procedure to be able to 
keep quality and cut out bad relationships' 
SSE 
    no commitment we didn’t have the same vision. There was 
no commitment so we stopped the 
partnership' BLG 'I need partners but 
everyone wants more money' Little Giants 
    cultural 
differences  
 They have a limited culture. They look at 
the past, not dynamic, not accepting change' 
Tasha 'it's difficult for villagers to trust an 
outsider, that is foreigner, that is a woman 
and that is an Englishman when previous 
Englishmen had made promises of building 
high quality premises and let them down' 
ESA 
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 Opportunism   opportunistic 
partners 
power driven, encourage others to see my 
vision. You need hierarchies' Tasha Partner 
'Go to investors as a monopoly once you 
have secured your position in the market' 
'how do you pass something on that is not 
threatened by the weaknesses of trust 
system? How can you sustain a privileged 
position and success for ever?' 'I have to 
push for change to happen! I'm an educator I 
want to convince other trustees... If not i will 
find others and do it'. He is frustrated fom 
the NGO culture and the slow decision 
making. 'I want to get out and do something 
and succeed. I would change everything and 
keep only credibility and heritage. They can 
not even make a decision on upgrading the 
website!' 'You take what you can get' Tasha.  
    afraid to share 
ideas 
We want to sign a MoA with our partners so 
that they do not steal our ideas and do it 
alone' Quality Net. 'ideas get hijacked' 
Human Grid. 'You talk with people and then 
they go out and do it alone' Loft 2 Work 
    lack or afraid of 
partners 
I don’t want partners' Elea Med 'I have the 
idea, I have developed the model but I need 
a parter with a market sense' Close the loop.  
 
5.7.1. Formation- Relational Embeddedness 
 
According to Balournos & Geormas (2012) in December 2012 there were 97 Social 
Cooperative Enterprises in Greece, having altogether 920 members. According to 
unofficial reports from our interviews the majority of these enterprises have low potential 
of achieving earned income strategies as they are formed to rely on state subsidies, 
demonstrate low or no social innovation, and reveal no indication of providing significant 
social impact. It has been officially stated that the lack of growth of social enterprises in 
Greece is due to the inexistence of a favourable environment from the state. We 
identified the existence of two networks of social enterprises that were internally 
interconnected and the differences were: resources, strategy, individual entrepreneurs. 
They had similar patterns of relationship with the members of each informal network. 
Issues of centrality, issues of relational elements, 
 
One of the practical implications of the study was the identification of the opportunities 
to form social alliances, isolated organizations having important qualities that are in need 
by other organizations lack and who may want to increase their connectivity to the 
network. For this network data through social network theory are very useful. 
 
'We want alliances, collaborations' Human grid TEDX Up Greek tourism. " SE is a party 
of people not numbers' Equal Society. 'We need a network, a social franchise of school 
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canteens to be able to implement our model. The network will be investing in the creation 
of other units in other schools though collaboration and volunteering' School Canteens. 
'Who are your supporters? Make them part of it. Not going to be a good campaigner if 
you are not a good neighbour. Make it fun!' 
 
Foodbank social franchise of Trussell Trust charity emerged from a local imperative, 
emphasis on community participation and buy in. Partner selection trust from networks of 
existing direct or indirect ties: is build from the network of churches they already have 
and builds on a relationship. The formation happens once they both make the decision 
based on an informal process. It is with groups not with an individual as commercial 
franchising. (Berelowitz, 2012) 
 
“Before they decide to do the project, they have to do a number of things... [say 
you] rang me up and said you are interested in running a Foodbank. My first question to 
you is: where are you coming from, where do you live, are you part of a faith-led 
organisation, do you know you will have to work with churches. The first document that 
we send them is the terms and conditions and a little bit of an explanation as to how the 
Foodbank works. It says who we are, what we do and it basically outlines how we work. 
Then there are the conditions and the money.” (Trussell Trust staff in Berelowitz, 
2012:15) 
“In the beginning, [a contact from the Trussell Trust] came and met with the 
leaders of the church, then I think we had another meeting and that was the first meeting 
that I went to… he went through the whole process. We asked tons of questions and he 
showed us the manual… and that was so comprehensive, things that we never even 
thought of. If you wanted to set up a charity status – everything was covered. He went 
away and it was discussed and decided… we were going to go for it!” (Foodbank 
franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:15) 
 “SSE settled on a franchise strategy because it was in line with core principles: 
working in genuine partnerships; that those who best understand the problem understand 
the solution; and utilisation of existing networks” (interviewer’s opinion in Higgins et al, 
2008:23). 
 
Franchisee interconnectedness with other local networks criteria for selection, the 
structural enforceable element of trust: “Sutton Food Bank is run by twelve churches in 
the London borough of Sutton, who formed a new charity, Community Works. The 
mission is to engage with the needs of the community but also to engage with the council, 
the police, the local authorities, to make sure we’re talking to the church and to the local 
authority, to make sure we’re meeting needs. We felt there was a need in the borough for 
a Foodbank.” (Foodbank franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:16). This is in line with the 
research of Korosec and Berman (2006) and Sullivan (2007) who highlight the need of 
social entrepreneurs to have high connections with their communities.  
 
This example indicates the accumulation effect of embeddedness how trust and prior 
direct tiers lead to the formation of other social franchises.  
“FoodCycle is a simple idea. Students and others collect food that would 
otherwise go to waste – from markets, shops and supermarkets and through the Fare 
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Share scheme – cook the food in donated kitchen space and serve it to vulnerable people 
– refugees, old people, the homeless, etc. It was adapted from the Campus Kitchen 
Project in the USA, and launched in the UK in 2009, achieving the Best New Charity 
award in 2010. Local projects are student or community run, and are asked to contribute 
￡2,500 per annum towards the central costs of FoodCycle, and in return they receive 
food safety training (which is required for all volunteers), help with start up including 
equipment, on-going advice, training and support, and the benefits from being part of a 
network. The projects are given ideas and help for their fundraising, and the eventual aim 
is to 
raise the target from ￡2,500 to ￡7,500, which will come from a mixture of sources, 
including student fundraising events (perhaps involving the use of free food), 
crowdfunding and support from student unions and local trusts and companies. By the 
end of Year 3, there were 17 FoodCycle projects across the UK. Three of the projects 
now run cafes or restaurants based on the same principle of using volunteers to cook 
reclaimed food. The first, at Bromley-by-Bow centre is running smoothly 5-day per week 
and is now profitable. There is a lot of interest being shown by churches and community 
centres, and plansare being developed to create a separate franchise for these restaurants 
using the name ‘Pie in the Sky’”. (FoodCycle in Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012:42) 
Other accumulative examples are: BIOS, BLG, Fair trade, Little Giants=Childit-Home 
Play, TEDX-Human Grid-Up Greek Tourism- Communications Effect, Edra-Drasi, 
Klimaka-Klimax Plus, Organization Earth-Aephoria, Equal Society 'we have many 
different activities and many branches. I vision all this as a group of companies' Equal 
Society 
 
Cultural barriers that drives social entrepreneurs in running their own ventures and the 
suspicion of social entrepreneurs of anything that is commercial (Richie et al, 2011). 
 
“.... many players in the so called third sector see themselves as ‘social change 
agents’... they prefer to focus their energies on the development of new approaches. 
Imitating those of others is considered ‘not sexy’” (industry expert in Richie et al, 2011: 
7) 
 
“.... as if our legitimacy can only come from that which is brand new, as if each 
and every approach must be without precedent…that social enterprise can only succeed 
as a manifestation of a single heroic individual, able to discard and surmount all failure, 
all the discredited past” (social entrepreneur in Richie et al, 2011:7) 
 
5.7.2. Partner Selection Criteria 
 
commitment level, personal integrity like fund raising skills, linkages with the local 
networks and knowledge of the local sector and in some cases financial robustness 
(Doherty, 2009; Holberg and Morgan, 2003; Sivakumarand Schoormans, 2011a; 
20011b). Weaven, Grace and Manning (2009) personality traits of franchisees and 
governance structure 
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5.7.3. Governance- relational embeddedness  
 
“You need friends; you need honest transparent relationships with people who believe in 
what you do and will help you. That is the secret” Colin Crooks CEO Green Works, 
2011. 
 
The federation is when all franchisees are part of the wider franchise network and 
contribute cooperatively to the development of the network this is the case for Emmaus 
and The Hub. Central charity supports the network of social franchisees. The Food bank 
franchises are spin outs from the Trussell Trust the charity is in control of the network. 
The network structure consists of sub-network and regional networks coordinated by 
assigned managers-mentors and assistants.  
 
a. Commitment, the selection process asks for resource commitments, the financial 
readiness criteria helps to filter those that “just think they will have a go at it and 
those that are committed to it.” (Trussell Trust staff in Berelowitz, 2012:16). 
Entrance fee £1,500 and royalties £360 per year which is one third of set up and 
support costs the rest fund raised through the Trussell Trust.  
b. Restraint of power, mutuality, flexibility: “There is no point training people who 
have picked up things from the manual very quickly and they understand it. So 
what we have to do is allow them to decide what sort of training they need from a 
menu or a discussion. We have created a menu of the kind of training provided, 
who it is for and how long it takes. There are peer to peer audits and mutual 
marketing campaigns but basically based on the word of mouth” (Trussell Trust 
staff in Berelowitz, 2012:16). 
c. Mutuality:  “The Trussell Trust wants to break the barriers of how normal 
charities do things. They want to go to the next level, so they encourage you to 
come up with creative ideas of how to do things. That information gets filtered 
back. You see that different Foodbanks operate slightly differently to others 
because, depending on their team and the area that they’re in, it works for them. 
Best practice gets shared amongst us. We’re always pushing the envelope and 
we’re allowed to do that. It enhances the whole of the Trussell Trust. That’s what 
we’re there to do, enhance the project” (Foodbank franchisee in Berelowitz, 
2012:17). “SSE has Network Away Days for peer discussion and support” 
(interviewer’s opinion in Higgins et al, 2008:24) “CASA holds minority equity 
stake 26% shares in all its franchisees who in turns have a Board member in the 
Board of the franchisor” (Berelowitz, 2012:19).  
d. Solidarity, Trussell Trust provides on-the-job customized training, manuals, 
mentoring, website, data collection tools, branding suite: “They are there all the 
way. … the coordinator for London is on my speed dial; he is available all the 
time. He comes down for the training of volunteers; we had a photo opportunity, 
he came down for that. They are totally supportive. They are there all the way. 
They built our website, they ask us how it’s going. We report to them on 
everything we do. They report back to us. There are annual meetings and 
newsletters. You’re supported. They plug you in. You are totally supported.” 
(Foodbank franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:16). “SSE wanted to build a network of 
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Social Entrepreneurs to provide support / innovation for each other” 
(interviewer’s opinion in Higgins et al, 2008:23). “when they (the  franchisees) 
give people shopping lists of donated goods they need outside Tesco’s, they get 
50% of people giving them something.” (Trussell Trust staff of Food bank in 
Berelowitz, 2012:15) 
 
As the award winner Peter Joseph (2008) says in his documentary film ‘Zeitgeist: The 
Movie’: 
 
“It is all one…a new conscientiousness is created that sees the earth as a single organism 
and recognises that an organism in war with itself is doomed” (Peter Joseph, 2008). 
 
e. Accumulation of alliances. Foodbank joint programmes boost innovation as well 
as joint collaboration and resource pooling and leads to the accumulation of 
alliances: “many plan to work with other churches to create umbrella charities 
within which the Foodbank would be one project” (interviewers comments in 
Berelowitz, 2012:17). “one of the franchisees recounted that they had a local 
police officer who regularly ‘popped in’ at the Foodbank, and who one day said 
that she sees so many lonely people on her beat that she would like to teach some 
of them to do beadwork. The Foodbank said they would be delighted to set this up 
and purchased the materials. They now have 15-20 people who come in every 
Thursday afternoon to do beading. This is just one example of ‘instinctive local 
development’ that happens once the Foodbank knows and gains the trust of the 
local people” (interviewers comments in Berelowitz, 2012:19).  
f. Credibility, reputation and reference power: “They are getting something for 
nothing, and they are getting something for nothing from an organisation that is 
credible. Credibility is all-important, and reputation. We try really, really hard to 
make sure that the project is credible and with a good replication plan, because 
that gives the food banks confidence that this is going to work and that it is going 
to be sustainable.” (Trussell Trust staff in Berelowitz, 2012:18).  
g. Harmonization of conflict, the network has a network forum where anyone feeds 
in interactively and informs the whole network: “Certainly I’ve fed things back, 
like using a label gun, things like where you get crates from, we’ve bought bio-
bags so that clients go away with food in bags that are biodegradable that have a 
supermarket name on. Generally we feed those sorts of things back to the forum 
so that people are aware.” (Foodbank franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:17). Face 
challenge of funding though franchisee development to self-finance their 
activities “encouraging individual Foodbanks to develop social enterprises to 
assist their own sustainability, through for example the Restore charity shop 
model developed at Salisbury” (interviewers comments in Berelowitz, 2012:18). 
“I know some of the team think that we could do with a bit more support from 
them, especially with the actual funding applications.” (Foodbank franchisee in 
Berelowitz, 2012:16) “Personal relationships were of vital importance during 
difficult times” (SSE staff in Higgins et al, 2008). 
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h. Role integrity. Social franchising is conceived by many social enterprises as 
undermining their individuality, so role integrity is vital. Flexibility and freedom 
are key issues for social entrepreneurs (Berelowitz, 2012). Social enterprises don’t 
match the franchisee profile that mainstream franchises have.  (CAN in Higgins et 
al, 2008) 
 
Formulating the social franchise network and building relationships requires time 
more than two years was documented by Le Mat, CAN and Social Firms UK 
(Higgins et al, 2008). Requires training into a new culture of pursuing both financial 
as well as social objectives for the system to succeed (Social Firms UK in Higgins et 
al, 2008). Practical support in the early stages; regular communication and exchange 
of information on performance between all network members; regular support with 
recruitment, training and qualifications; peer to peer learning mechanisms so that 
franchisees can learn from each other (Cap Supermarket social franchise in Higgins et 
al, 2008). Social franchising is an innovative strategy and requires a network 
management structure with a central organization to develop and manage the network 
(Le Mat in Higgins et al, 2008). 
 
5.7.4. Performance - relational embeddedness  
 
Social and Financial Return 
 
Foodbank success relies in it easy to understand, simple model “The church leaders got 
hold of it as well; it’s something that members could get hold of. You didn’t want to 
make it too complex, too wishy-washy, too ethereal… [it needed to be] something very 
tangible that would make us feel we could make a difference in our community.” 
(Foodbank franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:17); it is low cost and it is bottom up building 
on the existing relationships and skills of charities and on the work they are doing, same 
values, meeting same social objectives, building trust: “For our church, having seen the 
project and what it does, it’s exactly what’s needed in the area, it’s something that’s up 
and running. It didn’t require a brainstorm. It’s a franchise, it’s up there, it knows what 
it’s doing. When you buy into it, you get the booklets, you get an overload of 
information. It’s quite daunting – you look at the folder and the information. You’ve got 
the help of the regional coordinator. You’re pretty much sure what you’re going to do is 
going to work, especially because everybody loves the idea. As far as our church is 
concerned, it was great. Getting other churches in to work with us requires a little bit 
more selling. Once you explain you are literally helping people in a crisis situation and 
providing what they need, then everybody else is also interested in doing it.” (Foodbank 
franchisee in Berelowitz, 2012:18). Perfomance measurement: quality audit processes, 
peer to peer audit. Challenges are the quality maintenance, understaffed and funding.  
 
Environment. In 10 years green Works has redirected from landfill tons of furniture and saved 
over 55,000 tones of CO2e. Recycling is the principle value of the company. Customers. Since its 
creation green Works has helped more than 5,500 charities and organizations by providing low 
cost furniture. One of Green Work’s target groups are charities that as Colin explained they have 
a lot of people to take care but in many cases they do not even have a locker to keep their records 
in, or they have broken chairs for their employees. Green Works provides them with very low 
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cost high quality furniture that is actually helping them to raise their productivity and improve the 
moral of their customers and personnel. Employees. Since its creation Green Works has offered 
over 800 job posts for people from disadvantaged group. Green Works provides employment and 
training to marginalized groups. The labour intensiveness of Green Work’s business model helps 
the alleviation of poverty through creating large numbers of jobs either paid or volunteered. The 
important factor is that people living under poverty have never been given the chance to see that 
they can be good at something. Through Green Works a variety of jobs is created from sales to 
marketing and so people are trained in many different skills.  
 
“It is a very big satisfaction to see people that didn’t believe in themselves to find out that they 
can actually be good in sales or in marketing or in accounting or in manufacturing and design” 
Colin Crooks. 
 
 Community. Helping the global community to alleviate poverty had always been in the agenda. 
Colin Crook has traveled himself many times to developing countries to actually see what the 
needs are and to establish long-term relationships with organizations in these areas. They have 
sent 450 tones of furniture to Africa, 200 tones to Sierra Leone to schools and governments. As 
Colin explained the greatest challenge there is humidity, so when he asked them if they needed 
books they replied back that they needed cabins to keep the books in, chairs, and desks. So Green 
Works has been helping institutions by sending them furniture and educational material for years 
now. The other important thing as Colin explained is that to make an impact in these areas you 
have to send large volumes. Green Works has built transparent long-term partnerships with 
organizations in Sierra Leone and Ghana so that they can control exactly where their donations 
go.  
 
 
5.7.5. Proposition 4 
 
Proposition 4: The influence of the dynamics of the system of informal institutions 
in the formation, governance and performance of social franchising 
 
 
5.7.5.1. Formation and Partner Selection of Social Franchises 
 
Social networks are positively related to social entrepreneurship formation (Van Putten 
and Green, 2010) 
 
Evidence from Meyskens et al (2010a:441) research indicates that the formation of 
networks among social enterprises and corporations is positively related to the acquisition 
of human, social and financial capital resources for social enterprises; while corporations 
gain access to customer base, increase self-reports of perceived legitimacy, and fulfill 
regulatory obligations. 
 
5.7.5.2. Governance of Social Franchises 
 
Mair and Sezgi (2011) investigated the level of control among three models of scale up 
strategies of social enterprises: branches, affiliations, dissemination; they found that the 
mechanisms used to achieve control were training, mobility, communication and 
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templates. The first three achieved higher levels of commitment and thus operational and 
value consistency, they highlighted the need for informal mechanisms of control to 
maintain consistency in the network.  
 
Evidence from Meyskens et al (2010a) research indicates that the length and strength of 
the social venture network is influenced by the relationship of the individuals from all 
partnering actors that are involved in the network activities.   
 
5.7.5.3. Performance of Social Franchises 
 
Social enterprises did worse than average SMEs in 2012 in the UK and worse than how 
they performed in 2010. On average SMEs social enterprises generate £650,000 income 
annually, 60% generate up to £250,000. 8% only expect a drop in revenue in 2013 and 
15% of them expect to have fewer employees. While 40% expect to increase their income 
and 18% to increase their number of employees. Actually in 2012 27% increased their 
turnover, 12% increased their personnel and 63% generated profit. Only 6.7% expected 
to close down in the next 5 years as opposed to 2.7% in 2010. Only 22% of social 
enterprises received grant and donations in 2012, fewer than in 2010. 75% wanted to 
grow through increasing the leadership capabilities of managers, they were generally 
found to be more innovative than SMEs and to have higher management capabilities. 
They had less need to acquire finance than SMEs and more difficulty to do so; they argue 
that one of their biggest obstacles to success is getting access to finance (Cabinet Office, 
2013a). The social enterprises that are reliant to public funding will face the greater 
challenges in the future (Cabinet Office, 2011). In 2008 the value of their expenditure 
was 93% of their total income (Big Society Capital, 2012a) which means that they are 
constrained to spend all their income. From 2003-2007 income rose by 5% annually 
while fixed assets growth was 3% annually and current asset growth was 1% annually.  
 
For sponsoring bodies to support the growth of social enterprises they have to accept that 
some will fail as normal businesses do, that they need time, energy and money, that their 
aims should be both business and social, that employee involvement and responsibility 
are essential at all organizational levels and that ownership belongs to the entrepreneurs 
and employees so decision making should be left to them (Jeffery, 2005). 
 
As Dr Alex Nicholls the first Lecturer in Social Entrepreneurship Skoll Research Centre, 
Oxford University says (in Sky News, 2012) when an organization is deciding in which 
way to chose to assess its social impact the important thing is primarily to turn to its 
beneficiaries and ask them ‘how would you evaluate us?’ and then incorporate those 
parameters in the social reporting of the organization.  
 
There is limited research in assessing the effectiveness of social enterprises; one model 
that is suggested is an adaptation of the balanced scorecard assessing five parameters: 
financial, employee, social return, customer and community, and business development 
(Jeffery, 2005; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Also there is the concept of Social Auditing 
that targets funders, owners/board, community, potential employees and evaluates 
parameters such as health gains, personal development (self esteem, confidence), cost 
 300 
benefit, community benefits, employment policies, practices and empowerment actions 
(Schwarz, 2003). 
 
Evidence of Sharir and Lerner (2006) evaluate performance through three parameters: the 
level at which social enterprises can meet their objectives, the capability of the social 
enterprise to raise resources so as to maintain stability and sustainability of the offering 
(service/product/programme), and the resources available to achieve growth and 
development.  
 
According to Meyskens et al (2010a:441) social venture networks survival will depend 
on whether all partners are meeting their corresponding strategic objectives of perceived 
social and economic value creation in communities. 
 
5.7.5.3.1. Financial and Social returns 
 
Existing initiatives include the US-based Impact Reporting and Investment Standards 
(IRIS) and the Social Return on Investment (SROI) approach developed by a 
collaboration of individuals and organisations in the UK (such as the membership 
organisation the SROI Network).
 
These could be developed on a sector-specific basis, as 
opposed to there being nationally relevant metrics that cut across all the sectors in which 
social ventures operate (health, education, etc.). A menu of options for measurement 
methodology will need to operate according to what investors need, with greater rigour 
being applied to those that require it; (Cabinet Office, 2013c). This also closely related 
with the need for social risk ratings, so that proportionate risk rate with reference to social 
outcomes could be a tool for identifying investment opportunities 
 
5.7.6. Summary of Results for Proposition 4 
 
Social norms are socially shaped (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Meek et al, 2010) 
and emerge through the relational embeddedness of actors in networks (Granovetter, 
1985). Social norms influence the effect of governmental interventions and therefore 
before the design of policies authorities should research the social norms that exist in this 
region and culture (Meek et al, 2010). When formal/central institutions are absent or 
weak then local institutions like social norms, culture and religion are the important 
determinants of the entrepreneurs’ activity; in the case where there are market failures 
and formal institutions are weak or contradict local social institutions then we have the 
phenomenon of institutional voids, in that case social inequalities will continue to exist 
(Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). So contradiction and conflict may raise among the 
two set of systems that of central/formal institutions and that of decentralised/informal 
institutions. Voids represent an institutional pluralism and are the result of conflict and 
contradiction among formal and informal institutions. Institutional plurality is also 
indicated as a source of conflict creation that influences social entrepreneurship 
(Nicholls, 2010a; Pache and Santos, 2010). Those identified institutional voids in the 
Greek case are further restrained from low entrepreneurism, individualism, mistrust and 
low skills in network building of prospective social entrepreneurs. Never the less because 
of the severe recession, high unemployment rates, increased number of people living 
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under poverty or in risk of poverty these logics are shifting. Our findings indicate that a 
growing number of individuals participate in networks and informal structures that target 
institutional change, social norms like solidarity and mutuality have risen, people though 
collective actions try to address unmet social needs, and to innovate through social 
entrepreneurial ventures ignoring the role of formal institutions.  
 
The strength of an institutional logic to prevail in organisational decision making is 
determined by: firstly, the centrality of actors; for example governments have a central 
role and through coercive power can impose their institutional logic. Secondly, by the 
resources of actors; like foundations that have the resources needed by social enterprises 
and so their logics influence significantly decision-making of social entrepreneurs. And 
thirdly, by normative processes that shape the behaviour of social entrepreneurs; like 
through training, mentoring and socialization activities carried by educational and 
business support centers or by the norms and values coming from the internal 
environment of social enterprises through their volunteers, trustees and staff and through 
their social networks and alliances (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair and Serzgi, 2011). 
 
A vital characteristic of social entrepreneurs is their ability to build networks (Nicholls 
and Opal, 2005) those networks provide them access to resources, help them support their 
venture, but also increase their capacity in making social impact and social value creation 
(Nicholls, 2008). Having other entrepreneurs in one’s social network is fundamental for 
detecting opportunities in the market (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003).  Lack of social 
connections, can make business startups unsuccessful despite having identified an 
opportunity gap in the market (Shane and Eckhardt, 2003). Most theories on social 
innovation identify the correlation among social innovation models and network 
embeddedness of actors (Alvord et al, 2004; Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009; Mair, 
Battilana and Cardens, 2012; Seelos and Mair, 2005). Quoted from our interviewees: 'We 
want alliances, collaborations'; ‘ SE is a party of people not numbers'; 'Who are your 
supporters? Make them part of it. Not going to be a good campaigner if you are not a 
good neighbour. Make it fun!'; ‘You need friends; you need honest transparent 
relationships with people who believe in what you do and will help you. That is the 
secret’ Colin Crooks CEO Green Works. Another important dynamic of embeddedness is 
the accumulation effect of networks. We have identified a number of what we call ‘serial 
social entrepreneurs’; specifically 10% of our population have diversified their operations 
by creating at least three different social enterprises.  
 
From the findings of our research it is indicated that social entrepreneurs in the Greek 
case that have managed to scale and achieve a substantial social impact are 
advantageously positioned in high status networks and are people highly empathetic and 
caring about others. The ability of social institutional entrepreneurs to actually emerge 
and break the boundaries of their embeddedness within institutions (the paradox of 
embedded agency) is influenced by the the enabling conditions; such as field 
characteristics (like regulatory changes, scarcity of resources, economic and political 
crises, coexistence of contradicting institutions, low degrees of institutionalisation, the 
behaviour of other actors) and their social position (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 
2009). Actor’s social position is also influenced by their perceptions of field level 
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characteristics but also by their ability to leverage resources to challenge them. Therefore 
there exists a correlation among social position -that is structural embeddedness in 
networks- and institutional entrepreneurship. There also exists a correlation among 
personal characteristics such as demographic and psychological factors and their 
correlation and institutional entrepreneurship.  
 
Most of the failure cases of social enterprises have been due to the unwillingness of the 
owners to partner with others, their low levels of trust and their fear of sharing their ideas. 
Another risk is overembeddedness which in the Greek case is evident by the creation of 
specific fractions of non for profits which are grant reliant and deeply embedded in their 
‘client’ relationships with ministries and municipalities. Most of these organizations are 
now facing bankruptcy due to governmental cost cuts.  
 
 
5.8. Challenges and Lessons Learnt  
 
The biggest challenge that Green Works has faced is the social franchise itself. Their first 
attempt to build a social franchise network in 2003 in three different locations 
simultaneously was a failure; that was due to the fact that their model was not yet ready 
to be franchised. It was not standardized and clear cut, they had no support system in 
place, and they had very low capital to invest. Also Green Works model is very much 
different to a Mc Donald’s in a sense that in recycling you are not in control over both 
backwards and forwards vertical supply chain relationships, and there are very few things 
that you can do about that in terms of marketing and boosting demand. The lesson that 
they have learnt is that they, being the social franchisor, have to stop operating the Green 
Works business model and focus only in the support of the social franchise network. The 
latter is in line with evidence from the industry research of Higgins et al (2008). 
 
Aspire, Whole Food Planet and Law for All are three case of social franchises that have 
failed. The reasons are in line with the ones that we identified from our research. Aspire 
the model was not well structured although they received funding, they started 
franchising when their own social enterprise hadn’t been sustainable, a weak business 
model linked with very high social objectives, when problem arose they changed the 
rules and increased control and authority over franchisees, conflict of interest as 
franchisor targeted financial objectives and franchisees social objectives (Higgins et al, 
2008; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007). Whole Food Planet was set up by Social Firms UK who 
bought the IP from Daily Bread Co-operative and tried to build a network, the model did 
not have a strong market orientation, they did not build on strong brand and marketing, it 
did not establish linkages and relationships with the parent company, it relied on grants 
rather than the market (Richardson and Berelowitz, 2012). Many social enterprises lack 
the capability to set up, market and manage a viable franchise system; they also lack 
motivation preferring to manage their own social enterprises; an important issue is that 
social franchises have to find access to working capital until they reach breakeven which 
is not  before 2-3 years or before reaching 12 units (Higgins et al, 2008). Social 
franchisors indicate that they are willing to take lower fees but also provide less support, 
also most social franchises have not tested and invested on standardizing their concept 
before recruiting franchisees. These elements weaken the strengths of franchising as a 
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model for replication and thus posing threats to the viability of the venture (Higgins et al, 
2008).   
 
Issues and challenges that social enterprises face: Issues of formation, development: high 
need for prestart-up and start-up support at their local area. Need to scale-up; they are 
constrained to their local markets there is a need to enhance market opportunities; they 
struggle to achieve financial independence through generating income, as they charge 
lower fees for their offering, they employ volunteers and staff who are willing to be paid 
at below average level salaries (Sharir and Lerner, 2006)   there is a need to raise 
awareness and understanding of bidding public contracts; they struggle to externalize 
from parenting bodies; their scale is too small to make the impact that is needed: there is 
a need to increase their effectiveness in delivering a triple bottom line (people, planet, 
profit). They need to grow to meet consumer demand and need to increase their 
marketing skills to promote themselves to consumers. There biggest challenge is getting 
access to capital: need for funding to compensate for their social and environmental 
contributions; need for funding to overcome market failures; need to gain access to 
finance and the social investment market; awareness of existence and access to 
alternative sources of finance; lack of investment readiness of social enterprises; need of 
understanding and producing social and environmental impact measurements; there is a 
need for capital investment of social enterprises in fixed assets and reserves 
 
Networking needs: the need of social enterprises to connect with other social enterprises; 
to get acquainted with, be taught by and collaborate with other social entrepreneurs.  
 
In terms of business support required there are needs that are similar to mainstream 
entrepreneurs, such as: managing expectations effectively, active follow up, relevant and 
practical information and advice. But mostly needs differ. Social enterprises are 
heterogeneous. Capacity building and skills required depends on: how they came to 
market, their business model, their sector, their stage of development; many spin-outs of 
charities or voluntary sector organizations reliant on grants and donations, other from 
social entrepreneurs with strong commercial background. Some have a commercial part 
as a mainstream business which raises surpluses to meet the social and environmental 
objectives; others have a stronger relationship between the social enterprise and their 
beneficiaries.  
 
Such needs are: diverse legal structures, understanding social and environmental 
objectives, understanding social enterprise model, appointing trustees and volunteers, 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). Need to empathise with their social and environmental aims; need 
to communicate in an easily understood language; need to be inspired, motivated and 
enthused.  
 
5.9. Concluding Remarks 
 
At this section we presented and discussed our qualitative data analysis findings. The 
Social Franchise Model provides evidence that formal institutions (like tax incentives), 
informal institutions of social norms and networks (Arrighetti et al, 1997), innovation 
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(like technology) (Van Putten and Green, 2010) and individual characteristics (like 
collective leadership) (Alvord et al, 2004) are positively related to social entrepreneurship 
and social franchising formation growth and success. The importance of these systems is 
increased during recession (Van Putten and Green, 2010). The most important elements 
in priority ranking are: firstly, relational and structural embeddedness of social 
entrepreneurs in networks; secondly, the existence of a favourable environment supported 
by formal institutions especially in terms of start-up capital offered and access to 
specialized educational and consulting schemes; thirdly, the technological and 
sustainability element of the ventures that has to be able to be solvent in due course; 
fourthly the ability of social entrepreneurs to enter and manage network relationships and 
their level of empathy, motive to make a positive change in society and resilience.  
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6. Quantitative Data Analysis  
 
In this section we will analyse the data collected from a pilot web survey on mainstream 
franchises in the UK and Greece. The scope of the survey is to evaluate the influence of 
the informal institution of social norms of relational and structural network 
embeddedness on the formation, governance and performance of franchising systems.  
6.1. Descriptive Research Findings 
6.1.1. Survey Response rates 
 
The sampling frame was drawn as following: on the 29th of February 2011 the list of 
participants at the international franchise fair in Athens included 142 companies of which 
27 were not yet developed at the Greek market; so 160 fully operational franchise 
networks at the Greek market and 18 fully operational franchise networks at the UK 
market. The list of members to the Greek Franchise Association included 51 fully 
operational franchise networks. Among these 51 networks 21 took part in the 
international franchise exhibition. So in aggregation we had a sampling frame of 190 
Greek franchise systems. From the list of members at the British Franchise Association 
we had another 97 full members. We followed a structured plan in conducting our survey 
following the ‘tailored design’ protocol (Dillman, 2007)  
Table 13 Survey Response Rates Statistics 
 
Total number of Sampling Units  
Greece 
UK 
 
190 
97 
Total No of Respondents 
Greece 
UK 
 
35 
12 
Total No of Eligible Respondents 
Greece 
UK 
 
173 
88 
Total No of Ineligible Respondents 
(bounced back or dropped out) 
Greece 
UK 
 
 
17 
9 
Percentage of Eligible Respondents 
Greece 
UK 
 
91% 
90% 
Total No of Non Respondents 
Greece 
UK 
 
138 
76 
Response Rate 
Greece (35/173) 
 
20% 
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UK (12/88) 14% 
 
6.1.2. Non response bias 
 
To avoid unknown bias from refusals is to know that those who did not respond do not 
differ greatly from those that did respond. The potential of non response bias can be 
checked by comparing early respondents with late respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977). So through the t-student test we measured the significance among early and late 
respondents in both the UK and the Greek sample. We measured the significance of 
differences in TD and GB variables which have been widely used in our regression 
analysis and have been proven strong variables. Significance rates for the Greek sample 
were p≥ 0.818 for TD and p≥ 0.903 for GB and for the UK sample respectively p≥0.488 
and p≥0.352 
 
Therefore significance rates are above 10% so the two data sets are not consider as 
having significant differences among them and so we argue that the respondents of the 
people who didn’t respond wouldn’t differ greatly.  
 
6.1.3. Significance among Greek and UK samples 
 
We also applied a t-student test to see the significance of difference among the Greek and 
the UK samples as a whole; we checked findings with reference to variables TD p≥ 0.112 
and GB p≥0.225; the same variables were used in the previous t tests. Since the 
significance rates are above 10% we consider that there are no significant differences 
among the data sets and have pooled them together.  
 
Mavondo and Rodrigo tested their models for equivalence of the covariance matrices 
across national samples and did not find them to be different; x
2
=14.816, df=16, p<0.538. 
According to Abe et al (1996) the aforementioned results demonstrate equality of the 
variance-covariance matrices and equivalence of measures across cultures. In this case it 
can be suggested that data can be combined and no further cross-sample analysis are 
needed. Therefore the data set can be pooled and results can be generalised across both 
samples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 307 
6.1.4. Descriptive Findings of Variables 
 
Table 14 List of Variables and Scales 
Ties Trust Commitment Flexibility Role 
Integrity 
Solidarity Mutuality 
TA1 TB1-10 CA1-6 FA1-4 IA1 SA1 M1-2 
TA4-5 TC1-6 CB1-2 FB1-3    
 TD1-3 CC1-2     
  CD1-9     
  CE1-4     
 
 
Harmonization of 
Conflict 
Restraint of 
Power 
Formation 
Motives 
Governance  Performance Demographics 
HA1 RA1-3 MA1-3 Hierarchies 
HB1-17 
PA1-6 DA1-5 
HB1-4 RB1-5 MB1-2 Equity 
GA1 
PB1-12 DB1-5 
SRH1-6 RC1-7 MC1-2 Prp/ion 
GC1 
PC1-2  
  MD1-3 Entry Mode 
JB2 
PD1  
  ME1    
 
 
Our study includes binary variables (the variables that measure Ties), categorical or else 
called nominal and multi-item ordinal variables of five point Likert scales which we 
analysed using SPSS package. From the table above we can see that Ties, Trust, 
Commitment, Flexibility, Role Integrity, Solidarity, Mutuality, Harmonization of 
Conflict and Restraint of Power are the Independent Variables of our study; while 
Motives for Formation, Governance and Performance are the Dependent Variables of our 
study. We have also used a number of control variables, also known as dummy variables 
to test variance in our findings due to industry, organizational or individual factors. None 
of these were found significant as we will see later on.  
 
We can also see that we used many different scales for measuring the same or similar 
aspects of our variables. These scales (see Chapter 4) are all drawn or adapted from 
existing literature. The use of many different scales was purposively chosen as this is a 
pilot study and we wanted to allow the most appropriate scales to emerge from the social 
settings of our research. Based on the factor analysis findings of our scales reliability and 
validity tests we have drawn the final questionnaire that we are proposing for future 
research use at the mainstream and social franchise industry. 
 
We hypothesized that the scales are linear so we treated them as interval variables; this is 
a common practice in many quantitative studies that use Likert scales. There is a big 
debate in literature on the difference among ordinal and interval variables and there is 
sustainable argumentation to support our choice. This allowed us to perform correlation 
analysis using Pearson’s r and linear regression analysis.  
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In the case of the three binary variables of ties we used t-student test by measuring the 
significance of the differences of means. It was not possible to perform neither Pearson’s 
r nor regression analysis since the dependent variables are interval and the independent 
are binary in this case. 
 
6.1.5. Descriptive Statistics of Social Norms 
 
The following tables provide a description of the frequency of each variable. We can se 
how many times the respondets chose a specific answer on the different scales and the 
percentage of appearance of each response choice within scales. Some scales had a clear 
concentration of replies on a specific scale while others had a wider distribution of 
choices of scales indicating a weaker strength of the scales and a variation of the sample. 
Table 15 Aggregated Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TB 47 2,40 5,00 3,9319 ,49216 
TC 47 2,33 5,00 3,8475 ,63019 
TD 47 2,33 5,00 3,9149 ,56238 
CA 47 2,75 5,00 3,9043 ,44707 
CB 47 2,50 5,00 4,3298 ,57367 
CC 47 2,50 5,00 3,9787 ,56103 
CD 47 2,75 5,00 3,9202 ,51633 
MA 47 3,00 5,00 4,4362 ,55772 
FB 47 2,33 4,67 3,7660 ,52894 
SIA 47 2,67 5,00 3,8794 ,54029 
HB 47 1,00 3,75 1,8617 ,92049 
RA 47 1,33 5,67 3,4468 ,98117 
RB 47 1,00 5,80 3,5660 1,03698 
RC 47 1,00 4,40 2,1660 ,92155 
GB 47 1,60 5,00 3,8468 ,74625 
PBA 47 2,00 5,00 3,9078 ,70438 
PBB 47 2,00 5,00 3,8351 ,67823 
PBC 47 3,00 5,00 4,2908 ,57993 
PC 47 2,00 5,00 3,9468 ,75350 
MB 47 1,00 5,00 3,4362 ,91851 
MD 47 2,33 5,00 4,3121 ,60355 
SHR 47 3,00 5,00 4,1436 ,43221 
Valid N (listwise) 47     
 
The above table presents the means and standard deviation of all the variables of our 
study. 
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Table 16 Descriptive Statistics of TC 
 
TC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,33 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
2,67 1 2,1 2,1 6,4 
2,83 1 2,1 2,1 8,5 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 10,6 
3,17 3 6,4 6,4 17,0 
3,33 3 6,4 6,4 23,4 
3,50 3 6,4 6,4 29,8 
3,67 1 2,1 2,1 31,9 
3,83 3 6,4 6,4 38,3 
4,00 18 38,3 38,3 76,6 
4,17 4 8,5 8,5 85,1 
4,50 2 4,3 4,3 89,4 
4,83 1 2,1 2,1 91,5 
5,00 4 8,5 8,5 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 17 Descriptive Statistics of TD 
 
TD 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,33 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
2,67 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
3,00 3 6,4 6,4 10,6 
3,33 4 8,5 8,5 19,1 
3,67 6 12,8 12,8 31,9 
4,00 21 44,7 44,7 76,6 
4,33 5 10,6 10,6 87,2 
4,67 3 6,4 6,4 93,6 
5,00 3 6,4 6,4 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
For the measurement of trust we used three different multi-item likert type scales which 
we coded TB, TC and TD. 1 was strongly disagree and 5 was strongly agree. Almost 
38% of our respondents indicated that they agree that there is trust in their network based 
on TC which has 6 items. Almost 45% of our respondent indicated the existence of trust 
based on TD which has 3 items. 
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Table 18 Descriptive Statistics of CA 
CA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,75 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,25 5 10,6 10,6 12,8 
3,50 7 14,9 14,9 27,7 
3,75 4 8,5 8,5 36,2 
4,00 20 42,6 42,6 78,7 
4,25 4 8,5 8,5 87,2 
4,50 4 8,5 8,5 95,7 
5,00 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 19 Descriptive Statistics of CB 
CB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,50 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,50 3 6,4 6,4 8,5 
4,00 22 46,8 46,8 55,3 
4,50 5 10,6 10,6 66,0 
5,00 16 34,0 34,0 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
 
Table 20 Descriptive Statistics of CC 
CC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,50 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,00 4 8,5 8,5 10,6 
3,50 7 14,9 14,9 25,5 
4,00 24 51,1 51,1 76,6 
4,50 6 12,8 12,8 89,4 
5,00 5 10,6 10,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
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Table 21 Descriptive Statistics of CD 
CD 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,75 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
3,25 4 8,5 8,5 12,8 
3,50 9 19,1 19,1 31,9 
3,75 5 10,6 10,6 42,6 
4,00 15 31,9 31,9 74,5 
4,25 3 6,4 6,4 80,9 
4,50 3 6,4 6,4 87,2 
4,75 4 8,5 8,5 95,7 
5,00 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
For measuring commitment we used four different scales. According to CA which has 6 
items 43% of our respondents agreed that there is commitment in the network. According 
to CB which has 2 items the majority indicated that they agree (57%) and that they 
strongly agree (34%). Based on CC which has 2 items 63% indicated that they agree that 
there is commitment and 10% they stronglee agree that they are committed to the 
network. Finally according to CD which has 9 items there was a wider distribution of 
answers 42% indicated that they agree that they are committed to the network. 
Table 22 Descriptive Statistics of FB 
FB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,33 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
2,67 2 4,3 4,3 6,4 
3,00 5 10,6 10,6 17,0 
3,33 4 8,5 8,5 25,5 
3,67 7 14,9 14,9 40,4 
4,00 20 42,6 42,6 83,0 
4,33 6 12,8 12,8 95,7 
4,67 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
For measuring flexibility we used two scales, FA and FB. More valid was FB which 
indicates that 32% were indifferent in the existence of flexibility in the network, while 
almost 60% indicated that there is flexibility in the network relationships. 
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Table 23 Descriptive Statistics of SIA 
SIA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,67 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
3,00 3 6,4 6,4 10,6 
3,33 5 10,6 10,6 21,3 
3,67 7 14,9 14,9 36,2 
4,00 21 44,7 44,7 80,9 
4,33 5 10,6 10,6 91,5 
5,00 4 8,5 8,5 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
For measuring solidarity, rle integrity and harmonization of conflict we created a new 
scale which was valid and reliable which we codes SIA, this encompassed items SA1, 
IA1 and HA1. The replies indicate that the majority of respondents acknowledged the 
existence of these norms in the franchise relationship. 
Table 24 Descriptive Statistics of HB 
HB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,00 17 36,2 36,2 36,2 
1,25 3 6,4 6,4 42,6 
1,50 2 4,3 4,3 46,8 
1,75 4 8,5 8,5 55,3 
2,00 7 14,9 14,9 70,2 
2,25 3 6,4 6,4 76,6 
2,50 2 4,3 4,3 80,9 
2,75 1 2,1 2,1 83,0 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 85,1 
3,50 4 8,5 8,5 93,6 
3,75 3 6,4 6,4 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Harmonization of conflict was generally a strong scale which we also measured through 
HB. HB is a reverse scale so that is why our entire sample replied that they strongly 
disagree or disagree. This means that our sample indicated that the social norm of 
harmonization of conflict is present in their franchise relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 313 
Table 25 Descriptive Statistics of SHR 
SHR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,25 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
3,50 1 2,1 2,1 6,4 
3,75 3 6,4 6,4 12,8 
4,00 25 53,2 53,2 66,0 
4,25 6 12,8 12,8 78,7 
4,50 2 4,3 4,3 83,0 
4,75 3 6,4 6,4 89,4 
5,00 5 10,6 10,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
We also used a scale to measure solidarity harmonization of conflict and role integrity 
which we coded SRH it has 6 items. 87% of our sample indicated the existence of these 
norms in the franchise relationship. 
Table 26 Descriptive Statistics of RA 
RA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,33 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
1,67 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 6,4 
2,33 1 2,1 2,1 8,5 
2,67 13 27,7 27,7 36,2 
3,00 6 12,8 12,8 48,9 
3,33 2 4,3 4,3 53,2 
3,67 5 10,6 10,6 63,8 
4,00 5 10,6 10,6 74,5 
4,33 4 8,5 8,5 83,0 
4,67 4 8,5 8,5 91,5 
5,00 2 4,3 4,3 95,7 
5,33 1 2,1 2,1 97,9 
5,67 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
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Table 27 Descriptive Statistics of RB 
RB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,00 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
1,80 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 6,4 
2,40 2 4,3 4,3 10,6 
2,60 1 2,1 2,1 12,8 
2,80 3 6,4 6,4 19,1 
3,00 12 25,5 25,5 44,7 
3,20 5 10,6 10,6 55,3 
3,40 1 2,1 2,1 57,4 
3,60 2 4,3 4,3 61,7 
4,00 2 4,3 4,3 66,0 
4,20 4 8,5 8,5 74,5 
4,40 1 2,1 2,1 76,6 
4,60 2 4,3 4,3 80,9 
4,80 3 6,4 6,4 87,2 
5,00 3 6,4 6,4 93,6 
5,20 1 2,1 2,1 95,7 
5,60 1 2,1 2,1 97,9 
5,80 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 28 Descriptive Statistics of RC 
RC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,00 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
1,20 4 8,5 8,5 10,6 
1,40 10 21,3 21,3 31,9 
1,60 2 4,3 4,3 36,2 
1,80 10 21,3 21,3 57,4 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 59,6 
2,20 5 10,6 10,6 70,2 
2,80 5 10,6 10,6 80,9 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 83,0 
3,40 1 2,1 2,1 85,1 
3,60 2 4,3 4,3 89,4 
3,80 1 2,1 2,1 91,5 
4,00 3 6,4 6,4 97,9 
4,40 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
To measure restraint of power we used thre different scales RA measuring expert type of 
power it has three items, RB measuring reference type of power has five items and RC 
measuring reputational type of power has seven items. Our respondents indicate that 
expert type of power is not present in the relationship and they do not engage in actions 
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that would enhance the development of this type of power. From their replies it is also 
suggested that reference type of power is not that present as prospective franchisees are 
not referenced to the network by existing network members. Finally reputational type of 
power is also not enhanced; practices and actions like joint activities among franchisees 
and franchisors are not encouraged. 
  
6.1.6. Descriptive Statistics of Formation 
 
Table 29 Descriptive Statistics of MA 
MA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
3,00 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
4,00 20 42,6 42,6 46,8 
4,50 5 10,6 10,6 57,4 
5,00 20 42,6 42,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 30 Descriptive Statistics of MB 
MB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,00 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
2,00 3 6,4 6,4 10,6 
2,50 4 8,5 8,5 19,1 
3,00 9 19,1 19,1 38,3 
3,50 9 19,1 19,1 57,4 
4,00 12 25,5 25,5 83,0 
4,50 6 12,8 12,8 95,7 
5,00 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 31Descriptive Statistics of MD 
MD 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,33 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
3,33 3 6,4 6,4 8,5 
3,67 6 12,8 12,8 21,3 
4,00 7 14,9 14,9 36,2 
4,33 12 25,5 25,5 61,7 
4,67 5 10,6 10,6 72,3 
5,00 13 27,7 27,7 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The formation of franchise networks was measured through motives that lead to 
formation. We used five categories of motives which were not found to be strong. Mainly 
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MA which was financial motives was a more valid scale and from this we can see that the 
majority of respondents (94%) indicated that financial motives were the reasons for 
entering into franchise partnerships. With reference to technological motives MB 40% of 
the respondents indicated that they formed franchise networks to gain technological 
benefits. MD referred to strategic motives, the majority of the respondents indicated that 
they formed franchise partnerships to meet strategic objectives.  
 
6.1.7. Descriptive Statistics of Governance 
Table 32 Descriptive Statistics of GB 
GB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1,60 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 4,3 
2,20 1 2,1 2,1 6,4 
2,40 1 2,1 2,1 8,5 
2,80 2 4,3 4,3 12,8 
3,20 2 4,3 4,3 17,0 
3,40 4 8,5 8,5 25,5 
3,60 3 6,4 6,4 31,9 
3,80 5 10,6 10,6 42,6 
4,00 4 8,5 8,5 51,1 
4,20 10 21,3 21,3 72,3 
4,40 7 14,9 14,9 87,2 
4,60 3 6,4 6,4 93,6 
4,80 2 4,3 4,3 97,9 
5,00 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
We measured governance through the existence of hierarchies using 17 items. The 
majority of the respondents indicated the existence of hierarchies to govern the franchise 
relationships.  
 
6.1.8. Descriptive Statistics of Performance 
Table 33 Descriptive Statistics of PBA 
PBA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
2,67 4 8,5 8,5 10,6 
3,00 1 2,1 2,1 12,8 
3,33 7 14,9 14,9 27,7 
3,67 4 8,5 8,5 36,2 
4,00 14 29,8 29,8 66,0 
4,33 7 14,9 14,9 80,9 
4,67 4 8,5 8,5 89,4 
5,00 5 10,6 10,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
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Table 34 Descriptive Statistics of PBB 
PBB 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,00 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
2,50 2 4,3 4,3 6,4 
2,75 1 2,1 2,1 8,5 
3,00 2 4,3 4,3 12,8 
3,25 3 6,4 6,4 19,1 
3,50 8 17,0 17,0 36,2 
3,75 7 14,9 14,9 51,1 
4,00 8 17,0 17,0 68,1 
4,25 6 12,8 12,8 80,9 
4,50 3 6,4 6,4 87,2 
4,75 2 4,3 4,3 91,5 
5,00 4 8,5 8,5 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 35 Descriptive Statistics of PBC 
PBC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
3,00 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
3,33 2 4,3 4,3 8,5 
3,67 6 12,8 12,8 21,3 
4,00 12 25,5 25,5 46,8 
4,33 4 8,5 8,5 55,3 
4,67 10 21,3 21,3 76,6 
5,00 11 23,4 23,4 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 36 Descriptive Statistics of PC 
PC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2,00 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
2,50 3 6,4 6,4 10,6 
3,00 2 4,3 4,3 14,9 
3,50 4 8,5 8,5 23,4 
4,00 23 48,9 48,9 72,3 
4,50 6 12,8 12,8 85,1 
5,00 7 14,9 14,9 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
To emasure the performance of the franchise networks we used four different scales. PA 
measured actual performance which was not provided by the majority of our respondets 
so we eliminated this scale. PB measured the satisfaction of the motives (MA-MD) that 
initially lead them to form franchise partnerships. PBA measured the satisfaction of 
meeting financial motives; 60% of our respondent indicated that they agree and strongly 
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agree that they achived their financial motives. PBB measures both technological and 
managerial motives as it is a stronger scale when these item combined; it is unclear and 
almost indifferent whether they met their technological motives; 45% indicating that they 
do not agree nor disagree about meeting technological objectives. PBC measures strategic 
motives; 77% of our sample was satisfied for achiving strategic objectives. Performance 
was also measured through a two item scale which measured overall satisfaction from the 
franchise network; 61% of respondents agreed that they were overall satisfied and 15% 
strongly agreed that they were overall satisfied from the franchise network.  
 
6.1.9. Demographics - Descriptive Findings 
 
Table 37 Descriptive Statistics of Demographics  
DA1 years 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 2 4,3 4,3 4,3 
2 3 6,4 6,4 10,6 
3 4 8,5 8,5 19,1 
4 27 57,4 57,4 76,6 
5 11 23,4 23,4 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The wider majority of the sample were mature franchise networks. 
 
DA1 REGION 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 32 68,1 68,1 68,1 
2 4 8,5 8,5 76,6 
3 5 10,6 10,6 87,2 
4 6 12,8 12,8 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Our data indicate that 68% of the franchisors of the systems were firstly established in the 
capital or big cities in the UK and Greece.  
 
DA3 YEARS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 5 10,6 10,6 10,6 
2 3 6,4 6,4 17,0 
3 29 61,7 61,7 78,7 
4 9 19,1 19,1 97,9 
5 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The wider majority 62% of our respondents had created their franchise network for more 
than 10 years now. That is when they decided to establish their first franchised store. 
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DA3 REGION 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 34 72,3 72,3 72,3 
2 4 8,5 8,5 80,9 
3 4 8,5 8,5 89,4 
4 5 10,6 10,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
Almost 72% of the first franchised store was located in the capital of big cities. This 
indicates that franchisors chose to recruit franchisees from big cities initially.  
 
DA4 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 4 8,5 8,5 8,5 
2 27 57,4 57,4 66,0 
3 12 25,5 25,5 91,5 
4 4 8,5 8,5 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The majority of the respondents operate in the retail sector. 
 
DA5 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 41 87,2 87,2 87,2 
2 6 12,8 12,8 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The majority of the respondents (87%) has not changed ownership of their franchised 
network  
 
DB1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 42 89,4 89,4 89,4 
2 5 10,6 10,6 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
The respondents of our research are 90% men and only 10% women, indicating that 
owners and high ranking executives of franchise networks are male. This is a 
contradiction with social franchises and social enterprises were the distribution is 50-50.  
 
DB2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
2 33 70,2 70,2 70,2 
3 13 27,7 27,7 97,9 
4 1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
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With reference to age distribution 70% of our sapmle are below 45 years old while 28% 
are between 45-55 years old.  
 
DB3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 6 12,8 12,8 12,8 
2 6 12,8 12,8 25,5 
3 9 19,1 19,1 44,7 
4 24 51,1 51,1 95,7 
5 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 With reference to educational background 50% of our sample hold a masters degree and 
20% hold a bachelor degree, only 1 respondet is a PhD graduate and 13% are high school 
graduates without any further certification or training.  
 
DB4 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 25 53,2 53,2 53,2 
2 20 42,6 42,6 95,7 
3 2 4,3 4,3 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
With reference to the position they hold in the franchisor company, 53% are the owners 
of the company and 43% are senior managers only 2 respondents were managers.  
DB5 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 11 23,4 23,4 23,4 
2 31 66,0 66,0 89,4 
3 2 4,3 4,3 93,6 
4 3 6,4 6,4 100,0 
Total 47 100,0 100,0  
 
With reference to former education the majority 66% were working in the private sector 
while 23% were self-employed. 
 
6.2. Principal Component Analysis & Construction of Scale Indices 
 
Initially we measured each scale independently and have identified the items that were 
not significant and eliminated them. This is an exploratory factor analysis through 
viramax rotation which is mostly used in other research and results in better factors 
loadings. Principal components analysis is used to evaluate the reliability and validity of 
scales and the structure of its factor. We present the component matrix of the scales that 
were found significant. The factor loadings comprise the weights and correlations 
between each variable and the factors which need to be higher than 0.5 to be sufficient. 
This is also refered to as the validity of the factors indicating that the factors are really 
measuring what we want to measure.  
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The cronbach alpha (hereafter CA) needs to be higher than 0.7 and measures the 
reliability of the variables indicating that if we would do this study again we would get 
the same answers. CA measures the internal consistency of the scale, namely how closely 
related a set of items are as a group. According to Nunnally above 0.7 is significant 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1970-19724-000. These measurements are in line with 
previous research (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Manning and Munro, 2007; Mavondo and 
Rodrigo, 2001; Mollering, 2003; Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997; Weaven, Grace and 
Manning, 2009). 
 
6.2.1. Principal Component Analysis of Social Norms- Scales 
Reliability and Validity 
 
6.2.1.1. Ties 
We used two scales to measure formation based on the existence of weak and strong ties. 
We can see that the validity of the variable for measuring strength of ties is significant 
but there reliability as one variable is low, so we treated them as two independent 
variables.  
Table 38 Principal Component Analysis Ties 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
TA4 ,780 
TA5 ,780 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.26 
 
6.2.1.2. Trust 
Table 39 Principal Component Analysis Trust 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
TB1 ,539 
TB2 ,824 
TB3 ,771 
TB5 ,639 
TB7 ,781 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.72 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
TC1 ,789 
TC2 ,948 
TC3 ,924 
TC4 ,899 
TC5 ,862 
TC6 ,901 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
TD1 ,790 
TD2 ,861 
TD3 ,801 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.75 
 
6.2.1.3. Commitment 
 
Table 40 Principal Component Analysis Commitment  
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
CA1 ,768 
CA4 ,883 
CA5 ,721 
CA6 ,590 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
CB1 ,929 
CB2 ,929 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.84 
 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
CC1 ,719 
CC2 ,719 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.70 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
CD3 ,730 
CD4 ,773 
CD5 ,745 
CD8 ,692 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.70 
 
6.2.1.4. Mutuality 
Table 41 Principal Component Analysis Mutuality 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
MA1 ,940 
MA2 ,940 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.85 
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6.2.1.5. Flexibility 
 
Table 42 Principal Component Analysis Flexibility 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
FB1 ,829 
FB2/SRH5 ,862 
FB3 ,712 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
CA: 0.71 
 
6.2.1.6. Solidarity, Role Integrity Harmonization of Conflict 
Table 43 Principal Component Analysis SIA 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
SA1 ,671 
IA1 ,527 
HA1 ,772 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.34 
 
 Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
HB1 REVERSE ,778 
HB2 REVERSE ,909 
HB3 REVERSE ,622 
HB4 REVERSE ,704 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
CA: 0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 325 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
SRH1 ,683 
SRH2 ,980 
SRH3 ,980 
SRH4 ,713 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.83 
 
6.2.1.7. Restraint of Power 
 
Table 44 Principal Component Analysis Power 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
RA1 ,636 
RA2 ,916 
RA3 ,876 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.75 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
RB1 ,842 
RB2 ,588 
RB3 ,908 
RB4 ,908 
RB5 ,920 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.88 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
RC1 ,562 
RC2 ,739 
RC4 ,697 
RC6 ,797 
RC7 ,536 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
 
6.2.2.  Principal Component Analysis of Formation – Scales 
Reliability and Validity 
 
Table 45 Principal Component Analysis Formation 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
MB1 ,877 
MB2 ,877 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
MD1 ,544 
MD2 ,688 
MD3 ,832 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.47 
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6.2.3.  Principal Component Analysis of Governance- Hierarchies- 
Scales Reliability and Validity 
Table 46 Principal Component Analysis Governance  
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
GB5 ,857 
GB6 ,904 
GB7 ,862 
GB8 ,761 
GB9 ,590 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.86 
 
6.2.4.  Principal Component Analysis of Performance- Scales 
Reliability and Validity 
 
Table 47 Principal Component Analysis Performance  
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PB1 ,906 
PB2 ,847 
PB3 ,611 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PB4 ,858 
PB5 ,824 
PB6 ,863 
PB7 ,714 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
CA: 0.80 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PB8 ,871 
PB9 ,835 
PB10 ,656 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA: 0.70 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PC1 ,863 
PC2 ,863 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components 
extracted. 
 
CA:0.65 
 
All the above tables include only the scales and items that have a sufficient reliability and 
validity. From the tables above we can redesign our questionnaire for future use and 
eliminate all other scale and items.  
6.3. Correlation Analysis and Multiple Linear Regression Modelling  
 
6.3.1. Correlation Analysis within Selected Constructs 
 
The next step is the binary relation among variables using the scales that has a strong 
loading factor and CA. We performed correlation analysis using pearsons r. The 
correlation matrix that we present hereunder presents the relations among only two 
variables at a time and whether these are significant or not. When under 0.05 sig we 
indicate one star, if under 0.01the two tiered significance which indicates an even 
stronger significance. Τhe Pearson correlation is the index of the tention of the relation 
between each two variables.  
 
Table 48 Pearson Correlation Analysis  
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Me
an 
Std. 
Deviati
on 
TA
1 TA4 TA5 TB TC TD CA CB CC CD MA FB SIA HB RA RB RC MB 
M
D 
SH
R GB 
PB
A 
PB
B 
PB
C 
P
C 
TA
1 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
    1                                                 
TA
4 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
   -
,27
5 
1                                               
TA
5 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
   ,02
8 
,215 1                                             
TB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 0 ,31
5* 
,014 ,475
** 
1                                           
TC Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,8 1 ,16
7 
,005 ,432
** 
,622
** 
1                                         
TD Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 1 ,21
9 
-
,032 
,284 ,471
** 
,825
** 
1                                       
CA Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 0 ,29
7* 
-
,046 
,029 ,157 ,323
* 
,464
** 
1                                     
CB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4,3 1 ,16
3 
,030 ,269 ,374
** 
,172 ,201 ,338
* 
1                                   
CC Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4 1 -
,00
8 
-
,008 
,193 ,310
* 
,416
** 
,465
** 
,241 ,444
** 
1                                 
CD Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 1 ,19
5 
-
,033 
-
,090 
,059 ,229 ,344
* 
,390
** 
,348
* 
,482
** 
1                               
M
A 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4,4 1 ,25
0 
-
,024 
,002 ,103 -
,008 
,213 ,444
** 
,543
** 
,030 ,331
* 
1                             
FB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,8 1 -
,15
3 
,040 ,023 ,004 ,094 ,224 ,141 ,057 ,435
** 
,288
* 
,169 1                           
SI
A 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 1 ,02
5 
,084 ,230 ,334
* 
,271 ,204 ,296
* 
,388
** 
,230 ,400
** 
,202 ,15
3 
1                         
HB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
1,9 1 ,04
5 
-
,437
** 
-
,230 
-
,328
* 
-
,357
* 
-
,384
** 
-
,165 
,016 -
,290
* 
-
,069 
,189 -
,25
4 
-
,388
** 
1                       
RA Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,4 1 ,14
4 
-
,193 
,056 ,070 ,087 ,197 ,046 ,222 -
,035 
,251 ,325
* 
-
,08
7 
-
,042 
,25
6 
1                     
RB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,6 1 ,33
3* 
-
,007 
,100 ,200 ,117 ,226 ,105 ,173 ,174 -
,017 
,207 ,06
2 
-
,075 
-
,02
9 
,29
0* 
1                   
RC Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
2,2 1 ,02
3 
,108 ,421
** 
,355
* 
,339
* 
,333
* 
,403
** 
,474
** 
,339
* 
,239 ,266 ,01
9 
,338
* 
-
,01
8 
,29
3* 
,147 1                 
M
B 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,4 1 -
,13
0 
,159 ,025 ,048 ,014 ,024 -
,214 
,154 ,345
* 
,247 ,013 ,26
7 
-
,009 
-
,09
1 
,03
2 
-
,039 
-
,02
8 
1               
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M
D 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4,3 1 -
,24
1 
-
,066 
-
,082 
-
,020 
-
,104 
,073 -
,162 
,136 ,352
* 
,105 ,211 ,24
9 
-
,060 
,11
8 
,09
0 
,135 ,00
6 
,285 1             
SH
R 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4,1 0 ,05
7 
,194 ,204 ,492
** 
,554
** 
,618
** 
,410
** 
,440
** 
,405
** 
,393
** 
,490
** 
,21
4 
,378
** 
-
,36
6* 
,15
7 
,234 ,27
2 
,024 ,06
8 
1           
GB Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,8 1 ,15
8 
-
,015 
,108 ,371
* 
,342
* 
,286 ,102 ,268 ,356
* 
,230 ,002 -
,04
9 
,359
* 
-
,21
5 
,26
8 
,234 ,19
3 
,242 ,12
8 
,262 1         
PB
A 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 1 ,02
8 
,174 ,318
* 
,291
* 
,365
* 
,248 ,380
** 
,292
* 
,307
* 
,303
* 
,215 ,12
9 
,408
** 
-
,27
2 
,03
6 
,263 ,10
7 
-
,054 
-
,02
2 
,503
** 
,469
** 
1       
PB
B 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,8 1 ,00
1 
,262 ,251 ,356
* 
,328
* 
,333
* 
,283 ,429
** 
,298
* 
,505
** 
,338
* 
,30
4* 
,355
* 
-
,30
7* 
,14
3 
,051 ,18
7 
,458
** 
,19
0 
,467
** 
,282 ,404
** 
1     
PB
C 
Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
4,3 1 ,02
5 
,107 ,224 ,421
** 
,273 ,300
* 
,312
* 
,337
* 
,253 ,188 ,462
** 
,26
6 
,238 -
,09
3 
,17
0 
,458
** 
,15
5 
,029 ,25
3 
,581
** 
,289
* 
,493
** 
,456
** 
1   
PC Pearson 
Correlat
ion 
3,9 1 -
,09
3 
,268 ,301
* 
,353
* 
,307
* 
,305
* 
,396
** 
,544
** 
,357
* 
,212 ,315
* 
,11
4 
,500
** 
-
,28
5 
,10
1 
,142 ,33
9* 
,074 ,11
7 
,458
** 
,554
** 
,694
** 
,514
** 
,484
** 
1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).                                         
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).                     
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6.3.2. Correlation Analysis Results 
 
The findings from Pearson r analysis indicate the following which are useful to our research: 
We wanted first of all to eliminate very high correlation among variables, that is to eliminate 
multicolinearity error and to see whether our independent and dependent variables were 
correlated in some way. The results indicate the inexistence of threats of multicolinearity to 
our analysis. Homoscedasticity was also not an issue in this research 
 
 
6.3.3. Multiple Linear Regression- Model Evaluation and 
Misspecification Tests and Multicollinearity Diagnosis 
 
The next step was to conduct regression analysis using the scales that had strong CA and 
strong loading factor and at the same time that expressed some levels of correlation through 
them through the Pearson r correlation analysis.  
 
 
6.3.3.1. Formation Hypothesis 1 
 
H1: The informal institution of network embeddedness is positively related to the formation 
and partner selection decision of franchising networks 
H11: Trust from prior direct ties between firms is positively related to franchise formation and 
partner selection 
H12: In the absence of prior direct ties, the larger the number of the common third-party ties 
of two firms the more likely they are to lead to franchise formation and partner selection  
H13: The existence of the network is positively related to the creation of new alliances and 
networks, so to its accumulation 
 
Regression analysis on formation didn’t indicate any relationship among motives and ties, or 
among trust and motives for formation. So our hypothesis were neither rejected nor confirmed 
with reference to formation of franchise networks based on prior ties and trust.  
 
TA4 measures the strength of ties among the franchisors and the franchisees distinguishing 
among weak and strong ties. The findings indicate that franchisors had no prior ties with 
franchisees TA1, with reference to TA4 it is indicated that the ties among the franchisor and 
the franchisees are strong. TA5 measures the strength of ties among the franchisees 
distinguishing among weak and strong ties. The findings indicate that the ties among the 
franchisees are weak.  
 
Quoting from a franchisor “What has business to do with family? I’m impressed. References 
and ties don’t count the selection is based on objective criteria”  
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6.3.3.2. Governance Hypothesis2 
 
H2: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness determines the 
governance system of the franchising networks, therefore it is inversely related to hierarchical 
controls in franchising networks 
H21: Trust is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H22: Prior ties between firms are inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H23: Commitment is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H24: Solidarity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H25: Mutuality is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H26: Flexibility is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H27: Role Integrity is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H28: Harmonization of Conflict is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
H29: Restraint of Power is inversely related to hierarchical controls 
 
 
6.3.3.2.1. Factor1 
 
Table 49 Regression Analysis Governance & HIA 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,190 ,200 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,114 ,451 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,034 ,812 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,158 ,316 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (HIA1) 
0.24 0.14 ,414 ,005 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
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6.3.3.2.2. Factor2 
 
Table 50 Regression Analysis Governance & SRH 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,210 ,181 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,113 ,479 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,102 ,489 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,022 ,905 
Solidarity, Role 
Integrity, 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (SRH) 
0.14 0.04 ,282 ,086 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
 
6.3.3.2.3. Factor3 
 
Table 51 Regression Analysis Governance & SIA 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,178 ,245 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,193 ,226 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,011 ,941 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,151 ,349 
Solidarity, Role 
Integrity, 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (SIA) 
0.19 0.10 ,374 ,018 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
6.3.3.2.4. Factor4 
 
Table 52 Regression Analysis Governance & Commitment C 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,201 ,191 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,070 ,654 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,120 ,406 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,128 ,430 
Commitment  (CC) 0.18 0.08 ,330 ,026 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
334 
 
6.3.3.2.5. Factor 5 
 
Table 53 Regression Analysis Governance & Trust B 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,249 ,098 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,122 ,424 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,081 ,565 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,103 ,520 
Trust  (TB) 0.21 0.12 ,381 ,010 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
6.3.3.2.6. Factor 6 
 
Table 54 Regression Analysis Governance & Trust C 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,256 ,089 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,114 ,456 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,165 ,247 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,085 ,596 
Trust  (TC) 0.21 0.12 ,384 ,010 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
6.3.3.2.7. Factor 7 
 
Table 55 Regression Analysis Governance & Trust D 
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,205 ,191 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,111 ,486 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,123 ,405 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,111 ,506 
Trust  (TD) 0.14 0.04 ,268 ,074 
a. Dependent Variable: GB 
 
6.3.3.2.8. Summary of tests for Hypothesis 2 
 
The regression analysis indicates that there are causal positive relationships among 
Hierarchies and Trust based on all scales TB, TC and TD. Among Hierarchies and 
Commitmemtn based on scale CC. Among Solicarity, Harmonization of conflict and Role 
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integrity and Hierarchies based on both scales SIA and SRH. The causal positive relationship 
among harmonization of conflict and Hierarchies were further supported by the regression 
analysis between HA1 and Hierarchies.  
 
According to these results our hypothesis are refuted indicating that the existence of social 
norms among franchisors and their franchsiees are not enough to counter balance the need to 
have hierarchies.  
 
Quoting from a respondent: “The management style in Greece is old fashioned. We cannot 
abandon hierarchies. I would do it. I would relax some hierarchies without having risk but the 
people are not trained to accept that. I know that hierarchies cause failures and distortions in 
our relationships” 
 
Another respondent combined trust with training, he stated that the less trained franchisees 
have lower trust in the system. Another respondent with reference to commitment mentioned 
that “we became committed because we had to, our franchisees have 100% ownership of their 
stores. I could easily replace the invidividual partner with another one but their business I 
need it”.  
 
6.3.3.3. Perfomance Hypothesis 3   
 
H3: The informal institution of the system of relational embeddedness is positively related to 
the performance of franchising networks 
H31: Trust is positively related to performance 
H32: Commitment is positively related to performance 
H33: Solidarity is positively related to performance 
H34: Mutuality is positively related to performance 
H35: Flexibility is positively related to performance 
H36: Role Integrity is positively related to performance 
H37: Harmonization of Conflict is positively related to performance 
H38: Restraint of Power is positively related to performance 
 
 
6.3.3.3.1. Factor1 
Table 56 Regression Analysis Performance, Trust B & SRH 
Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,204 ,169 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  ,179 ,244 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,014 ,924 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,115 ,461 
Trust (TB) 0.36 0.28 ,297 ,048 
Solidarity Role 
Integrity 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (SRH) 
0.19 0.10 ,269 ,090 
Dependent Variable: PBB 
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6.3.3.3.2. Factor2 
 
Table 57 Regression Analysis Performance & Trust C 
Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   -,070 ,630 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -,198 ,193 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,249 ,081 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,054 ,732 
Trust (TC) 0.24 0.14 ,330 ,024 
a. Dependent Variable: PBB  
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6.3.3.3.3. Factor3 
 
Table 58 Regression Analysis Performance & Commitment B 
Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,326 ,007 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -,347 ,006 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,168 ,142 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,082 ,510 
Commitment (CB) 0.54 0.46 ,524 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: PC 
 
6.3.3.3.4. Factor4 
 
Table 59 Regression Analysis Performance & Trust B 
Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,349 ,012 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -,296 ,036 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,251 ,054 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,060 ,676 
Trust (TB) 0.36 0.28 ,326 ,014 
a. Dependent Variable: PC 
 
6.3.3.3.5. Factor 5 
 
Table 60 Regression Analysis Performance & SRH  
Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,295 ,023 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -,302 ,024 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,258 ,035 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  ,109 ,458 
Solidarity, Role 
Integrity, 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (SRH) 
0.44 0.37 ,466 ,001 
a. Dependent Variable: PC 
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6.3.3.3.6. Factor 6 
 
Table 61 Regression Analysis Performance & Reputational Power  
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   2,303 ,026 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -2,076 ,044 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -1,770 ,084 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,708 ,483 
Restraint of Power 
through Reputation 
(RC) 
0.32 0.24 2,001 ,052 
a. Dependent Variable: PC 
 
6.3.3.3.7. Factor 7 
 
Table 62 Regression Analysis Performance & Harmonization of Conflict  
  Model R2 Adjusted R2 Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Sig. 
 
Org. Context Years   ,316 ,025 
Org. Context 
Industry Sector 
  -,210 ,162 
Indiv. Context 
Education  
  -,360 ,011 
Indiv. Context  Past 
Position 
  -,080 ,584 
Harmonization of 
Conflict (HB) 
0.33 0.24 -,296 ,043 
a. Dependent Variable: PC 
 
 
6.3.3.3.8. Factor 8 
 
 
Table 63 t-student test Strength of Ties and Perfomance 
 
Strength of ties among 
franchisees (weak vs 
strong) TA5 
Mean of Weak Ties Mean of Strong Ties Sig (2-tailed) 
Performance Meeting 
Financial Objectives 
PBA 
3.68 4.13 0.029 
Performance Meeting 
Technological & 
Managerial Objectives 
PBB 
3.66 4 0.089 
Overall Performance 
Satisfaction PC 
3.72 4.15 0.040 
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6.3.3.3.9. Summary of tests for Hypothesis 3 
 
Our regression analysis indicate that there are causal positive relationships among 
performance and trust (all scales of trust), harmonization of conflict, restraint of power 
especially with regards to reputational power, solidarity and role integrity.  
 
We also measured the correlation among TA5 and the rest variables through t-student test. The 
only significant means correlation existed between the strength of the ties among the 
franchisees of the systems and the performance of the system. The findings indicate that those 
with stronger ties among them were better performing that those with wicker ties among them 
and this difference of means among these two groups was statistically significant p≤ 0.05% 
and p≤ 0.09% with reference to PBB. 
 
Therefore our hypotheses are confirmed indicating that the existence of the social norms of 
governance is positively related with the performance of the franchise network.  
 
6.3.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
At this section we analysed the quantitative data collected through our online self-
administered questionnaire. The findings have indicated the existence of correlations and 
causal relationships among hierarchies and social norms as well as among performance and 
some social norms. Our quantitative research analysis doesn’t provide any justification for the 
refutation or confirmation of our first hypothesis that A Firm’s embeddedness in social 
networks is positively related to the formation of new alliances-franchises and the selection of 
appropriate partners -franchisors/ees. With reference to our second hypothesis that network 
embeddedness influences the governance structure of franchise systems and that there is a 
negative relationship among hierarchies and social norms. Our data indicate that social nroms 
in fact influence the governance of the franchise systems but positively instead of inversely. 
Finally with reference to our third hypothesis that network embeddedness is positively related 
to the performance of franchise systems, our data has confirmed this hypothesis. We also 
checked the relationship among ties and performance and found a strong positive causal 
relationship   
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7. Conclusions, Limitations and Implications 
 
Our qualitative research indicated that in understanding social franchising we have to 
understand social entrepreneurship and the social innovation model of the ventures that 
combine resources in an innovative way to achieve social objectives and impact. The 
determinant factor that differentiates social franchises from mainstream franchises and 
alliances are these two elements which are strongly embedded and influenced by their 
contextual political and social environments building on the dynamics of social networks. 
Social franchises cannot be analysed in isolation from the spheres of social entrepreneurship, 
social innovation, the political context within which they emerge and operate and the social 
settings of relationships they form with other organizations and actors which shape their 
behaviour through the dynamics of relational and structural embeddedness.  
 
The objectives of this study have been the attempt to provide satisfactory responses to the 
influence of the aforementioned four systems to the formation governance and performance of 
social franchises. Dissemination has been an objective of our research from early stages, 
therefore building on hard data of formal institutions incentives, best practices, challenges 
faced and solutions adopted by social entrepreneurs and support organizations.  
 
The phenomenon of social franchising that is the subject of this research is at its ‘natal’, early 
introduction phase as a topic of research and therefore could benefit from any theory building 
that could shed some light on this new inter-organizational format. In overcoming this barrier 
we have drawn from theories in mainstream franchising, alliances, networks and social 
entrepreneurship which are all closely linked to the construct of social franchising. The main 
body of research in franchising and generally in inter-firm alliances has tended to view the 
phenomena through a unilateral or bilateral approach, at the expense of neglecting valuable 
insights, which could be gained from a social network theory approach and from viewing the 
interactions among various systems of institutions. Social entrepreneurship and their alliances 
is a relatively new field of research that could benefit from viewing these phenomena from a 
holistic approach incorporating elements of institutional dynamics and social network theory. 
Most empirical research on social entrepreneurship and social alliances either builds on 
secondary data or on case studies from the developing world. The consequence of this 
research imbalance is that little research has devoted itself in viewing the phenomena of 
alliances in its social and political context and assessing the impact of the dynamics of the 
social relationships of a network in its formation, governance, and performance. We are also 
attempting to cover this gap by gathering primary data from cases active at the developed 
world.  
 
Our research is mainly exploratory building on an analytic induction theory of mixed-method 
approaches (Bailey, 2008; Bryman, 2006; Sloane and O’Reilly, 2013; Yin, 2008) of both 
quantitative and qualitative data analysis, including: 1) case studies of six social franchises in 
the UK and Greece; 2) in depth interviews with 113 social entrepreneurs in Greece and in the 
UK; 3) In depth interviews with 20 stakeholders in the UK and Greece; 4) an action research 
with the local authority of the city of Athens, the project name was ‘Athens Social Economy 
Initiative’; 5) an action research 30 hours workshop with 30 prospective social entrepreneurs 
and social franchisors; 6) an action research three days workshop with 7 CEOs of best 
practices social entrepreneurship centers and hubs in Europe, 2 experts policy advisors from 
the EC, 2 members of the Social Business Initiative of the EC, and 14 representatives from 
Greek formal institutions; 7) archive analysis of secondary data from sources including 
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Europa, governmental, organizational, and local authorities; 8) and an online pilot survey 
through a quantitative approach in franchise systems in the UK and Greece to provide a 
quantifiable tool for future research needs in evaluating and explaining the influence of the 
system of informal institutions of relational and structural embeddedness on franchise 
formation, partner selection, governance and performance. 
 
7.1.1. Research Findings  
 
A conceptual model named ‘SoFraM’ (Social franchise Model) has been induced from the 
data analysis which views social franchising formation, partner selection, governance and 
performance through the dynamics of the following systems: 
 
e) Institutional Political Context: 
a. centralized or formal institutions 
i. the supranational institutions, (data from the EU case) 
ii. the national institutions, (data from the UK and Greek case) 
f) Institutional Social Context: 
a. decentralized or informal institutions, social norms and the argument of 
embeddedness  
g) Organizational context: 
a. social innovation.  
h) Individual Context: 
a. the individual/psychological social entrepreneurship profile   
 
The properties and interactions of the system of decentralised or informal institutions of social 
norms have been further investigated through an explanatory quantitative study. The ‘FNM’ 
(Franchise Network Model) has been proposed, and subsequently empirically tested, which 
describes a number of factors hypothesized to be related to the formation, partner selection, 
governance, and performance of franchise networks. 
 
Our data indicate that social franchise and social enterprises formation growth and success is 
heavily dependent upon four systems and their subsystems. These being: firstly, formal 
institutions through their policies and incentives both national and supranational, like the case 
of the EU that has assumed an active role in the support of the growth of the sector not only in 
Europe but also in its affiliated developing countries.  Secondly, informal institutions of social 
norms and network embeddedness; social entrepreneurs are very much reliant on their 
relational and structural embeddedness in networks which provide them with opportunities 
and resources to emerge and scale. Thirdly, the system of the social innovation model adopted 
by the social enterprise; specifically the social impact that it wants to achieve, the way to 
achieve it, the way to raise resources, its sustainability and its scaling model. Finally, 
elements of the system of the individual/psychological social entrepreneurship profile, 
especially traits like empathy, social skills and ability to act collectively.  
 
Our quantitative research analysis doesn’t provide any justification for the refutation or 
confirmation of our first hypothesis that A Firm’s embeddedness in social networks is 
positively related to the formation of new alliances-franchises and the selection of appropriate 
partners -franchisors/ees. With reference to our second hypothesis that network 
embeddedness influences the governance structure of franchise systems and that there is a 
negative relationship among hierarchies and social norms. Our data indicate that social nroms 
in fact influence the governance of the franchise systems but positively instead of inversely. 
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Finally with reference to our third hypothesis that network embeddedness is positively related 
to the performance of franchise systems, our data has confirmed this hypothesis. We also 
checked the relationship among ties and performance and found a strong positive causal 
relationship   
 
7.1.2. Research Significance and Contribution 
 
The main contribution and significance of this study has been the investigation of the new 
interorganizational format of social franchising which has received almost non research 
attention up to date. Secondly, another significant contribution of this study has been the 
theoretical approach adopted which has been a holistic ontological and epistemological 
approach through systems theory and specifically social network theory creating a link among 
network theory and social entrepreneurship theory, the so called Social Franchise Model 
(SoFraM). Thirdly, this research pioneers by establishing the foundations for understanding 
the relationships among relational and structural embeddedness and the process of social 
entrepreneurship formation, growth and success; also by providing evidence for the role of 
formal institutions interventions to this process and by providing evidence for the role of 
specific elements form the individual psychological profile of social entrepreneurs that have 
not been identified up to now. Other significant contributions are: fourthly, it draws on 
primary data from the developed world which has been scant; fifthly, it draws on hard copy 
primary data of formal institutions policies, legislation, funding, capacity-building 
programmes along with evaluating their efficacy and perceived efficiency by key actors. This 
apart from having theoretical contributions can have direct practical implications for policy 
makers at the EC, national governments and local authorities;  
 
Sixthly, it combines mixed method approaches of action research projects, analytic induction 
of case studies and an online survey therefore providing more knowledge to the theoretical 
implications of such approaches when used complementary. Seventhly, it contributes 
theoretically and practically by providing in depth information of the social economy 
ecosystem in Greece presenting the dynamics, conflict, collaboration, emergent logics and 
corruption levels among the different key stakeholder groups from the political, social, public 
and private organizational context. Finally, this research contributes to theory and practice by 
providing evidence through the quantitative study in the UK and Greece of the existence of 
causal relationships and correlations among relational and structural embeddedness and the 
formation, governance and performance of mainstream franchises.  
 
 
7.2. Limitations of the Study 
 
Various research limitations have been acknowledged early on (see chapter 4.3.2) that could 
threaten the reliability and validity of the study and actions have been taken to eliminate those 
risks. The latter being: participant/researcher biases and errors; sampling errors and response 
issues; measurement errors and methodological issues; and resource constraints. The adoption 
of triangulation techniques of space (among the UK and Greece), time, investigator and 
method, and the use of mixed method approaches following appropriate research protocols in 
every case have helped address those issues.  
 
Possible limitations of our study are the issue of the generalisability of our results to the rest 
European member states and to the developing world. Though Greece represents the EU south 
and the UK the EU north, on the other hand the action research project with the best practice 
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social entrepreneurship centres from Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium counter-
balanced that providing a wide representation of the EU social economy eco-system. The 
strongest limitations of our quantitative study are the very low response rates which has been 
complemented by the vast data of the qualitative empirical study. Another limitation of both 
our qualitative and quantitative studies is the large number of variables that we are dealing 
with which is due to the inexistence of research on social franchising on one hand and on the 
other hand is due to our holistic systemic approach into studying the phenomena. The vast 
number of variables and systems has made our study more complex, lengthier in time and 
size, more time consuming, in need of many sampling units, but on the other hand has 
provided rich foundings and knowledge on the phenomena as well as a complete overview of 
the various interacting systems, actors and elements.  
 
7.3. Implications of the Study 
 
This thesis has direct implications to practice on all four systems, specifically: 
 
Formal National Institutions. The European Union and supranational institutions need to 
define the legal framework of social enterprises providing legitimate labelling and unified 
harmonization of the different national legal frameworks. They need to provide incentives and 
sponsorship to the creation, development and scaling of social enteprirses and of the social 
investment market. They need to provide metrics for the evaluation and measurement of 
social enterprises performance. They need to fund the exchange of know how, expertise, 
human resources, training and funds among European member states. They should enhance 
social innovation through sponsoring the development of scientific research and academic 
knowledge on social entrepreneurship. Govenrnments need to emloy specific policies to foster 
the creation and development of social enterprises. They need to define a legal framework that 
encompasses various social innovation ventures and to provide credibility and legitimacy to 
these enterprises. They need to adapt policies to allow social enterprises to deliver social 
welfare state services and to enhance the growth of the social investment market. They need 
to employ mechanisms and provide benefits like tax reliefs to counter balance the distortions 
and fallacies of the social economy sector. They need to provide grants and access to funding 
to social entrepreneurs. The local authorities need to collaborate with social enterprises 
allowing for the exploitation of real estate and service provision.  
 
Business Support centres and social enterprise networks on social entrepreneurship need to be 
enhanced at regional and European level; including access to these centres for vulnerable 
groups and training of their staff. These centres should operate as social investnment finance 
intermediaries bridging social enteprirses and BoP (bottom of the pyramid ventures) with 
social investors, like big companies and their CSR, enabling the creation of corporate social 
partnerships; to allow the seeding of capital from venture capitals, hedge funds, financial 
institutions, banks and citi capital through crowd funding platforms. These centres should 
provide networking opportunities for social entrepreneurs allowing the formation of social 
partnerships, they should provide co-working spaces and incubators, capacity building on 
various hard and soft skills, and finally, they should provide targeted specialised consulting 
services. Universities and research centres should engage on social entrepreneurship and 
social innovation acting as incubators and providing education and networking to prospective 
social entrepreneurs, they should enable the transformation of research into social 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
Executives of big organizations, multinationals and for profits acting as social intrapreneurs 
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need to support communities and social entrepreneurs by partnering with them and providing 
financial capital, infrastructure and mentoring. Financial institutions and investors need to 
exploit opportunites and assume the risk of investing into social enterpreneurial ventures 
targeting primarily social objectives and secondarily financial profit; to leverage 
maximasitation of profits with social impact creation. Publicly recognised people, famous 
people, artists, journalists, policy makers, public officials, academics and various 
professionals should act as opinion leaders into raising awareness of social entrepreneurship 
and the civil society ventures.  
 
Consumers and the wider public need to integrate social criteria when entering into market 
transactions; the act of buying shoul incorporate elements of ethical consumption by taking 
into consideration the social impact created by the vendor companies. Communities and 
citizens should assume an active role in the provision of the social welfare state, in the 
transformation of institutions, in the management of local and national resources, in the 
execution of public policy. Citizens could take stakes in social enterprises and participate in 
their decision making thus shifting power from the centre to their communities; they could 
support the establishment and growth of social ventures of their co-citizens by providing their 
own resources these being time, expertise, human capital, volunteering, financial capital, 
physical capital, entrepreneurship.   
 
7.4. Suggested Avenues for Future Research 
 
The posing of questions that resulted in a scientific inquiry in the first place has as an output 
the raise of more questions. The output of a significant theory building are conceptual models 
that can be used and applied in other settings and through further investigation of the 
relationships identified (Dubin, 1978; Elsbach et al, 1999; Whetten, 2001). We suggest future 
research to direct to the following avenues:  
 
In terms of future research we recommend for a systemic approach of the scaling strategies of 
social enterprises as well as a systemic approach on the drivers that can trigger the social 
investment market.  
 
Moreover, replication strategy; we believe that valuable insights can be gained by 
investigating the spheres of ‘SoFraM’ in other national environments and cultures. We also 
find it important to apply ‘SoFraM’ in other inter-firm alliance and network types both 
mainstream and social.  
 
The properties of ‘SoFraM’ can benefit from an analytic approach in creating a framework for 
each sphere, like what was attempted with ‘FNM’ on the social sphere. The objective could 
be to causally link the specific variables that we identified from each sphere with strategic 
issues facing social enterprises and franchises. Hypothesised relationships can be formulated 
and then tested and measured through larger scale research studies both nationally and cross-
nationally, both in the developed and developing world. 
 
‘FNM’ is an analytical framework that needs to be applied in the settings of social 
cooperatives, social enterprise networks and social franchises to evaluate its significance and 
to assess the impact of its variables in these formats.  
 
We feel that ‘SoFraM’ and ‘FNM’ theories provide a theoretical framework that can be useful 
to future research that wants to address these issues.  
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7.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This section identified the main conclusions of the study and highlighted the findings of the 
qualitative and quantitative empirical research. The limitations of the research were identified 
and addressed. An important element for the writer of this research is the implications of this 
study for practitioners; these have been have been developed both through the empirical study 
and in this section. We finally concluded by suggesting avenues for further research 
investigation.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A The Online Questionnaire 
 
Below is the online questionnaire as constructed on survey monkey platform that has been cop pasted as picture hereunder [Available at: 
https://www.surveymonkey.net/MySurvey_EditorPage.aspx?sm=8F0uZw39rTV82OLjpqVyWkh8rT7YB%2bWJ0508x9DmhmE%3d]  
 
. SoFraM- Social Franchise Model Inter-country Survey 
  
 
This is an inter-European academic research conducted by Brunel University of London with the support of the British Franchise 
Association, the European Franchise Federation, the Greek Ministry of Labour and the Greek Franchise Association. This 
research provides valuable insight on the role of relational network embeddedness in the formation, partner selection, 
governance and performance of franchises. It also investigates the emerging relationship between social entrepreneurship and 
franchising.  
 
You have been chosen because of the position you hold in the company and your franchise is one of a few systems that have 
been carefully selected to participate in this survey. Your contribution is vital to the design of policies at a regional and 
European institutional level for the further growth and support of Franchising and it should only take you about 30'. Your 
participation is expected to be a constructive process that could provide you with learning benefits.  
 
All information provided will be treated with absolute confidentiality and anonymity and is protected by Brunel University's 
Ethical Research Code (see link: http://www2.brunel.ac.uk/427/policy/CoEv7wpdraftnotrk.pdf) 
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In return for your cooperation, the findings of the inter-country survey will be provided. Also, we could offer you a free private 
consultation on the implications of the findings to your business. 
 
Thank you for your time and contribution. 
 
For any query you may have please do not hesitate to contact Brunel's Academic Research Team:  
Brunel University, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, Tel: +44 (0)1895 274000, Fax: +44 (0)1895 232806, Email: 
fiori.zafeiropoulou@brunel.ac.uk 
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Network Embeddedness Survey - SoFraM 
2. Motives for the Formation of Franchise Networks 
  
 
Please answer by selecting the appropriate box. In some cases space is provided to write your personal comments. 
The questionnaire is 6 pages long and will take you no more than 40' to complete it. Once you answer all questions 
in a page please move to the next one by pressing the button at the bottom of the page. We hope that this will prove 
to be a constructive and learning process to you. Your absolute sincerity is needed for the credibility of the research 
results. 
1. In recruiting Franchisees you 
usually find partners using one of 
the following methods: 
In 
recruiting 
Franchisee
s you 
usually find 
partners 
using one 
of the 
following 
methods: 
Existence 
of a direct/ 
indirect 
prior tie 
with the 
prospectiv
e 
franchisee
s 
Through 
franchise 
fairs, 
magazine
s, 
franchisin
g 
agencies 
Franchisee
s 
unsolicited 
enquiries 
2. Have you provided a second franchise to existing Franchisees? 
Have you provided a 
second franchise to existing 
Franchisees?  Never 
Rarely Often 
Explain the reason?
  
x 
 
 Referred 
by others 
 
3. Which were your motives for creating a franchise network 
(evaluate the importance of each motive to your decision)? 
 
Completely 
unimportant 
Unimportant Indifferent Important 
Very 
important 
Share business risk 
     
Business growth (increase of sales, 
profits) 
     
Exploit economies of scale(reduce 
per unit costs) 
     
Increase innovation (access to new 
ideas, develop new technologies) 
     
Access to information capabilities 
(local markets, new skills) 
     
Increase customer loyalty 
     
Develop and improve marketing and 
distribution skills 
     
Enter in new markets (geographical, 
new customer segments) 
     
4. Which were your three most important 
motives that led you in creating this 
franchise network? (choose from the scroll 
down menu) 
 
Motives Franchise Formation 
First 
most 
importa
nt 
motive 
 
Which were your three most important 
motives that led you in creating this 
franchise network? (choose from the scroll 
down menu)   First most important motive   
Motives Franchise Formation 
Second 
most 
importa
nt 
motive 
 
Second most important motive   Motives 
Franchise Formation 
Third 
most 
importa
nt 
 
Third most important motive   Motives 
Franchise Formation 
xi 
 
Increase brand awareness 
     
Gain competitive advantage (create 
uniqueness over competitors in the 
customer minds) 
     
Existence of trustworthy parnters 
     
Other motive that triggered the formation of the franchise network 
(explain)
 
motive 
 
5. Do you own more than one franchise system 
Do you own more 
than one franchise 
system  Yes, the 
brand names are: 
(please mention them 
at the space provided) 
No, but we would like to create one in the 
future(please explain at the space provided 
"why?" and whether it would be a related or 
unrelated diversification) 
No, we do not 
intend to create 
another franchise 
system 
Explain  
 
6. The influence of the strength of ties 
 
Stron
g 
Somewh
at strong 
Somewh
at weak 
Wea
k 
Prefer 
to avoid 
this 
person 
or 
Strange
rs 
How strong 
of a 
connection 
do you 
have with 
your 
     
xii 
 
Franchisee
s? 
How 
connected 
are your 
Franchisee
s between 
each 
other? 
     
 
 
 29%  
  
Powered by SurveyMonkey  
Check out our sample surveys and create your own now! 
 
3. Governance of Franchise Networks 
  
 
7. To what extent do the following factors describe the structure of the franchise system (we are mostly 
interested in whether these are being implemented rather than if they are written on a contract) 
Previous Next
xiii 
 
 
Doesn't 
apply at 
all 
Doesn't 
apply 
Indifferent 
Slightly 
applies 
Applies 
completely 
We have specified a priori all members roles and responsibilities 
     
There is a clear authority system, we do the decision making and specification of 
actions 
     
There are standard operating procedures (clear process specifying Franchisees 
decisions for the everyday management of their companies and the entire network) 
     
We are doing the planning of the network 
     
We have designed a priori formalised contingency plans 
     
We have designed a priori the process of change and adjustments 
     
There are formalised monitoring procedures (clear process measuring performance, 
procedures of output and external controls of behaviour) 
     
We have incentives and rewards tied to output performance and to observed 
behaviour of Franchisees 
     
We have standard and clear dispute resolution procedures (quasi-judicial process to 
resolve disputes) 
     
Enforcement mechanisms are by legitimate authority (like contract termination and 
direct control) 
     
Our relationship with the Franchisees has a fixed length defined a priori 
     
xiv 
 
 
Doesn't 
apply at 
all 
Doesn't 
apply 
Indifferent 
Slightly 
applies 
Applies 
completely 
We have unilateral authority on renegotiating or terminating the relationship written on 
contract 
     
The prices of our services offered to Franchisees are fixed in advance 
     
Franchisees keep detail records of everyday transactions they have 
     
We use formal means of communication than dealing with the Franchisees informally 
     
The structure of our partnerships is hierarchical 
     
The structure of our partnerships is informal 
     
8. What is the ownership type of your franchised units? 
What is the ownership type of your franchised units?  100% under the ownership of 
the Franchisees 
We have a minority equity stake on the franchised units 
We have a joint venture with the franchisees (a seperate third company in which we 
both have equity stakes) 
We have 100% ownership of the business and provide a management contract to our 
Franchisees 
We own the property where the Franchisee establishes the franchised unit 
Other (please specify)
9. Have you expanded the franchise 
network to a foreign market? 
Have you 
expanded the 
franchise 
network to a 
foreign 
market?  No, 
we have not 
expanded 
internationally 
No, we 
have not yet 
expanded 
internationally 
but we intend 
to 
Yes, the 
network has 
already 
expanded 
internationally 
xv 
 
 
Doesn't 
apply at 
all 
Doesn't 
apply 
Indifferent 
Slightly 
applies 
Applies 
completely 
  and do not 
intend to 
 
 
 43%  
  
Powered by SurveyMonkey  
Check out our sample surveys and create your own now! 
4. 
  
 
10. What is the mode of entry into foreign markets? 
What is the mode of entry into foreign markets?  Master Franchise to a local 
entrepreneur 
Direct franchise (recruit and manage franchisees from the home country) 
Subsidiary established at the foreign market to recruit and manage Franchisees 
Joint venture (create a third company with a local partner to establish and manage 
the chain) 
Area Development Agreement (provide licence to a local partner to open company-
owned units in specific geographical areas) 
11. How do you recruit local partners (franchisees) 
in the foreing markets? (please respond what 
actually stands for the franchisor) 
How do you 
recruit local partners 
(franchisees) in the 
foreing markets? 
(please respond what 
actually stands for the 
franchisor)  Referred 
Existence of a 
prior direct/indirect 
tie with the 
prospective partner 
Unsolicited 
enquiries of 
prospective 
franchisees from 
foreign countries 
Through 
international fairs, 
foreign magazines, 
recruiting and 
consulting agencies 
Previous Next
xvi 
 
Other (specify)
  
by members of our 
wider networks: 
professional, social, 
familial 
Other (specify)
  
 
 57%  
  
Powered by SurveyMonkey  
5. Performance of the Franchised Network 
  
 
12. How satisfied are you from achieving the following goals 
because of the existence of the franchised network? 
 
Strongly 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Strongly 
satisfied 
We achieved the sharing of business 
risk 
     
We achieved business growth 
(increase of sales, profits) 
     
13. How strongly do you agree with the 
following statements? 
 
Stronlg
y 
disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Indiffere
nt 
Agre
e 
Strongl
y 
agree 
Overall the 
relationshi
     
Previous Next
xvii 
 
We exploited economies of 
scale(reduce per unit costs) 
     
We achieved the increase of 
innovation (new ideas, new 
technologies) 
     
We achieved access to information 
capabilities (local markets, new skills) 
     
We achieved increase of customer 
loyalty 
     
We achieved the development and 
improvement of marketing and 
distribution skills 
     
We achieved entry in new markets 
(geographical, new customer 
segments) 
     
We achieved increase of brand 
awareness 
     
We achieved the acquisition of 
competitive advantages (create 
uniqueness over competitors in the 
customer minds) 
     
p with our 
Franchise
es has 
been 
beneficial 
and is 
sufficiently 
profitable 
to carry on 
We have 
met the 
objectives 
that made 
us create 
the 
network 
     
Our 
industry 
sector is 
doing well 
     
 
xviii 
 
We achieved more trustworthy and 
higher quality relationships with our 
Franchisees 
     
Other goal that you achieved or commentary on the network's 
performance
 
Answer Q14-Q19 by completing the actual and expected value of the figures for the past and following three years. If 
you do not wish to provide us with the actual numbers then you can give us a rate from the previous year. 
14. Turnover 
Turnover 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
15. Profits 
Profits 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
16. Profit 
margins 
Profit 
margins 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
17. Market 
share 
Market 
share 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
18. Number of 
company 
owned units 
Number 
of 
company 
owned 
units 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
19. Number of 
franchised 
units 
Number 
of 
franchised 
units 
 2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011e 
 
xix 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
2012e 
 
2013e 
 
 
 
 71%  
  
Powered by SurveyMonkey  
6. Relational Network Embeddedness Variables 
  
 
20. How true do you believe that the following statements are about your relationship with your partners? 
(please answer as thruthful and accurate as possible since this questionnaire is anonymous and keeping in 
mind that we are not testing each company individually but the whole of the sample at a European level) 
 
Completely 
untrue 
Untrue Indifferent True 
Completely 
true 
Our Franchisees are fair in recording their transactions 
     
There are a few problems with the quality of products/services offered by our 
Franchisees 
     
We experience relatively few problems with the reliability of our Franchisees 
     
Our Franchisees operate a reliable quality system 
     
Our Franchisees have a good reputation in the business 
     
Legal disputes with our Franchisees are unlikely 
     
Previous Next
xx 
 
 
Completely 
untrue 
Untrue Indifferent True 
Completely 
true 
Our Franchisees understand the needs of the business and the way we work 
     
We appreciate the way our Franchisees behave to us as Franchisor 
     
Our working relationship with our Franchisees' staff is good 
     
Our Franchisees make constant efforts to maintain good relationship with us 
     
Our Franchisees are honest and truthful with us 
     
We have great confidence in our Franchisees 
     
I feel that I can trust our Franchisees 
     
I believe that our Franchisees can be counted on to do what is right 
     
Mutual trust has helped in developing our relationship with our Franchisees 
     
In our relationship our Franchisees have high integrity 
     
Our Franchisees keep the promises that they make to our operation 
     
We believe the information our Franchisees provide to us 
     
Our Franchisees are genuinely concerned with the success of our business 
     
We had some direct/indirect connections with the majority of our Franchisees before 
negotiating on joining the network 
     
21. Please reply 22. Please reply 
xxi 
 
 
Completely 
untrue 
Untrue Indifferent True 
Completely 
true 
 
Very 
unimportant 
Unimportant 
Don't 
know 
Important 
Very 
important 
How important is your relationship with 
the specific Franchisees of your network 
to the overall success of your business? 
     
If these specific Franchisees were no 
longer available what effect would that 
have on your business? 
     
Why? Is it related to the ownership type of the franchised units or to the nature of 
the relationships?
 
 
Very 
easy 
Easy 
Don't 
know 
Difficult 
Very 
difficult 
How difficult 
could it be 
to develop a 
relationship 
with other 
partners 
similar to 
the 
relationship 
you now 
have? 
     
How difficult 
would it be 
to replace 
the 
Franchisees 
with other 
partners? 
     
 
xxii 
 
23. How strongly do you believe that the following 
statements are true about your partnerships with the 
Franchisees?  
(please answer as thruthful and accurate as possible 
since this questionnaire is anonymous and keeping in 
mind that we are not testing each company 
individually but the whole of the sample at a 
European level) 
 
Completely 
untrue 
Untrue Indifferent True 
Completely 
true 
We have promised 
resources to the chain 
(land, finance, raw 
materials) 
     
All members of the 
system make equal 
contributions to the 
business 
     
We expect our 
Franchisees to make 
equal contributions as 
we have 
     
24. How strongly do you believe that the following 
statements are true about your partnerships with 
the Franchisees? (please answer as thruthful and 
accurate as possible since this questionnaire is 
anonymous and keeping in mind that we are not 
testing each company individually but the whole of 
the sample at a European level) 
 
Completely 
untrue 
Untrue Indifferent True 
Completely 
true 
If the chain 
performs well this 
means that we will 
also perform well 
     
The chain has good 
potential for future 
success, so we 
expect stable future 
benefits 
     
We would not 
expect the 
Franchisees to 
support us beyond 
     
xxiii 
 
We intend to allocate 
more resources to the 
chain 
     
We are bound to the 
chain for future 
operations 
     
We believe that the 
reliability of our 
Franchisees has led 
to a rewarding 
business relationship 
     
Our relationship with 
our Franchisees is 
something we are 
very committed to 
     
Our relationship with 
our Franchisees 
deserves our 
maximum efforts to 
maintain 
     
There is an 
     
their formal 
contractual 
obligation 
We won't grant the 
Franchisees 
leeway if they have 
temporary 
problems in 
delivering as 
agreed 
     
We share with our 
Franchisees the 
results of any 
research and 
analysis we 
conduct 
     
Our Franchisees 
participate in the 
changes of policies 
and strategies of 
the system 
     
xxiv 
 
agreement over key 
decisions, goals, 
roles, future plans, 
strategic direction, 
daily operations and 
contractual terms 
We are obligated to 
be patient with our 
Franchisees over 
mistakes, to listen to 
their problems, to try 
to overcome their 
problems 
     
We provide valuable 
market information to 
our Franchisees 
     
Our relationship with 
our Franchisees was 
developed over a long 
period of time 
     
We carry on 
     
Flexibility in 
response to 
requests for 
changes is a 
characteristic of our 
relationship 
     
We all expect to 
make adjustments 
in the ongoing 
relationship to cope 
with change 
     
When some 
unexpected 
situation arises, the 
parties would rather 
work out a new 
deal than hold each 
other to the original 
terms 
     
Staying together in 
situations of 
adversity/challenge 
     
xxv 
 
developing our 
relationship with our 
Franchisees so as to 
provide future 
advantages for our 
company 
We intend to 
exchange more 
important information 
with our Franchisees 
in the future 
     
We intend to allow our 
Franchisees more 
decision making in the 
future 
     
Our Franchisees and 
us share similar 
business values 
     
Our Franchisees and 
us share similar social 
values 
     
is very important to 
all members 
Our relationship 
with our 
Franchisees 
extends across 
many complex 
responsibilities and 
multiple tasks 
     
When 
disagreements 
arise all facts are 
reassessed to try to 
reach a mutually 
satisfactory 
compromise 
     
There is distrust in 
our relationship 
     
There are 
personality conflicts 
     
There are cultural 
     
xxvi 
 
The reason I prefer 
this system to others 
is because of what it 
stands for, its values 
     
I am proud to tell 
others that I am part 
of this system 
     
 
misunderstandings 
There are 
conflicting goals 
     
Our Franchisees 
and we think it is 
important to 
continue our 
relationship 
     
Our Franchisees 
and we are 
generally able to 
resolve 
disagreements to 
all parties' 
satisfaction 
     
Our Franchisees 
and we are 
conscious about 
maintainig a 
cooperative 
relationship 
     
xxvii 
 
There is a high 
level of trust 
between our 
Franchisees and us 
     
We expect that our 
Franchisees will 
help us if we are in 
crisis (like through 
managerial and 
financial support) 
     
 
25. How often do you believe that the following occur 
in your relationship with the Franchisees? 
 
Never 
Once 
every 
two 
years 
Once 
a 
year 
Once 
every 
six 
months 
Once 
a 
month 
Once 
a 
week 
Training of all members is an 
ongoing process in the system 
      
Market research and 
competitive gains are regularly 
measured 
      
26. How often do you believe that the following 
occur in your relationship with the Franchisees? 
 
Never 
Once 
every 
two 
years 
Once 
a 
year 
Once 
every 
six 
months 
Once 
a 
month 
Once 
a 
week 
Franchisor and 
Franchisees jointly plan 
and implement specific 
programmes and activities 
      
Franchisees among 
themselves jointly plan and 
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Market research and its 
results (competitve gains, 
customer satisfaction, etc) are 
regularly reported to all 
members of the system 
      
Businessmen request to join 
the system after having been 
referred to by existing 
Franchisees 
      
Prospective employees apply 
to work after being 
encouraged by our 
Franchisees 
      
Our Franchisees would 
encourage any candidate 
Franchisee to join the system 
      
Our Franchisees recommend 
the system for a partnership to 
their friends and relatives 
      
How often have organizations 
or businessmen been referred 
      
implement specific 
programmes and activities 
We send newsletters, 
annual reports or other 
information to our 
Franchisees 
      
Our Franchisees exchange 
among them newsletters, 
annual reports or other 
information 
      
Managers of the Franchisor 
meet personally 
Franchisees to discuss 
about business 
      
Franchisees meet 
personally with each other 
to discuss about business 
      
Meetings of an advisory 
council or board with 
members from the 
Franchisees take place 
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to join the network by your 
Franchisees? 
 
 
 86%  
  
 
7. Demographics 
  
 
27. Please state the year and region 
that your company was established. 
 
Please state the year and region that 
your company was established. 
28. If you are a Master Franchisee 
please state the year and region 
that the Franchisor's company 
was established. 
 
If you are a Master Franchisee 
please state the year and region 
that the Franchisor's company was 
established. 
29. Please state the year and 
region that you established your 
first franchising. 
 
Please state the year and region 
that you established your first 
franchising. 
30. What is the sector that 
you operate in? (please 
name the sector) 
31. Has the Franchisor changed 
ownership? 
Has the Franchisor Yes, the company has 
32. What is your gender? 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
Female 
 
Previous Next
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What is the sector that you 
operate in? (please name the 
sector) 
changed ownership?  No, 
the company remains 
under the same ownership 
changed ownership 
 
33. What is your age group? 
What is your age group?  Under 25 
26-45 
46-65 
Above 65 
 
34. What is your Educational Background? (choose all 
that apply) 
What is your Educational Background? (choose 
all that apply)  High School Diploma 
Bachelor Degree 
Master's Degree 
PhD 
Other Professional Qualification (specify)
  
35. What is your position in the firm? 
What is your position 
in the firm?  Owner 
Senior Manager Manager 
Other (specify)  
 
36. What was your prior occupation to that position? 
What was your prior occupation to that position?  Self-
employed 
Employee in the private sector 
Employee in the public sector 
Student 
Unemployed 
Other (specify)  
 
37. Can you think of a recent event that made you realise that there is trust in your relationship with your 
Franchisees? Please explain the situation 
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Can you think of a recent event that made you realise that there is trust in your relationship with your Franchisees? 
Please explain the situation 
38. Can you think of a recent event that there was evidently a case of low trust between you and your 
Franchisees? Please explain the situation. To what do you think is low trust of Franchisees related? (e.g. 
untrained Franchisees, geographical distance) 
 
Can you think of a recent event that there was evidently a case of low trust between you and your Franchisees? 
Please explain the situation. To what do you think is low trust of Franchisees related? (e.g. untrained Franchisees, 
geographical distance) 
39. Do you believe that the governance of your network is influenced by the strength and the quality of your 
relationships with your Franchisees? If so, why do you still keep hierarchies and contractual terms that are 
responsible for numerous distortions? Is it a matter of national culture and lack of education on new 
management styles that structures franchised networks around hierarchies? 
 
Do you believe that the governance of your network is influenced by the strength and the quality of your relationships 
xxxii 
 
with your Franchisees? If so, why do you still keep hierarchies and contractual terms that are responsible for 
numerous distortions? Is it a matter of national culture and lack of education on new management styles that 
structures franchised networks around hierarchies? 
40. Have you considered the adoption of social missions apart from your commercial ones in your 
franchised business concept? Missions that Franchisees would have to pursue and achieve. 
 
Have you considered the adoption of social missions apart from your commercial ones in your franchised business 
concept? Missions that Franchisees would have to pursue and achieve. 
41. Do you feel that the recent financial crises has changed business patterns in your field? Do you intend to 
change the partnership model in any way in the future? 
 
Do you feel that the recent financial crises has changed business patterns in your field? Do you intend to change the 
partnership model in any way in the future? 
42. Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
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Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
Thank you for your time and contribution! 
 
43. Do you want to receive the results of this 
academic research? 
Do you want to receive the results of 
this academic research?  No 
Yes 
 
44. Do you want to receive an individual 
consultation about the implications of the findings 
to your activities? 
Do you want to receive an individual 
consultation about the implications of the 
Yes 
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findings to your activities?  No 
 
 
 100%  
  
Previous Done
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Appendix B Cover Letter to Case Studies Participants 
 
This research is Sponsored By Brunel University any information provided is 
protected by the University's Rule and Regulations on Condusting  Ethical 
Research, like Protecting Respondents Anonymity and Non-Disclosure 
Policies of Participants Responses. 
Brunel University, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH 
Tel: +44 (0)1895 274000, Fax: +44 (0)1895 232806 
Dear Cynthia, 
 
Brunel is managing a Research Project on Social Franchising with the aim of building the case for the Government to create a "Professional Body of Social 
Franchising". Your enterprise is one of a very few systems that have been carefully selected to participate in this study. This research work is expected to 
provide valuable insights to the formation of Social Franchises, their selection of partners, their governance structure and to whether trust, commitment and 
the social norms of governance influence their performance. Your participation in this study will have significant implications for helping other Social 
Enterprises resolve issues of growth, for helping the Government in establishing specialized bodies to support Social Franchises, and for helping the entire 
Franchise industry in integrating social objectives in their practices. 
Following my recent communication with members of your company I’m sending you the questionnaire of the study, it is in excel format, please 
download it in your PC, fill in your responses (the format is an easy mark an "X type which will take no more than twenty min), save the document and then 
email it back to me at fiori.zafeiropoulou@brunel.ac.uk. I would be grateful if you could send me your replies back by the 26th of November.  
All information will be treated with absolute confidentiality in line with Brunel University’s Ethical Research Code. The findings of this study will be 
presented at the International Society of Franchising Conference in June in Boston University and submitted for publication at the International Journal 
of Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation and at the Journal of Small Business and Management. This will give Fare Share an international exposure. 
You can also benefit by receiving the results of the study and also we can offer you an individual feedback session on the implications of the findings for your 
business activities to help you guide your strategic decisions.  
Thank you in advance for your participation. If you have any further queries don’t hesitate to email me or call me on 07401648111 or 01895267460.  
Best Regards, 
Fiori  
Fiori A. Zafeiropoulou BSc MBA c.PHD 
Brunel Research Centre for Enterprise, International Business, and Innovation in Emerging Markets CEIBIEM 
Paper Reviewer of International Society of Franchising, Huizenga School, Nova Southeastern University, Florida 
  
Brunel Business School, Room 355 Michael Sterling Building 
Tel +44 1895 267460, Mob +44 7401648111 
Email: fiori.zafeiropoulou@brunel.ac.uk 
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/bbs 
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Appendix C The role of Franchising and SMEs to the Global Economy  
 
“The rate at which inter-firm alliances have been formed the last two decades has been unprecedented and an important 
characteristic of this growth is the increasing diversity of inter-firm alliances” (Gulati and Singh, 1998:782). 
 
According to a research conducted by Day (1994) it was estimated that inter-firm alliances would increase by 25% annually. That is 
due to the big range of benefits that they can provide to organizations (Whipple and Gentry, 2000), these benefits extent beyond 
pure financial motives, like creating new market opportunities, expanding economies of scale and sustaining long-term competitive 
advantage (Day, 1994). These expectations have been verified by recent research (Sakaraya et al, 2012; Sorensen et al, 2013) 
 
Business format franchising, being a type of inter-firm alliances, plays a significant role in the global economy and there is extensive 
literature and research on this format (McIntyre, Young and Gilbert 1994, 1997; Spriggs and Nevin, 1994; Stanworth and Kaufmann 
1996). Franchising as a concept is growing both in economic importance and also as a topic of academic interest (Hoy and 
Stanworth, 2003). The last decades the phenomenon of franchising has seen an important evolution both as a domestic growth 
strategy and as a mean for international growth (Eroglu, 1992; Hoy and Stanworth, 2003; Mendelsohn, 1993; Walker and Cross, 
1989).  
 
The importance of franchising can be stretched through the following data. In the UK in 2012 there were 929 chains with 4% 
increase from previous year with 38,400 franchised businesses, employing 600,000 people and generating £13.4bil (BFA, 2012). 
The industry kept growing through recession but with lower growth rates; 27% of all franchisees are multiple franchise owners. In 
Greece in 2012 70,000 firms failed overall in the economy representing 36% of all firms, but only 2% of all franchised companies 
failed which represents a 0.2% of all firms; there is a drop in revenue of 20% in franchised networks. The franchised units were 
20,000 employing less than 100,000 people which represents 15% of all employment in Greece indicating that franchising has 
resisted stronger to recession than mainstream businesses. Perceptions indicate that 56% expect that the franchise market will pick 
up in 3 years while 37% expect this to happen in 10 years (Franchise Observatory, 2013). 
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In 2009 in Europe-17 there were over 10,000 systems with a growth rate of 8% accounting for 500,000 franchised businesses (EFF, 
2011). The European Franchise Federation’ survey (1997, 1998, 2004) on 12 European countries (Austria, Benelux, UK, France, 
Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden) revealed that in 1997 there were 3,149 franchise systems, in 
2002 4,920, in 2004 5,552 creating employment for 1.3 million people in 1997 and generating an aggregate turnover of 75 billion 
euros which rose to 135.13 billion euros for the year 2002. The number of franchised units in 1997 was 144,561 while in 2004 this 
increased to 250,643. In the US in 2003 there were 767,483 franchises generating turnover of $1.53 trillion and creating 10 million 
direct jobs. In 2011according to a survey conducted by International Franchise Association (IFA, 2011) the franchise industry was 
doing better than in 2010 for both franchisors and franchisees and expectations for growth were bigger than the previous year.  
 
This research project falls also under the area of small business research as the majority of social enterprises, franchises-both 
franchisors and franchisees-and social franchises are SMEs (Stanworth 1995b). The EU classifies businesses as: micro firms 
businesses with less than 10 people and up to €2m turnover, small firm 10-49 employees and up to €10m, medium-sized firms 50-
249 employees and up to €50m and large firms with 250 or more employees and more than €50m turnover; the first 3 categories 
are combined into a single category: SMEs. (Curran and Blackburn, 2001; Europa, 2013a) 
 
SMEs represent over 95% of enterprises in most OECD countries, and generate over half of private sector employment. The 
significance and contribution of SMEs is stretched both in the ‘Lisbon’ strategy for economic growth in the EU and in the ‘Europe 
2020’ strategy (Europa, 2013a). Today, most governments and the EU apply an array of policies and programmes to promote 
entrepreneurship (especially of youth and female entrepreneurship) and boost development of SMEs. These programmes generally 
aim to alleviate the difficulties that SMEs experience in areas such as financing, technology and innovation, e-commerce, 
management and internationalisation, and seek to identify and implement best practice policies. According to the EU annual report 
on SMEs in 2012 (Europa, 2012a) SMEs have kept their position as the backbone of the EU countries, they represent in EU-27 
98% of all businesses (for both Greece and the UK 99.9%) of which 92.2% are micro there number is 20.7m firms accounting for 
67% of all employment (85.2% in Greece; 59% in the UK of private sector employment) and 58% of turnover (GVA) (75.2% in 
Greece; 48.8% in the UK of all private sector turnover) they generate €3.6tril; while 43.6 thousand large firms generate €2.5tril. In 
the UK in 2011 SMEs employment dropped by 0.8 while GVA rose by 1.2 while in Greece SMEs employment dropped by 2.4 and 
GVA by 3.1. In 2013 the UK is expected to have both figures positive and Greece both figures negative.  
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Unemployment rate in August 2013 in the EU-28 was 11% and in the Eurozone 12.1%; in Greece it was the highest in all EU being 
27.9% while this was 7.7% in the UK; youth unemployment (under the age of 25) rate in the Euroarea was 23.7%, in Greece it was 
the highest in all EU being 61.5% and 21% in the UK (Eurostat, 2013a). 
 
 “The small enterprise has experienced a remarkable revival as a focus of business, political and research interest in recent 
decades…it is now seen more positively as the generator of the enterprise economy and integral to economic regeneration” (Curran 
and Blackburn, 2001: preface).  
 
“In an era increasingly dominated by ‘big’ business the petite bourgeoisie has become a marginal social and economic 
category threatened by powerful political and economic forces” (Stanworth et al, 1986: 164).  
 
There is a considerable re emergence of the small enterprise the last decades, after the transformation to concentrated structure 
dominated by large and often monopolistic corporations. So there is a revival of small enterprises across the industrialized world 
and at the same time there is evidence that shows that large firms move to decentralization. This does not prove that there is a shift 
of control from the centre to the periphery. Organizational types such as franchise indicate that the small firms (the franchisees) are 
bound together under the control of the franchisor. So a central control and command still exists. Franchisees are legally 
independent from both their franchisor and others within the chain, yet they trade in more or less the same way, under the same 
brand name as those from whom they are autonomous (Felstead, 1993). 
 
Stanworth et al (1986) also argue that there is an emergence of small firms and entrepreneurship, which try to gain a share of 
power from the big organizations. Curran and Blackburn (2001) argue that SMEs are likely to be the key to the UK’s economic 
future because they are very important in many knowledge-based sectors, like high-technology activities. The main contribution of 
SMEs according to Griffin and Ebert (2005) is job creation, innovation, and importance to big businesses as they provide them with 
components and services. Other research has highlighted the increasing importance of SMEs in business services such as 
consultancy and research. 
 
“...The importance of SMEs in terms of employment and business turnover makes the case of small business research important in 
understanding the functioning of the UK economy” (Keeble et al, 1992). to 
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